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Abstract 
State funding is currently provided to parties in most first and second wave 
democracies. For European political parties, state funding has come to constitute 
a majority of their income. Existing studies have found that state funding is linked 
with staffing, shifting structures of intra-party power (centralisation), and 
continued pursuit of constitutive function, i.e. electoral participation (survival). 
However, the results are far from unequivocal. In consequence, we have only a 
limited understanding of the ways in which state funds shape contemporary 
parties, and in particular, the extent to which state funding fosters or hinders the 
performance of political parties’ crucial linkage function between citizens and the 
state. 
This thesis addresses this limitation, by analysing the impact of state 
funding in parties where this impact is most likely to manifest itself, namely in 
newly established (post-1980) and electorally minor parties (with less than 10 
percent of the vote). The central research question is: How does state funding 
influence processes of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function 
(electoral participation) in newly established, electorally minor parties? State 
funding is defined as state benefits, comprising direct (e.g. annual grants), and 
indirect (e.g. party tax) state funds, and state constraints, comprising criteria 
related to access to and maintenance of state benefits. Staffing is defined as 
shifts to a party’s number of staff, while centralisation refers to the process in 
which elites increase their share of seats in the (national) executive council at the 
expense of members. Pursuit of constitutive function (electoral participation) is 
defined as surpassing Pedersen’s (1982) threshold of authorisation, i.e. 
exceeding ballot access requirements and presenting an electoral list.  
The thesis develops three hypotheses to guide the empirical analysis. 
Firstly, I argue that an increase in state funding sparks hiring processes (H1). 
Secondly, I argue that state funds and staff strengthen party elites, in turn 
enabling them to initiate and execute centralising reforms (H2). Finally, H3 
contends that state funding and staff contribute to new minor parties’ pursuit of 
constitutive function by facilitating their compliance with ballot access 
requirements and their presentation of an electoral list. 
A comparative case design is adopted to empirically explore H1, H2, and 
H3. The comparison takes place both across the 14 selected new minor parties 
in Norway and Italy, and within these parties, as the exploration of staffing, 
centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function take place by means of 
analyses of individual party life cycles. A range of primary documents, 61 
interviews, and secondary sources are used to analyse the research question. 
The main conclusion from the in-depth, exploratory analysis is that state funds do 
indeed shape new minor parties’ staffing patterns, supporting H1. In a similar 
vein, state funds and staff strengthen elites, in turn enabling them to initiate 
centralising reforms, and – in some instances – state funds and staff contribute 
to execute centralising reforms, thus supporting H2. Finally, state funds and staff 
broadly contribute to new minor parties’ ability to exceed ballot access 
requirements and present an electoral list in both Norwegian and Italian new 
minor parties, in line with H3.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Puzzle and research question 
Most first and second wave democracies currently provide state funding in some 
form to their political parties and/or electoral candidates (Biezen & Kopecký, 
2007, 2014; Nassmacher, 2009). For political parties across Europe, state 
funding has come to constitute a majority of their income (Poguntke et al., 2016). 
Parallel to the introduction or increase of state funding to parties, laws to regulate 
parties’ access to state funds, the size and distribution of state funding, and 
monitoring and oversight of their receipt and use, have been introduced (see e.g. 
Biezen, 2008). No other regulatory instrument is so widely diffused across 
countries in the world as state funding with attached regulation (Casas-Zamora, 
2006, p. 4). Given the prominence of state funds, an important question is if and 
how these funds impact political parties. This question is the topic of this thesis. 
Proponents of state funding contend that it provides parties with sufficient 
resources to engage in important democratic activities and to operate effectively 
(see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, pp. 4-5; Nassmacher, 2009, pp. 290-294), which, 
arguably, makes it important to the functioning of contemporary democracies, 
given the vital role of political parties in them (Schattschneider, 1942, p. 1). 
Empirically, this claim is substantiated by studies documenting a correlation 
between the availability of state funds and staff presence in political parties (Mair, 
1994; Mendilow, 1992; Sundberg, 1994; Svåsand, 1994a), staff who can aid 
parties in executing day-to-day tasks. Studies have also found that state funds 
help to secure parties’ continued electoral participation (i.e. their survival) (Casal 
Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Casal Bértoa & Taleski, 2016; Casal Bértoa & Walecki, 
2014), often perceived as the core task – or ‘constitutive function’ – of parties 
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(see e.g. Pedersen, 1982; Sartori, 1976). Opponents of state funding conversely 
contend that it has turned political parties away from their members and 
supporters (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, pp. 4-5; Nassmacher, 2009, pp. 290-
294), intensified parties’ relationship with the state, and turned them into public 
utilities (Biezen, 2004; Epstein, 1986). It is arguable that such a development 
threatens the ability of parties to function as a means of linkage between citizens 
and the state (see e.g. Katz & Mair, 1995). On this point, literature has found that 
state funding contributes to changed party power structures, benefitting the top, 
national echelons rather than the members (i.e. contributing to centralisation) 
(see e.g. Ebbighausen, 1996; Hagevi, 2018; Katz & Mair, 2002; Mendilow, 1992).  
The empirical results concerning the impact of state funds on intra-
organisational party dynamics, whether concerning staffing, centralisation, or 
survival, are, however, far from unequivocal (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 
50; Koss, 2011, p. 4; Pierre et al., 2000; Scarrow, 2007, pp. 204-205). 
Consequently, we have only a limited understanding of whether, when, and how 
exactly state funds impact these intra-organisational dynamics. In turn, we also 
have only a limited understanding of whether and how state funds threaten to 
undermine parties’ citizen-state linkage function. The present thesis addresses 
this empirical ambiguity and goes beyond the drawing of correlations to explore 
in-depth how state funding specifically contributes to staffing, centralisation, and 
pursuit of constitutive function (i.e. electoral participation) in parties.  
To do so, the study investigates the impact of state funds on intra-
organisational dynamics in parties where this influence is more likely to manifest 
itself (for a similar argument, see Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017, p. 2), namely in 
newly established (post-1980) minor parties (winning less than 10 percent of the 
vote). The existing literature contends that both newness and minority status (in 
15 
 
electoral terms) make parties particularly vulnerable to the design of, and 
changes in, state funding regulations. Stinchcombe (1965), for instance, argues 
that younger organisations are generally shaped more by external pressures 
(such as state funds) than older ones are. When it comes to minority status, Casal 
Bértoa and Spirova (2017, p. 2) state: ‘(…) the availability of state financing is of 
major consequence for small political parties, but might have less significant 
impact on the bigger parties (…)’. Thus, new minor parties are particularly 
insightful objects of study when the goal is to explore the impact of state funds. 
Given these considerations, the central research question is: How does state 
funding influence processes of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of 
constitutive function in newly established, electorally minor parties? 
In the following, state funds are understood as direct and indirect state 
benefits and state constraints (related to access to and maintenance of state 
funds). The study’s in-depth focus on the impact of state funds on intra-
organisational processes attempts to fill different gaps in the literature. 
Specifically, the analysis of staffing sheds light on how state funds – as compared 
to other income sources – shape staffing patterns (i.e. shifts in the number of 
permanent and temporary staff), and also explores whether the timing of staffing 
is related to state funds. In this way, the results fill a gap in the literature, which 
has mainly been concerned simply with correlations between state funds and 
staffing (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair, 1994; Mendilow, 1992; Sundberg, 
1994; Svåsand, 1994a).  
The analysis of centralisation, defined as the process in which party elites 
increase their control of the party’s executive council (at the expense of 
members), first sheds light on whether and how both state funds and staff 
contribute to strengthening party elites in new minor parties. The analysis thus 
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adds more detail to the literature’s finding that state funds strengthen specific 
party faces (e.g. party in public office) (Bardi et al., 2017; Hagevi, 2018; Katz & 
Mair, 2002), by analysing specifically which party elites are strengthened by state 
funds and staff, and the mechanisms through which it happens. Secondly, the 
analysis contributes to the literature by investigating whether and how elites use 
their strengthened position to initiate changes in the composition of the executive, 
and whether or not state funds and staff contribute to executing such changes, 
both of which are unexplored to date. The focus on the executive council in a 
centralisation analysis is a novelty in a literature that has mainly focused its 
attention on which party actors control specific decision-making procedures, such 
as candidate and leadership selection and policy development (see e.g. Gauja, 
2013; Lisi et al., 2015; Rahat & Hazan, 2001). This analysis thus broadens our 
knowledge regarding which actors are in charge of party affairs on a daily basis 
(i.e. the executive) (Poguntke, 1998).  
Pursuit of constitutive function is defined as a party’s ability to comply with 
ballot access requirements and file an electoral list (i.e. to exceed Pedersen’s 
(1982) threshold of authorisation). This thesis goes beyond previous studies that 
have found that state funds contribute to parties’ continued ability to run in 
elections (see e.g. Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Casal Bértoa & Walecki, 2014; 
Spirova, 2007) by exploring specifically how state funds and staff contribute to 
new minor parties’ ability to exceed the threshold of authorisation.  
One final, and crucial, contribution of the study is to provide empirical data 
on the organisational development of new minor parties generally, and new minor 
parties in Italy and Norway specifically. While electorally minor parties barely 
have been covered in the existing literature (Fisher, 1980; Muller-Rommel, 1991; 
Pedersen, 1982; Pridham, 1991; but see e.g. Spoon, 2011), the literature on new 
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parties is larger. However, literature on new parties mainly comprises parties of 
specific party families (e.g. green and far right parties), and not new parties as 
such (e.g. Art, 2011; van Haute, 2016; but see Bolleyer, 2013;). In Norway and 
Italy only individual case studies on (mainly green and communist) new minor 
parties have been conducted (see e.g. Bertolino, 2004; Biorcio, 2016; Calossi, 
2007; Siem Knudsen, 2016; Vannucci, 2007). Therefore this study’s analysis of 
new minor parties (belonging to different party families) fills a glaring empirical 
gap, which is crucial for our broader understanding of how a large diversity of 
interests are represented in Norway and Italy specifically, and contemporary 
democracies more generally. 
The rest of this introductory chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I justify 
the decision to analyse new minor parties, elaborating on the argument briefly 
outlined above. Then, I discuss the normative debate on state funding, laying the 
groundwork for discussing the normative implications of the empirical findings in 
the concluding chapter of the thesis. Thirdly, I outline in more depth the gaps that 
this thesis seeks to fill, and review the state of the art on state funding and staffing, 
centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. I conclude with an outline of 
the thesis by chapter. 
1.1.1 Why new minor parties? 
The choice to study new minor parties has analytical and methodological 
advantages in a study that seeks to understand in-depth how state funding 
shapes intra-organisational patterns. As mentioned above, new parties are more 
easily shaped by external pressures, such as state funding regulations, than 
established parties are (Stinchcombe, 1965). This reflects new parties’ more 
malleable and less institutionalised party structures (see e.g. Gauja, 2016, p. 
115). Additionally, the impact of state funding regulations will differ according to 
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the electoral support a party has (Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Lanzalaco, 1985, 
cited in Pridham, 1991). Specifically, whereas electorally larger parties will rarely 
encounter difficulty in surpassing access criteria for state funds, this may present 
a real hurdle for electorally minor parties (for a similar argument, see Rashkova 
& Spirova, 2014). Moreover, new and minor parties have vulnerable income 
structures as they have yet to develop mass memberships and are an 
unattractive prospect for donations (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ikstens et al., 
2002; Mair & Biezen, 2001). Thus, state funds have been found to be particularly 
important for largely state-dependent new minor parties (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 
2006, p. 43), as they rely on these funds more than other parties in order to 
operate (for a similar argument, see Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017).1  
New minor parties’ state dependency first allows the study to pin-point 
precisely how state funds impact intra-organisational processes, such as staffing, 
centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. Secondly, I can explore in-
depth how specific shifts in state funding regulations, for example with regards to 
access criteria for funds, possibly impact directly on the internal workings of new 
minor parties. The selection of state-dependent new minor parties thus reflects 
the study’s focus on understanding the exact impact of state funds, and is an 
initial attempt to bring more clarity to the existing bulk of research, which is 
characterised by contradictory results regarding the link between state funding 
and party organisational development (Casas-Zamora, 2006).  
The selection of state dependent new minor parties, arguably constituting 
so-called most likely cases (see e.g. Gerring, 2007; Levy, 2008), i.e. cases where 
I most expect to find that state funding does indeed matter for intra-organisational 
                                                          
1 This finding thus counters the claim that new minor parties are disadvantaged by high access 
thresholds to state funds set by the established (and governing) parties (Katz & Mair, 1995, 2009). 
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development, could limit the study’s scope for generalisation. However, the 
selection of a diverse group (e.g. on ideology) of new minor parties in two 
regulatory contexts that have differed over time, gives a suitable starting point for 
extending the relevance of the study’s findings to a broader group of new minor 
parties. Furthermore, the in-depth exploratory analysis allows me to investigate 
the extent to which findings are related to parties’ newness and minority status 
respectively. This opens up for a final discussion of whether the study’s empirical 
results also are of relevance to electorally larger or established parties – or both. 
Consequently, the empirical results of the analysis of most-likely cases will be of 
relevance both beyond the Italian and Norwegian new minor parties studied here, 
but also – potentially – to large and established parties.   
1.2 State funding from a normative perspective 
The strong opinions that exist both for and against state funds is what Pierre et 
al. (2000, p. 2) label the ‘public subsidy debate’. The debate is rooted in normative 
conceptions of the role of political parties as core linkage structures between 
citizens and the state in contemporary democracies. In fact, Van Biezen (2004, 
p. 707) contends that only ‘a conception of democracy which views parties as the 
principal protagonists and as an indispensable public good’ could let the state 
gain the momentum in party finance that it (by now) has. Consequently, whether 
the debate leans in favour of state funding or against it, the underlying factor in 
the arguments is the crucial role parties play in democracies today (see also 
Schattschneider, 1942, p. 1).  
There are three core arguments for/against state funding in the literature. 
One concerns the role of state funding in the income structure of parties (state-
dependency), and another its role in shaping electoral participation. Both of these 
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are discussed below as they are relevant to the theoretical and empirical 
approach of this study. The final argument concerns the role of state funding in 
curbing illicit financing practices and fighting corruption. As this issue is neither 
theoretically nor empirically under scrutiny here, this argument is not to be further 
discussed (but see Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 5).  
Proponents of state funding first emphasise that it is crucial for enabling 
political parties to perform their core functions, such as running in increasingly 
cost-intensive electoral campaigns, and enabling day-to-day operation of 
branches (for an overview of this argument, see Biezen, 2004; Casas-Zamora, 
2006; Pierre et al., 2000). The implicit argument is that a democracy dependent 
on parties would not function if its constituent parts (parties) do not have the 
means to operate effectively. To that point, Nassmacher (2009, p. 292) argues 
that state funds represent the only income source that parties can use to close 
the gap between their rising expenses and their self-generated income. Arguably, 
state funds are also important for levelling the playing field between parties and 
other societal actors (e.g. interest groups), as the financial resources of parties, 
by definition exercising a monopoly on candidate selection for elections, are 
financially weak in comparison to other actors, who also exert crucial political 
influence (Pierre et al., 2000, p. 4).  
Proponents of state funding secondly argue that it contributes to levelling 
the playing field in electoral competition. State funding helps to ensure that parties 
can compete in the electoral game on equal grounds, as it can take away the 
advantage held by incumbents and ‘offer fairness to opposition parties’ 
(Nassmacher, 2009, p. 291). This argument is based on the fact that parties 
operate with different pools of resources:  
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State funding is expected to facilitate a more equal level playing field by 
enabling new, small and less resourceful parties to compete on a more 
equitable basis with the dominant and financially more privileged ones 
(Biezen, 2004, p. 707).  
Conversely, critics argue that state funds reduce political parties’ incentive 
to reach out to members and supporters for funds. However, this depends on the 
type of state funding system in place. If parties receive state funds with ‘no strings 
attached’, i.e. without an obligation to match state funds with self-generated 
income (e.g. membership fees), parties will arguably lose the incentive to recruit 
and maintain members for financial reasons (for an overview of these arguments, 
see Casas-Zamora, 2006; Nassmacher, 2009, p. 295; Pierre et al., 2000). 
According to critics, therefore, state funding can contribute to parties’ alienation 
from members specifically, and society more generally, if mechanisms such as 
matching funds are not used. This resonates with the cartel party thesis, which 
argues that cartel parties are immersed in the state and not in civil society (as 
would be a mass party), so that they resemble public utilities (Biezen, 2004; 
Epstein, 1986) that are more interested in promoting their own ends than those 
of the citizens (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 293).  
Additionally, critics argue that state funding contributes to freezing the 
existing party system, as those parties benefitting from state funding regulations 
would generally be the parties already established in power. Consequently, state 
funds would contribute to excluding some political formations, while keeping 
others on life-support (Pierre et al., 2000, p. 3). This argument is based on the 
fact that political parties themselves are in charge of introducing public policy, 
which means that the parties already in power are likely to enact a system of state 
funding that benefits themselves (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 5), which is also a core 
component of the cartel party thesis (see Katz & Mair, 1995).  
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In normative terms, therefore, proponents of state funds first emphasise 
their importance for parties’ ability to perform the functions that make them 
important linkage structures between citizens and the state. Secondly, state 
funds are allegedly crucial for levelling the playing field in elections, and ensuring 
that the widest possible variety of citizens are linked to the state through the 
broadest possible selection of parties. The opponents, however, fear that state 
funds have the inverse effect, namely harming parties’ role as linkage structures 
by (potentially) reducing their incentive to recruit and maintain members (Pierre 
et al., 2000, p. 3). Moreover, critics argue that state funds contribute to freezing 
the party system, thus hindering the effective linkage between the state and the 
broadest possible group of citizens by excluding certain political parties.  
The next section of the chapter provides an overview of the literature on 
how state funding shapes staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive 
function, and identifies the gaps which this study seeks to fill. As such, it 
represents the empirical side of the normative debate just discussed.  
1.3 Closing gaps in the existing literature: A literature review  
Some have argued that the introduction of state funding to political parties is ‘one 
of the most significant developments in the relationship between political parties, 
the state and the citizenry in the advanced Western democracies’ (Pierre et al., 
2000, p. 1). Despite the interest in state funding as one factor in studies of party 
organisational change (see e.g. Janda, 1980; Katz & Mair, 1994), or party 
organisational strength (see e.g. Webb, 2002; Webb & Keith, 2017), a limited 
number of studies analyse in depth the effects of state funding, especially in 
comparative terms (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 5; Hopkin, 2004; but see 
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Nassmacher, 2009). The following literature review – which also outlines the gaps 
in the literature that this thesis seeks to fill – evidences this.  
1.3.1 State funding and staffing 
Theoretically speaking, the party literature has linked the provision of state 
funding to an increased presence of employed staff in political parties. The catch-
all (Kirchheimer, 1966), electoral professional (Panebianco, 1988), and cartel 
party models (Katz & Mair, 1995) mainly link an increase in professional staff to 
parties’ increased tendency to engage in capital intensive campaigns,2 but also 
to the existence of state funds (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 20; see also Kirchheimer, 
1966; Panebianco, 1988). Empirically, the literature does present empirical 
evidence for a correlation between an increase in state funding and an increase 
in staff (whether professionals or party bureaucrats)3, for instance in Norway 
(Svåsand, 1994a, p. 325), Sweden (Gidlund, 1991, p. 48), Finland (Sundberg, 
1994, p. 173), Ireland (Farrell, 1994, p. 223), and Israel (Mendilow, 1992). Mair 
(1994, p. 9) states that the large increase in staff, particularly with regards to 
parliamentary party staff, in the 1970s and 1980s, was paid for with the help of 
state funds. 
Despite these findings, there are ambiguities as to the exact influence of 
state funding on staffing, as systems with little or no state funding, such as 
Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, had a higher growth in party staff (1975-
1989) than parties operating in more generous state funding systems, e.g. 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland (Casas-Zamora, 2006, pp. 50-51). Concretely, not 
only is there a gap with regards to our understanding of the actual role of state 
                                                          
2 For an account of the increasing demands related to electioneering, for example due to 
technological innovations in campaigns, see for instance Farrell (1996). 
3 For a more elaborate discussion on the distinction between professionals and party bureaucrats, 
see Panebianco (1988, chapter 12). 
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funding (as compared to other income sources) in processes of staffing, but also 
with respect to when parties take on staff (particularly the timing of this in relation 
to state funding access) (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 50). This study seeks to fill this 
gap. The staffing analysis explores how a party’s increase of, and decrease or 
loss of state funding influences patterns of staffing over time. As new minor 
parties are highly state-dependent, the analysis will be able to say something 
specific about how state funding (as opposed to other sources of funding) 
contribute to staffing patterns. Moreover, the life cycle analysis will shed light on 
the exact timing of party staffing patterns, addressing Casas-Zamora’s (2006, p. 
50) claim that the role of state funding with regards to timing of staffing is 
ambiguous. 
In addition, the analysis of staffing helps to shed light on an empirical 
puzzle in the literature concerning new minor party membership. Recent studies 
have found that members are more important for newer parties than they are for 
older, due to the electoral support that such members can provide (Kölln, 2014, 
p. 465). One would thus expect a push in new minor parties to recruit and 
maintain members. However, above it was argued that new parties have poorly 
developed membership structures (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair & Biezen, 2001): 
‘it is striking to note how relatively few members there are among many of the 
new and alternative parties that have emerged to gain electoral support in recent 
years’  (Mair & Biezen, 2001, p. 14; see also Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43;). This 
is arguably one of the reasons why new minor parties are particularly reliant on 
state funding. As the analysis of staffing in this thesis also discusses what types 
of tasks the hired staff do, it sheds empirical light on the contrast between new 
minor parties’ need for members, and their low memberships. It does so by 
outlining whether or not new minor parties prioritise having their hired staff (if they 
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have staff) perform tasks related to membership recruitment and management. 
In this way, the results also feed into the normative debate on state funding, 
where critics claim that access to state funds eliminates the incentive to recruit 
members (if no obligation to collect self-generated funds exists).  
1.3.2 State funding and centralisation 
The theoretical literature argues that state funding empowers the actors who 
receive and manage them (Mendilow, 1992; Nassmacher, 1989, 2009). 
Empirically, the literature has addressed this argument in two ways; First by 
investigating how state funding allocations have benefitted either the party in 
public office or the party in central office.4 Katz and Mair (2002, pp. 123-124; see 
also Katz & Mair, 2009, p. 756) found that the provision of state funding to the 
party in public office, combined with these representatives’ control over the level 
and type of funding available (through their presence in parliament), advantaged 
this party face (see also Bardi et al., 2017). Correspondingly, the party in public 
office in Sweden (Hagevi, 2018, p. 9), and the party in central office in Italy 
(Ciaurro, 1989, p. 168) both strengthened their positions at the expense of other 
party faces due to their receipt of state funding. Secondly, the empirical literature 
has investigated how state funds empower party representatives on different 
party levels, i.e. on national, regional, or local level respectively. This empirical 
strand of the literature reflects the fact that many countries provide state funding 
to parties on different institutional tiers (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 50). 
Concretely, empirical results show that the distribution of state funds to other 
party branches beyond the national branch has strengthened such subnational 
branches, as illustrated by evidence from Anglo-Saxon-democracies 
                                                          
4 Political parties allegedly have three different faces; the party on the ground, the party in public 
office and the party in central office (Katz & Mair, 1993). These faces refer to the party members, 
the governing/parliamentary branch of the party and the national party headquarters respectively. 
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(Nassmacher, 2009), Sweden (Hagevi, 2018)5, Canada (Coletto et al., 2011), and 
Spain (Casal Bértoa et al., 2014).  
In addition to the importance of state funds in empowering either party 
faces or party branches (beyond the national branch), the literature has also 
focused on how staff can have the same impact. The importance of staff as an 
organisational resource (Webb & Keith, 2017) was one of the reasons why Katz 
and Mair (2002) argued that increased staff for the party in public office has 
advantaged this party ‘face’ at the expense of the party in central office (for similar 
arguments, see Bardi et al., 2017; Biezen, 2003b). The literature has thus 
outlined how both state funds and staff can empower the party face or party 
branch that receive them, which has thus far been taken to mean centralisation.  
The centralisation analysis in this thesis goes further than the literature 
discussed above, thereby contributing to fill three gaps in the literature. First, I 
analyse exactly which party actors (in the party’s central, national office)6 
empower their positions following access to state funds and staff, and the 
mechanisms through which this happens. This adds another layer of detail to the 
existing literature which mainly has focused on how party faces or branches are 
strengthened by state funds and staff. Secondly, I analyse whether and how the 
strengthened elites use their empowered position to initiate reforms that shift the 
control of the executive council towards themselves, and the extent to which state 
funds and staff are used to execute such reforms. This contributes to filling a gap 
in the literature with regards to whether state funds (and staff) actually contribute 
to centralising reform. In other words, it goes further than the literature discussed 
                                                          
5 Hagevi not only refers to the distribution of state funds to subnational branches, but also to 
regional and municipal parties’ possibility to ‘secure access to separate public funding that it 
decides on locally’ (Hagevi, 2018, p. 9).  
6 Reflecting the analysis of national financial accounts and staffing on national level. See chapter 
3 for details.  
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above, which has focused on how state funds (and staff) strengthen party faces 
and branches. The centralisation analysis in this thesis thus gives a broader 
overview of how state funds and staff potentially contribute to shaping reforms 
that affect the daily running of contemporary new minor parties, adding more 
detail to those studies that equate state funding access (to the national branch) 
with party centralisation, but without exploring this in-depth (see e.g. 
Ebbighausen, 1996, cited in Koss, 2011; Mendilow, 1992; Nassmacher, 1989).  
Moreover, the centralisation analysis addresses a lacuna in the literature 
by analysing the composition (i.e. control) of a party’s executive council. So far, 
the literature has focused more on analysing which party actors are in charge of 
which decision-making procedures, such as candidate (Bille, 2001; Hazan & 
Rahat, 2010) and leadership (Cross & Pilet, 2015; Kenig, 2008; Lisi et al., 2015; 
Wauters, 2014) selection, and policy development (Gauja, 2009, 2013;  but see 
studies on party congresses, Heidar & Saglie, 2002; Pettitt, 2007). The analysis 
of centralisation thus provides new empirical insight concerning which actors 
(elites or members) control the executive councils of new minor parties over time, 
i.e. run the party on a daily basis. As such, the study empirically addresses Mair’s 
(1994, p. 12) observation that central office organs are increasingly made up of 
elected representatives (i.e. party elites), rather than the party on the ground 
(members). 
1.3.3 State funding and pursuit of constitutive function 
State funding has been found to be an important factor for understanding party 
survival. As survival is most often defined as participation in elections, these 
studies constitute the background for this study’s analysis of how state funding 
(possibly) contributes to new minor parties’ pursuit of their constitutive function, 
i.e. electoral participation. Compared with the literature on staffing and 
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centralisation the literature on survival has to a larger extent addressed the 
survival of new and/or minor party formations specifically. Bolleyer (2013, p. 85), 
for instance, finds that the permissiveness of access criteria for state funding 
significantly influences the survival of new parties. Concretely, more constraining 
access thresholds significantly increase the chances that a new party dies, i.e. 
stops running in elections (Bolleyer, 2013, p. 14). The link between state funds 
and parties’ continued electoral participation has been found for minor parties in 
Hungary (Spirova, 2007, p. 145), and for new but electorally major parties in 
Macedonia (Casal Bértoa & Taleski, 2016, p. 14) and Poland (Casal Bértoa & 
Walecki, 2014). Interestingly, Casal Bértoa and Spirova (2017) find, in a study 
encompassing parties in post-communist Europe, that parties that are not 
represented in parliament (i.e. most often minor parties) have a higher chance of 
continuing to persist in the electoral contest when they have access to state 
funding.   
This evidence links state funding to the persistence of all kinds of parties 
(old and new, minor and major) in the party system, i.e. their ability to continue 
fighting elections. Still, few studies have gone into depth and studied how state 
funding specifically contributes to keeping parties in the party system, and 
analysed the impact of staff in this equation (but for the importance of staff in 
electoral campaigns, see e.g. Farrell, 1996; Farrell, 2000; Karlsen, 2010). This 
study addresses these limitations, and looks more specifically at whether and 
how state funding and/or staff directly contribute to electoral participation, for 
example by assisting with signature campaigns (by paying for costs, or organising 
rallies), or filing the electoral list (recruiting candidates). Moreover, it analyses 
how state funds and staff facilitate electoral participation indirectly, by contributing 
to building branches and recruiting members.  
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1.3.4 New minor parties (in Norway and Italy) 
Electorally minor parties are often omitted from studies of political parties (Fisher, 
1980; Muller-Rommel, 1991; Pedersen, 1982; Pridham, 1991) either because of 
limited data, to make studies of party politics more manageable, to avoid entities 
that allegedly have no impact on the political system, or because minor parties 
are considered dysfunctional entities in the system (Fisher, 1980, pp. 609-610, 
cited in Pedersen, 1982). The consequence is that we know little of minor parties 
generally, but about their organisations specifically (but see case studies, such 
as Bertolino, 2004; Vannucci, 2007). This is especially so since electorally minor 
parties largely have been omitted from the comparative efforts to collect 
organisational data on parties (Katz & Mair, 1992; Poguntke et al., 2016). New 
parties (which are sometimes also minor parties) belonging to specific party 
families, such as the green (see e.g. Spoon, 2011; van Haute, 2016) or far-right 
family (see e.g. Art, 2011; Enyedi & Linek, 2008), have been covered in the 
literature. However, the literature analysing new parties more broadly 
(irrespective of party family) – especially in organisational terms – is modest (but 
see Bolleyer, 2013). This lack of coverage of new minor parties in the literature 
is curious when we consider that new and/or minor parties often are the most 
numerous parties in party systems.  
In the two national contexts under scrutiny here, excellent case studies 
have enhanced our organisational knowledge of two of the Italian new minor 
parties selected for analysis, namely the Greens (see e.g. Biorcio, 2002; Biorcio, 
2016; Rhodes, 1992; Vannucci, 2007) and the Communist Refoundation Party 
(see e.g. Albertazzi et al., 2011; Bertolino, 2004; Calossi, 2007). However, the 
remaining five parties selected for analysis are barely mentioned in the literature 
(but see Pridham, 1991 for an older study of small Italian parties). In Norway, the 
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literature is even more limited, although a few studies of the Norwegian greens 
exist (Heglum, 2015; Jupskås, 2013; Siem Knudsen, 2016).  
The empirical analysis of intra-organisational development in new minor 
parties in Norway and Italy in this thesis, covering the income structure of parties, 
their patterns with regards to staffing, their centralisation, and their pursuit of 
constitutive function, thus contributes in a significant manner to fill (parts of) a 
large lacuna; Both by contributing to the general literature on new and electorally 
minor parties, and more specifically by filling a gap concerning organisational 
development of new minor parties in Norway and Italy. This is important, as only 
by studying a broader segment of political parties can we extend our 
understanding of how different interests in contemporary democracies are 
represented. In turn, this also gives us a better comprehension of the 
aforementioned linkage function between citizens and the state.  
1.4 Outline of thesis 
This introductory chapter has given an overview of the core puzzle that this thesis 
seeks to address, the research question, and the normative debate regarding the 
utility (or not) of state funds. Finally, the state of the art with regards to how state 
funding shapes intra-organisational patterns in parties was discussed, outlining 
the gaps that this thesis seeks to fill. The remaining chapters in this thesis are 
structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 outlines the thesis’ analytical framework. The first part defines 
state funding, staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. I then 
briefly present rational choice institutionalism as the guiding principle for the 
theoretical framework, before I develop three hypotheses that are heuristic tools 
to guide the empirical analysis. First, I argue that an increase of state funding 
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contributes to staffing in new minor parties, and that a decrease sparks 
downsizing (H1). In H2, I argue that both state funds and staff contribute to 
strengthening the position of party elites (e.g. party leader, treasurer). In turn, this 
strengthened position enables party elites to initiate and execute reforms that 
either increase their control of the executive council (centralisation) or decrease 
the importance of other national party organs besides the executive, in order to 
consolidate elite power (consolidation). Centralising reforms arguably take place 
in parties where the elites do not have full control of the executive council, i.e. 
where the executive is not solely composed of party elites. Consolidating reforms 
take place in parties that already have completely elite-dominated executive 
councils. The third hypothesis, H3, argues that state funding and staff contribute 
to enabling pursuit of constitutive function, understood as compliance with ballot 
access criteria and presentation of electoral list.  
Chapter 3 discusses the study’s research design. First, I briefly outline the 
comparative case design deployed in the thesis, before I proceed to argue that 
Italy and Norway are feasible regulatory contexts from which to draw new minor 
parties, given their rich variety in state funding regulations (over time). Then I 
discuss case selection; seven new minor parties are selected in each context 
based on a) party newness, b) minority status, c) variation with regards to state 
funding access, and d) variation in ideology/age/status (alive/dead). The case 
selection also outlines the criteria for selecting centralising reforms and electoral 
contests, both of which will be analysed in depth in the analysis of centralisation 
(H2) and pursuit of constitutive function (H3) respectively. Subsequently, I 
present and discuss the benefits and limitations of the primary documents, semi-
structured interviews, and secondary sources upon which the analysis rests. In 
the final part of the chapter I operationalise state funding, staffing, centralisation 
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(and consolidation), and pursuit of constitutive function, and discuss indicators 
that will be used in the empirical analysis. In the end, I outline the additional 
factors that will be accounted for in the empirical analysis.  
Chapters 4 to 8 are empirical chapters. Chapters 4 and 5 analyse state 
funding regulations and income structure respectively, and thereby lay the 
groundwork for the later analysis of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of 
constitutive function. Specifically, chapter 4 presents an analysis of state funding 
regulations in Italy and Norway respectively, each divided into so-called 
regulatory phases, to demarcate important shifts in state funding regulations. The 
analysis outlines which types of state benefits (direct and indirect) have been 
available over time, their size (generosity) and allocation mechanism (e.g. flat 
grants), and the access criteria and regulation related to maintaining them (state 
constraints). The chapter concludes with a comparative discussion, outlining the 
similarities and differences between the two contexts. Chapter 5 analyses the 
income structure of all the selected new minor parties throughout their life cycles, 
in light of the regulatory phases developed in chapter 4. The chapter gives a 
comprehensive overview of how shifting state regulations shape the income 
structure of the selected parties, and concludes with a systematic comparative 
overview bringing together the findings from the Italian and Norwegian parties 
respectively. 
Chapter 6 analyses staffing patterns (H1) in the selected new minor 
parties within the aforementioned regulatory phases, thereby enabling a 
systematic investigation of how state benefits and constraints foster and hinder 
patterns of staffing over time. The chapter first analyses staffing in the Italian 
parties, and then in the Norwegian, before a comparative overview and 
discussion is provided. The chapter finds that an increase of state funding (and 
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decrease/loss of state funds) broadly shape staffing in new minor parties in both 
Norway and Italy, thus supporting H1. A party’s overall budget, membership 
fluctuations, and leadership change are some of the additional factors that 
contribute to shaping staffing. Interestingly, the findings show that new minor 
parties most often invest in staff to work on organisational maintenance, for 
instance to recruit and maintain members. 
Chapter 7 analyses the extent to which state funding and staff contribute 
to centralisation of the executive council (H2). The chapter starts with a life cycle 
analysis of the composition and tasks of the executive council – both statutory 
and de-facto – to establish whether or not the parties had room to centralise their 
executive councils. The analysis also sheds light on whether 
centralising/consolidating reforms took place. To capture the dynamics of how 
state funding and staff shape centralising/consolidating reforms, the first reform 
process of the executive council that took place in each of the parties following 
state funding access and/or staffing was selected for in-depth analysis. If there 
was no room to centralise the executive, I selected the first consolidating reform 
that took place after state funding access and/or staffing. A total of six centralising 
and three consolidating reforms were analysed across the Norwegian and Italian 
parties. The results support H2; state funding and staff strengthen the position of 
party elites, who in some parties use this position to initiate 
centralising/consolidating reforms. There is also some evidence that state 
funding and staff contribute to executing centralising and consolidating reforms. 
Other factors, such as leadership change, organisational vulnerability, and 
membership fluctuations also contributed to shaping the centralising and 
consolidating reform processes.  
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Chapter 8 analyses how state funding and staff contribute to new minor 
parties’ pursuit of constitutive function, i.e. surpassing Pedersen’s (1982) 
threshold of authorisation. The first part of the chapter analyses new minor 
parties’ pursuit of constitutive function in a life cycle perspective, outlining the 
share of constituencies in which the parties fielded candidates in each election 
on national, regional, and EU levels over time. To analyse how state funding and 
staff contribute to pursuit of constitutive function, I select one electoral contest in 
each party for in-depth scrutiny. The first electoral contest following a shift in 
income from the state and/or a change in staffing was selected in a majority of 
the parties. However, in order to ensure variation with regards to the institutional 
tier of the election (e.g. national vs. regional), and in ballot access criteria, the 
second electoral contest following changes to state funds and/or staff was 
selected in a minority of cases. The in-depth analysis of electoral contests 
supports H3; state funding and staff both contribute to enabling compliance with 
signature requirements for ballot access and to the process of presenting an 
electoral list. In Italy, state funds and staff are most important to electoral 
participation through their role in aiding parties to overcome signature 
requirements, while in Norway they are more crucial in the building of branches 
and maintenance of membership. Other factors that contributed to new minor 
parties’ electoral participation were parties’ overall budget, and their participation 
in electoral coalitions.    
Chapter 9 summarises the empirical results, explores their 
generalisability, and their normative implications. The chapter concludes with an 
overview of avenues for future research. 
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2 Analytical framework 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter firstly presents the study’s conceptual framework, before going on 
to develop a theoretical framework that pinpoints how state funding contributes 
to staffing, and how state funding and staffing contribute to centralisation and 
pursuit of constitutive function in new minor parties. Thus, it is the contribution of 
state funding (H1) and state funding and staff (H2 and H3) that is of prime interest. 
The centrality of the role of state funding in organisational processes in new minor 
parties is the reason why the conceptual framework starts with the definition of 
state funding, and only subsequently goes on to define the three other core 
concepts of the study: staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. 
The second part of the chapter firstly outlines rational choice institutionalism as 
the broader theoretical framework within which the three hypotheses of the thesis 
are embedded, and secondly outlines the rationale behind them.  
The theoretical argument is composed of three parts. Firstly I argue that 
an increase of state funding contributes to staffing in new minor parties, and 
inversely, that decreasing state funding contributes to a process of letting staff go 
(H1). Secondly, state funding access and staff are theorised to contribute to 
strengthening party elites, such as party leaders, treasurers, and party 
secretaries, enabling them to initiate and execute centralising reforms of the 
executive council that increase their own control of this organ (H2). Such 
centralising reforms are theorised to take place only in parties where the 
executive is not already composed exclusively of party elites. In parties where 
there is no ‘room’ to centralise the executive further (i.e. where it already 
comprises only elites), state funding and staff are theorised to contribute to 
consolidate the position of the already strong elites. Thirdly, I argue that state 
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funding and staff help new minor parties to pursue their constitutive function, i.e. 
to overcome ballot access requirements and present lists in elections, and 
conversely, that the loss or significant decrease of such resources hinders pursuit 
of constitutive function (H3).  
2.1 Defining state funding, staffing, centralisation, and 
pursuit of constitutive function 
2.1.1 State funding 
With the help of rational choice theory, this study conceptualises state funding in 
terms of benefits and constraints, incorporating both state funding in various 
forms (benefits), and reporting requirements related to the receipt of state funding 
(constraints). State benefits more specifically comprises direct and indirect 
sources of state funding (for a similar approach, see Pizzimenti, 2017). Direct 
state funding is cash grants paid out by the state to parties, both on national, 
supra-national (EU), and subnational levels (regional and local). Such cash 
grants can, for example, be annual state grants or electoral reimbursements. 
Indirect state funding comprises party tax, and tax benefits that materialise in 
cash transfers. An example of the latter tax benefit is funds that spring from 
ordinary citizens’ decision to assign a share of their tax return to a political party, 
which is then distributed (by the state) to the relevant parties as a form of cash 
benefit. Party tax refers to parliamentarians’ transfer of a share of their income 
(paid by the state) to their party (Biezen, 2003a; Bolleyer & Gauja, 2013; Casas-
Zamora, 2006; Ewing, 2007; Koss, 2011; Nassmacher, 2009). In the following, 
‘state funding’ thus refers to both direct and indirect forms of state funding. 
Consequently, financial transfers rather than in-kind resources, such as 
secretarial help in parliament or government, are under scrutiny here. Such in-
kind resources can certainly bring positive spill-over effects for a new minor party, 
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for example in developing party policy, and are therefore factors that will be 
accounted for in the empirical analysis (see chapter 3) 
State constraints comprise the different (reporting) requirements that 
political parties need to comply with in order to either be eligible for funding or to 
maintain direct/indirect state funds. Examples of the former are access criteria for 
funding and registration requirements, while examples of the latter are reporting 
requirements ranging from auditing of accounts to disclosure of financial 
accounts (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ewing, 2007; Nassmacher & Nassmacher, 
2001). New minor parties may also be exposed to a broader range of state 
regulations, for example related to ballot access, whose relevance for pursuit of 
constitutive function will be discussed in greater detail in the theoretical argument 
below. Existing studies have also shown how other regulations, such as those 
regarding donations or election expenses, have increasingly become part of the 
legislative framework for political parties (see e.g. Biezen, 2008; Doublet, 2011). 
However, such regulations are excluded from this thesis, whose focus is strictly 
on direct and indirect state benefits, and constraints related to their receipt and 
maintenance. Also, regulations related to expense ceilings and donations will to 
a lesser extent be relevant for new minor parties given their restricted funds, their 
poorly developed income structures, and their status as less attractive prospects 
for potential donors.(see  Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ikstens et al., 2002; Mair & 
Biezen, 2001). In the following, permissive regulation means regulation that is 
beneficial for new minor parties, for example low access criteria for funding or 
light or no reporting requirements related to such funds. Constraining regulations 
refer to the opposite.  
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2.1.2 Staffing 
Staffing is in this thesis defined as the process in which a party hires staff either 
on permanent (full-time or part-time) or temporary basis (e.g. external 
consultants). Patterns of staffing thus describe shifts in the existence of staff and 
the number of staff, resonating with definitions adopted in existing studies (see 
e.g. Farrell & Webb, 2000; Poguntke et al., 2016; Webb & Keith, 2017). This 
numerical definition of staffing also reflects existing studies which seek to link 
development in staffing patterns to state funding access (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 
2006, p. 51), and allows the study to develop a precise theoretical link between 
state funding access and staffing. This thesis thus takes a step back from studies 
that focus on the skills of staff (see e.g. Negrine & Lilleker, 2002; Romzek & Utter, 
1997; Webb & Fisher, 2003; Webb & Kolodny, 2006), which generally reflect the 
concept professionalisation.7 Rather than professionalism, the interest here lies 
in capturing shifts in a party’s number of staff, as that can shed light on resource-
vulnerable new minor parties’ (see e.g. Bolleyer, 2013; Casas-Zamora, 2006; 
Wilson, 1973, see also below) organisational strength (see also Dalton & 
Wattenberg, 2002, p. 269; Webb, 2002, p. 9). This is particularly pertinent in a 
study that is not just concerned with analysing how state benefits and constraints 
contribute to staffing, but also how staffing contributes to centralisation and 
pursuit of constitutive function.  
                                                          
7 Semantically, the use of the concept ‘professionalisation’ implies taking into account either the 
professional skills of individual staff or the overall professionalism of a party (or both), even though 
several scholars have also referred to a party’s shifting number of staff when referring to 
professionalisation (see e.g. Farrell & Webb, 2000; Kölln, 2015). The notoriously ambiguous 
nature of this concept (Eliassen & Pedersen, 1978; Negrine & Lilleker, 2002; Webb & Kolodny, 
2006), and this study’s focus on the number of staff, explains why it is avoided. 
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2.1.3 Centralisation  
This study defines centralisation as the process in which party elites, at the 
expense of party members, increasingly control the national executive council, 
i.e. increase their share of seats in the executive. As such, the study seeks to 
understand of whom the circle of decision-makers is composed, reflecting the 
concept of inclusiveness used in the intra-party democracy literature (Hazan & 
Rahat, 2010; Scarrow, 2005; Von dem Berge & Poguntke, 2017). Centralisation,  
broadly taken to concern the locus of ‘effective decision-making authority within 
the party’ (Janda, 1980, p. 108; see also Duverger, 1959), can meaningfully be 
defined as the process in which elites – at the expense of members – increase 
their control of the executive, due to this organ’s central role in party decision-
making.  
Concretely, the executive, which usually comprises between 15 and 20 
members, is vested with the important power to run a party on a daily basis (Katz, 
2002, pp. 98-99; Michels, 1962 [1911], p. 58; Poguntke, 1998, p. 161; Von dem 
Berge et al., 2013, p. 25).8 Consequently, it has powers related to making various 
types of decisions (for example related to urgent policy matters, or finances) 
between party congresses, which only convene intermittently (Katz, 2002, p. 96). 
The centrality of the executive in daily party management arguably implies 
leadership power (Lukes, 2005, cited in Loxbo, 2013, p. 540), and changes to its 
composition constitute what Panebianco denominates ‘real changes’, i.e. 
changes that alter the distribution of control in a party (Panebianco, 1988, p. 243). 
                                                          
8 It is worth noting that in the party’s central office, the executive is often accompanied by a larger 
executive (hereby called the national executive), which is involved in more fundamental debates 
on strategy and ideology (Katz & Mair, 2002, pp. 98-99; Michels, 1962 [1911], p. 58; Von dem 
Berge et al., 2013, p. 25). This organ is in some cases a reflection of the territorial branches of 
the party (see Bolleyer, 2012 for a discussion of the leadership structure in federations). Potential 
changes to the composition of the national executive will be accounted for in the empirical 
analysis, as changes to one organ can be met with changes in the other.  
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This definition of centralisation thus broadly captures whether elites or members 
control decision-making by analysing an organ that makes a range of decisions, 
thereby taking a step back from the intra-party democracy literature, which largely 
focuses on describing and analysing which actors within a party have decision-
making power in specific (yet crucial) decision-making procedures, such as 
candidate selection (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Rahat, 2013; Rahat & Hazan, 2001), 
leadership selection (Aylott & Bolin, 2017; Kenig, Rahat, & Hazan, 2015; Kenig, 
Rahat, & Tuttnauer, 2015), and policy development (Gauja, 2013; Loxbo, 2013; 
Pettitt, 2007). 
This definition of centralisation acknowledges that members of an 
executive council do not have to be elites, even though the executive council – 
as an aspect of the party in ‘central office’ – is generally perceived as an elite 
organ (Katz & Mair, 2009, p. 756). The argument here is rather that a person’s 
tasks and/or position within the council is what determines elite-status (ex officio 
members versus members elected by the congress, for example). This means 
that I go beyond the mere status of this organ as an aspect of the party’s central 
office, avoiding the circularity that such an argument would entail, namely 
studying centralisation in what would already be perceived as a centralised 
aspect of the party (the party in central office). Elites are in the following defined 
as the party’s core representatives on regional, national, and over-national level, 
i.e. the leader, deputy leader, party secretary, and treasurer, and the elected 
representatives (party in public office), thereby acknowledging that elites are not 
necessarily exclusively found on the national level (see e.g. Bolleyer, 2012). That 
said, local party leaders, treasurers etc., are not perceived as elites here, given 
their proximity to, and need for support from, the members. This arguably makes 
them part of the membership (see Katz & Mair, 1993, p. 598). This proximity can 
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be argued to be even more prominent in new minor parties due to their smaller 
memberships (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43). A party member is 
understood here in the formal sense, characterised by the existence of a clear 
recognition of the membership (e.g. payment of a regular and annual membership 
fee) (Gauja, 2015).  
The definition of centralisation above implies that parties’ executives have 
room to co-opt more elites, i.e. that they are composed of both elites and 
members, and not necessarily exclusively of elites. However, some parties may 
have executives that do only contain elites. Elites may still (even in such 
centralised executives) increase their control of the party. To account for that, the 
concept of consolidation is introduced. Consolidation refers to the process in 
which party elites operating in parties that already have a completely centralised 
executive, reinforce their strong position (i.e. consolidate it), for example by 
enlarging the scope or responsibility of the centralised executive. In brief, 
therefore, centralisation and consolidation of the executive both refer to 
processes in which elites increase their own power in the party. Centralisation 
occurs if the share of elites in the executive organ increases, while consolidation 
takes place if elites consolidate their position, for instance by reducing the 
importance of other core organs (besides the centralised executive), or by 
banning them.9  
                                                          
9 In the analysis I will refer to centralising and consolidating changes as reforms. The concept 
reform is used irrespective of whether the change in centralising or consolidating direction implied 
a statutory change or not, and whether information concerning the (centralising/consolidating) 
change was publicised or not. The core criterion for using the concept reform is to highlight that 
the studied processes of centralising and consolidating changes are intentional (for a similar 
argument, see Gauja, 2016, p. 20)  
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2.1.4 Pursuit of constitutive function  
The core characteristic of any political party is its participation in elections 
(Pedersen, 1982; Sartori, 1976), and electoral participation can thus be described 
as a party’s constitutive function (Bolleyer, 2018), and raison d’etre. Participating 
in elections is a precondition of pursuing any of a party’s three goals – office, 
votes, or policy (Strøm & Muller, 1999) – and of its more overarching goal of 
survival (Lowery, 2007). In fact, several scholars have defined party survival in 
terms of whether it continues to present candidates in elections or not (Casal 
Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Cyr, 2016; Dinas et al., 2015). In the following, pursuit of 
constitutive function is thus defined as a party’s continued electoral participation 
on national, regional, or supra-national levels. Two matters must be disentangled 
with regards to this definition: What electoral participation means, and what 
continued electoral participation means. 
Firstly, drawing on Pedersen’s seminal work on the life cycle of parties, 
electoral participation is in the following defined as surpassing Pedersen’s (1982, 
p. 7) ‘threshold of authorisation’. If a party manages to comply with legal 
regulations for ballot access, and in turn present an electoral list, it has exceeded 
the threshold (ibid). This definition acknowledges that the constitutive function of 
a party is not to be represented in the national legislature (i.e. the threshold of 
representation), but to seek to be represented, for which surpassing the threshold 
of authorisation is the first step. Defining electoral participation in terms of a 
party’s ability to exceed the threshold of authorisation also eliminates 
endogeneity issues that potentially arise when pursuit of constitutive function is 
to be understood in light of Pedersen’s threshold of representation. The reason 
is that representation in the national legislature is often a precondition of 
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accessing state funding, which could obfuscate an analysis that seeks to explore 
the impact of state funds on a party’s pursuit of constitutive function.  
Secondly, the definition of pursuit of constitutive function adopted here 
underlines a party’s continued participation in elections. Existing literature has 
argued that a party may, for various reasons, find itself temporarily outside the 
electoral race (Kjær, 2012; Spirova, 2007). To account for this, only when a party 
fails to run in two consecutive elections will I count it as failing to pursue its 
constitutive function, building on already existing studies on party survival which 
adopt the same time-frame (Tavits, 2008). As the thesis captures electoral 
participation on national, supra-national, and regional levels, a new minor party 
must fail to surpass the threshold of authorisation in two consecutive elections on 
any of these three levels in order to fail in pursuing its constitutive function. Thus, 
a party can count as pursuing its constitutive function even if it fails to present 
lists on national level, as long as it does so on a subnational (or supra-national) 
level.  
2.1.5 Summary 
The table below summarises the core concepts of the study: 
Table 2.1 Overview of core concepts and their definitions 
Concepts  Definition 
State funding  a) Direct and indirect state benefits 
b) Constraints: Access requirements for benefits, and 
reporting related to maintaining benefits 
Staffing The process of hiring staff either on temporary or permanent 
basis (full-time or part time) 
Centralisation  The process in which elites increase their control of the 
executive council 
Pursuit of constitutive 
function 
Electoral participation, i.e. the process of exceeding the 
threshold of authorisation (overcoming ballot access 
requirements and presenting an electoral list) 
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2.2 The impact of state funding on staffing, centralisation, 
and pursuit of constitutive function: A theoretical framework 
This study is built on the assumption that party actors operate rationally and seek 
utility maximisation within their own party, but that their actions are significantly 
shaped by the institutions – in this case state benefits and constraints – that 
surround them. As such, the study takes up the perspective of rational choice 
institutionalism, which outlines how ‘institutions are (…) systems of rules and 
inducements to behaviour in which individuals attempt to maximize their own 
utilities’ (Peters, 1999, p. 19; see also Weingast, 1996; Weingast, 2002). In this 
thesis state benefits and constraints constitute a formal institution, given that they 
are embedded in national law (for a distinction between formal and informal 
institutions, see Peters, 1999, p. 18). More specifically, where some institutions 
are related to values and symbols, rational choice institutionalism is more 
concerned with institutions as rules and sets of incentives (Peters, 1999, p. 50). 
In practice, therefore, the thesis tries to shed light on how one specific form of 
institution shapes political parties through their actors, following Detterbeck:  
Political processes will depend on the choices of individual and corporate 
actors which have some freedom of manoeuvre yet are shaped and 
constrained by the institutional rules of the game (Detterbeck, 2012, p. 46). 
The assumption that most individuals will respond in similar ways to the 
incentives they are confronted with is a common view in rational choice 
institutionalism (Peters, 1999, p. 50). Thus, rational choice institutionalism is core 
to the development of the three hypotheses in the study.  
The first hypothesis presumes that party actors will respond similarly to an 
increase or decrease of state funding, by taking on or downsizing staff 
respectively (H1). Correspondingly, H2 presumes that party actors will use state 
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funds and staff to centralise the executive council, and to pursue the party’s 
constitutive function (H3). In other words, staffing is in H1 the factor to be 
analysed, while staffing and state funding constitute the indicators whose 
influence will be analysed in H2 and H3. The theoretical framework focuses on 
exploring state funding’s (H1) and state funding and staff’s (H2 and H3) role in 
shaping party organisational patterns, and not on developing a testable 
framework of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function per se. 
The hypotheses are thus heuristic devices to guide the subsequent in-depth 
exploratory analysis. 
2.2.1 How does state funding contribute to patterns of staffing (H1)? 
New minor parties tend to be fundamentally challenged by scarce resources. The 
literature outlines how new parties generally start out with few financial resources 
and few material incentives to distribute to members, activists, or followers 
(Bolleyer, 2013; Wilson, 1973). Additionally, new parties tend to have small 
memberships (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43), partially because incentives to 
become a party member are greatly diminished (see e.g. Scarrow, 2015, p. 74; 
see also Mair & Biezen, 2001).10 This also means that these parties have fewer 
organisational branches, and weak or non-existent youth organisations. Finally, 
minor parties have little access to donations (Ikstens et al., 2002; Scarrow, 2007), 
simply because they are less attractive prospects for potential donors (Casas-
Zamora, 2006, p. 43).11 In sum, new minor parties have poorly developed income 
structures. The existing literature has found that the answer to this is state 
                                                          
10 Interestingly, other authors (Bolleyer, 2013) find that some new radical right parties have been 
surprisingly proactive in building a strong party organisation, examples being National Front and 
Forza Italia, but these are electorally larger parties (and not minor parties). 
11 That said, donations (if new minor parties access them) naturally contribute to the overall 
budget which in turn can contribute to staffing. In order to account for this, the empirical analysis 
accounts for parties’ overall budget size in the staffing analysis (see chapter 3).  
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funding. Despite the dreary prediction of Katz and Mair’s cartel party thesis (Katz 
& Mair, 1995; see also Palitel, 1981), which contends that established (cartel) 
parties will exclusively strive to ensure their continued receipt of state funding, 
and exclude other parties (such as new minor parties) by raising the bar for 
access to state funds, empirical evidence suggests the opposite. Namely that 
electorally minor parties are in fact often over-subsidised by the state. This is in 
some cases facilitated through the use of flat grants, benefitting electorally 
smaller contestants over larger ones (Bille, 1997; Casas-Zamora, 2006; 
Nassmacher, 1989; Sundberg, 2002).  
State funds (if accessed) thus represent a crucial source of income for new 
minor parties, forming the basis for understanding why fluctuations in income 
from state funding shape staffing patterns in such parties. Concretely, new minor 
parties have to cope with the same organisational tasks as any other 
(established, more affluent) party, namely recruiting political leadership, training 
political elites, recruiting and maintaining members, keeping membership 
registers, organising meetings, rallies, and workshops, writing letters and 
answering the telephone, and articulating and aggregating political interests 
(Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002; Key, 1964). Additionally, new minor parties operate 
in an era characterised by increasing demands related to participation in elections 
and electoral campaigns (Farrell, 1996; Farrell & Webb, 2000; Panebianco, 
1988), which adds additional pressure. Therefore, once new minor parties 
increase their income from state funding, either by accessing state funds (for the 
first time) or increasing the sum received, I expect them to hire staff to deal with 
some of these organisational tasks, in turn increasing their organisational 
strength (see also Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002, p. 269; Webb, 2002, p. 9). The 
47 
 
reason for this is that having staff, as opposed to just volunteers, is useful as it 
provides continuity and stability for the party.  
The hiring of staff following an increase in state funds can also be sparked 
by state constraints (e.g. reporting and transparency requirements) related to the 
maintenance of state funding, constraints which have increasingly been 
introduced across many countries (see e.g. Biezen & Kopecký, 2007; Biezen & 
Kopecký, 2014). Compliance with such reporting may require professional 
knowledge, echoing Panebianco’s argument (1988, p. 222) that political 
decisions have become much more technical than in the past.  
Similarly, decreasing levels of income from the state, or the complete loss 
of state funding, which can represent what Panebianco (1988, p. 243) calls an 
environmental shock, is expected to lead to downsizing.12 In the management 
and organisational literature (see e.g. McKinley et al., 2014; Staw et al., 1981), a 
decline in organisational resources, in this case income from the state, is 
theorised to limit the possibilities for manoeuvre in the organisation, making 
‘organisations less innovative and more restricted’ (Kölln, 2015, p. 709).  Gidlund 
(1991, p. 51), for example, argues that the first expenses to be cut back in times 
of financial crisis are expenses to staff and offices, which is corroborated by the 
empirical literature (Albinsson, 1986). A loss of state funding will also relieve a 
party of regulatory requirements related to state funding. Consequently, parties 
will downsize, as the need to balance the financial account will trump the party’s 
responsibility and loyalty towards their employees.  
The restricted income structure of new minor parties combined with the 
pressures these parties face to execute organisational tasks, is theorised to give 
                                                          
12 Even though environmental shocks are generally described as the dramatic loss of votes from 
one election to the next, they can also be understood as the loss of a significant portion of the 
party’s income, constraining a party in performing its core functions. 
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state funding a crucial role in shaping staffing patterns in these parties, leading 
to the hypothesis below. In light of the above, I expect that new minor parties that 
do not have any income from state funding will not be able to take on staff. 
H1: An increase in income from state funding will contribute to staffing in new 
minor parties.  
2.2.2 How do state funding and staffing contribute to centralisation (H2)? 
Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1990, p. 148) contention that ‘organisations are (…) 
resources’ is the starting point for arguing that state funding and staff contribute 
to centralisation of executive councils or consolidation in new minor parties. Thus, 
different groups within a party organisation will compete over and be protective 
of the resources available (Tan, 1997). Given the resource shortage in new minor 
parties, competition over state funds and staff – as two core resources (see Webb 
& Keith, 2017) – will be particularly fierce. The reason for this competition is that 
those actors that have access to their own resources, will become stronger and 
more independent from others in the party (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 379), and 
particularly so in parties that are short of resources:  
To the extent participants furnish resources that are more critical and 
scarce, they obtain more control over the organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1990, p. 148).  
Concretely, those vested with the power to receive, allocate, audit, and monitor 
the use of state funds in the party will arguably have an elevated position due to 
the responsibilities that this entails (Janda, 1980, p. 111; Nassmacher, 2009, p. 
305). In a similar vein, elites controlling hiring processes and employees’ tasks 
will equally reinforce their position, reflecting Panebianco’s (1988, p. 227) 
contention that the control of staff (even though he refers to a strong, bureaucratic 
apparatus) advantages those who control it, over those who do not (see also 
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Nassmacher, 2009, p. 379). Empowerment of elites will also occur if elites 
themselves take on a paid position, as they then have both the advantage of their 
position, and of having time to dedicate themselves fully to party tasks. So, state 
funding and staff will both increase party elites’ symbolic power as they enhance 
their responsibilities in comparison with other party actors (see Kefford, 2016, p. 
513 for party leaders' power), and their material power as they are put in 
command of larger budgets with greater financial leeway, and in command of 
staff.13 Subnational elites, for instance regional leaders and treasurers that 
themselves manage state funding and control staff, will be equally as reinforced 
as elites on the national level (see e.g. Hagevi, 2018; Nassmacher, 2009). 
Consequently, exactly which party elites (i.e. national or subnational) are 
reinforced due to state funding access and staff is an empirical question to be 
analysed in each relevant case (and is dependent on the regulatory framework in 
place). 
Whereas Tan (1997) argues that competition over internal resources may 
lead to a situation where rent-seeking organisational actors prevent or slow down 
reforms within a party, the argument here is that the opposite may just as well be 
true. More specifically, ‘the battle for organisational control would also constitute 
an important motivator for party reform’ (Gauja, 2016, p. 42), echoing Ware’s 
(1999) argument that resources in a party are more available to the party 
leadership than to rank-and-file members, so that ‘in any party, policy and 
strategy initiatives are far more likely to develop among officials and leaders than 
with members’ (Ware, 1999, p. 110; see also Gauja, 2016; Nassmacher, 1989). 
Taking as a starting point the assumption that party actors pursue their own 
                                                          
13 Such a financial leeway may in practice be limited, due to statutory regulations that, for 
example, grant the party congress power over the budget. However, this is a question that must 
be examined empirically. 
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rational self-interest, Barnea and Rahat (2007, p. 378) argue that politicians will 
try to either protect or increase their status in the intra-party hierarchy by 
maintaining the status quo or changing the rules of the game.14 An effective way 
to do so is to work for reforms that secure them enhanced control over the 
executive council, given the executive’s important role in day-to-day decision-
making. The argument here is thus that new minor party elites, reinforced (either 
in material or symbolic terms) by state funding access and/or staff, will use their 
enhanced positions and these resources to work for such reforms, or to see them 
through. This echoes the description of party leaders as core promoters of 
organisational change in parties given (among other things) their position (Gauja, 
2016, p. 147; see also Harmel et al., 1995). Whether reinforced party elites 
choose to work to centralise or consolidate the executive is dependent on how 
the new minor party within which they operate is structured, which is the topic of 
the next paragraph. 
The organisational structure of a party will provide party actors – reinforced 
by state funding access and/or staff – with institutional possibilities and 
restrictions for centralising reforms, reflecting Duverger’s assertion that ‘modern 
parties are characterised primarily by their anatomy’ (Duverger, 1959, p. xv). 
Thus, elites’ leeway to use their empowered position will be different depending 
on the new minor party’s organisational set-up. Bolleyer (2012, p. 319; see also 
Carty, 2004; Carty & Cross, 2006; Mair, 1994) outlines three different party 
models: party hierarchies, stratarchies, and federations, to be deployed as 
heuristic devices here. In the first, the locus of power is on the national level, in 
stratarchies it is divided across different territorial levels, and in federations it is 
                                                          
14 Even though this assumption has been developed for elites in larger, established parties, there 
is no reason why elites in new minor parties should be any different, as they presumably entered 
politics for the same reasons, namely pursuing either office, policy, or votes (Strøm & Muller, 
1999). 
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situated at the regional level. Consequently, federations will have national 
executive organs in which the territorial division will be reflected (Bolleyer, 2012, 
p. 321), a way of organisation often found in Green parties (Poguntke, 1987; van 
Haute, 2016). In contrast, party hierarchies will have a strong concentration of 
elites in the national leadership, which is a type of organisation frequently found 
in radical right parties (Art, 2011, p. 58; de Lange & Art, 2011, p. 1232; Taggart, 
1995, p. 40) and successor parties to communist parties (Chiru et al., 2015; for a 
similar argument, see also Cross & Pilet, 2015). In the broader party literature, 
the cadre, mass, and catch-all party models are characterised by hierarchical 
power structures, where either elected representatives (cadre and catch all) or 
elites in the national party office (mass) dominate over party members in core 
decision-making (Duverger, 1959; Katz & Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer, 1966). 
Stratarchies, with dispersed power structures (see cartel party thesis, Katz & 
Mair, 1995), have more member-based national executive councils (Bolleyer, 
2012, p. 320).  
Thus, in parties organised as stratarchies, elites that are empowered by 
state funds and staff will have room to centralise the executive, i.e. increase the 
share of elites in the organ. Conversely, this is not possible in hierarchical parties, 
as the executives in such parties will already be composed exclusively of elites, 
leaving them open only for processes of consolidation (i.e. consolidation of elite 
power). Parties organised as federations can offer opportunities both for 
centralisation and consolidation, depending on the type of elites in the executive. 
As federal parties emphasise regional representation in the executive, this may 
in practice mean that the executive is already composed exclusively of elites (i.e. 
regional elites), leaving it open only for consolidating reforms. However, such 
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parties may also invite local leaders (who are not perceived as elites in this thesis) 
to participate, in which case centralising reforms can take place. 
State funds and/or staff help elites both to initiate centralising or 
consolidating reforms, and to see them through. Concretely, elites’ increased 
symbolic position due to state funding access and/or staff control can them give 
them the leverage and authority to initiate (possibly controversial) proposals of 
centralising or consolidating reforms without suffering repercussions, and aid 
them in the process of convincing party representatives and members of their 
proposal. In a material way, state funding can help party elites to execute 
centralising and consolidating reforms by facilitating the organisation of 
workshops, meetings, and congresses where changes can be discussed and 
developed. Moreover, state funds can secure the payment of expenses for travel 
and accommodation to various party representatives who participate in such 
meetings, and see to the printing and distribution of proposals to other affected 
party representatives/members.  
Elite control over staff, or hired elites themselves, can also contribute to 
the execution of centralising or consolidating reforms, resting on the argument 
(and findings) that staff can have a role in processes of party reform (Gauja, 2016, 
pp. 157-159). First, staff can liberate party elites from administrative tasks, giving 
them more time to focus on preferred issues, for example 
centralising/consolidating reform, resonating with Panebianco’s (1988, p. 232) 
argument that staff can ‘increase the leaders’ freedom of movement’ (see also 
Moe, 1980, p. 98). Secondly, staff can aid elites in developing an argument for 
centralising/consolidating reform, and gather the relevant and necessary data to 
back up such a proposal (for example membership figures, or data on local 
branches). Such preparatory work can also effectively be done by party elites 
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who themselves are hired. Thirdly, Moe (1980, p. 99) argues that elites can use 
their staff’s expertise and control over information to shift the perceptions of 
actors who are part of internal politics. Similarly, elites hired as staff can do the 
same. Concretely, staff can thus be used to lobby for party reform among 
congress participants (whether members or delegates or both).  
Now, as most parties change their statutes in party congresses, where 
either delegates (of members) or members themselves directly participate, 
centralising or consolidating reforms prepared by strong party elites are far from 
automatically accepted by a party congress. In cases where members or 
delegates do support such reforms, this can be understood in light of resource-
dependency relationships between members and elites. For example, Coletto 
(2011, p. 112; see also Gidlund, 1991, p. 49) argues that a party branch has to 
be financially independent if it is to be autonomous (see characteristics of a 
stratarchical party in Bolleyer, 2012). Consequently, in new minor parties where 
resources are scarce, those branches not receiving state funding will most likely 
be dependent on the branch which receives it, whether this is at the national, 
supra-national, or regional level. Empirically, there are examples of parties where 
subnational branches transfer state funds upwards to the national branch, and 
parties where the national branch transfers shares of state funding to subnational 
branches (for a Swedish example, see Hagevi, 2018. See also the Norwegian 
and Italian case in this thesis). Consequently, in new minor parties where the 
national and/or regional branches are strongest financially, centralising reforms 
of the executive can be more likely to happen because, either explicitly or 
implicitly, party elites (on these levels) can threaten unruly members with the 
withdrawal of funds from (local) party branches (party on the ground) if they do 
not vote in favour of a reform proposal (see also Coletto et al., 2011). The financial 
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situation, and the internal distribution of funds in a party, can thus put party elites 
in a position to ‘discipline’ members into agreeing to reforms that possibly 
diminish the latter’s power.   
In brief, therefore, state funding and staff can contribute to centralising or 
consolidating reforms, depending on the organisational structure of the party in 
question, by giving elites the symbolic and material leeway necessary to initiate, 
prepare, win support for, and eventually execute reforms. Resource-dependency 
relationships between party branches can arguably ensure that party members 
and/or delegates in congresses accept such reforms, even if they ultimately 
decrease these representatives’ own power. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: Access to state funding and control over staff will empower party elites and 
in turn, depending on organisational structure, either contribute to consolidation 
or centralisation.  
2.2.3 How do state funding and staffing contribute to pursuit of 
constitutive function (H3)? 
In resource-vulnerable parties, such as new minor parties, state funding and staff 
can help the party to surpass the threshold of authorisation, i.e. to comply with 
ballot access requirements and present an electoral list, here labelled electoral 
participation. State funding and staff can arguably do so both directly and 
indirectly.  
In a direct manner, state funding can firstly help parties to comply with 
various ballot access requirements that require funds, such as payment of fees, 
preparation and printing of statutes/bylaws, and having an external auditor (see 
Tavits, 2008; Pedersen, 1982;  for examples from the US case, see Stratmann, 
2005; Burden, 2007), echoing the argument that state funds are the money that 
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keep parties alive from one election to the next (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 292). State 
funds are especially important for potential signature requirements for ballot 
access. Concretely, signature collection often demands that party 
representatives travel and rally for their party. State funds can cover the costs of 
such travel, and enable party representatives to collect signatures in more areas 
than would otherwise be possible. Moreover, party pamphlets and other materials 
that can be used in the signature campaign itself can be prepared and printed 
with the help of state funds. Additionally, possible fees related to approval of 
signatures are naturally more easily covered when a party has state funds. 
Surely, other income sources also aid a party in these processes. However, as 
mentioned previously, new minor parties tend to have few alternative income 
sources upon which they can rely. 
Staff can also contribute directly to the task of complying with ballot access 
requirements, and signature requirements specifically: Staff have knowledge and 
updated information regarding the specificities of the ballot access requirements. 
This task is particularly pertinent for parties that operate in contexts where ballot 
access requirements often change, or where snap-elections are held, meaning 
that the time-frame within which new minor parties have to exceed the threshold 
of authorisation, is short. Additionally, staff can coordinate and participate in 
signature campaigns. 
In addition to helping to surpass ballot access requirements, state funding 
and staff facilitate the process of constructing the electoral list(s) itself. Depending 
on the electoral system, a party has to either present one electoral list per 
constituency, or two in the case of mixed electoral systems (one party list and 
one with individual district candidates). The process is in itself crucial, as a party 
is defined by its candidates demographically, geographically, and ideologically 
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(Hazan & Voerman, 2006, p. 148). Previously in the chapter it was argued that 
new minor parties have a limited recruitment ground as they often have few 
organisational branches and lack a strong youth organisation. This is also related 
to an often low membership number (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair & Biezen, 2001). 
All these characteristics complicate the process of developing an electoral list, as 
‘one thing that parties absolutely cannot do without (…), is candidates’ (Art, 2011, 
p. 35; see also Lucardie, 2000; Scarrow, 2015). State funding can help new minor 
parties to exploit their (limited) membership base to the fullest when it comes to 
constructing and presenting an electoral list. Concretely, state funding ensures 
that new minor parties have the funds available to reach out to their members 
and find out which of them are interested in standing as candidates on the list, for 
example by distributing letters to all members, launching a campaign searching 
for electoral candidates, or organising meetings where candidacies can be 
discussed. Moreover, coordination between constituencies or between party 
representatives with regards to candidacies can be facilitated when the party has 
money to cover travel costs, meeting facilities, and telephone and internet bills. 
Also external campaigns, where a party seeks electoral candidates outside its 
membership ranks, can more easily be conducted and paid for with the help of 
state funding. Similarly, staff presence can contribute to the processes described 
above: staff can help in the process of identifying candidates, contacting them, 
and interviewing them (if the parties choose to do that), and dealing with the 
administrative requirements related to presenting a list (for example formatting 
requirements).  
In an indirect manner, state funds and staff can enable electoral 
participation by contributing to building branches and increasing the membership. 
More specifically, Kölln (2015, p. 707) argues that party organisations, 
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understood as the extra-parliamentary units of parties, ‘prepare the party for the 
next electoral event’. In works on party members, their importance as potential 
candidates for public office and as a means of voluntary support are frequently 
mentioned (see e.g. Scarrow, 2000; Scarrow, 2015). Consequently, I argue that 
members represent a crucial resource which is necessary to facilitate electoral 
participation per se. Members can for example aid compliance with ballot access 
criteria by being mobilised to organise signature campaigns, and collect 
signatures. They provide a party with candidates for elections, and can also 
themselves contribute with proposals for candidacies, which helps in the process 
of developing the electoral list. This indicates that state funding and staff may be 
well utilised in the task of increasing the party membership. State funding can 
contribute to membership growth by facilitating membership campaigns and 
travels by party leaders to new areas where recruitment campaigns can take 
place. Furthermore, transfers to subnational branches can be used for 
recruitment purposes. Staff can similarly work on such campaigns, identify new 
members, and provide a stable point of reference in the party office with whom 
new members can be in touch. State funding and staff can thus, by contributing 
to membership growth, indirectly make it easier for new minor parties to exceed 
the threshold of authorisation.  
State funding and staff can also contribute indirectly to electoral 
participation by contributing to either establishing or strengthening subnational 
party branches.15 Having functioning subnational branches is particularly 
important for electoral participation as parties in many European countries 
                                                          
15 While some argue that an increase in membership necessitates more subnational leaders and 
branches (Blondel, 1978, p. 149, cited in Kölln 2015; see also Michels, 1962 [1911], p. 34), 
membership increase and the establishment and strengthening of subnational branches are 
different organisational processes with different dynamics, which is why they are treated 
separately in this argument. 
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(including Norway and Italy) grant their subnational levels a crucial role in 
identifying and selecting candidates for election (Bille, 2001; Hazan & Voerman, 
2006; for Norwegian examples, see Svåsand, 1994a; Svåsand et al., 1997), not 
just in regional, but also in national elections. Although the studies referred to 
above offer little insight into new minor parties specifically, given that ‘parties tend 
to imitate one another’ (Hazan & Voerman, 2006, p. 154), it is reasonable to 
expect the new minor parties in this study to have a similar way of organising their 
candidate selection processes. Consequently, functioning subnational branches 
to which members adhere, and that the party can rely on for proposals and 
decisions regarding candidacies, are crucial for a party’s ability to complete the 
work on setting up electoral lists in different types of elections. A subnational 
branch can also aid in processes of signature collection, for instance by 
mobilising members.  
Staff can facilitate the establishment of new branches, for instance by 
travelling to areas where there is no branch (but only members) in order to set up 
basic structures (local executive, for instance). Staff can also work to strengthen 
those branches that already exist (but function poorly), by following up on their 
activities, urging them to hold annual meetings, and performing training to ensure 
that branches know how to deal effectively with internal matters (e.g. candidate 
selection, regular meetings), and external matters (how to engage in public 
debate, write letters to the editor, etc.). This can in turn significantly improve a 
new minor party’s potential to field candidates in more electoral districts, and 
hence pursue its constitutive function.16 State funding can also contribute (not 
                                                          
16 I take countries that do not have an electoral system with one single nation-wide district as a 
starting point, as neither Norway nor Italy have had this. For a discussion of the link between 
electoral district and candidate selection method, see Hazan and Voerman (2006).  
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just by paying for staff) to the establishment and strengthening of branches, by 
financing meetings, office space, and basic facilities (computers etc.).  
In brief, therefore, state funding and staff can directly contribute to 
facilitating the processes of overcoming ballot access requirements and 
presenting an electoral list, and can indirectly contribute to an increase in 
membership and to the establishment and/or strengthening of subnational 
branches. This argument similarly implies that new minor parties that lose or face 
a significant decrease in their income from state funding, and/or decrease or 
downsize their staff, will have a harder time in surpassing the threshold of 
authorisation. This is because new minor parties will then have less money and 
fewer staff to help with demands related to ballot access requirements and the 
preparation of the electoral list, but also because efforts to increase the 
membership and establish and/or strengthen subnational branches will suffer. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: State funding access and staff help new minor parties to exceed the threshold 
of authorisation.  
2.3 Summary  
This chapter has defined the study’s core concepts, and outlined how they are 
theoretically related to one another, developing a total of three hypotheses that 
are heuristic devices to guide the empirical analysis. Concretely, state funding 
was defined as state benefits, comprising both direct and indirect benefits, and 
state constraints, comprising requirements related to the access and 
maintenance of state funds. Staffing was defined as changes to the number of 
either temporary or permanent staff, while centralisation is understood as the 
process in which elites, such as party leaders and elected representatives, 
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increase their power over the executive council in new minor parties. 
Consolidation was defined as the process in which party elites (that operate in 
parties that already have a completely centralised executive), reinforce their 
strong position, as such consolidating it. Finally, pursuit of constitutive function is 
understood as the process of exceeding Pedersen’s (1982) threshold of 
authorisation, i.e. complying with ballot access criteria and presenting an 
electoral list.  
There are three core arguments in this study, each reflected in a 
hypothesis. The hypotheses have been developed based on rational choice 
institutionalism, and are outlined in the table below. H1 argues that an increase 
of state funding will contribute to staffing in new minor parties. The argument 
conversely implies that a decrease or loss of state funds contributes to 
downsizing. In H2 staffing shifts status, and becomes – in addition to state funding 
– the factor theorised to contribute to centralisation. In the table below, I mark this 
shift with a double line between H1 and H2. The argument in H2 is that state 
funding and staff will contribute to strengthening party elites, in consequence 
leading to either a centralisation of the executive council, or to the consolidation 
of an already centralised structure. The argument thus takes into account that 
different parties will exhibit different levels of centralisation prior to a reform, which 
will affect a party’s room to centralise. Finally, the argument in H3 contends that 
state funding and staff facilitate electoral participation, by directly contributing to 
overcoming ballot access criteria such as signature campaigns and candidate 
recruitment. Also, these resources contribute indirectly to electoral participation, 
by aiding in the establishment and strengthening of party branches and in 
increasing the membership. Conversely, H3 implies that a decrease or loss of 
state funding and staff will make it more difficult for new minor parties to 
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participate in elections, as they will then lack two core resources that directly and 
indirectly enable electoral participation.   
Table 2.2 Overview of theoretical argument and hypotheses 
Hypotheses State funding 
access/increase 
Staffing Centralisation Pursuit of 
constitutive 
function 
H1 + +   
H2 + + +  
H3 + +  + 
Note: The impact of state funding on staffing is analysed in H1, while the impact of state funding 
and staff on centralisation and pursuit of constitutive function is analysed in H2 and H3.  
The next chapter outlines the research design of the thesis, specifying how 
it empirically addresses the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter. 
Concretely, I discuss why a comparative design, relying on in-depth qualitative 
data from 14 new minor parties from Norway and Italy, provides a fruitful way to 
analyse the theoretical propositions discussed in this chapter. 
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3 Research design 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the study’s comparative design, case selection, the data on 
which the analysis relies, and operationalisations. Firstly, I discuss the thesis’ 
comparative case design, and why it is feasible to select Italy and Norway as 
contexts from which to draw new minor parties. These two advanced, established 
democracies offer rich variation concerning state benefits and constraints, crucial 
for both within-case and across-case comparisons. Secondly, I present the 
study’s case selection, which has two parts. The first discusses the criteria for 
and selection of new minor parties. As emphasised in chapter 1, the impact of 
state funds will be most readily visible in new minor parties, making them 
particularly pertinent to the aims of this thesis. Four analytical criteria are 
employed to select new minor parties: a) party newness; b) minority status; c) 
variation with regards to state funding access; and d) variation in 
ideology/age/status (alive/dead). Seven new minor parties in each context are 
selected. The second part of the case selection outlines the criteria for selecting 
centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests, both of which constitute 
units of analysis that will be analysed in-depth in order to explore how state funds 
shape centralisation (H2) and pursuit of constitutive function (H3) respectively. 
The core criterion for selecting centralising/consolidating reforms is that prior to 
the reform the party had access to either state funds and/or staff, while the main 
criterion for selecting electoral contests is that prior to the relevant contest the 
party experienced an increase or decrease of state funds and/or staff.  
The following part of the chapter describes the data upon which the 
analysis relies, namely primary documents, semi-structured interviews, and 
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secondary sources. I discuss how the data is used and triangulated, both across 
different sources and within the same type of source, how it has been collected, 
and its challenges regarding validity and reliability. In the final section of the 
chapter I operationalise the concepts of the study (state benefits/constraints, 
staffing, centralisation/consolidation, and pursuit of constitutive function), and 
outline the indicators for the analysis. Then I discuss which additional factors will 
be considered throughout the analysis. 
3.1 Research Design: The comparative approach, contexts, 
and time-frame 
This study’s aim, to systematically explore how state benefits and constraints 
shape staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function, implies that the 
core focus is on ‘the importance of an independent variable’ (George & Bennett, 
2005, p. 80). The complexity involved in analysing the ways in which institutions17 
– for this thesis, state benefits and constraints – influence political actors has led 
some to argue that in-depth examinations of individual cases are necessary 
(Detterbeck, 2012). In recognition of this, the present work is a comparative case 
study. Case studies better enable us to specify whether and how a factor matters, 
rather than how much it matters (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 25), making this 
method appropriate to the aim of this study – to analyse how state funding 
contributes to shaping intra-organisational processes in new minor parties. The 
comparative approach employed first seeks to ensure a comparison across 
contexts, i.e. by analysing how state funding in Norway and Italy impact staffing, 
centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function in the respective new minor 
parties of these two contexts. However, the analyses of H1, H2, and H3 are also 
                                                          
17 See rational choice institutionalist approach in chapter 2. 
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life cycle analyses, meaning that shifts in staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of 
constitutive function will also be analysed over time within each of the new minor 
parties under scrutiny, thereby allowing for within-case comparison as well 
(Paterson, 2012). 
Chapter 1 outlined how the choice to study new minor parties in this thesis 
is appropriate for analytical and methodological reasons. In particular, these 
parties tend to have poorly developed income structures, few material resources, 
and small memberships (Bolleyer, 2013; Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ikstens et al., 
2002; Mair & Biezen, 2001; Wilson, 1973). As a result, state funds are particularly 
important for these largely state-dependent parties (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 
2006, p. 43). Thus, new minor parties constitute most-likely cases, i.e. cases 
where one expects to see that state funding (in this case the crucial factor to be 
studied) indeed has an impact on the outcome of interest (staffing, centralisation, 
and pursuit of constitutive function) (see e.g. George & Bennett, 2005, p. 253; 
Gerring, 2007, p. 89; Levy, 2008). Such state-dependent new minor parties (most 
likely cases) are arguably particularly useful for a study that seeks to bring clarity 
to a literature that has found contradictory results concerning the impact of state 
funds on intra-organisational development in parties (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 
2006). More specifically, their state-dependency makes it possible to pin-point 
the impact of state funds (as opposed to other income sources) on staffing, 
centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function, and explore how regulatory 
shifts to state benefits and constraints potentially impact intra-organisational 
processes. 
The crucial role of state benefits and constraints in the analysis means that 
regulatory context is the core entity that needs to be selected first in order to 
ensure variation (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 83). By selecting Italy and Norway 
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this study contributes to redressing the fact that political finance issues have 
‘received far less systematic treatment in Western Europe [than in the US]’ 
(Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 3; but see Nassmacher, 2009; Poguntke et al., 2016). 
These two contexts from Western Europe ensure homogeneity on some core, 
overarching factors. First, both Italy and Norway are parliamentary democracies 
in which parties (not candidates) are at the centre of political finance, contrary to, 
for example, the systems in place in the US and Canada (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 
32). Secondly, both countries have, since 1970 and 1974 (Norway and Italy 
respectively) offered state funds to political parties, which is crucial given the 
thesis’ focus on exploring the impact of state funds on intra-organisational 
processes. Moreover, selecting two countries where state funding was introduced 
before the parties under scrutiny were established (i.e. prior to 1980) eliminates 
the introduction moment per se as an additional factor in the analysis. Thirdly, 
these two countries’ political parties (irrespective of size) have over time been 
highly state-dependent (see e.g. Biezen & Kopecký, 2014, 2017). Finally, Norway 
and Italy are similar with regards to the timing of the introduction of a party law 
(2006 in Norway and 2012 in Italy) and party constitutionalisation – two matters 
that generally differ across new and old democracies (Biezen & Kopecký, 2014).  
These overarching similarities aside, the two contexts have exposed their 
parties to considerably varying state benefits and constraints over time, which 
enables the analysis to investigate how a broad range of (different) state funding 
regulations influences staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. 
More specifically, both contexts have changed the nature of state benefits (type 
of benefit, amounts available) and constraints (related to accessing and 
maintaining benefits) considerably since state funding was introduced (see also 
Pizzimenti, 2017; Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011; Saglie & Sivesind, 2018). Now, the 
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extent to which the new minor parties studied notice these changes and adapt to 
them is an empirical question. The crucial matter is that each of the contexts 
allows for variation over time within the core indicator of the study (see 
operationalisation below), namely access to/increase of state funding (or 
decrease or loss), and therefore facilitates the comparisons outlined above: both 
across contexts and within cases. 
Italy and Norway also differ (and have differed over time) concerning some 
(party) system-level variables. First, despite both Italy and Norway being 
established democracies, the Italian party system has been more fluid, and has 
been characterised as ‘fertile soil’ for new party emergence, while Norway is used 
as an example of the opposite (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008, p. 280). This fluidity is 
particularly related to the collapse of the party system following corruption 
scandals in the early 1990s (see e.g. Bull & Rhodes, 1997). The changed external 
pressures and opportunities that all political parties were faced with in the wake 
of this – such as a rejection of the political class by the people, and the 
disappearance of a range of the established parties (see e.g. Bull & Rhodes, 
1997) – could potentially affect the analysis of the ways in which state funds 
impact intra-organisational development, particularly so with regards to staffing 
(H1). This difference between Norway and Italy enables the analysis to explore 
whether state funds still shape organisational patterns in new minor parties 
operating in two different party systems similarly.  
Secondly, the electoral system in Italy has changed more frequently and 
undergone more substantial changes than in Norway. The shift from a highly 
proportional to a mixed electoral system in 1993 is a case in point (see e.g. Katz, 
2003; Regalia, 2018). This has provided (new minor) parties with different 
opportunities, e.g. concerning coalition participation in elections. I can thus 
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explore whether state funding (and staff) similarly contribute to pursuit of 
constitutive function in new minor parties that operate under contrasting electoral 
systems. Thirdly, Italy is a member of the EU, which Norway is not. In terms of 
state funding provision, this should not significantly skew the analysis, as both 
contexts have provided direct state funding on three levels. While Norway has 
done so on national, regional, and local level, the Italian state has provided 
benefits related to regional, national, and European elections. Now, that does not 
mean that the benefits provided on these three different levels across the two 
contexts are alike, but that the number of institutional tiers on which state benefits 
are available are identical in the two countries, eliminating this as a source of 
variation. 
As mentioned above, state funding was introduced to Norwegian parties 
in 1970, and to Italian ones in 1974. However, even though the regulatory 
analysis goes back to the 1970s, the time-frame for the analysis of how state 
funds shape staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function is from 
1980 until 2016. 1980 is selected as a cut-off point given that 1980 is selected as 
a definitional criterion for newness in this thesis. Studying parties that were 
formed post 1980 allows for the coverage of complete life cycles of new parties, 
while simultaneously assuring that all the parties face the challenge of 
consolidating support in increasingly individualised contexts and in times of 
considerable regulatory change (see e.g. Biezen & Kopecký, 2014, p. 173). 2016 
is the final year covered in the analysis, as this was the year the fieldwork for the 
thesis began.  
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3.2 Case selection: Parties, reforms, and electoral contests 
The first part of this section on case selection reflects the above section on 
selection of regulatory contexts, by outlining the criteria for and selection of seven 
new minor parties in each context, whose patterns concerning staffing, 
centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function will be analysed in this thesis. 
The second part outlines the criteria for selecting centralising/consolidating 
reforms and electoral contests with regards to the in-depth analysis of H2 and H3 
respectively.18 Concretely, the analyses of centralisation (H2) and pursuit of 
constitutive function (H3) both comprise a life cycle and an in-depth analysis. The 
life cycle analysis of H2 outlines shifts to the composition of the new minor parties’ 
executive councils and the de-facto leadership structure over time, in order to 
establish whether or not centralisation and/or consolidation took place. Similarly, 
the life cycle analysis of H3 explores the new minor parties’ electoral participation 
(i.e. ability to exceed the threshold of authorisation) over time. The in-depth 
analyses of H2 and H3 explore the ways in which state funds and staff impact 
centralisation/consolidation (H2) and pursuit of constitutive function (H3), by 
analysing selected centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests 
respectively. The criteria for selecting these centralising/consolidating reforms 
and electoral contests are thus outlined in the second part of this section on case 
selection. 
3.2.1 Selecting new minor parties in Norway and Italy 
Analytically speaking, there were four steps to constructing a sample of new 
minor parties for the analysis of H1-H3. Firstly, new parties in Norway and Italy, 
i.e. parties formed post-1980, had to be identified. Secondly, it had to be 
                                                          
18 There is no need to select specific staffing processes for in-depth scrutiny of H1, as the analysis 
of H1 includes all staffing processes throughout the new minor parties’ life cycle.  
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established which of these were electorally minor parties, i.e. winning less than 
10 percent of the vote. This also implied eliminating possible major (new) parties. 
Thirdly, the focus on how new minor parties’ access to/increase of, and 
decrease/loss of, state funding impacts intra-organisational processes meant that 
the sample had to be selected from new minor parties exhibiting variation on this 
indicator. Finally, it was important to achieve variation with regards to the parties’ 
ideology, formation date, and current status (dead/alive), given these indicators’ 
relevance in the analysis. The following paragraphs outline the details of these 
four steps, but first, I operationalise the concepts party, new, and minor, as these 
form the basis for the subsequent case selection.  
Chapter 1 defined a new party as one established after 1980, and a minor 
party as one that has never achieved more than 10 percent of the vote. To 
operationalise ‘new’, I rely on Hug (2001), who states that a new party either 
results from a split or is a genuinely new foundation that has no basis in an older 
party/different party. This contrasts with the view adopted by Harmel and 
Robertson (1985), who included mergers, splits, and natural formations in their 
category ‘circumstances of formation’ for new parties, and with Bartolini and Mair 
(1990), who excluded both mergers and splits from a sample of new parties.  
Hug’s starting point is appropriate for studying organisational development 
over time since the parties selected will have to build a new organisation (if they 
chose to do so) from scratch, and not the least maintain it. Moreover, new parties 
- irrespective of whether they originate as a split or as a completely newly born 
party - will share the trait of having malleable and (at least initially) poorly 
institutionalised party structures due to their age, and of having vulnerable income 
structures (see section 1.1.1 in this thesis). So, even though some parties may 
start out with (more or less) resources, such as members and/or elected 
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representatives, these features are still present. In theory, therefore, state funds’ 
impact on these parties’ patterns of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of 
constitutive function, will be similar. To empirically explore this notion, however, 
the final sample of parties (see below) studied in this thesis, includes both splits 
from powerful mother parties (e.g. the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy) 
and completely newly born parties (such as the Greens in both Norway and Italy). 
Thus, the thesis can investigate if state funds actually impact new parties that 
start out with different pools of resources similarly - or not.  
To operationalise minor party status, I rely on a party’s electoral results 
(see e.g. Duverger, 1959; Mair, 1991), and not on institutional criteria, e.g. 
membership in the national parliament (Pridham, 1991), or the party’s relevance 
or position in the party system (Copus et al., 2009; Herzog, 1987; Smith, 1991). 
Electoral results are a feasible indicator for minor party status because they often 
determine a party’s access to state funding. Operationally, a minor party needs 
to be distinguished from a major party, and hence an upper electoral limit must 
be set. Casal Bértoa and Spirova (2017) argue that small (minor) parties are 
those that linger between the thresholds for parliamentary representation and 
access to state funds, while Rashkova and Spirova (2014) argue that small 
parties (in Bulgaria) are those receiving less than 10 percent of the national 
electoral vote. I adopt the latter threshold for two main reasons. First, it creates a 
sample of minor parties that is relatively homogeneous in terms of electoral 
turnout, but still captures both electorally minor parties that have no problem 
accessing state funds (winning 5-10 percent of the vote), and parties that never 
or only sometimes qualify (winning 0-5 percent of the vote). Secondly, since this 
study investigates party features over time, a 10 percent threshold allows minor 
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parties to grow through the period of study, without being excluded from the study 
because of their doing so.  
Only national and regional new minor parties are included in order to 
exclude strictly local formations that will never – because they either lack the 
potential or lack the desire – become relevant on a national level. To avoid 
selecting minor party formations that never came close to accessing state funds, 
and that, due to their size, most likely lack structures that can be analysed, a 
lower 0.5 percent limit for inclusion in the sample is adopted. Concretely, 
national/regional parties that never won more than 0.5 percent of the vote on 
national level are not selected. However, if a party that never achieved more than 
0.5 percent of the vote on the national level still managed to have a 
parliamentarian elected, the party is included. The reason is that parliamentary 
representation most likely implies the presence of (at least some organisational) 
structure in a party (that can be analysed in this thesis). The selection criteria are 
summarised in the table below: 
Table 3.1 Operationalisation of party, newness, and minor party status  
 Party New Minor 
Operationalisations 
a) Be a national or 
regional party 
 
b) Achieve more 
than 0.5 percent in 
national elections or 
have one 
parliamentarian 
elected 
a) Be formed as a 
split or completely 
newly born 
 
b) Founded post-
1980 
Never achieve more 
than 10 percent of the 
vote 
 
In order to select new minor parties, I first identified all parties that ran in 
elections in Italy and Norway between 1980 and 2016 by analysing official 
statistics from the Italian Ministry of Interior, and reports and electoral lists 
provided by Statistics Norway (SSB) and the Norwegian Social Science 
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Database (NSD). The table below shows that 252 parties ran in the nine 
parliamentary elections held between 1980 and 2016 in Italy, while the figure was 
65 in Norway (same number of elections).  
Table 3.2 The party landscape, Norway and Italy 
Overview Italy1 Norway 
Total number of parties running 252 65 
Number of new parties 282 8 
Number of new minor parties 26 8 
% of new minor parties of total number of parties running 10 12 
Number of new minor parties (achieving between 0.5-5% in 
elections) 
21 8 
Number of new minor parties (achieving between 5-10% in 
elections) 
53 0 
Formative features of the new minor parties   
Splits 23 6 
Newly born 3 2 
Notes: All elections in the period 1980-2016 are included. Both Italy and Norway had 9 parliamentary 
elections in this time period.  
1 Only Chamber of Deputies elections (not Senate) are included. In 1994, 1996, and 2001 Italian parties 
could run lists in a proportional and a majoritarian component. The table only includes parties running in 
the proportional part of the election for these three years.  
2 Three parties have not been registered, as they do not have individual (just coalition) election results. 
3 The Christian Democratic Centre (CCD) and United Christian Democratic Centre ran together, and their 
total election result is above 5 percent. The two parties are counted as two in this figure, even though their 
election result was joint. 
Sources: Norway: Statistics Norway (Undated (a)), and Norwegian Social Science Database (Undated). 
Italy: Ministry of the Interior. 
After having identified all parties that ran in elections between 1980 and 
2016, I coded newness, i.e. whether a party was established after 1980 as either 
a split or a newly born. Party webpages, other webpages (of them Wikipedia)19, 
secondary sources, and newspaper sources were used in this analysis. Then I 
noted which parties had either achieved more than 0.5 percent of the vote or had 
one parliamentarian elected. Afterwards, I singled out those that had achieved 
more than 10 percent of the vote. Two such (new, major) parties existed in Italy, 
namely Forza Italia and The 5 Star Movement, but none in Norway. In Italy, a 
total of 26 parties were both new and minor, while the number was eight in 
Norway. While all the new minor Norwegian parties are located in the electoral 
                                                          
19 For some of the very minor formations, Wikipedia is nearly the only source for information, and, 
although not ideal, the author has decided to rely on information from this source in a few cases 
where no other source is available.  
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range between 0.5 percent and 5 percent of the vote, the Italian context also 
produced new minor parties that won between 5 and 10 percent in national 
elections. Appendix A lists all of the new minor parties in each of the two contexts.  
Given the overall lower number of new minor parties in the Norwegian case 
(only eight parties), all of them except one is included in the final sample.20 Seven 
parties were selected among the new minor parties in the Italian case. Both of 
the samples contain parties that increased and decreased their income from state 
funding, ensuring variation on the study’s crucial indicator. Two parties – in each 
context – that did not access state funding are included. This is useful in the 
analysis of staffing, as it enables me to explore whether a complete lack of state 
funds really does (as theorised) mean a complete lack of staff. As outlined above, 
the selected parties are founded at different time points between 1980 and 2016, 
enabling a broad analysis of how different state funding regulations have affected 
them at different time points. Moreover, two dead parties are included in each 
context to enable an analysis of the extent to which state funding contributes to 
a decrease (and eventual ceasing) of ability to pursue constitutive function. As 
ideology is one of the factors that will be accounted for throughout the analysis 
(see section 3.5), it is valuable that both the selected Norwegian and Italian new 
minor parties exhibit a diverse range of ideological dispositions, from single-issue 
parties, to regional/agrarian, to environmental. The table below outlines the core 
traits of the seven selected parties in each context.  
 
                                                          
20 I exclude The Political Party from the analysis, given that it was a party created by two 
comedians, widely perceived as a joke by the mainstream media and commentators (see e.g. 
Dagbladet, 2000; Kvilesjø, 2000). 
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Table 3.3 New minor parties selected for analysis – Norway and Italy 
 
Formation  
date 
Dead/ 
alive 
Accessed 
state 
funding 
in life 
span 
Decreased/
lost state 
funding in 
life span 
Ideology 
NORWAY      
The 
Pensioners’ 
Party  
1985 Alive Yes Yes Single-
issue/pensioner 
The Greens  1988 Alive Yes Yes Environment 
Future for 
Finnmark  
1989 Dead 
(1993) 
No No Single-
issue/regional 
The 
Fatherland’s 
Party 
1990 Dead 
(2008) 
Yes Yes Far-
right/immigration 
Cross-
Partisan MPs 
1992 Alive No No Non-applicable1 
The Coastal 
Party 
1999 Alive Yes Yes Regional/ 
coastal 
interests/ 
agrarian 
The Christian 
Conservative 
Party 
2011 Alive Yes Yes Christian 
conservative 
ITALY      
The Greens 1986 Alive Yes Yes Environmental 
The 
Pensioners’ 
Party  
1987 Alive Yes Yes Pensioner/ 
single-issue 
Communist 
Refoundation 
Party  
1991 Alive Yes Yes Communist 
The Segni 
Pact 
1993 Dead 
(2002) 
Yes Yes Single-issue 
(change 
electoral law) 
Tricolour 
Flame  
1995 Alive Yes Yes Far-right 
The 
Communist 
Party of 
Workers 
2006 Alive No No Communist 
Work to Stop 
the Decline 
2012 Dead 
(2014) 
No No Liberal 
Notes: 1Non applicable is coded because Cross Partisan MPs allowed their representatives to 
choose their own program/issues. 
3.2.2 Selecting centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests  
To select reform processes for the in-depth study of centralisation/consolidation, 
I first relied on the life cycle analysis of centralisation. This analysis (see chapter 
7) outlines whether or not the selected new minor parties centralised the 
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composition of their executive councils – if there was room to do so – throughout 
their life cycles. If there was no room to centralise the executive (i.e. it was already 
completely elite-controlled), the analysis investigates whether the party 
underwent a consolidating reform. If a new minor party never introduced either a 
centralising or consolidating reform, the party was excluded from the second (in-
depth) part of the centralisation analysis. Then, if a party implemented several 
reforms, the core criterion for selecting one reform process was that prior to its 
introduction the party had access to state funding and/or staff, i.e. one or both of 
the resources which constitute the main interest of the analysis. To establish 
whether parties had state funds and/or staff, I relied on the life cycle analysis of 
the parties’ income structure (see chapter 5) and staffing patterns (chapter 6). 
The adoption of this selection criterion implies that those parties that introduced 
a reform, but did not have state funding and/or staff prior to its introduction, were 
omitted from the in-depth analysis (i.e. their reforms are not analysed).  
I selected the first reform21 (centralising or consolidating) following access 
to state funds and/or staff. Three centralising and two consolidating reform 
fulfilled the selection criteria in the Italian case, whilst three centralising and one 
consolidating reform were selected in the Norwegian case.22 As it happens, the 
selected reforms comprise both major and minor reform processes, which 
ensures that the analysis does not present a skewed picture of the role of state 
funds and staff, as larger reforms would arguably require more resources (for 
example in the form of preparatory work) than smaller reforms. The empirical 
details of the selection process (in light of the criteria developed above) are found 
in chapter 7 on centralisation. 
                                                          
21 I.e. the first reform that I have been able to document via my sources. 
22 This means that no party in my sample introduced a de-centralising reform as its first reform 
following access to state funds and/or staff.  
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To select one electoral contest for each of the parties, for in-depth analysis 
regarding pursuit of constitutive function (H3), I relied on the life cycle analysis of 
the new minor parties’ income structure (see chapter 5), and staffing patterns 
(chapter 6). The first criterion for selecting an electoral contest is that prior to it 
the party experienced either an increase or a decrease of state funding and/or 
staff, i.e. a significant shift in one or both of the resources which constitute the 
main interest of the analysis. New minor parties in both contexts which 
experienced an increase or decrease of such resources were thus identified in a 
first step, to ensure variation. The adoption of this selection criterion automatically 
implies that those parties which throughout their life cycles had neither state funds 
nor staff are excluded from the in-depth analysis, since I would not be able to 
explore the impact of the two core indicators of interest (state funds and staff) in 
these cases.  
Two additional selection criteria were adopted, to ensure the broadest 
possible sample of electoral contests and give the analysis a wider basis for 
exploring how state funding and staff contribute to electoral participation. First, 
electoral contests exposing new minor parties to varying ballot access criteria, 
which are a crucial part of the threshold of authorisation, were selected. A detailed 
overview of the ballot access criteria in place in Norway and Italy over time can 
be found in Appendix G. Ensuring variation within this indicator is important in 
order to avoid presenting an analysis which, due to homogeneity (either ballot 
access criteria are permissive or constraining), is biased with respect to the 
impact of staff and state funding on electoral participation. In a related vein: 
electoral contests taking place on different institutional levels (national, regional, 
EU) were selected. This criterion helps to fulfil the previous one (i.e. variation 
concerning ballot access criteria), but also ensures that the impact of state 
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funding and staff is analysed in electoral contests where parties’ need for 
members and local branches might vary. For example, the number of candidacies 
required to present a list may differ in different types of elections (see Appendix 
G), in turn exposing new minor parties to different pressures with regards to 
recruitment of candidates. Overall, the first electoral contest following a new 
minor parties’ increase or decrease of state funding was selected. However, to 
ensure variation in ballot access criteria and institutional tier of the election, the 
second electoral contest after an increase or decrease of state funding and/or 
staff was selected for in-depth analysis in some of the parties. In the Italian case, 
six electoral contests were selected – one at the European level, three at the 
regional level, and two at the national level. In Norway, three regional electoral 
contests and two national were selected. The empirical details of the selection 
process are outlined in chapter 8 on pursuit of constitutive function.  
The table below summarises the selection criteria for 
centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests:  
Table 3.4 Overview of selection criteria for centralising/consolidating reforms 
and electoral contests 
Unit of analysis Selection criteria 
Centralising/consolidating 
reform 
1. Presence of state funds and/or staff prior to introduction 
of reform 
2. First reform following access to state funds and/or staff 
selected 
Electoral contest 
1. Significant increase/decrease in income from the state 
and/or in staff number 
2. First electoral contest following such a shift in resources 
selected in a majority of the parties, but in minority of 
parties the second electoral contest following this shift 
was selected to ensure variation in: 
3. Ballot access requirements 
4. Institutional tier of the election 
 
78 
 
3.3 Data and method 
The main sources of data used in the analysis were: primary documents such as 
party documents and newspaper sources; semi-structured interviews; and 
secondary sources such as legal texts. The party documents, newspaper 
articles/radio recordings, and interviews were all analysed using simple 
qualitative content analysis.23 To address the three hypotheses, I first analysed 
the written material, i.e. party documents, newspaper articles, radio interviews, 
and secondary sources. Then, those sources were analysed in conjunction with 
interview material, in order to ‘confirm information that has already been collected 
from other sources’ (Tansey, 2007, p. 766). The diversity of data sources, and 
this way of analysing it, facilitated data triangulation (Bryman, 2003) throughout 
the analysis, both across sources (interviews vs. documents, and primary vs. 
secondary sources), across interviewees (party leader vs. party staff), and across 
party documents (financial account vs. annual account). Triangulation enhances 
the validity of the study’s findings, and simultaneously reveals weaknesses in 
other sources (Patton, 2002; Tansey, 2007).24 The ability to triangulate across 
interviewees facilitated validity in cases where other data sources (e.g. 
documents) were scarce. The next section outlines the different data sources 
upon which the analysis rests, and discusses their challenges and limitations. 
 
                                                          
23 The direct quotes from documents and interviews in Norwegian/Italian have been translated by 
me, and semantically adopted to appear fluent in English. That means that not all translations are 
completely literal, as this would hamper the understanding in English.  
24 As will become evident in the analysis, triangulation is not possible in all cases and for all 
information. Sometimes this is caused by the fact that some information has been particularly 
difficult to get hold of. The lack of triangulation in some instances is a weakness, but difficult to 
operate without, given that new minor parties are generally poorly covered (with a few exceptions) 
in the secondary literature, and that new minor parties have to a lesser degree developed archives 
offering consistent and broad information. Having said that, care has been taken to highlight 
where this is the case in the analysis, and to modify the nature of the conclusions accordingly. 
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3.3.1 Primary documents 
Financial accounts and annual accounts are two core primary documents in this 
thesis. The former gives crucial information concerning state funding access and 
staffing, and the latter (often) provides information on various matters including 
staffing, electoral participation, organisational change, and finances. More 
specifically, the attachments to the Italian parties’ financial accounts (nota 
integrativa) (usually) detail the exact number of staff in the parties. In some 
instances, staffing figures are discussed in the Italian parties’ annual accounts as 
well (or instead of in the attachments). In Norway, staffing figures and changes 
to these are reported in the parties’ annual accounts. The annual accounts also 
give (in some cases substantial) information about the staff’s tasks.  
The annual accounts in the Italian case usually originate from the 
treasurer, and are called Relazione del tesoriere/Relazione sulla gestione del 
bilancio, while they are often written by the executive council or the leadership in 
the Norwegian parties (årsrapport). Financial and annual accounts for Italian 
parties that accessed state funding from the late 1980s onwards are publicly 
available online.25 Consequently, I lack financial accounts for the two parties that 
never accessed state funding: Act to Stop the Decline and the Communist Party 
of Workers.26 There are also gaps in the accounts of Tricolour Flame and the 
Pensioner Party in Italy, as they only occasionally accessed state funding. In 
these instances, information about finances and party activities was collected 
through interviews (see below) and other party documents. In the Norwegian 
                                                          
25 See http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/ (last accessed 30.08.2018). The legal requirement to also 
submit the annual account to the state was introduced in 1997 (see regulatory chapter). However, 
prior to this, parties also tended to attach the annual account to the submitted financial account 
(see e.g. Financial Account, the Greens, 1994).  
26 The Communist Party of Workers does not disclose such documents, as they are perceived as 
internal documents, according to party representatives. In Act to Stop the Decline, nobody with 
whom I spoke had access to financial/annual accounts, and I was not able to retrieve them online 
either. 
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case, full financial accounts (comprising income and expenses) are only publicly 
available covering 2014 onwards.27 Financial and annual accounts in Norway 
have thus been collected in party archives (the Greens and the Pensioner Party), 
via party representatives (Coastal Party and the Fatherland’s Party), and from the 
Norwegian State Archive (the Coastal Party).28 For the Cross Partisan MPs and 
the Future for Finnmark there are no financial or annual accounts, which means 
that, for information concerning finances and party operation, I rely on interview 
material and other primary sources (see below). 
Some authors have called into question the reliability of the financial 
accounts submitted to the authorities in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s (see e.g. 
Ciaurro, 1989; Rhodes, 1997; see also Pierre et al., 2000). Even though this 
suspicion has good ground, as indicated by the massive corruption scandals that 
hit the established political parties in the early 1990s, the problem of hidden 
finances and corrupt practices is generally much larger for the financial accounts 
of the affluent, established parties than for those of new minor parties. The reason 
is that new minor parties, as they rarely hold governmental power, nor have stable 
and strong parliamentary representation, are less prone to bribes and corrupt 
practices, as they would have little to offer in return. As we know from the 
literature, new minor parties are also less inviting prospects for donations, which 
reduces the chance that they have large donors supporting them (without it 
appearing in the financial account). Moreover, new minor parties generally have 
                                                          
27 Norwegian parties were also obliged to file income accounts from 1998, but these have been 
impossible to track down. The author has been in touch with the Storting and its archive, the 
Ministry of Local Government and Administration, and the Norwegian State Archive, none of 
which has been able to find these reports in their records. According to the archive in the Storting, 
there is a possibility that the income reports were not seen as ‘worthy to be archived’, which may 
explain why they are nowhere to be found. Income accounts between 2006 and 2014 are 
available at www.partifinansiering.no (last accessed 30.08.2018).  
28 Granted access to file in State Archive: RA/PA-1484 Steinar Bastesen, serie F – Arkiv, eske 
nr.1.  
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few other sources of income besides state funding (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 
2006; Ikstens et al., 2002; Mair & Biezen, 2001), which to a large extent 
eliminates the risk of hidden funds in these parties’ accounts. I thus align with 
Ciaurro (1989, p. 158) who argues that the financial accounts provide interesting 
and essential information for the study of public financing in Italy, even though 
they must be treated with caution. This also applies to the Norwegian financial 
accounts.  
Where available, the analysis here relies on meeting documents (e.g. 
meeting minutes), congress documents, letters, party newsletters, and news 
reports from the parties’ own webpages. The availability varies from party to 
party, but overall, my access to party archives, party representatives’ willingness 
to share documents, and their publication on both present and past webpages, 
has provided me with a range of different documents for each party. These 
documents – as with the financial and annual accounts – are read with a critical 
eye, as they are often developed for public consumption, and as such (often) 
constitute the party leadership’s presentation of the party. They thus present a 
form of ‘official’ version of events (Tansey, 2007, p. 767). That said, since this 
thesis focuses primarily on how party elites respond to state funding access (for 
instance with regards to staffing and centralisation), the leadership’s own account 
of what goes on in a party is of particular interest. Moreover, such challenges are 
less relevant for some documents, such as internal meeting documents and 
letters, since they tend to be developed for a restricted group of party 
representatives.  
This thesis also relies on statutes, i.e. the formal rulebooks of parties, in 
order to establish governance structures in general, and the composition of 
executive councils more specifically. The statutes have mainly been accessed 
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from current and old webpages.29 Statutes of the Pensioner Party, the Greens, 
and the Fatherland’s Party in Norway, as well as the Communist Refoundation 
Party and the Greens in Italy have been accessed through party archives and 
party representatives. Even though party statutes are useful when analysing 
party change, as statutory changes normally result from long deliberations and 
real conflict within a party (Katz & Mair, 1992), statutes also have their limitations. 
Concretely, they are – just as with other documents – not necessarily valid 
indicators of actual behaviour (see also Allern, 2006). Panebianco (1988), for 
example, states that statutes, at best, can only serve as a point of departure for 
the analysis of party organisation. Following the recommendation of Smith and 
Gauja (2010, p. 756), who state that party statutes must be ‘treated with caution 
in describing the actual operation of parties’, statutes are triangulated with 
interview data and other party documents in the analysis presented here. 
Finally, the analysis relies on news outlets. In the Norwegian case, I have 
mostly used newspaper articles, retrieved from the newspaper archive Atekst 
(Retriever).30 In the Italian case, a combination of newspaper articles, mainly from 
the archives of La Repubblica, Corriere della sera, and La Stampa31, and 
recordings and interviews by the radio station Radio Radicale are used.32 This 
radio archive has been highly valuable for the analysis of for example the Greens, 
Tricolour Flame, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Segni Pact. The 
                                                          
29 Old versions of webpages are saved at the web-portal Wayback machine, accessible here (last 
accessed 30.08.2018): https://archive.org/web/. 
30 This archive brings together issues (current and old) for a range of national/regional/local 
newspapers in Norway. Accessible here (login required) (last accessed 30.08.2018): 
https://www.retriever.no/product/mediearkiv/.  
31 Accessible here: http://ricerca.repubblica.it/, 
http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/landing.html (login required), 
http://www.lastampa.it/archivio-storico/index.jpp. Last accessed 02.09.2018.  
32 Radio Radicale has a large digital archive available online, and has (for example) recorded the 
sound of a range of the selected new minor parties’ congresses from the 1980s onwards. 
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complete list of all primary documents explicitly used in the thesis is given in 
Appendix B.  
3.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Interview data generally makes it easier to grasp values, attitudes, informal 
interactions, tactics, strategies, and processes (Beyers et al., 2014; Bryman, 
2004; Tansey, 2007). This study has mainly interviewed party elites or 
representatives that have positions in some of the core organs of the parties, 
such as the executive council (for elite interviews, see e.g. Odendahl & Shaw, 
2001). This is because decisions on staffing are mainly taken in a party’s head 
office, which means that detailed information about such processes is best sought 
among party elites (H1). The same rings true when it comes to party 
representatives’ endeavours to centralise the executive council (H2), or a party’s 
strategy with regards electoral participation, i.e. pursuit of constitutive function 
(H3).  
Elite/expert interviews specifically, and interviews about concrete events 
more generally, pose some particular challenges concerning validity. First of all, 
party elites may try to either modify the details of a specific process, and/or inflate 
or minimise their own role in an event, depending on whether there is something 
at stake (see e.g. Beyers et al., 2014; Tansey, 2007). For these reasons, elites 
may provide an erroneous or misguided account of a process. Secondly, time 
lags between the interview and the topic upon which the interview focuses can 
threaten reliability (Beyers et al., 2014, p. 178). To address these challenges, I 
interviewed several people with different roles in each party, and people who at 
various time points were active in the party, facilitating triangulation. Hence, I 
identified party representatives who had held core positions in the party 
throughout its life cycle, such as party leaders, deputy leaders, staff, treasurers, 
84 
 
and regional leaders. To a limited extent, snowball sampling (see e.g. Tansey, 
2007) was used, as it enabled me to reach out and eventually speak to a broader 
group of party elites exercising different roles, which in turn facilitated 
triangulation across different interviewees, enhancing validity.  
To assure comparability, the interviews were semi-structured, and an 
interview guide was developed. The interview guides (Norwegian/Italian) are 
attached in Appendix E. The questions mainly revolved around the impact of state 
regulations generally, and state funds specifically, on the party’s operation, and 
changes to this over time. It also asked questions about the parties’ income 
structure, and decision-making procedures. The Italian fieldwork was conducted 
first (November 2016), while the Norwegian fieldwork was done in two parts, the 
first in spring/summer of 2017, and the rest in winter 2017/2018. A total of 32 and 
29 interviews were conducted in Italy and Norway respectively. The table below 
gives an overview of the interviews, while Appendix C gives details concerning 
the interviewees, their position in the party, the form of the interview, and 
interview date(s). Appendix D also provides the project’s ethics approval.  
Table 3.5 Interviews in Italy and Norway  
 Italy  Norway 
Total number of interviews, comprising semi-
structured and follow-up interviews 
32 29 
Of the total interviews:   
a) Semi-structured interviews 
b) Follow-up interviews 
a) 25 
b) 7 
a) 22 
b) 7 
Average length of semi-structured interviews (i.e. 
not follow-up interviews or written interviews) 
Ca 45 min Ca 50 min1 
Range of interviews in each party 2-5 2-5 
 Note: 1 In the Norwegian case, four interviews were not recorded, and are thus not part of this 
table. 
 
3.3.3 Secondary sources 
A range of legal texts and some secondary sources have been consulted and 
analysed to provide an overview of how state funding regulations and ballot 
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access criteria have developed over time in Italy and Norway. The legal texts 
were accessed via the Italian and Norwegian law portals.33 Electoral statistics 
provided by the Ministry of Interior in the Italian case, and reports and electoral 
lists provided by Statistics Norway (SSB) and Norwegian Social Science 
Database (NSD) were crucial for the analysis of the new minor parties’ pursuit of 
constitutive function. Finally, the study relies on some secondary literature, 
especially some excellent case studies of two of the Italian parties – The Greens 
(Vannucci, 2007) and the Communist Refoundation Party (Bertolino, 2004; 
Calossi, 2007) – and of the Italian regulatory framework (Pacini & Piccio, 2012; 
Pacini, 2009; Pizzimenti, 2017; Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011). One case study of the 
Norwegian Greens (Siem Knudsen, 2016) was also highly useful for the analysis. 
3.3.4 Summary of sources  
The summary below outlines the different sources that the thesis relies on in the 
analysis: 
Table 3.6 Data sources – Italian and Norwegian new minor parties  
Data Used to analyse which 
hypothesis? 
Primary documents: Financial and annual 
accounts, letters, newsletters, congress 
documents, meeting minutes, newspaper 
articles, radio recordings, and party statutes. 
H1, H2, H3, and analysis of parties’ 
income structure  
Semi-structured interviews H1, H2, H3, and analysis of parties’ 
income structure  
Legal texts Regulatory analysis, and H3  
Electoral statistics H3  
 
3.4 Operationalisations 
State funding (i.e. state benefits and constraints) is operationalised as access to 
and/or increase of state funds (and decrease/loss of state funds). This core 
                                                          
33 www.lovdata.no and http://www.normattiva.it/ (last accessed 30.08.2018). 
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indicator in the study captures both parties’ access to and increase of indirect and 
direct state funds, and state constraints attached to these benefits (access 
criteria/reporting). Even though the definition of state benefits comprises state 
funds obtained from different party levels (EU, national, regional, local), only state 
funds registered in the national party branch’s financial account are captured by 
the operationalised indicator. Understanding the national branch’s financial 
situation is most central when the goal is to systematically analyse new minor 
parties, as their subnational branches are often either non-existent or weak, and 
the national branch is thus the central locus of the party.34 This also implies that 
the data availability on the subnational level – especially over time – is weak,35 
and an analysis of national accounts thus ensures comparability across new 
minor parties. Capturing state funds in national accounts gives a broad overview 
of the total state funds received as state funds can originate from the parties’ 
local, regional, and European levels if internal transfers take place, which 
happens in a few (but not all) the Italian and Norwegian new minor parties studied 
here. Moreover, in Italy, state funds are allocated directly to the national branch, 
even when the funds are won in relation to, for example, regional elections. Thus, 
all state funds (won on all levels) are captured by analysing the national accounts. 
In Norway, state funds are allocated to the branch responsible for winning them.  
Staffing as an indicator has different roles throughout the empirical 
analysis; the influence of state funds on staffing is analysed in H1, while the 
influence of state funding and staff is analysed in H2 and H3. Staff is 
operationalised as either permanent or temporary staff (full-time or part-time). In 
the analysis of H1, staffing thus refers to changes in number of either permanent 
                                                          
34 This is especially so since none of the selected new minor parties (except the Italian Greens) 
have adopted a federal party structure.   
35 For example, the Greens’ and Pensioner Party’s archives in Norway had very few documents 
pertaining to the operation of subnational branches.  
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or temporary staff, while in the analysis of H2 and H3, staffing refers to the 
presence of staff. The analysis of staffing in H1 will also include data on what 
tasks the staff perform, even though this is not part of the staff-indicator per se. 
This is done in order to shed light on the contrast between new minor parties’ low 
memberships (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair & Biezen, 2001) and their alleged need 
for members (Kölln, 2014;see also chapter 1), and to enable a more detailed 
analysis of how staff (possibly) shape centralisation (H2) and pursuit of 
constitutive function (H3). Staffing is captured at the national level only, as new 
minor parties have few resources available for the employment of subnational 
party staff.36 This decision also reflects the above decision to only capture state 
funds registered in national financial accounts. Parliamentary party staff is also 
excluded, as the study is interested in understanding the impact of party 
organisational state funds (i.e. not parliamentary party grants). That said, 
parliamentary staff can certainly contribute positively (for instance by developing 
motions) to new minor party organisations, which is why parliamentary 
representation is accounted for in the analysis of staffing.  
Centralisation is operationalised as changes to the executive council in 
which elites increase their share of seats, while consolidation is operationalised 
as a process whereby national organs (besides the executive), a) convene more 
rarely, and/or b) are removed altogether. Both these indicators imply a 
strengthened position of the executive and party elites. In the life cycle analysis 
of centralisation/consolidation, these are the indicators to be analysed. Party 
elites comprise party leader(s) and deputy leader(s), treasurer, party secretary, 
and elected representatives situated on either on regional, national, or supra-
                                                          
36 Only the Greens in Norway (post-2013) (Gaupset, 15.05.2017), the Communist Refoundation 
Party in Italy (Bertolino, 2004), and the Italian Greens (at certain time points and in a few regions) 
(Lion, 17.11.2017) have had regionally employed staff among the parties in the analysis. 
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national levels (EU). Locally elected representatives and other party 
representatives (leaders, deputy leader) on the local level are not defined as 
elites because of their proximity to the rank-and-file (see Katz & Mair, 1993).  
To facilitate the second, in-depth part of the centralisation/consolidation 
analysis, where I systematically explore how state funds and/or staff impact 
centralisation/consolidation in carefully selected reform processes, a set of 
indicators is developed. The two first indicators capture whether state funds and 
staff strengthen party elites, in turn enabling them to initiate reform. Specifically, 
and reflecting the theoretical argument of chapter 2, I analyse a) elites’ 
management of state funds and b) elites’ control over staff, elites’ ability to hire 
staff, and/or whether elites’ themselves are hired in their parties. The two last 
indicators are c) whether state funds, and d) staff, are used to execute the 
centralising or consolidating reform process. A full overview of the indicators are 
given in the table below.  
To capture a party’s pursuit of constitutive function (electoral participation), 
the operationalised indicator is the share of constituencies in which a party 
manages to pass the threshold of authorisation, i.e. comply with ballot access 
requirements and present an electoral list, in each election. This is thus the 
indicator that will be analysed in the life cycle analysis of new minor parties’ 
pursuit of constitutive function. In order to get a full understanding of a party’s 
ability to pursue its constitutive function, electoral participation is captured on 
three levels, i.e. national, regional, and supra-national (EU), in line with existing 
literature on party survival (Copus et al., 2009; Cyr, 2016; Obert & Müller, 2017). 
Following recent studies investigating political parties in a multi-level setting 
(Detterbeck, 2012; Swenden & Maddens, 2009), only the regional level (and not 
provincial/local) level is included in the definition of ‘subnational’ here. This still 
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secures the inclusion of one institutional tier which has traditionally been more 
welcoming towards new minor parties (Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Swenden & 
Maddens, 2009, p. 7). While Italian parties participate in European elections, 
Norwegian parties do not, which gives Italian parties an additional avenue for 
electoral participation. This is of little importance to the analysis here, as the goal 
is to explore how state funding and staff contribute to electoral participation by 
empirically focusing on one electoral contest. The comparison across cases 
(Norway and Italy) thus refers to the different mechanisms linking state funds and 
staff to electoral participation, and not the institutional tier of the election per se. 
 Four indicators are developed to capture how state funding and staff 
contribute to electoral participation in selected electoral contests in the second, 
in-depth part of the analysis of pursuit of constitutive function. I analyse whether 
a) state funding and b) staff are used to overcome the signature requirements for 
ballot access and to present an electoral list, and whether c) state funding and d) 
staff are used to recruit members (increase membership) and establish and/or 
strengthen subnational branches. The two former indicators (a and b) refer to the 
direct impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation, and the two latter 
(c and d) to their indirect impact.    
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Table 3.7 Operationalised indicators of staffing, centralisation/consolidation, and pursuit of constitutive function 
Concept Definition  Indicators  Party level 
State funding 
 
Benefits: Direct state funds 
(cash grants) and indirect 
state funds (tax benefits 
and party tax). State 
constraints:  Access 
criteria and reporting 
related to the maintenance 
of state funds. 
Access to/increase (loss/decrease) of state funding. National 
Staffing 
 
The number of staff – 
either temporary or 
permanent staff. 
In analysis of H1: Shifts in number of staff (either permanent or temporary). 
 
In analysis of H2 and H3: Staff presence (permanent or temporary). 
National 
Centralisation 
and 
consolidation  
 
Centralisation: Elites’ (at 
the expense of party 
members) get increased 
control over the executive 
council.  
 
Consolidation: The 
process whereby party 
elites operating within an 
already centralised 
executive reinforce their 
position (for example by 
enlarging the scope or 
responsibility of the 
centralised executive). 
Indicator for life cycle analysis of centralisation: Increased share of party elites in 
executive council.  
 
Indicator for life cycle analysis of consolidation: When national organs (besides the 
executive) a) convene more rarely or b) are removed altogether. 
 
Four Indicators for in-depth analysis of state funding and staff’s impact on 
centralisation/consolidation:  
- State funding and staff’s impact on strengthening party elites, in turn 
enabling them to initiate reforms, as measured by: (1) Elites’ management 
of state funds and (2) elites’ control over staff, ability to hire staff, and/or 
whether staff themselves are hired in their party. 
- (3) State funding and (4) staff are used to execute the centralising or 
consolidating reform process. 
National 
 
 
Pursuit of 
constitutive 
function 
Surpassing the threshold 
of authorisation, i.e. 
exceed ballot access 
criteria and present 
electoral list. 
Indicator for life cycle analysis of pursuit of constitutive function: Share of 
constituencies in which the party is able to comply with ballot access criteria and 
present an electoral list. 
 
Four indicators for in-depth analysis of state funding and staff’s impact on pursuit of 
constitutive function:  
- (1) State funding and (2) staff used to overcome the signature requirement 
for ballot access criteria and present electoral list. 
- (3) State funding and (4) staff used to recruit members and/or 
establish/strengthen subnational branches. 
National/ 
Regional/ 
European  
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3.5 Additional factors to be considered in the analysis 
The main aim throughout the empirical analysis is to explore how state funds (and 
staff) impact intra-organisational processes. That said, other factors – outlined as 
important in the current literature – will also be considered in the analysis in order 
to shed a broader light on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive 
function.  
In the analysis of staffing, the parties’ overall budget will be accounted for, 
i.e. whether the party experiences large shifts in income sources (besides state 
funds). Money is one of a party’s crucial resources, and ‘can be turned into many 
uses’, of which one is staff (see e.g. Webb & Keith, 2017), highlighting this factor’s 
importance for an analysis of staffing. In a related vein, the staffing analysis 
accounts for changes to the membership, whether increasing or decreasing. As 
one income source for parties (see e.g. Nassmacher, 2009; Scarrow, 2015; Webb 
& Keith, 2017), fluctuations in membership (and hence in income from members) 
can affect the overall budget of the party, in turn influencing a party’s staffing 
patterns. Some also equate increasing memberships with increasing number of 
staff (see e.g. Webb & Keith, 2017, p. 44). Leadership change is discussed in the 
staffing analysis, as a new leader’s priorities may impact on staffing patterns, 
reflecting the argument that leaders ‘may advocate and succeed in bringing about 
some change’ in parties (Harmel & Janda, 1994, p. 266). Furthermore, the 
existing literature has showed that staff are increasingly taken on to deal with 
electoral campaigns (see e.g. Farrell, 1996, 2006; Farrell & Webb, 2000), which 
is why the electoral cycle is considered in the staffing analysis. Finally, reflecting 
the decision not to define parliamentary staff as (organisational) staff, I consider 
parliamentary representation in the analysis of staffing. This is done to explore 
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whether the presence of staff in parliament in any way shifts staffing patterns in 
the party’s central organisation. 
In the analysis of centralisation, some of the same factors are accounted 
for as in the staffing analysis. Specifically, leadership change has in existing 
studies been found to be important for understanding party reform, which 
centralisation/consolidation is an expression of (see e.g. Albinsson, 1986; Gauja, 
2016; Kefford, 2016; Müller, 1997; Wilson, 1980), while changes to the 
membership, mainly in a decreasing direction, has similarly been found to be a 
factor in explaining party reforms (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Kenig, Rahat, & Hazan, 
2015). Another indicator which has broadly been argued to spark internal party 
reforms is electoral decline (Albinsson, 1986; Harmel & Janda, 1994; 
Panebianco, 1988), to which a loss of parliamentary representation is related. 
Furthermore, existing studies have found that party reform (regarding leadership 
selection procedures) is more common in new and small parties (see e.g. Chiru 
et al., 2015, p. 46; Cross & Blais, 2012, p. 39). As newly established parties have 
more malleable and less institutionalised organisational structures (see e.g. 
Gauja, 2016, p. 115), one can expect that centralising reforms are also initiated 
by a need to address poorly functioning party organs. As all the parties 
investigated in this thesis are new (and also minor), I thus account for such 
organisational vulnerabilities in the centralisation analysis.  
I take into consideration two factors that arguably are interlinked when it 
comes to understanding new minor parties’ pursuit of constitutive function. The 
first factor is parties’ overall budget, as existing studies have found that parties’ 
financial considerations can shape particular electoral choices, for instance 
whether parties choose to field lists in an electoral coalition or not (Kostadinova, 
2005; Rashkova & Spirova, 2014; Spirova, 2007, p. 146). In turn, parties’ 
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participation in electoral coalitions may (for instance) shift new minor parties’ 
exposure to signature requirements for ballot access, which it is important to 
consider when seeking to understand how state funds and/or staff contribute to 
shaping a party’s ability to comply with such requirements.  Moreover, it is worth 
reminding the reader that in the analysis of pursuit of constitutive function, two 
core factors that can arguably have an impact on a new minor party’s pursuit of 
constitutive function, i.e. membership shifts and signature requirements for ballot 
access, are implicitly part of the theoretical argument. Concretely, in H3 I argue 
that state funds and staff can contribute to increasing the membership, which in 
turn can facilitate compliance with ballot access requirements and assist with the 
process of setting up the electoral list. Thus, these two factors will – due to their 
centrality for the core argument – also be discussed and considered throughout 
the analysis.  
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the comparative approach of the thesis, and outlined 
how the impact of state funding on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of 
constitutive function will be compared across parties from Norway and Italy, but 
also how the life cycle approach facilitates within-case analysis in each of the 
selected parties. Norway and Italy have been selected as regulatory contexts 
from which to draw new minor parties primarily because of the variation in state 
benefits and constraints that has characterised the two contexts since state 
funding was introduced, which facilitates such comparisons. Based on four 
analytical criteria, i.e. parties’ newness and minor status, their variation with 
regards to state funding access, and ideology/formation date, seven new minor 
parties were selected in each country. Moreover, centralising/consolidating 
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reforms and electoral contests were selected for the in-depth analyses of 
centralisation and pursuit of constitutive function respectively. The core selection 
criterion for centralising/consolidating reforms was that a party had to have 
access to either state funds or staff (or both) prior to its introduction. To select 
electoral contests, the main criterion was that a significant increase or decrease 
in state funds and/or staff preceded the contest.  
A broad range of sources comprising primary documents such as financial 
and annual accounts, 61 interviews, and secondary sources are used in the 
analysis. The broad range of data allows for triangulation both between different 
sources (documents and interviews) and within the group of sources (congress 
documents vs. letters, across interviewees), enhancing the validity of the study’s 
findings. The chapter’s final section operationalised the core indicators of the 
study, paving the way for the chapters on empirical analysis that follow. The 
empirical section now starts out with an analysis of the regulatory development 
of state benefits and constraints in Italy and Norway respectively. 
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4 State funding regulations in Italy and 
Norway  
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter outlines and compares state funding regulations, i.e. regulations 
concerning state benefits and constraints, in Norway and Italy from the year in 
which they introduced state funding (in 1970 and 1974 respectively) until 2016. 
As such, it provides the foundation for the later analysis of how the thesis’ core 
indicator, namely access to/increase of state funds, impacts intra-organisational 
dynamics in new minor parties. As defined previously, state benefits comprise 
both direct benefits such as annual direct state funding and electoral 
reimbursements, while indirect funds are tax benefits that materialise as cash 
transfers and party tax. State constraints are regulations concerning the access 
to or receipt (maintenance) of state benefits. The previous chapter outlined how 
two established, Western European countries, i.e. Italy and Norway, are suitable 
contexts from which to draw new minor parties for analysis because both have 
(since the 1970s) provided state funds to parties (rather than candidates), and 
exposed their (new minor) parties to changing state benefits and constraints. 
Whilst the types of state benefit available (e.g. annual grants, electoral 
reimbursements, tax benefits) have differed greatly between the two contexts, 
both systems increasingly made more money available in state benefits 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s until Italy started to cut back in 2008. In terms 
of constraints, both countries lowered the access criteria for state funds overall 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, until the Italian system made them more 
constraining from 2009 onwards. In a similar vein, both Norway and Italy 
increasingly made reporting tied to the maintenance of state funds more 
constraining, starting in the late 1990s and continuing in the 2000s. For example, 
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Norway introduced expense reporting in 2013/2014 (previously it had only had 
income reporting), while Italy introduced an obligation for parties to undergo 
external auditing in 2012.  
This chapter is divided into three parts, one Italian, one Norwegian, and a 
concluding comparative discussion. Each country-specific analysis is divided into 
what I refer to as regulatory phases. A transition between one phase and another 
is constituted by a significant shift in state benefits and/or constraints. The Italian 
regulatory analysis has three regulatory phases, and the Norwegian two.  
4.1 State benefits and constraints in Italian party finance 
1974-2016 
4.1.1 Regulatory phase 1: 1974-1992 
Two different forms of state funding to political parties, annual grants and 
electoral reimbursements, were for the first time introduced in Italy in 1974.37 
Annual state funds were paid out to the parliamentary party groups in both the 
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in Italy, and to access them a party thus 
had to be represented in the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies respectively 
(Law 195/1974). As the Italian electoral system for both the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies was, prior to 1993, almost perfectly proportional (see 
among others Katz, 2003; Renwick et al., 2009),38 the access criteria for annual 
state funds were permissive for new minor parties. This proportional system also 
made collection of party tax (for those parties deciding to do so) easier. The law 
                                                          
37 Parliamentary party grants are not part of the definition of state funds in this thesis. It is however 
worth mentioning that such grants have existed in Italy in the period studied here. The 
parliamentary regulations have always stated that such grants are in place to ensure the operation 
of the parliamentary party groups, but only from 2012 onwards did the regulations explicitly state 
that the funds are to be used for parliamentary purposes only (Camera dei deputati, undated). 
38 Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, although the regulations were slightly different, 
had in practice the same proportional system in the post-war period (Grofman & Giannetti, 2011, 
p. 3). 
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demanded that no less than 95 percent of the annual funds paid out to the 
parliamentary party group was to be transferred to the central party organisation. 
In 1981 this was changed to 90 percent (Law 659/1981). Hence, the national 
branch of eligible parties was the ultimate recipient of annual state grants, which 
in total amounted to circa 23 million euros annually39 (Art. 3, L195/1974). The law 
did not outline any constraints on the use of these funds (L195/1974, L659/1981). 
The allocation mechanism of the annual grants disadvantaged new minor parties, 
as only 2 percent were allocated as flat grants, while the rest were allocated 
proportionally to parties (Art 3. L195/1974; see also Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011).  
To qualify for electoral reimbursements related to elections to the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate, a party had to win at least 2 percent of the votes and 
present lists in at least two thirds of the electoral constituencies (Art. 1, 
L195/1974). Even though this threshold has been described as low (Pizzimenti & 
Ignazi, 2011), it could still represent a barrier for new minor parties, which often 
achieved an electoral result below 2 percent. These access criteria were thus 
less permissive than those for annual state funds. The total sum available in 
electoral reimbursements amounted to circa 7.7 million euros in 1974,40 which 
was generous as the reimbursements by far exceeded the different parties’ 
reported electoral expenditures (Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 74). The allocation of 
electoral reimbursements was more favourable to new minor parties than the 
allocation of annual grants, as 15 percent was distributed equally to all parties 
(who fulfilled the eligibility criteria), while the rest was distributed proportionally to 
all parties according to election results (Rhodes, 1997, pp. 60-61).  
                                                          
39 The sum was 45 thousand million lire, which has been converted into euro by using conversion 
rates issued by the European Central bank (1998): 1 euro = 1936.27 lire. 
40 15 thousand million lire (see conversion rate above). 
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In sum, the Italian context’s first state benefits were permissive towards 
new minor parties, as the access criteria (especially for annual state grants) were 
low, the sums allocated were generous, and finally, a share of the funds (albeit 
relatively low) was allocated equally across different parties, irrespective of size. 
The generosity towards parties increased in 1980 when electoral reimbursements 
related to regional and European elections were introduced (Law 422/1980). All 
parties that had at least one member of the European Parliament (EP) or one 
regional councillor elected, had access. The electoral system for EP and regional 
elections was completely proportional (Law 18/1979, Law 108/1968), and the 
access criteria were thus highly permissive for new minor parties. 20 percent of 
the electoral reimbursements related to EP and regional elections was allocated 
equally to the eligible parties, benefitting new minor parties, while the rest was 
allocated on a proportional basis. The total fund for these two elections amounted 
to circa 15 million euros, and the funds were paid out at the national party level.  
Thus, state funds related to both national, regional, and EU elections were 
channelled into the national branch, indicating a highly centralised system 
(Nassmacher, 1989, p. 250), which, it was expected, would end the ‘endemic 
fractionalization of Italian parties’ (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 50). In 1981 (Law 
659/1981) the total of state funds to be allocated to political parties (see also 
Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 75) was nearly doubled (Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011, p. 205), 
thus increasing the generosity in the system. This tendency of increasing 
generosity continued until 1992 (Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011).  
There was limited reporting tied to the maintenance of state funds in this 
phase. Parties receiving state funding had to set up their financial accounts in a 
specific way, disclose them in the official party paper or in a newspaper with 
national distribution, and file them with the president in the Chamber of Deputies 
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(Law 195/1974). In 1981 this requirement was made somewhat more 
comprehensive, as the financial account had to comprise information about (for 
example) the party’s real estate, its participation in commercial societies, and 
ownership of companies (Art. 4, Law 659/1981). Additionally, an internal audit 
organ in the parties had to approve the financial account. Administrative 
sanctions, such as a shortening of state funding, were introduced in 1974. 
However, as enforcement rested with the parliament,41 i.e. the parties 
themselves, and the control was mostly formal (controllers lacked investigative 
powers) (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 23; Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 74), both the reporting 
and enforcement were permissive, not only towards new minor parties, but 
towards parties generally (see also Rhodes, 1997).  
The period from 1974, when state funding was first introduced, until 1992, 
represents the first regulatory phase in Italy. The main characteristics of this 
phase are summarised in the table below. Overall, the state benefits and 
constraints were permissive towards new minor parties in this phase due to 
overall low access criteria, generous funds, and permissive reporting. 
 
 
                                                          
41 The law stated that the presidents of the two chambers (the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate) were to control the financial accounts, relying on help from a specifically appointed group 
of auditors. However, as the controls rested with the presidents, it was party-controlled, and not 
independent.  
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Table 4.1 Overview of regulatory phase 1 (1974-1992): Italy 
Type of state 
benefits 
Tied to which 
level/institution 
Recipient Introduction 
year 
Access criteria Reporting related 
to the receipt of 
state funding 
Enforcement 
Annual state funds Chamber of Deputies 
and Senate 
National 
branch 
1974 Representation in 
Chamber of 
Deputies and/or 
Senate 
1974: Disclose 
financial account in 
party newspaper or 
other newspaper. 
File financial 
account with the 
president in the 
Chamber of 
Deputies 
 
1981: Same as 
above, but 
somewhat more 
comprehensive 
reporting. 
Requirement to 
have an internal 
audit organ 
introduced. 
1974: Permissive:  
Administrative 
sanctions existed, 
but the (formal) 
control rested with 
the parties 
themselves. 
 
 
Electoral 
reimbursements 
Chamber of Deputies 
and Senate 
National 
branch 
1974 Present lists in 
more than 2/3 of 
constituencies, 
and achieve more 
than 2 percent of 
the vote  
Electoral 
reimbursements 
European parliament 
and regional councils 
National 
branch 
1980 One candidate 
elected 
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4.1.2 Regulatory phase 2: 1993-2011 
The transition from the first to the second republic in Italy, following the corruption 
scandals Tangentopoli, sparked a referendum which led to the abolition of state 
funding to political parties in Italy in 1993, representing the start of regulatory 
phase 2.  Concretely, annual state funding was abolished in 1993, while electoral 
reimbursements were kept (or rather re-instated with a new law) (Law 515/1993). 
Electoral reimbursements were intended to cover expenses to a broad range of 
party activities, such as the production and distribution of campaign material and 
staff working on the campaigns (Art. 11, Law 515/1993). This change represented 
a constraining turn, both for new minor parties and other parties, in two ways: 
First of all, the abolition of annual grants meant that state funds (i.e. electoral 
reimbursements) were now ‘only’ provided in election years, and not annually. 
Secondly, the abolition of annual state funds meant that less money was 
available. Nevertheless, the electoral reimbursements paid out still exceeded the 
expenses incurred by parties during the electoral campaigns (Pacini & Piccio, 
2012; Pacini, 2009, p. 187; Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 76), which modifies this picture.42 
In fact, the state allocated much more money to electoral reimbursements after 
1993 than before, aiming to compensate for the loss of annual state funding (see 
Pacini, 2009, p. 187).  
In 1993 a new mixed electoral system was introduced. It elected 75 
percent of the MPs to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on a plurality 
basis, and the remaining 25 percent on a proportional basis (Katz, 2003; 
Parlamento Italiano, undated (a); Newell & Bull, 1993). This shift from a nearly 
pure proportional system to a mixed one made the access criteria for electoral 
                                                          
42 It is also worth noting that the new law passed in 1993 also introduced some indirect (non-
financial) benefits for parties, such as free use of public halls and reduced rates on postal delivery 
(see Art. 17 and 19, L515/1993). 
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reimbursements more constraining. Concretely, to access state funds related to 
Senate elections, political parties now had to either have one candidate elected 
in a region or achieve at least 5 percent of the regional votes. Funds related to 
Chamber of Deputies elections could be accessed by winning at least three 
percent of the national vote and having one candidate elected in one of the 
majoritarian districts, or by winning more than 4 percent in the proportional 
component of the election (Law 515/1993).43 The shift away from a purely 
proportional system also made it harder for parties to collect party tax, as it was 
more difficult to become represented. Similar shifts took place on regional level. 
From 1995 (Law 43/1995) onwards, parties that wished to win representation 
(and therefore access state funds on regional level) had to achieve at least 3 
percent of the vote, or be aligned with a coalition that won at least 5 percent of 
the vote,44 which per definition represented a constraining turn. Still, the 
secondary literature has found that the broadest group of beneficiaries of state 
funds in Italy are found on regional level (Pacini, 2009, p. 197). There was no 
change to the access criteria related to European elections, and they were thus 
just as permissive as before.  
The allocation mechanism also became somewhat more constraining for 
new minor parties at the start of regulatory phase 2, as all electoral 
reimbursements related to European, Senate, and Chamber of Deputies 
elections were to be allocated (in full) in a proportional fashion based on the 
number of votes obtained. Before, a component of the reimbursements was 
distributed equally (flat grant) to all parties eligible (Art. 9 and 16, Law 515/1993). 
                                                          
43 In the 1987 elections, for instance, three parties received less than 0.5 percent of the vote, but 
still won representation in the Chamber of Deputies, meaning that they were entitled to state 
funding.  
44 The electoral system on the regional level changed slightly in 1995. From then on, one fifth of 
the regional councillors were to be elected on the basis of a majoritarian model, and the rest on 
a proportional basis.  
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No change was made to the centralised allocation mechanism – state funds won 
on all levels were still paid out to the national party branches.  
The first part of regulatory phase 2 was thus more constraining for new 
minor parties with regards to the state funds available and access criteria (than 
regulatory phase 1). Nevertheless, the generosity in the system quickly changed 
to the advantage of parties. In 1997 the Italian parliament introduced a new form 
of state funding, called Four for the Thousand (Pacini, 2009, p. 185), which 
allowed citizens to earmark 0,004 percent of their personal income tax for the 
funding of the party system. Parties with one MP were eligible to participate in 
the subsequent allocation of these funds (Pacini, 2009, p. 185; Pizzimenti, 2017, 
p. 77; see also Law 2/1997). A whopping 82 million fresh euros were made 
available for parties through Four for the Thousand in 1997 (Art. 4, Law 2/1997).  
Interestingly, the 1997 law also introduced somewhat more constraining 
reporting requirements related to the receipt of state funds. From now on, the 
financial account had to be followed by an annual report from the treasurer/legal 
representative and had to be set up in a different way. Financial accounts of 
companies aligned to the party also had to be filed (Art. 8, Law 2/1997). The 
financial accounts were to be controlled by a Board of Auditors (i.e. not the 
presidents of the two chambers in parliament), making the enforcement slightly 
more independent. Nevertheless, right to impose sanctions still rested with 
politicians (the president of the Chamber of Deputies). The secondary literature 
states that the reporting and sanctions system remained inefficient throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s (GRECO, 2010, p. 23; Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 76), which 
indicates that the constraining turn in 1997 had little effect in practice.  
In 1999 the availability of state funds and the access criteria were changed 
again. In one way, the new law (Law 157/1999) made the system (much) more 
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generous as the sums to be allocated to parties in electoral reimbursements were 
heightened again (see also Pacini, 2009; Pizzimenti, 2017). At the same time, 
however, the tax benefit introduced in 1997 (Four for the Thousand) was 
abolished. Moreover, the new law obliged parties to spend 5 percent of the 
allocated funds in electoral reimbursements to activities aimed to increase 
women’s participation in politics (Art. 3, Law 157/1999). The introduction of a 
lower access threshold for electoral reimbursements related to Chamber of 
Deputies elections benefitted new minor parties. Whereas the threshold before 
was to win 3 percent of the vote and have a candidate elected in a majoritarian 
district, the percentage threshold was now lowered to 1 percent,45 which 
represented the start of a ‘progressive lowering of the payoff thresholds’ (Pacini 
& Piccio, 2012, p. 8). The law from 1999 also made state funding allocations 
annual (Art. 1, comma 6, Law 157/1999),46 which was particularly beneficial for 
new minor parties with vulnerable income structures. Thus, the annual funds that 
had been abolished in 1993, were now in practise re-instated (in the form of 
annual electoral reimbursements). 
This increasing permissiveness continued with Law 156/2002. First and 
foremost, the access threshold for electoral reimbursements related to the 
Chamber of Deputies was lowered to a general 1 percent of the vote in 2002. 
Secondly, the electoral reimbursements were ‘multiplied each year of the 
legislature’ (Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 77). Concretely, instead of having one sum 
available in electoral reimbursements for a whole legislature, this same sum was 
now made available for each year of the legislature (see Art. 2, Law 156/2002), 
massively increasing the funds allocated to political parties, also benefitting new 
                                                          
45 In the proportional component of the election the threshold was still 4 percent of the vote (Art. 
2, L157/1999).  
46 The first instalment comprised 40 percent of the total funds. 
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minor parties. In 2006, a new permissive change took place, when it was decided 
to continue payments of the (by now) annual electoral reimbursements for full 
legislatures, even in the event that they would terminate early (which indeed 
happened in 2008) (Pacini, 2009; Pizzimenti, 2017). 
In the mid-2000s, changes to electoral laws on both national and regional 
levels shifted the access criteria for funds. First, in 2005 the Italian electoral 
system was turned into a more proportional system with a majority bonus (from 
a mixed electoral system) (see e.g. Giannetti & De Giorgi, 2006; Pappalardo, 
2006). This did not change the access criteria for state funds related to the 
Chamber of Deputies, which was set to 1 percent of the vote anyway. For the 
Senate, the inclusiveness of electoral coalitions now determined how permissive 
the access criteria for state funds were (i.e. the criteria to win one 
representative).47 While coalitions were highly inclusive in 2006, they were less 
so in 2008, which impacted on which new minor parties managed to win 
representation. The changed electoral system for the Senate was thus 
permissive towards new minor parties when coalitions were inclusive, less so if 
not. The same argument applies to the collection of party tax. In terms of winning 
representation (and thereby being able to claim party tax), the inclusiveness of 
the large coalitions (centre-left and centre-right) was crucial.  
Similarly, starting in 2005, Italian regions started to introduce their own 
regional electoral laws, which prescribed different thresholds for winning 
representation from the national laws. In turn, this affected the access thresholds 
for state funds, as that was linked to regional representation. By 2010, 10 regions 
had introduced a regional law, but only four of them changed the threshold for 
                                                          
47 Another access criterion for state funds related to the Senate was to win at least 5 percent of 
the vote, which naturally was the same (irrespective of electoral system). 
106 
 
representation. These were Calabria, Le Marche, Puglia, and Toscana, and they 
all heightened the threshold for representation (Camera dei Deputati, 2010), in 
turn representing a constraining turn for new minor parties’ access to regional 
funds there. In a similar, constraining vein, a 4 percent threshold for 
representation in the European parliament was introduced in 2009. This also 
represented a constraining turn for access criteria for state funds, as access was 
tied to having one member of the European parliament elected (before 
representation was based on a purely proportional system). In addition to making 
access criteria more constraining at the end of regulatory phase 2, the financial 
crisis in 2008 led to the reduction of state funds to parties (by 20 million euros 
annually) from 2008 and onwards (Parlamento Italiano, Undated (b)), decreasing 
the system’s generosity. 
In brief, therefore, the shift from regulatory phase 1 to 2 initially 
represented a constraining turn with regards to access criteria and generosity of 
state funds. However, from the late 1990s until 2008, the state funding system in 
Italy was characterised by increasingly permissive access criteria and 
increasingly generous allocations. In 2008 the generosity in the system 
decreased, while the access criteria for European and regional state funds 
became more constraining in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Reporting related to 
the receipt of state funds stayed permissive throughout the phase (despite some 
changes in 1997). The table below summarises the developments in phase 2. 
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Table 4.2 Overview of regulatory phase 2 (1993-2011): Italy 
State benefit Tied to 
which 
institution 
Recipient  Introduction 
year 
Access criteria Reporting related to the 
receipt of state funding 
Enforcement  
Electoral 
reimbursements 
Chamber of 
Deputies, 
Senate, 
European 
Parliament, 
regional 
councils 
National 
branch 
1974 (re-
instated in 
1993) 
-Chamber of Deputies 
(1993-1999): One 
candidate in a majoritarian 
constituency elected and 3 
percent of the votes, or 4 
percent in the proportional 
part of the election.  
-Chamber of Deputies 
(1999-2001): One 
candidate elected in a 
majoritarian constituency 
and 1 percent of the votes, 
or 4 percent in the 
proportional part of the 
election. 
-Chamber of Deputies 
(2002): 1 percent of the 
vote 
-Senate (1993): One 
candidate elected or 5 
percent of the votes in the 
region. 
-Regional elections 
(1993): One candidate 
elected. 
-EP-elections (1993-2009): 
One candidate elected (no 
threshold). 
-EP-elections (2009): 
One candidate elected (4 
percent threshold). 
(Some requirements from 
regulatory phase 1 were still 
valid, and are thus repeated 
here) 
1974: Disclose financial 
account in party newspaper 
or other newspaper. File 
financial account with the 
president in the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
 
1981: Same as above, but 
somewhat more 
comprehensive reporting. 
Requirement to have an 
internal audit organ 
introduced. 
 
1997: Somewhat more 
comprehensive reporting: 
the financial account had to 
be followed by an annual 
report from the 
treasurer/legal 
representative, and financial 
accounts of companies 
aligned to the party had to 
be filed as well. A new 
template for the financial 
account was introduced. 
Financial accounts were to 
be published in the Italian 
state’s official journal 
(Gazzetta Ufficiale). 
1974: Permissive:  
Administrative 
sanctions existed, but 
the (formal) control 
rested with the parties 
themselves 
 
1997: Control of 
financial accounts by a 
group of auditors (not 
politicians as before). 
However, politicians in 
parliament kept the 
authority to impose 
sanctions. The system 
was thus still 
permissive. 
 
 
Four for the 
Thousand 
National 
level  
National 
branch 
1997 
(abolished in 
1999) 
Have one MP 
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4.1.3 Regulatory phase 3: 2012-2016 
In line with the regulatory trend in Western Europe (Biezen & Kopecký, 2014; 
Piccio, 2014), Italy introduced a party law in 2012, marking the entrance into 
regulatory phase 3. The 2012 law continued the provision of electoral 
reimbursements, but simultaneously introduced a so-called co-funding scheme. 
From 2012 and onwards, electoral reimbursements constituted 70 percent of the 
state funds available and co-funding 30 percent. The overall sum available in 
these two schemes together was 91 million euros, 50 percent less than what was 
provided in electoral reimbursements in 2011 (Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 80), which 
indicates decreasing generosity. The co-funding mechanism allocated 50 cent 
from the state for each euro that the eligible parties managed to raise through 
membership fees/donations etc. A party had to have at least one candidate 
elected in elections to either the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, regional 
councils, or European parliament, or receive 2 percent of the vote to qualify for 
the co-funding mechanism (Art. 2, Law 96/2012).  
To access electoral reimbursements related to elections to the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate, parties now had to have one candidate elected (Art. 
6, Law 96/2012), which changed the access criteria for electoral reimbursements 
related to Chamber of Deputies elections.48 The inclusiveness of electoral 
coalitions determined whether this represented a permissive or constraining turn 
for new minor parties. The new access criteria could in theory be more permissive 
towards new minor parties than the old 1 percent rule, as inclusive electoral 
coalitions could grant parties receiving less than 1 percent representation.49 
                                                          
48 To have one candidate elected had previously been a requirement to access state funds related 
to the Senate. 
49 For example, in 2013 two of the parties who won seats in parliament (part of the winning centre-
left coalition) achieved only 0.43 and 0.49 percent of the vote, and would not previously have 
been eligible for funding, but were eligible after the 2012 shift. 
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However, less inclusive coalitions would make it harder to become elected, 
meaning that the new threshold would be more difficult to reach for new minor 
parties. The access criteria for European and regional elections remained 
unchanged (i.e. one candidate elected). The national branch was still the branch 
receiving state funds, and they were still allocated on the basis of number of votes 
achieved. 
The most constraining change in 2012 was the introduction of 
comprehensive reporting requirements related to the receipt of state funding. The 
core reporting requirements were still the ones introduced in Law 2/1997 (see 
Table 4.2 above), but from 2012 onwards, parties’ meeting the access thresholds 
for state funding had to have their financial account audited by an external 
auditing company (Art. 9, Law 96/2012). In addition, a new enforcement body 
was created, composed of five members (magistrates), with the mandate to 
control parties’ financial accounts. It was to work full-time with the control of 
financial accounts, and was also assigned staff. Still, as this body’s task was still 
‘only’ to control the regularity of the financial accounts, and lacked investigative 
powers, it was relatively similar to the one in place from 1997 (GRECO, 2014, pp. 
15-16). The difference was that it had power to apply sanctions to those parties 
not complying with the reporting requirements (see Art. 9, Law 96/2012).  
The entry into regulatory phase three thus represents a constraining turn 
due to increased reporting requirements and severely decreased availability of 
state funds. In 2013, however, the system became even more constraining as 
Law 159/2013 abolished all forms of direct public funding, and also drastically 
reduced the amounts that parties were due to receive for prior electoral 
competitions (Art. 14, Law 159/2013; see also Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 80). In place 
of electoral reimbursements, the Italian state introduced a tax-benefit called Two 
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for the Thousand, which gave citizens the opportunity to allocate 0.002 percent 
of their income tax to parties (Art. 12, Law 159/2013; see also Pizzimenti, 2017, 
p. 80). To be eligible, registration in a new party register, in addition to having at 
least one representative in either chamber in parliament, in the European 
parliament, or in a regional council, was required (Art. 10, Law 159/2013). In this 
way, the access criteria were the strictest to ever have been in place in Italy. In 
order to get registered, a party had to submit and get its statute approved.50 
Additionally, the parties were from 2013 onwards obliged to spend 10 percent (up 
from the previous 5 percent) of the allocated state funds on activities intended to 
increase women’s participation in politics (Art. 9, Law 159/2013). The reporting 
requirements related to the receipt of state funding (i.e. the Two for the Thousand) 
were the same as in the 2012 legislation. Interestingly, the new 2013 law tied the 
requirement to undergo external auditing to registration (and not to the receipt of 
state funding), representing a constraining turn for those new minor parties 
attempting to access the tax-benefit (but not succeeding), as they would then 
have no state funds, but still have to undergo external auditing to be eligible for 
such funds (at a later stage). 
Regulatory phase 3 in Italy thus represents an increasingly constraining 
environment both for new minor parties and other parties. State funds became 
less generous, and the access criteria and reporting requirements related to their 
receipt turned more constraining. An especially constraining turn for new minor 
parties was that allocations from the Two for the Thousand depended on parties’ 
ability to recruit people to be their donors, by having them donate a share of their 
income tax (later to be distributed as indirect state funds) to the party. This is 
                                                          
50 The statute has to contain some mandatory information, such as for example the rights and 
obligations of members, and the procedures in case of party dissolution (Art. 3, Law 159/2013). 
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surely harder for new minor parties with less visibility and lower memberships. 
The core mechanisms in regulatory phase 3 are outlined below. 
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Table 4.3 Overview of regulatory phase 3 (2012-2016): Italy 
Type of state 
benefit 
Tied to 
which 
institution 
Recipient  Introduction 
year 
Access criteria Reporting related to the 
receipt of state funding 
Enforcement 
Electoral 
reimbursements 
Chamber of 
Deputies, 
Senate, 
European 
Parliament, 
regional 
councils 
National 
branch 
1974 (re-
instated in 
1993).  
 
Abolished in 
2013 1 
One candidate 
elected (the same for 
Chamber of Deputies, 
Senate, European 
Parliament and 
regional elections). 
2012: 1997-rules continued, i.e. 
the financial account had to be 
followed by an annual report 
from the treasurer/legal 
representative, and financial 
accounts of companies aligned 
to the party had to be filed as 
well. Financial accounts were to 
be published in the Italian state’s 
official journal (Gazzetta 
Ufficiale). Plus, external auditing 
was introduced.  
 
2013: Former rules still applied, 
but registration (in the party 
register) required approval of 
parties’ statutes. External 
auditing was tied to registration 
(and not receipt of state funding).  
2012: A new 
enforcement group 
was set up with 
power to impose 
sanctions (but no 
investigative 
powers).  
 
 
Co-funding See above. National 
branch 
2012.  
 
Abolished in 
2013 
One candidate 
elected (either in the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
Senate, European 
Parliament or regional 
council), or win 2 
percent of the vote. 
Two for the 
Thousand 
National level  National 
branch 
2013 Registration in the 
party register and 
have at least one 
representative in the 
Senate, Chamber of 
Deputies, regional 
council, or in the 
European Parliament.  
Notes: 1 Decreased payments would continue for three more years after 2013. 
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4.2 State benefits and constraints in Norwegian party 
finance 1970-2016  
4.2.1 Regulatory phase 1: 1970-2005 
State funding was introduced for national party organisations in 1970, and was 
allocated (to the national branch) based on the number of votes that the parties 
achieved in the election (Kommunal og Moderniseringsdepartementet, 1993). 51 
The absence of flat grants made the system per definition constraining for new 
minor parties. To access state funds between 1970 and 1975 (i.e. before the 
parties in this thesis were founded), parties simply had to present lists (their own 
or together with other parties) in at least half the electoral districts in the previous 
parliamentary (Storting) election, which was highly permissive. In 1975 a 2.5 vote 
threshold to access state funding was introduced, which was added to the 
requirement to present lists in at least half the electoral districts (NOU, 2004, p. 
38; Svåsand, 1994b). So, when the parties studied in this thesis were founded, 
the access criteria for national state funds and the allocation mechanism were 
relatively constraining towards new minor parties. That is supported by the fact 
that the threshold for entry into parliament could be much lower. Concretely, the 
electoral system in Norway (both then and now) mainly52 allocates seats on the 
basis of regional constituencies. If a new minor party manages to concentrate its 
electoral support to one region, the chance of winning representation is larger 
than if the support is scattered out in the whole country. To illustrate, Future for 
                                                          
51 Parliamentary party grants are not part of the definition of state funds in this thesis. It is however 
worth mentioning that such grants have existed in Norway in the period studied here. However, 
they have been exclusively for the use of the groups in parliament, and have thus not been 
available for Norwegian party organisations (see e.g. Stortinget, 1995, and Innstilling 421 S, 2012-
2013). 
52 Compensatory seats were introduced with an alteration of the Constitution in 1988 (Justis- og 
beredskapsdepartementet, 1988) and from 1989 to 2001 there were eight compensatory seats. 
From 2002 and onwards there are 19 compensatory seats. To participate in the distribution of 
these seats, a party needs to achieve more than 4 percent of the vote.  
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Finnmark won one seat in parliament in the 1989 elections. It only won 0.3 
percent of the national vote, but 21.5 percent of the votes in the region of 
Finnmark.  
State funding on regional and municipal levels was introduced in 1975. 
The access criteria were permissive for new minor parties as a party simply had 
to be registered in accordance with the Electoral Act,53 have a branch in the 
relevant region or municipality, and win at least one vote. The funds were 
allocated on a proportional basis (Kommunal og Moderniseringsdepartementet, 
1993), which by definition disadvantaged new minor parties. State funds on 
national, regional, and local levels were allocated directly to the branch 
responsible for winning them, meaning that the state funding system in Norway 
was (contrary to the Italian) de-centralised.  
The sums available for subnational state funds were lower than those 
available for national state funds (Svåsand, 1994b), and throughout the 1980s 
the distribution of state funds was further skewed towards the national state 
funds. In 1976, the state funds to the national party organisations constituted 39 
percent of the overall state funds paid out, while the percentage had risen to 47 
in 1988 (Svåsand, 1994a, pp. 321-322). It is worth noting that the tendency to set 
aside more state funds for the national party branches was constraining for new 
minor parties due to the high threshold for access to such national funds. That 
said, the sums available in state funds (overall) increased in regulatory phase 1, 
as the table shows: 
                                                          
53 The application for registration with Notarius Publicus had to be signed by two members of the 
party’s executive, and be followed by 5000 signatures (Art. 17, Electoral Act, 1985).  
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Table 4.4 State funding allocations to Norwegian political parties, Regulatory 
phase 1. NOK. 
Year  Support in 1000 Support per vote 
1970  55,704  25.8  
1975  58,925  27.4  
1980  58,925  25.5  
1985  71,146  28.4  
1990  79,410  29.8  
1995  115,015  46.5  
2000  140,420  56.2  
2004  148,287  58.8  
Note: The sums are fixed 2004 Norwegian kroner. The reader can transfer the sums into euros 
by removing the last digit, so 148,287 NOK is ca. 14,828 euros. 
Source: (NOU, 2004, p. 39) 
Neither in this regulatory phase nor in regulatory phase two did the Norwegian 
state impose constraints on the use of state funds to party organisations (see e.g. 
Kommunal og moderniseringsdepartementet, 1993; Party Political Act, 2006). 
There were no reporting requirements tied to the receipt of state funds 
(Svåsand, 1994a, p. 321) until 1998 when mandatory reporting of income for 
parties’ national branches was introduced, representing a constraining turn for 
both new minor parties and other parties. Parties that had presented lists in the 
previous parliamentary election and were registered in accordance with the 
Electoral Law (and from 2002 in the party register), had to file an income report 
for their national branch, that had to be approved by an auditor. The latter 
particularly represented a constraining turn, due to the expenses it would incur. 
While the reporting was not related to the receipt of state funding, the only 
sanction for non-compliance with the reporting was a decrease in state funding. 
Compliance was thus crucial for those parties that were registered and received 
state funding (Law 22.05.1998).54  
In brief, therefore, regulatory phase 1 in Norway was constraining in terms 
of national state funds, both due to the high access criteria, the allocation method, 
                                                          
54 All the Norwegian new minor parties analysed in this thesis were registered. 
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and due to the obligation to report from 1998 and onwards. The skewed 
distribution of funds towards the national level strengthens this picture. Still, the 
access criteria for funds on regional and local levels were permissive, and so was 
the lack of reporting in the initial part of this phase. A summary of the regulation 
in phase 1 is outlined below: 
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Table 4.5 Overview of regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005): Norway 
Type of state 
benefit 
Tied to 
which 
institution 
Recipient Year  Access criteria Reporting 
related to the 
receipt of state 
funding 
Enforcement 
Annual state 
funds  
Storting (the 
parliament) 
National branch 1970 1970-1975: Present lists 
in at least half the 
constituencies. 
 
1975 Same as above, 
and win 2.5 percent of 
the vote. 
1970-1998: No 
reporting. 
 
1998-2005: 
Reporting of 
income. Audit 
required. 
1998: 
Administrative 
sanction: Shortened  
state support. No 
enforcement organ. 
Annual state 
funds 
Regional and 
local councils 
Regional and local 
branches 
1975 Be registered, have a 
party branch in the 
relevant 
region/municipality, and 
win at least one vote. 
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4.2.2 Regulatory phase 2: 2006-2016 
The introduction of the Political Party Act (PPA) in 2006 marks the entry intro 
regulatory phase 2 in Norway. The PPA mainly altered the access and allocation 
criteria for state funds, and made reporting somewhat more comprehensive. 
Annual state funds to the national, regional, and/or local branches of party 
organisations were now split into two: one vote support allocated proportionally 
to eligible parties based on the number of votes achieved; and one basic support, 
allocated to those parties winning more than 2.5 percent of the vote on the 
national level. On regional and local levels the criteria for access to the basic 
support was to win more than 4 percent of the vote or have one representative 
elected. 9/10 of the funds were allocated as vote support, and the remaining 1/10 
as basic support (Art. 11 and 12, PPA). The access criteria were thus made 
remarkably more permissive towards new minor party organisations on the 
national level in 2006. Moreover, the existence of flat grants (the basic support) 
was also a move in the permissive direction for new minor parties, even though 
the threshold of 2.5 percent to access it to some extent undermined this benefit. 
The state funds were still to be paid out to and be managed by the relevant party 
branch, keeping the de-centralised component of the system.  
The PPA made the reporting more comprehensive and constraining for 
new minor parties. The reporting requirements were still tied to registration (and 
not to the receipt of state funding). Still, the sanction for non-compliance was, as 
before, a shortening/loss of state funds (Moderniseringsdepartementet, 2004-
2005). Parties were still ‘only’ obliged to file an income account, but from 2006 
onwards also the parties’ organisational branches had to report their income 
account annually – a constraining requirement for organisationally vulnerable 
new minor parties. The types of income that had to be reported were extended 
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(including information on donations) in the PPA, and a declaration stating that the 
party did not have any other income sources than those reported also had to be 
presented. The audit requirement from 1998 was still valid 
(Moderniseringsdepartementet, 2004-2005). For the first time, a specific 
committee (the Political Party Act Committee) charged with the responsibility of 
interpreting the Party Political Act and deciding on sanctions (withholding state 
support) was introduced. The committee was to be independent, but its leeway 
was limited, as it neither had investigative rights nor the right to control the 
accuracy of the financial reports. The sanction of withholding state support was 
thus made on the basis of whether or not the parties had reported their financial 
income on time (Moderniseringsdepartementet, 2004-2005; see also GRECO, 
2009).  
Thus, the PPA introduced more permissive access criteria for state 
funding, but simultaneously made reporting somewhat more constraining. The 
funds available in state funds increased throughout this phase, indicating 
increased generosity. Where Table 4.4 above outlined that 148 million NOK (ca. 
14.8 million euros) was allocated to Norwegian political parties in 2004 (i.e. end 
of regulatory phase 2), the sum increased to 220 million NOK (ca. 22 million 
euros) in 2009, and further to 282 million NOK (ca. 28 million euros) in 2014, 
confirming the claim made elsewhere that the Norwegian system of state funding 
is generous (GRECO, 2009, p. 17). This benefitted not just new minor parties, 
but all eligible Norwegian parties. The share of the total state funds paid out at 
the national level was 70 percent between 2009 and 2014 (Finansdepartementet, 
2009, 2010, 2012, 2014). This was not particularly negative for the new minor 
parties in regulatory phase 2, given that the access criteria for state funding on 
the national level were now so permissive. 
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The end of regulatory phase 2 (2013/2014) saw the introduction of more 
constraining requirements related to documentation and bookkeeping. For the 
first time party expenses also had to be reported, and the independence of 
auditors was highlighted in the law. The enforcement organ, the Political Party 
Act committee, was assigned wider powers to control the parties’ reporting 
(Stortinget, 2012-2013). Moreover, criminal sanctions for non-compliance with 
reporting requirements were also specified in the PPA (see Art. 28-30, Party 
Political Act). So, in parallel with increasingly permissive access and allocation 
criteria for state funding, and increasing generosity, increasing demands related 
to reporting were also introduced in regulatory phase 2. A summary of the 
regulation in this phase is summarised in the table below: 
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Table 4.6 Overview of regulatory phase 2 (2006-2016): Norway 
Type of 
state 
benefit 
Tied to which 
institution 
Recipient Introduction 
year 
Access criteria Reporting related to 
the receipt of state 
funding 
Enforcement 
Annual 
state funds  
Storting National 
branch 
1970 Vote support: No 
threshold.  
Basic support: 2.5 
percent of the vote. Vote 
support accounts for 
9/10 of the total support. 
 
2006: All organisational 
branches subject to 
income reporting. Audit 
required. Income 
declaration had to be filed.  
 
2013/2014: Audit 
requirements specified. 
Reporting of expenses. 
Increased demands 
concerning bookkeeping 
and documentation. 
2006: The Political Party 
Act Committee could 
impose administrative 
sanctions, but had no 
investigative rights.   
 
2013/2014: Criminal 
sanctions for non-
compliance introduced in 
the PPA. The Political 
Party Act Committee 
could control parties’ 
reporting. 
Annual 
state funds 
Regional and 
municipal 
councils 
Regional 
and local 
branch 
1975 Vote support: No 
threshold. Basic 
support: 4 percent of the 
vote or have one 
candidate elected. 
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4.3 State funding regulations in Norway and Italy – Parallels 
and differences  
The first difference between the two countries is the frequency of change to state 
funding regulations in Italy compared to Norway. New minor parties in Italy have 
operated in a much more unstable context with regards to state funding 
regulations, increasing the possible adaptation costs of new minor parties, and 
making the funding system more difficult to navigate. The fact that Italian electoral 
laws have changed several times between 1980 and today adds another layer of 
instability to the Italian context. The life cycle analysis of parties’ income 
structures and staffing later on will outline whether and how these frequent 
changes impacted on the new minor parties under scrutiny. 
Whereas one of the central features of the Italian state funding system is 
its centralised structure, a core characteristic of the Norwegian system is its de-
centralised design. State funds in Italy, irrespective of whether they have been 
won in relation to regional, European, or national elections, have been paid out 
to the national party branch. No state regulation has demanded that the central 
branch transfer funds to other branches, which means that both the receipt and 
also the management of funds (and reporting related to them) has been managed 
on the central level. Conversely, the Norwegian state has practiced a de-
centralised system, where national, regional, and municipal party branches each 
gain access to, receive, and manage state funding. Thus, this study’s analysis of 
national branches’ financial accounts will most likely show that the Italian new 
minor parties’ financial accounts are larger than those of their Norwegian 
counterparts. This difference is particularly interesting as one of the goals of the 
thesis is to understand whether state funding contributes to centralisation of 
executive councils. Having one centralised and one de-centralised state funding 
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system means that there are parties that operate in a most-likely (Italy) and a 
least-likely (Norway) context for centralisation. This is based on the argument that 
state funds contribute to centralising reforms by strengthening party elites and 
contributing to executing reforms. I can thus explore whether Norwegian and 
Italian party elites are strengthened in different ways due to the (potentially much) 
larger income from state funds in the Italian new minor parties. Moreover, whether 
(potentially) larger income from the state in Italian new minor parties shapes the 
execution of reform can also be explored.  
Another difference between the two contexts over time has been the 
diverging access criteria to state funds and shifts in the generosity of state funds. 
Whereas Italian new minor parties were overall exposed to permissive access 
criteria (until 2009/2010) and to increasingly generous (exception in early 1990s, 
and after 2008) state funds related to both regional, national, and European 
elections, the access criteria for national state funds (but not subnational) in 
Norway were constraining until 2006. Consequently, prior to 2006, Norwegian 
new minor parties were to a large extent excluded from benefitting from the 
provision of (increasingly generous) national state funding allocations, as the 
majority of state funds in Norway went to national state funds, and not subnational 
state funds which had a lower access threshold. The picture reverses after 2006, 
when Norwegian new minor parties were exposed to very permissive access 
criteria for national state funds that became (increasingly) generous, while Italian 
new minor parties operated in a context where the access criteria for state funds 
became increasingly constraining, first concerning state funds related to the 
European level (2009), then the regional (2010), and finally the national level 
(2012/2013). This development in Italy coincided with decreasing generosity, 
culminating with the abolition of all forms of direct state funds in 2013. These 
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developmental traits allow the thesis to analyse how the income structures and 
staffing patterns of new minor parties that start out in a permissive and generous 
state funding context (Italy) (possibly) change with the transition to an 
increasingly constraining and less generous context. Similarly, I can analyse how 
such dynamics play out in new minor parties that start out in a constraining and 
less generous context (Norway) and enter into a permissive and generous 
environment.  
Alongside these differences concerning access criteria and generosity, the 
regulatory frameworks share an increasing tendency to introduce more and more 
constraining reporting related to the receipt of state funds.55 Both countries had 
non-existent (Norway) or very lenient reporting requirements (with poorly 
functioning enforcement mechanisms) in the 1980s and early 1990s. Both 
countries introduced somewhat more constraining reporting in the late 1990s, 
Italy in 1997 and Norway, introducing reporting for the first time, in 1998. In the 
2000s, both countries increasingly introduced constraining reporting: In Italy this 
happened in 2012 and 2013, and in Norway in 2006 and 2013/2014. By now, the 
reporting tied to the receipt of state funds is similarly constraining in the two 
contexts: Full financial accounts (including income and expenses) must be 
submitted in both contexts, and they must be audited by an external auditor. 
Parties in both contexts are subject to sanctions that can be imposed by an 
independent commission. The analysis can thus investigate whether increasingly 
                                                          
55 In a comparative perspective, this development is far from surprising, as transparency 
obligations related to state funding have arisen from the international anti-corruption agenda (see 
e.g. Biezen & Kopecký, 2007; Koss, 2011). On that point, both Norway and Italy have been 
reviewed and received recommendations concerning party finance transparency from the Council 
of Europe (through the GRECO), and Smirnova (2018) has recently found that countries tend to 
comply with such GRECO recommendations.  
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constraining reporting requirements in Norway and Italy have similar impacts on 
patterns of staffing in new minor parties in both contexts. 
4.4 Summary 
The above analysis outlined the rich variety of state benefits and constraints that 
have been in place in Norway and Italy since the 1970s until today. As such, the 
overview has demonstrated the potential for variation in the study’s core factor of 
interest, namely access to/increase of state funding and decrease and/or loss of 
state funding. The variation within and across the contexts is important for the 
thesis’ comparative case design, as it allows for both within- and across-case 
comparisons regarding how parties’ intra-organisational dynamics evolve under 
different state funding regulations. On that point, the next chapter explores how 
the shifting state funding regulations in Norway and Italy have shaped new minor 
parties’ income structure. 
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5 New minor parties’ income structures under 
shifting state funding regulations 
5.0 Introduction 
Earlier works claim that electorally smaller parties are highly state-dependent; 
some even argue that small parties are ‘over-subsidised’ by the state (Bille, 2001; 
Casas-Zamora, 2006; Nassmacher & Nassmacher, 2001; Nassmacher, 1989; 
Sundberg, 1994). This chapter empirically analyses whether this contention is 
true for new minor parties in Norway and Italy, and thus explores the role of state 
funding over new minor parties’ life cycles in these two contexts. This chapter 
(like the regulatory chapter) provides a crucial foundation for the later analyses 
of how state funds impact staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive 
function. Building on the regulatory analysis conducted in the previous chapter, 
this chapter is structured according to the regulatory phases outlined there, in 
order to analyse how the parties’ income structures are affected by shifting state 
benefits and constraints, especially access criteria and generosity of funds. The 
Italian and Norwegian parties are (in that order) discussed separately, before a 
concluding discussion engages in a comparative assessment.  
5.1 Italian new minor parties’ income structure  
5.1.1 Regulatory phase 1: 1974-1992 
The table below summarises the permissive access criteria and high generosity 
in regulatory phase 1 in Italy. This permissive situation is likely to make it easy 
for new minor parties to draw on state funds for their operation.  
127 
 
Table 5.1 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 1 (1974-1992), and 
expectations for new minor parties’ income structure: Italy 
Phase 1: 1974-1992   
Access criteria Access tied to institutional representation. Permissive 
due to proportional electoral system on all levels (EU, 
national, regional). 
  
Expectation for new minor 
parties’ access 
+   
State funds available 
(generosity ) 
Generous: Both annual grants and electoral 
reimbursements. 
  
Expected effect of state 
funding access on new minor 
parties’ budgets 
+ 
 
  
 
The Greens, the Pensioner Party, and the Communist Refoundation Party are 
the only three Italian parties studied here that were operating during this phase. 
Due to the permissive access criteria, the Greens and the Communist 
Refoundation Party accessed electoral reimbursements and annual state funding 
following their first national elections in 1987 and 1992 respectively.56 The 
Communist Refoundation Party also accessed regional state funding in its 
foundation year, 1991. The Pensioner Party ran in regional elections in 1990 and 
accessed state funds as a result. However, it failed to win representation in the 
1992 parliamentary elections with its modest 0.63 percent of the votes, and thus 
also failed to access state funds, despite the low threshold for entry.  
Figure 5.1 outlines that the Greens was nearly 100 percent state-
dependent in 1987. The Communist Refoundation Party was already relatively 
state-dependent in its foundation year in 1991, despite not participating in any 
elections (generating direct state funding). The state-dependency was due to 
party tax: The party was formed as a split from the electorally and organisationally 
powerful Italian Communist Party, and several founding members and others who 
                                                          
56 Ten Green regional lists that in 1986 went on to form the Green party, accessed regional state 
funding in the regional elections in 1985 (Annual account, 1986).  
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aligned with the new party were parliamentarians (Bertolino, 2004).57 Also the 
Green Party relied on party tax.58 The share of income from the state was 67 
percent for the Communist Refoundation Party in 1991, which emphasises the 
importance of party tax for the party’s budget. Once the party accessed electoral 
reimbursements related to the 1991 regional elections, the party’s state-
dependency rose to nearly 100 percent.  
Figure 5.1 Share of income from state funding. The Greens and the Communist 
Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 1 
Sources: Financial accounts 
Membership fees mainly benefitted the subnational branches in the Green 
Party in this phase. Its federated structure meant that membership fees were 
collected on the local level, and only a share was subsequently transferred to the 
national branch (Lion, 17.11.2016; Vannucci, 2007; Financial account, 1990). In 
the Communist Refoundation Party most of the membership fees have, 
throughout the party’s life cycle, stayed on the local level (see e.g. Financial 
                                                          
57 Founding members who were also MPs were for example Armando Cossutta, Lucio Libertini, 
and Sergio Garavini. The minor party Proletarian Democracy (Democrazia Proletara) with 
institutional representation was also incorporated into the new party in the spring of 1991. 
58 The Green statutes from 1986 (founding statute) and 1990 do not mention the obligation of 
elected representatives to pay party tax, neither does the founding statutes of the Communist 
Refoundation Party (1991). Nevertheless, the financial accounts document this practice from 
1988 for the Green Party (Financial account, 1988; see also Vannucci, 2007) and from 1991 in 
the Communist Refoundation party (Financial account, 1991).  
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accounts, 1997, 2002). This sheds light on the two parties’ high state-dependency 
in this phase.  
Unfortunately, no financial records are available for the Pensioner Party in 
this phase, but the state’s allocation plans for state funds59 demonstrate that the 
party received a total of 90,955 euros related to the regional elections in 1990. 
According to interviewees, the party has relied to a large degree upon personal 
funds from party representatives (Party representative, 10.11.2016), which 
supports the idea that the party never has practised party tax (see also Statutes, 
2002).60 Given that personal funds (and possibly some membership fees) were 
the party’s only other income sources, the state-dependency was probably high 
in this phase. This contention is strengthened by the fact that the party was highly 
dependent upon state funds in later regulatory phases.  
In brief, therefore, the permissive access criteria and generous state 
funding allocations in place in regulatory phase 1 largely benefited the three new 
minor parties established in this phase. The low income from membership fees 
on the national level sheds light on why the state-dependency of the Greens and 
the Communist Refoundation Party was so high. 
5.1.2 Regulatory phase 2: 1993-2011 
With the advent of regulatory phase 2, Italian legislators temporarily (between 
1993 and 1999) made the access criteria more constraining for new minor parties 
and also decreased the generosity by abolishing (annual) state funds (1993-
1997). However, from the late 1990s onwards, the generosity in the system 
increased, and the access criteria were made more permissive. Towards the end 
of the phase, in 2009 and 2010, the access criteria were again made more 
                                                          
59 These were issued after each election and outlined the sums that each party was to receive in 
electoral reimbursements. 
60 No older statutes have been accessed.  
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constraining. The parties’ financial leeway is thus likely to reflect this shifting 
permissiveness concerning access criteria and generosity in phase 2. 
Table 5.2 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 2 (1993-2011), and 
expectations for new minor parties’ income structure: Italy 
Phase 2: 1993-2011 
Access criteria Somewhat more constraining due to abolition of proportional 
electoral system. From 1999 and 2002 onwards increasingly 
permissive for funds related to Chamber of Deputies. More 
constraining after 2009 (EP-elections), and after 2010 (regional 
elections). 
Expectation for new 
minor parties’ access 
+ 
- (EP-elections/regional elections post 2009/2010) 
State funds available 
(generosity ) 
Only electoral reimbursements, i.e. less generous. Brief period with 
tax benefits from 1997-1999, i.e. more generous. Much more money 
allocated to state funding between 1997 and 2008, and the 
introduction of annual electoral reimbursements (2001) increased 
the generosity. Decreasing generosity after 2008. 
Expected effect of 
state funding access 
on new minor parties’ 
budgets 
- (1993-1997) 
+ (1998-2008) 
 
 
I address the income structures of the Greens and the Communist Party 
in conjunction first, then Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Pensioner 
Party, as the parties in these two groups have similar life cycles with regards to 
state funding access. Finally I discuss the Communist Party of Workers, the only 
party which did not access state funding in this regulatory phase.  
The Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party were highly state-
dependent throughout regulatory phase 2, with a clear dip towards the end of the 
period, which can be observed in the figure below. The parties’ income from the 
state reflects the regulatory framework nearly linearly, as illustrated by the dip in 
income from the state in the early 1990s following the abolition of annual state 
funds (see figure below). The introduction of the tax benefit Four for the Thousand 
in 1997 meant a stark increase in the income from the state in both parties that 
year. The increasing generosity in the system in the early 2000s meant that both 
parties experienced a nearly continuous increase in state funds from 2001 
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onwards. It is worth noting that the Communist Refoundation Party is the party 
with (by far) the highest income from the state in this phase. Increasingly 
constraining access criteria for state funds in 2009 (European elections) meant 
that neither party managed to access, with decreased income from the state as 
a result. Both parties also lost representation on national level in 2008, leading to 
a drop in income from the state.  
Figure 5.2 Income from state funding (euros) and share of income from state 
funding. The Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 
2 
Sources: Financial accounts  
Notes: The figures from before 2004 have been converted into euros by using conversion rates 
issued by the European Central bank (1998): 1 euro = 1936.27 lire. The Segni Pact dissolved in 
2002. 
Despite the two parties’ stable and high state-dependency, they are less 
state-dependent in some years, for example in 1996, 1999, and after 2008/2009. 
In 1996, both parties drastically increased their income from their members. For 
the Green Party this was because it launched a national membership campaign 
for the first time (Vannucci, 2007, p. 202),61 and for the Communist Refoundation 
                                                          
61 From then on, the national branch transferred a share of membership fees to subnational levels 
(Vannucci, 2007, p. 209).  
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Party because it was a congress year, which generated more income from 
members (Bertolino, 2004, p. 320). In 1998 and 1999 the share of income from 
membership fees rose to 15 and 27 percent respectively in the Greens, which 
can be related to a membership campaign that was launched when the work to 
restructure the party started in 1999 (Vannucci, 2007, pp. 177-178). Everyone 
interested in “creating the New Greens” (Federazione dei Verdi, 1999a) was 
urged to join, which also guaranteed participation in the party’s constitutive 
congress in 2000 (Federazione dei Verdi, 1999b). There was also lower state-
dependency in the Greens between 2001 and 2003 due to an increase in 
membership fees, and a parallel decrease in income from the state due to 
disappointing electoral results in 2001. In 2006 the party’s state-dependency 
increased when it doubled its representation in the Chamber of Deputies 
compared to 2001, and got more than 11 million euros in electoral 
reimbursements (Financial account, 2006). In 2008, a massive dip in income from 
membership fees sheds light on increased state-dependency. Finally, the party’s 
loss of representation following the 2008 national elections and the 2009 
European elections led to a stark decrease in state funding. Since 2008/2009, 
the party has increasingly relied on membership fees and other self-generated 
funds, according to interviewees (Bonelli, 16.11.2016; Ripamonti, 23.11.2016; 
see also financial accounts), even though the party regained some income from 
party tax (i.e. state funding) in 2011, after winning 15 seats in the 2010 regional 
elections.  
The Communist Refoundation Party kept a stable income share from the 
state until 2011, with the aforementioned dip in 1996, and another slight decrease 
in 2005, which was due to an increase in the income from donations, mainly from 
the party’s own elected representatives (Financial account, 2005). In 2011 the 
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share of income from the state plummeted due to loss of party tax. According to 
the treasurer, this was expected as the party failed to win representation in both 
the 2008 general elections and the 2009 European elections (Annual account, 
2011), which also affected the income from the state in real terms.  
The figure below shows that Tricolour Flame, the Pensioner Party, and the 
Segni Pact managed to access state funding early in this regulatory phase, 
despite the presence of slightly more constraining access criteria compared to 
regulatory phase 1. These parties’ income from the state has been much smaller 
(due to an electorally more minor position) than that of the Communist 
Refoundation Party, and also somewhat lower overall than that of the Greens. 
Only in 1994 did the Segni Pact, with an income of more than 3 million euros from 
the state, nearly reach the same levels in income from the state as the 
Communist Refoundation Party. As mentioned above, the Pensioner Party 
(Statutes, 2002) did not collect party tax, neither did the Segni Pact (Masi, 
13.03.2018; Segni, 29.01.2018). According to their 1999 statutes, Tricolour 
Flame obliged elected representatives to pay party tax, but since none of the 
interviewees mentions party tax as a source of income (Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016; 
Romagnoli, 16.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016; Fracescon, 25.11.2016) it 
is unlikely that this rule was ever enforced.  
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Figure 5.3 Income from state funding (euros). Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, 
and the Pensioner Party. Regulatory phase 2 
Sources: Financial accounts  
Notes: The figures from before 2004 have been converted into euros by using conversion rates 
issued by the European Central bank (1998): 1 euro = 1936.27 lire. The Segni Pact dissolved in 
2002. 
Overall, the figure shows that these three parties were generally most 
successful in accessing state funds related to European elections (i.e. in 1994, 
1999, and 2004) in this phase. This is hardly surprising, given the very low access 
criteria for such funds. Both Tricolour Flame and the Segni Pact significantly 
increased their income from the state in 1999 and 2004 respectively. The 
Pensioner Party also accessed state funding related to the European parliament 
in both 1999 and 2004 (as the party elected a representative), but no financial 
account from 1999 is available (and these state funds do thus not show in the 
figure). In turn, when the access criteria for state funds related to European 
elections were made more constraining in 2009, neither Tricolour Flame nor the 
Pensioner Party managed to access (the Segni Pact had dissolved by 2009).  
The fact that state funds were paid out in annual instalments after 2001, 
meant that both the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame (as the table outlines) 
had continuous state funding access for the first time after 2004. The tax benefit 
Four for the Thousand introduced in 1997, which significantly altered the income 
from the state for the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party, generated 
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less income for the Pensioner Party (135,000 euros), and the Segni Pact 
(297,000 euros), reflecting the proportional allocation mechanism, 
disadvantaging electorally (very) minor parties, such as these two. Tricolour 
Flame did not access this tax benefit. 
The Pensioner Party, Segni Pact, and Tricolour Flame were state-
dependent in the years they accessed state funding, as the figure below shows: 
Figure 5.4 Share of income from state funding. Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, 
and the Pensioner Party. Regulatory phase 2 
Sources: Financial accounts 
The Segni Pact and the Pensioner Party were particularly state-dependent, which 
coincides with interview material highlighting the importance of state funds for the 
Segni Pact’s (Masi, 13.03.2018; Segni, 29.01.2018) and the Pensioner Party’s 
budgets (Party representative, 10.11.2016). Echoing the findings in the Greens 
and the Communist Refoundation Party, big changes in income from membership 
fees in the Pensioner Party, sheds light on shifts to the party’s state-dependency. 
In 2010, for example, the income from membership fees suddenly soared in the 
Pensioner Party, which may reflect the party’s efforts to raise funds to 
compensate for the loss of state funding. Also, donations from party 
representatives in the Pensioner Party, such as in 2009 and 2010, shed light on 
why the share of income from the state decreased (Financial account, 2009, 
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2010).62 Such donations also occurred in Tricolour Flame. The financial accounts 
from 2006 and 2007 outline that the party secretary donated ca. 32,000 euros 
and 41,000 euros to the party respectively, reflecting information from party 
representatives who state that membership fees and personal funds have been 
crucial in periods when the party has not had state funding access (Romagnoli, 
16.11.2016; Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016; Francescon, 25.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 
28.11.2016). A steep increase in income from donations in 2008 (election year) 
also shed light on why Tricolour Flame’s state dependency decreased in 2008. 
Interestingly, the financial accounts from the Pensioner Party, the Segni Pact, 
and the Tricolour Flame indicate that all income from membership fees was kept 
at national level, which means that these parties had more leeway to use this 
income source than the Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens.  
The Communist Party of Workers was created in 2006, and never 
accessed state funding, despite permissive access criteria. The party only 
collects party tax from regionally or nationally elected representatives (Party 
representative, 11.11.2016; Statutes, 2008, 2011, 2014), which the party has 
failed to achieve. According to party representatives, the main sources of income 
for the party are membership fees, and income from fundraising activities or other 
self-generated income (Terra, 29.11.2016; Party representative, 11.11.2016, 
21.11.2016). A fixed sum of the collected membership fees is always transferred 
to the national branch of the party (Statutes, 2008, 2011, 2014).  
In brief, this analysis shows that five out of six parties operating in this 
phase were very state-dependent (when they had state funding access), and 
shifts in state benefits and constraints are largely reflected in the parties’ income 
                                                          
62 In 2009 and 2010 regional councillors Luigi Ferone and Elisabetta Fatuzzo contributed with 
private donations to the party (Financial account, 2009, 2010). In light of their position, these 
contributions are portrayed as donations in the financial records, rather than as contributions (i.e. 
not party tax).  
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structures. The Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party experienced 
decreased income from the state due to a decreasingly generous state funding 
system in the early 1990s. In a similar vein, the increasingly generous system in 
place from 1997 and onwards, as illustrated by the introduction of the tax benefit 
Four for the Thousand and the provision of electoral reimbursements on an 
annual basis, gave all the studied parties increased financial leeway. The fact 
that the Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Pensioner Party mainly 
accessed state funds related to European elections (1999 and 2004) 
demonstrates how highly permissive access criteria concerning these funds 
benefitted them. Similarly, more constraining access criteria (4 percent of the 
vote) for state funding related to the European parliament led to a loss of such 
funds for all the parties in 2009.  
5.1.3 Regulatory phase 3: 2012-2016 
The third regulatory phase encompasses great changes. First of all, common 
access criteria for electoral reimbursements on all levels (one candidate elected) 
were introduced in 2012. From 2013, the access criteria became more 
constraining as registration in a newly established party register was required. In 
addition, the state provided less and less money for direct state funding, 
continuing the development started in 2008. From 2013 all direct state funding 
was abolished. In its place, a tax benefit called Two for the Thousand was 
introduced. This decreasing generosity and increasingly constraining access 
criteria is likely to be reflected in decreased income from the state for the new 
minor parties. 
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Table 5.3 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 3 (2012-2016), and 
expectations for new minor parties’ income structure: Italy 
Phase 3: 2012-2016  
Access criteria Institutional representation was required for access to 
funds on all levels. Registration was required from 
2013.  
Expectation for new minor parties’ 
access 
- 
State funds available (generosity) A decrease in amount set aside for state funding 
(2012). Abolition of state funds from 2013, just tax 
benefits left. 
Expected effect of state funding 
access on new minor parties’ 
budgets 
- 
 
Echoing the Italian state’s provision of less money to state funds, the figure 
below shows that the Greens’ and the Communist Refoundation Party’s income 
from the state was significantly lower in this third regulatory phase (compared to 
previous phases). That said, the introduction of the tax benefit Two for the 
Thousand in 2013 led to a significant increase in state income for the Communist 
Refoundation party in 2015 and the Greens in 2016. 
Figure 5.5 Income from state funding (euros) and share of income from state 
funding. The Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens. Regulatory phase 
3. 
Sources: Financial accounts. 
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The figure shows that the Greens’ state-dependency decreased until accessing 
Two for the Thousand in 2016, due to a decrease in income from state funds, 
combined with a relatively stable income from membership fees between 2013 
and 2015, amounting to between 40,000 and 50,000 euros. The Communist 
Refoundation Party was increasingly state-dependent in the period. In 2014 this 
was because of a massive drop in membership fees (from 94,281 euros in 2013 
to 6115 euros in 2014), and in 2015 it was due to a significant increase in income 
from Two for the Thousand (see also Annual account, 2015).63  
The Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame, and the Communist Party of 
Workers were not able to access any state funds in this regulatory phase, 
reflecting increasingly constraining access criteria. Tricolour Flame continued to 
enjoy access to a small share of state funds that it won in relation to the 2008 
parliamentary election, but from 2013 onwards the party relied on membership 
fees and personal funds only (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016; Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016; 
Francescon, 25.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016). Act to Stop the Decline 
which was founded in 2012, did not manage to access state funds following 
participation in the parliamentary elections in 2013, and thus relied on small 
donations and self-generated income in its short life span (it died in 2014) 
(Boldrin, 27.11.2016; Brusco,  28.11.2016).  
This regulatory phase has thus demonstrated how the access criteria were 
constraining for the new minor parties in this sample, even though the previous 
chapter demonstrated how, depending on the inclusiveness of electoral 
coalitions, the new access criteria could also be more permissive than before. 
The decrease in generosity (i.e. by abolishing state funding and leaving only a 
                                                          
63 I have not accessed the Communist Refoundation Party’s 2016 financial account, which is why 
2016 figures are not reported here. 
140 
 
tax benefit in place) severely affected the income structures of parties that 
throughout their life cycles have been highly state-dependent. It is worth noting 
that failure to attract electoral support by the Greens, the Communist 
Refoundation Party, Tricolour Flame, and the Pensioner Party is also responsible 
for these parties’ stark decrease in income from the state prior to the abolition of 
direct state funds in 2013.  
5.2 Norwegian new minor parties’ income structure  
5.2.1 Regulatory phase 1: 1970-2005 
The table below demonstrates that access criteria for national state funding were 
constraining in this phase (2.5 percent), but permissive on regional and local 
levels, as the only requirement was to be registered, have an operative branch in 
the relevant constituency, and win at least one vote. The state increased the 
funds available in state funds throughout the phase, but a majority of the total 
state funds went to the national state funds. Reflecting this, new minor parties 
operating in this phase would to a greater extent qualify for (the less generous) 
subnational funds. 
Table 5.4 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005), and 
expectations for new minor parties’ income structure: Norway 
Phase 1: 1970-2005 
Access criteria  National level: Win more than 2.5 percent of the votes and present 
lists in at least half the electoral districts. 
Subnational level: Vote support (no threshold). 
Expectation for new 
minor parties’ access 
+ (subnational level) 
- (national level)  
Generosity Less generous than in Italy, as only annual grants (and not also 
electoral reimbursements) were available. The provision of funds 
on three levels compensates for this. Increasingly generous. 
Expected effect of 
state funding access 
on new minor parties’ 
budgets 
+ (but relatively modest, as I only expect the new minor parties to 
access subnational funds) 
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Echoing the constraining access criteria for state funds on the national 
level, the Pensioner Party, the Greens, the Coastal Party, and the Fatherland’s 
Party only accessed state funding on the subnational level in this phase. The 
Pensioner Party’s congress first introduced a rule where subnational branches 
had to transfer 10 percent of their state funds to the national level 
(Pensjonistpartiet, 1991a), which was increased to 20 percent from 1992 
onwards (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992b; Pensjonistpartiet, 1993a), while the 
Fatherland’s Party obliged their subnational branches to transfer 1/3 of the 
subnational state funds to the executive council (Statutes, 1990). In practice, 
however, nearly all of the state funds were transferred to national level 
(Fedrelandspartiet, 1992, 2002). The Greens required 10 percent from 1993 
(Statutes, 1993) and 15 percent from 1997 (Statutes, 1997) to be transferred. 
There was no further change to this in regulatory phase 1 (Green party statutes, 
1997, 1999, 2000, 2004; and Pensioner party statutes, 1996, 2004). These 
internal regulations explain why the national accounts of these parties have 
income from the state in this phase. There was not a similar practice in the 
Coastal Party. As will be discussed last, neither the Cross Partisan MPs nor 
Future for Finnmark accessed state funding.  
 The Pensioner Party received between 60 and 92 percent of its income 
from transfers of state funding from subnational branches between 1992 and 
2001. The Greens’ state-dependency ranged between 20 and 50 percent in this 
phase, while the Fatherland’s Party’s state-dependency was around 70 percent 
in 1992, before it decreased (see figure below).64 All three parties divided the 
                                                          
64 Regarding the Fatherland’s Party I have not been able to access full financial accounts, which 
means that there might be other sources of income that have not been registered. That said, both 
membership fees – which according to party representatives (Moseng, 26.02.2018; Party 
representative, 16.04.2018a) have been the party’s most important source of income – and state 
funds are included in the calculations on which the figure is based. 
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income from membership fees between the national and subnational level. In the 
Greens 1/3 of membership fees went to the national branch (Statutes, 1997), 
while half was reserved for the national branch in the Fatherland’s Party 
(Statutes, 1990). In the Pensioner Party the share was calculated by the 
Congress and the regional annual meeting (see e.g. Statutes, 1992, 1996).  As 
the only party in the Norwegian sample to do so, the Greens collected (modest) 
party tax from its elected representatives, and the party’s income from the state 
thus originated from both party tax and transferred subnational state funds (see 
e.g. Financial account, 1994).65  
The difference in overall state-dependency between the Greens, the 
Pensioner Party, and the Fatherland’s Party is first of all due to the different 
shares of subnational state funds transferred from the subnational branches (see 
above). Secondly, the Pensioner party was electorally larger than the Greens and 
the Fatherland’s Party in this phase, and thus received more state funds than the 
other two parties due to the proportional allocation mechanism. This sheds light 
on why the share of income from membership fees and other income sources 
(besides state funds) was lower in the Pensioner Party than in the other two 
parties. For example, the Pensioner Party received between 270,000 NOK (ca. 
27,000 euros) and 530,000 NOK (ca. 53,000 euros) in state funds between 1995 
and 2001 (Financial accounts, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001) while the 
sums ranged between 25,000 and 40,000 NOK for the Greens between 1994 to 
1997 (Financial accounts, 1994-1997), and between 4800 NOK and 152,000 
NOK for the Fatherland’s Party (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a). 
 
                                                          
65 The Greens’ income from party tax was significantly lower than that of Italian new minor parties. 
For example, the Greens received 3000 NOK (ca. 300 euros) in party tax in 1995 (Financial 
account, 1995). 
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Figure 5.6 Share of income from state funding. The Greens, the Pensioner 
Party, and the Fatherland’s Party. Regulatory phase 1 
Sources: The Greens: Financial accounts. The 1994 figures are just the budget figures 
(Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1994a), as no financial account is available. The Pensioner Party: Budget 
(1992) (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992b), otherwise financial accounts. The 2005 figure for state funding 
has been calculated by the author on the basis of the party’s receipt of subnational state funds 
that year. The Fatherland’s Party: Fedrelandspartiet, 1993, 2002.  
Note: There should have been subnational state funds transferred to the national level in the 
Fatherland Party in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 as well. The reason why such transfers 
are not noted in the figure is simply that the transfers never took place (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a). 
The state-dependency of the Pensioner Party decreased significantly in 1999 and 
2001. In 1999 the party received a transfer from one of its regional branches (not 
the mandatory state funds), amounting to nearly 100,000 NOK,66 while the 
financial account from 2001 demonstrates an increased income from sales, 
amounting to nearly 150,000 NOK, echoing the parliamentary elections that year. 
Interestingly, the party’s share of income from members declined throughout the 
period, from 8.6 percent in 1995 to 2.9 in 2003. Not until 2005 was there a small 
increase in income from this source. The decline in the late 1990s is probably 
related to the serious conflicts that riddled the party in 1998 concerning the sitting 
party leader Jørgen Øydvin (see e.g. NTB, 16.09.1998; Aftenposten, 
17.09.1998). Still, the increase from other sources compensated for this loss of 
income.  
                                                          
66 Rather it was noted as ‘returned money from Aust Agder’ (the region). In addition, the financial 
account that year included the sum that the party had in its account going into 1999 as income 
(which was ca. 80,000 NOK). 
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For the Greens and the Fatherland’s Party the shifting state-dependency 
reflects shifts in income from members, echoing findings from the Italian analysis. 
Specifically, the Greens’ increased income from members between 1994 and 
1997 meant that its state-dependency went down (Financial accounts, 1994-
1997). The increased membership in this period was also mentioned in the party’s 
newsletter in 1995, ‘Growth in the Greens: In August already 20 percent more 
members than in 1994 together’ (Grønn Kontakt nr. 4, 1995). The membership 
fee is also highlighted as a very important source of income for the party in 
regulatory phase 1 by interviewees (Party representative, 28.06.2017; Simonsen, 
16.06.2017). Another reason for the Green’s decreased state-dependency in 
1996 and 1997 was an increased income from gifts and donations (Financial 
accounts, 1996, 1997).  
The importance of state funding decreased in the Fatherland’s Party in 
1993, due to a surge in income from membership fees. In fact, the party increased 
its income from members from ca. 64,000 NOK (6400 euros) in 1992, to ca. 
280,000 NOK (28,000 euros) in 1993 (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a). The lack of 
income from state funding in the years between 1994 and 1998 is simply due to 
the fact that the branches never transferred the sums they were required to 
(Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a). After 1999, the party did not access state funds 
anymore. This shows how vulnerable a national party branch is in a situation 
where it cannot itself access state funding, and where subnational branches fail 
to fulfil their financial duties. Generally, in the period after 1994 until the party died 
(2008), the party’s main sources of income were membership fees, which was 
decreasing steadily from its highest point in 1993 (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a), and 
private funds (Moseng, 26.02.2018; Party representative, 16.04.2018a).  
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The figure above has a large gap in the Greens’ life cycle concerning state-
dependency. This mirrors the lack of specific data about the financial situation in 
the Greens between 1998 and 2005. That said, electoral statistics show that the 
party continued to access state funding on the subnational level in this period due 
to its stable (albeit low) electoral support.67 Consequently, the national branch of 
the Greens also continued to get a share of state funding from subnational 
branches in the period which is marked as blank in the figure above, as the rule 
to transfer subnational state funds to the national level was valid in the whole 
period. 
The Coastal Party did not oblige its local and regional branches to transfer 
state funding to the national branch (Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; Stabrun 
Johansen, 26.01.2017).68 The party (the national branch) thus relied on 
membership fees, some sales, and donations in this phase (Party representative, 
21.02.2018; Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018; Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2917), which 
is also supported by meeting documents that refer to the party’s only income 
sources being membership fees and donations (Kystpartiet, 2004). The lack of 
funds in the national branch was also due to the national branch’s transfer of a 
share of membership fees to subnational branches, which happened both in 
regulatory phase 1 (Kystpartiet, 2004) and 2 (Financial accounts, 2006, 2007, 
2010, 2011, 2012).  
Cross Partisan MPs69 and the Popular Movement for the Future for 
Finnmark never accessed state funding, and the lack of financial accounts for 
                                                          
67 The party achieved between 0.2 and 0.3 percent of the vote on the local level in the regional 
and local elections in 1995, 1999, and 2003 (Statistics Norway, Undated (b)). 
68 The party elected several representatives on the subnational level in 1999 (25 local councillors 
and three regional councillors) and 2005, for example, which means that the party’s subnational 
branches had access to state funding (Kystpartiet, undated).  
69 The party was registered under different names from the 1970s onwards, but was taken over 
by Harald B. Haram and supporters in 1992, and this is thus registered as the formative year of 
the party (even though it was first registered as Cross Partisan MPs in 1997) (Nordstrand, 2005).  
146 
 
both parties explains why they are not part of the figure above. Both parties were 
organisationally vulnerable, and neither of them had established membership 
registers (Leirvik, 26.01.2018; Moe, 05.02.2018; Party representative, 
21.02.2018). In consequence, Cross Partisan MPs has mainly relied on personal 
funds during its life cycle (Nordstrand, 2005; Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997a, 
1997b; Party representative, 15.02.2018), creating a very restricted financial 
situation (Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997b). The regional branches and local 
branches have been financially independent (Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997b). 
Consequently, in 1997, when a branch of the party in the region of Nordland 
started to enrol members (Party representative, 21.02.2018), the income from 
this activity stayed in the region.70 Future for Finnmark relied on membership fees, 
loans, and some donations to finance the electoral campaign in 1989 (Aune, 
1996; Leirvik, 26.01.2018; Framtid for Finnmark, 1990; Framtid for Finnmark, 
1991). However, after 1990 the membership register was not maintained (Leirvik, 
26.01.2018). Even though the party elected one candidate to the Storting in the 
1989 parliamentary elections, it neither achieved 2.5 percent of the vote, nor 
presented itself in more than half of the constituencies, both of which were 
required for accessing state funding.71 This illustrates the constraining access 
criteria for state funds in the period. In the period after 1989, the parliamentary 
party grant that Future for Finnmark won thanks to having a candidate elected 
financed the party’s tasks. There is no indication that the party had party tax (see 
e.g. Leirvik, 26.01.2018; Moe, 05.02.2018).  
                                                          
70 After 1999 the Nordland branch split and created the Coastal Party (1999). This financial 
independence between branches also meant that potential state funds won on the subnational 
level stayed there (and were not transferred to the national branch).  
71 The movement did access the parliamentary party grant, which was (partially) spent in part on 
paying down the debts incurred by the movement during the electoral campaign (Leirvik, 
26.01.2018). 
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The analysis of the income structure of Norwegian parties in regulatory 
phase 1 reflects the constraining access criteria for national state funds, and the 
permissive criteria for subnational state funds. Concretely, four parties accessed 
subnational state funds, and three of them, i.e. the Greens, The Fatherland’s 
Party, and the Pensioner Party, subsequently transferred a share to the national 
branch. State funds constituted a large share of the income in the Pensioner 
Party, while the Greens to a larger extent managed to raise money from the 
members and had a lower income from the state, which is why its state-
dependency was lower than in the Pensioner Party. Similarly, the Fatherland’s 
Party’s reliance on state funds decreased throughout this regulatory phase, and 
membership fees and personal funds were important for its operation. Future for 
Finnmark and Cross Partisan MPs relied on personal funds, and to a certain 
extent membership fees (only the former), as they never accessed state funds. 
5.2.2 Regulatory phase 2: 2006-2016 
Regulatory phase 2 is characterised by a shift towards highly permissive access 
criteria for state funding on the national level, and a continuation of the permissive 
criteria on the subnational level. This is likely to be reflected in increased financial 
leeway in the national branches of the studied new minor parties. In terms of 
generosity, the state increasingly provided state funds throughout this phase, and 
since the majority was allocated to the fund for national state support, it was now 
(with more permissive access criteria) easier for new minor parties to access the 
most generous part of Norwegian state funds. 
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Table 5.5 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 2 (2006-2016), and 
expectations for new minor parties’ income structure: Norway 
Phase 2: 2006 - 2016 
Access criteria  National level: Vote support: no threshold. Basic support: 2.5 percent of 
the vote. Vote support accounts for 9/10 of the total support. 
Subnational level: Vote support: no threshold. Basic support: 4 percent 
of the vote or one candidate elected.  
Expectation for 
new minor parties’ 
access 
+ (all levels) 
  
Generosity Increasingly generous over time (particularly on the national level). 
Expected effect of 
state funding 
access on new 
minor parties’ 
budgets 
+  
 
Reflecting the permissive turn in regulation, the Greens, the Coastal Party, 
and the Pensioner Party accessed national state funding in 2006, while the 
Christian Conservative Party accessed it following participation in its first 
parliamentary elections in 2013. The Fatherland’s Party did not present lists after 
2001, and thus could not access state funds in this phase.72 The figure below 
outlines the different parties’ state-dependency in regulatory phase 2.  
                                                          
72 Cross Partisan MPs only ran once in this regulatory phase, in 2009, and only won 64 votes 
overall in the region where it presented lists (Nordland). As highlighted previously, subnational 
state funding stayed on the subnational level.  
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Figure 5.7 Share of income from state funding. The Greens, the Pensioner 
Party, the Coastal Party, and the Fatherland’s Party. Regulatory phase 2 
Sources: Financial accounts.  
The figure shows that the Coastal Party and the Pensioner Party were 
particularly state-dependent after 2006, which coincides with information from 
interviews in these parties (Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; Stabrun Johansen, 
26.01.2018; Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017; Remman, 20.06.2017; Walseth, 
01.06.2017). The Pensioner Party only won 0.5 percent of the votes in the 2005 
elections, but still received nearly a million NOK in state support annually 
(Financial account, 2006) based on that result. The party’s share of income from 
membership fees varies slightly, but ranges between 1 and 2 percent, and the 
low figure also reflects the party’s decision to keep a share of membership fees 
on the subnational level (see e.g. Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017; Statutes, 2008). 
The Coastal Party received its highest amount of state funding in the period 2006-
2009, when the party received around 1.5 million NOK per year. Due to 
disappointing electoral results in the parliamentary elections in 2009, the party’s 
income from the state dropped to around 400,000 NOK a year. After the latest 
parliamentary elections in 2013, the sum is around 300,000 NOK per year. Still, 
the Coastal Party’s state-dependency remains the same, and has been stable at 
around 70-80 percent, which also reflects the party’s decision to keep much of 
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the membership fees on the subnational level (Financial accounts, 2006, 2007, 
2010, 2011, 2012). The only year in which the share of state funding dropped 
below 80 percent was in 2011, when the party had an income of a little more than 
160,000 NOK called “various income” which was probably related to the regional 
and local elections that were held that year.  
The Christian Conservative Party and the Green Party had an overall lower 
state-dependency than the Pensioner Party and the Coastal Party in this phase, 
demonstrating their ability to attract donations and draw on income from 
members. The Christian Conservative Party received between 50 and 60 percent 
of its income from state funding in this phase. The actual amount received has 
been ca. 1.5 million NOK annually (ca. 150,000 EUR) (Financial accounts, 2014-
2016). The dip in state-dependency in the election year 2015 was due to a steep 
increase in income from donations (Financial account, 2015), reflecting the 
argument of one of the party’s founders in 2012: ‘there are many Christians in 
Norway who have quite a lot of money. I do not think that the financial side of 
things will become a problem’ (Terje Simonsen, in Eikje, 14.03.2012). Besides 
state funds, the party has mainly relied on membership fees, which amounts to 
between 25 and 32 percent of the party’s income between 2013 and 2016 
(Financial accounts, 2013-2016). There have not been any transfers of 
membership fees from the national to the subnational levels in the party (see e.g. 
Financial account, 2013, 2014).73 Prior to accessing state funds on the national 
level, i.e. between foundation in 2011 and 2014, the Christian Conservative Party 
was funded with the help of membership fees, personal funds, and a personal 
                                                          
73 The statutes in the Christian Conservative Party do not mention transfers of a part of the 
membership fee (to either national or subnational levels).  
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loan taken by the then party secretary and founder Terje Simonsen (Husveg, 
2017; see also Party representative, 08.02.2018).  
In 2006 the Greens accessed state funding on the national level for the 
first time (237,000 NOK, ca. 23,700 euros), and following this, it was highly state-
dependent (90 percent in 2006). However, the party’s continued membership 
growth in this phase, as well as considerable donations in election years, explain 
the decrease in state-dependency (see Figure 5.7), and especially so in election 
years (Financial accounts, 2005-2016). Even though the party had party tax in its 
statutes until 2012 (Statutes, 2012), there is no indication from financial accounts 
that it was actually collected in this regulatory phase.  
The party decided that 2/3 (not 1/3) of the membership fee was to remain 
on the national level from 2012 onwards, and 1/3 was to be allocated to 
subnational branches, increasing the national branch’s income from membership 
fees (Statutes, 2012). The figure below outlines the party’s income from 
membership fees and state funds in regulatory phase 2: 
Figure 5.8 Income from membership fees and state funds (NOK). The Greens, 
2006-2016 
Sources: Financial accounts 2006-2016.  
Note: To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit. 
Despite the increase in income from members, party representatives report that 
state funding on the national level is the party’s most important income source 
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(Golis, 02.06.2017; Simonsen, 16.06.2017), which the figure above 
demonstrates. The party’s income from the state increased from 237,000 NOK in 
2006 to over 10 million NOK in 2010 (i.e. 1 million euros) (Financial accounts, 
2006-2016), reflecting the party’s increasingly strong performance in elections. 
From 2013 this guaranteed the party access to both the basic component of state 
funds (flat grant) and vote support. 
The shift to more permissive access criteria for national state funding in 
this phase significantly improved Norwegian new minor parties’ financial leeway. 
The Coastal Party, for instance, had a solid income source on the national level 
for the first time, and the newly established Christian Conservative Party 
accessed state funds following its first ever national election in 2013. The state-
dependency was particularly high in the Coastal Party and the Pensioner Party, 
due to limited income from other sources, of them membership fees. The Greens 
and Christian Conservative Party managed to a greater extent than the former 
two to rely on donations and membership fees, which accounts for their lower 
state-dependency in this phase.  
5.3 Comparative discussion: New minor parties’ income 
structure across Italy and Norway 
This chapter has demonstrated that the existing literature’s finding that new 
and/or minor parties tend to be state-dependent (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006), 
holds for new minor parties in Norway and Italy. The division of the analysis into 
two and three regulatory periods in Norway and Italy respectively has made clear 
how shifts in access criteria and generosity affect the financial means of new 
minor parties. In Italy, for instance, the shift from regulatory phase 1 to 2, reflected 
by a drastic decrease in generosity, led to the Communist Refoundation Party 
and the Greens having their income from the state nearly cut in half. Conversely, 
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the shift to more permissive state benefits in Italy from 2001 (making electoral 
reimbursements annual) gave new minor parties larger financial leeway. In a 
similar vein, the introduction of higher access thresholds for (decreasingly 
generous) Italian state funds, starting in 2009, effectively decreased the new 
minor parties’ financial leeway in regulatory phase 3. Similarly, the shift in access 
criteria for state funding introduced in Norway in 2006 suddenly implied that all 
the Norwegian new minor parties in the sample (that ran in elections), accessed 
vote support on the national level, significantly changing the (financial) life of the 
Pensioner Party, the Greens, the Coastal Party, and the Christian Conservative 
Party. 
The new minor parties’ state-dependencies (not just their financial leeway) 
also mirror these regulatory changes. The table below outlines this, by providing 
an overview of each party’s state-dependency (percentage) in each regulatory 
phase. The Italian new minor parties’ very high state-dependency in regulatory 
phase one and two reflects the overall permissive environment in these phases. 
Interestingly, state-dependency remains high irrespective of brief (and smaller) 
shifts to the parties’ actual income from the state. Only when drastic decreases 
(several million euros) in income from the state occur, does it affect the parties’ 
overall state-dependencies, as illustrated by the Communist Refoundation Party 
in 2011. Specifically, all the Italian new minor parties have a mean state-
dependency of at least 78 percent in these two regulatory phases. Unsurprisingly, 
the picture reverses with the entry into regulatory phase 3, reflecting the 
decreasing generosity and the stricter access threshold for funds. In that phase, 
four parties are not state-dependent at all, while the Greens exhibits the highest 
state-dependency with ‘only’ (compared to previously) 67 percent.   
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In a similar vein, the Norwegian new minor parties, had a mean state-
dependency ranging from 24 to 76 percent in the largely constraining regulatory 
phase 1 (1970-2005), where the Greens and the Fatherland’s Party were never 
more than 24 and 38 percent state-dependent respectively. However, the 
situation reversed when Norwegian new minor parties entered into regulatory 
phase 2 (2006). With a more permissive environment, the new minor parties 
increased their overall state-dependency, and no party was less than 59 percent 
state-dependent in Norway in this phase. The generally high state-dependency 
(in certain phases) in both contexts indicates that factors such as ideology, 
formative features (split or a newly born), or a party’s age, has little role in shaping 
new minor parties’ overall income structures. 
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Table 5.6 State-dependency, range and mean (percentage) in Italian and Norwegian new minor parties – across regulatory 
phases 
Notes: The figures only cover the years for which I have data. In the Italian case, that means that the data is only applicable for the years in which the 
parties had state funds. The zeroes indicate that the party had no access to state funds. 
1 The party had access to state funds, but no financial accounts are available, and I thus cannot calculate the party’s state-dependency. 
2 The party drew on state funds until 2013, but since I do not have the party’s individual financial account (only the joint financial account with the Right, 
with which the party fielded candidates in 2008), I cannot make a figure for the party’s state-dependency. 
 
 
 
Italy Regulatory phase 1 (1974-
1992) 
Regulatory phase 2 (1993-
2011) 
Regulatory phase 3 (2012-
2016) 
 Range Mean  Range Mean Range Mean 
The Communist Refoundation 
Party 
67-95  81 7-95 88 20-74 49 
The Greens 78-98  91,2 27-98 78 41-78 67 
The Pensioner Party No data1 No data 35-99 87 0 0 
Tricolour Flame   63-97 81 02 0 
The Segni Pact   68-99,5 85   
The Communist Party of Workers   0 0 0 0 
Act to Stop the Decline     0 0 
Norway  Regulatory phase 1 (1970-
2005) 
Regulatory phase 2 (2006-
2016) 
  
 Range Mean  Range Mean   
The Pensioner Party 60-92 76 79-92 86   
The Greens 0-47 24 16-89 61   
Future for Finnmark 0 0     
The Fatherland’s Party 11-67 38 0 0   
Cross Partisan MPs 0 0 0 0   
The Coastal Party 0 0 59-87 80   
The Christian Conservative Party   53-63 59   
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Despite the generally high state-dependency in both contexts when state 
benefits and constraints are permissive, two parties stand out. The Christian 
Conservative Party and the Greens in Norway have both managed to draw a 
considerable share of their income from sources besides state funds, such as 
from donations in the permissive regulatory phase 2 in Norway. That interestingly 
counters those who argue that new minor parties are generally unattractive for 
donations (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43), indicating that in some cases, donors 
look beyond a party’s size and newness when giving money to politics. Both of 
these parties have also managed to draw a considerable share of their income 
from their memberships. The importance of fluctuations in the membership for 
brief (but not lasting) shifts in state-dependency is also something that the 
analysis found in a range of other parties, as illustrated by for example the 
Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Pensioner Party in Italy, and 
the Fatherland’s Party in Norway. Interestingly, larger donations from party 
representatives themselves (not party tax) were also found to shift the state-
dependency temporarily in Italian new minor parties, such as Tricolour Flame and 
the Pensioner Party.  
The definition of state funds in this thesis includes party tax. This analysis 
has outlined one core difference between the parties concerning party tax, which 
underpins existing literature (Bolleyer & Gauja, 2013). Concretely, the analysis 
found that only parties in certain party families and with certain ideological 
dispositions (leftist and green parties) had party tax. Thus, in my sample, only the 
Communist Refoundation Party, the Greens, and the Communist Party of 
Workers in Italy, and the Greens in Norway, had party tax. However, only in the 
Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy did it constitute a 
substantial share of the parties’ income from the state, while the Norwegian 
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Greens’ income from this source in the 1990s was marginal. Interestingly, the 
statutes of Tricolour Flame – belonging to the far-right party family – outlined that 
the party was to have party tax, but in practice the rule was not enforced.  
5.4 Summary 
This chapter has outlined how different state regulations effectively shape the 
financial leeway of new minor parties, and their state-dependency. The core 
finding is that new minor parties, as already emphasised in the literature, are 
highly state-dependent. As such, the analysis has provided a solid foundation for 
the later analysis of the study’s core indicator, namely access to/increase of state 
funds. This chapter showed that there was ample variation with regards to new 
minor parties’ actual income from state funds, and the table above showed that 
state-dependencies differ as well, not just between parties within the same 
context, but also across Italian and Norwegian new minor parties. Interestingly, 
state-dependencies were found to not always coincide with changing income 
from the state. As such, the analysis has provided a fruitful starting point for the 
following analyses – both within life cycle and across context – of how state funds 
shape staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. The first of 
these analyses is the staffing analysis, to which the thesis now turns. 
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6 State funding and staffing 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter empirically explores the impact of state funds on staffing processes 
in new minor parties, as such shedding light on the thesis’s first hypothesis (H1). 
Concretely, I analyse if an increase of state funding lead to staffing, and if a 
decrease or loss of state funding lead to downsizing, as H1 argues. Staffing is 
understood as processes that shift the number of permanent or temporary staff 
in new minor parties. This chapter builds on the previous one, which showed that 
overall, the Italian and Norwegian new minor parties have been highly state-
dependent, almost irrespective of the level of income from the state. More 
specifically, the analysis in chapter 5 showed how the shift between regulatory 
phases in each context effectively changed the financial means of the parties. 
Reflecting these findings, H1 is in this chapter analysed within each of the two 
(Norway) and three (Italy) regulatory phases.  
The analysis of H1 within phases starts by outlining how I expect state 
benefits and constraints to impact patterns of staffing, before staffing processes 
in each party’s life cycle are analysed in detail. The chapter concludes with a 
comparative discussion, bringing together the findings from Norwegian and 
Italian and new minor parties. 
6.1 State funding and staffing: An analysis of Italian new 
minor parties 
6.1.1 Staffing in regulatory phase 1: 1974-1992 
The table below outlines the low access criteria and the high generosity (both 
annual grants and electoral reimbursements) that characterises regulatory phase 
1 in Italy, which leads me to expect that new minor parties will hire staff in this 
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phase. Concretely, access criteria for annual state grants and electoral 
reimbursements related to regional and European elections were tied to 
parliamentary representation (Senate/Chamber of Deputies). This was a 
permissive access criterion, as the electoral system at the time had an effective 
threshold for representation at all institutional levels below 1 percent (see among 
others Renwick et al., 2009).74 To access electoral reimbursements related to 
national elections, a party had to win at least 2 percent of the vote and present 
lists in more than 2/3 of the constituencies. Parties accessing direct state funding 
were (only) required to disclose their financial accounts in newspapers and to the 
parliament, with failure to do so potentially resulting in a shortening of state 
funding. As this reporting did not require specialist skills, I do not expect that 
reporting per se will spark staffing.  
Table 6.1 Regulatory phase 1 (1974-1992). Overview of state benefits and 
constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Italy 
Type of regulation Regulation in place   Expected consequence for 
staffing 
Access criteria Access tied to institutional 
representation. Permissive due 
to proportional electoral system 
on all levels. High generosity. 
New minor parties will take on 
staff following state funding 
access. 
Reporting 
requirements 
(related to 
maintenance of state 
funds) 
Permissive: Only disclosure of 
accounts. 
None (a regularly appointed 
treasurer could perform the 
reporting duties, no staff 
needed). 
 
Both the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party accessed state 
funding on the national level following participation in their first national elections 
in 1987 and 1992 respectively, and responded by taking on staff, supporting H1. 
The Pensioner Party only participated in regional elections before 1992, and 
                                                          
74 Although the regulations were slightly different, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, had 
in practice the same proportional (electoral) system in the post war period (Grofman & Giannetti, 
2011, p. 3). 
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accessed regional funds. However, the party did not take on staff, contrary to H1, 
and the Pensioner Party is thus discussed last. 
While the Greens hired one permanent employee in 1987 (Katz & Mair, 
1992),75 the Communist Refoundation Party had 2-3 permanent hired staff in the 
national party organisation in 1991 (Bertolino, 2004).76 In 1991, i.e. a year after 
the party’s official foundation, nearly 70 percent of the Communist Refoundation 
Party’s budget constituted state funds, and interviewees state: ‘State funding put 
us in a financial position to hire staff’ (Meloni, 24.11.2016), lending support to H1. 
Similarly, Green Party representatives argue that access to state funding in the 
1980s allowed the party to take on staff (Lion, 17.11.2016), which is also 
corroborated by the annual account from 1987, and current treasurer, Natale 
Ripamonti (Interview, 23.11.2016). In fact, the Greens got nearly 100 percent of 
their income from the state in 1987, which shows how state funds were crucial 
for staffing. The support for H1 is strongest with respect to the Greens, as the 
Communist Refoundation Party also got ca. 30 percent of its income from auto-
financing in 1991, which could help finance staffing. However, as the previous 
chapter outlined, the Communist Refoundation Party transferred a large share of 
its membership fees to subnational levels, which indicates that the actual financial 
leeway to hire came from state funding. Both parties, before becoming subject to 
reporting requirements, had already recruited a treasurer who could see to the 
(permissive) reporting related to the maintenance of state funds in this regulatory 
phase.  
                                                          
75 However, when we look at the financial account from 1988, there are no reported expenses on 
party staff. That said, the party reports a sum in administrative expenses, which was related to 
the party office, and thus could comprise staffing expenses (Financial account, 1988). 
76 In fact, Bertolino (2004, pp. 277-278) states that the party had a total of 10 employees, but that 
only 2-3 were hired, and that the rest were the founders of the party, who were parliamentarians 
(i.e. not staff according to the definition adopted in this thesis). 
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In 1992 The Communist Refoundation Party increased its income from 
state funding (see figure below) and simultaneously increased its number of staff 
to 26 (Bertolino, 2004), lending further support for H1. Bertolini (2004, p. 87) 
argues that the increased income from state funding following the successful 
1992 elections allowed the party to hire more permanent staff, which underlines 
that it was the increase of funds that facilitated the hiring process, and not the 
elections themselves. 
Figure 6.1 Income from the state (euros) and number of staff in the Greens and 
the Communist Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 1 
Sources: Financial accounts, Vannucci (2007), and Bertolino (2004). 
A similar development happened in the Green Party; it increased its staff between 
1987 and 1992 at the same time as increasing its income from the state, which 
supports H1. While it scaled up to two staff members in 1989, it had six in 1990, 
and eight 1991 and 1992 (Vannucci, 2007). The exception is 1991, when income 
from the state dropped and a simultaneous increase in staff took place. The 
reason was that the party established a publishing house late in 1990 (Annual 
account, 1990), and started to release its weekly newspaper, Notizie Verdi 
(Federazione dei Verdi, undated) in 1991. For this activity, the party received a 
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substantial sum in state funding (Annual report, 1991),77 which facilitated staffing. 
This lends some support to H1, even though state support for publishing activities 
is not included in the state funding concept here.78 The staff taken on in the 
Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in this regulatory phase were 
permanent, and there is only indication that the 1992 electoral campaign led the 
Greens to take on temporary staff (Financial account, 1992). 
The two parties differ concerning the type of tasks staff undertook. In the 
Green Party, staff carried out technical and administrative tasks, i.e. maintenance 
of both territorial branches and the national branch. For example, staff contributed 
to developing the party’s financial account (Party representative, 23.11.2017). 
The staff also undertook important tasks related to the presentation of electoral 
lists and electoral campaigns (Party representative, 23.11.2017; Francescato, 
14.11.2017). None of the political offices or other elected offices (such as that of 
the treasurer) were paid (Lion, 17.11.2016) in the Greens. In the Communist 
Refoundation Party, on the contrary, the staff was both political and 
administrative. More specifically, political staff, such as party leaders, deputy 
leaders, leaders of specific sections (on labour, immigration etc.), and the 
treasurer, were paid, while the party also had purely technical staff, dealing with 
everything from driving to supporting the technical elaboration of the financial 
account, to dealing with local branches (Celli, 25.06.2018; Meloni, 24.11.2016).  
This summary outlines that both parties had staff that aided with the 
elaboration of the financial accounts, even though there is no indication that 
reporting per se contributed to inducing the parties to take on such staff. That 
                                                          
77 The party received 221,047 euros (428,008,400 lire, conversion rate 1936.27) from the state in  
publishing support (Financial account, 1991). 
78 One could speculate if the increased staff in 1991 is related to the Greens’ merger with The 
Rainbow Greens (Verdi Arcobaleno) in December 1990 (Vannucci, 2007, p. 177). However, as 
the merger did not affect the income structure per se (see Figure 6.1), this is unlikely. 
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said, both the Greens (Financial account, 1990-1992) and the Communist 
Refoundation Party (Financial account, 1992) had expenses related to 
publication of the financial account, which was a requirement in the law.  
Unlike the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party, the Pensioner 
Party did not take on staff in 1990 when it accessed modest amounts of (regional) 
state funding (100,000 euros)79: 
We decided not to hire staff […]. For us it was more important to make the 
party known than to have staff (Party representative, 10.11.2016). 
One of the party’s goals has been to provide recommendations and advice, for 
example concerning pensions, to pensioners (Party representative, 10.11.2016, 
19.12.2017). So, instead of taking on staff, the party spent its state funds on 
frequent television broadcasts (see also Franzi, 2017), so that the party could 
both make itself known and provide a service for pensioners. This sheds light on 
why the party operates contrary to H1.80 An interviewee (Party representative, 
19.12.2017) also suggests that the party’s operation without staff has been 
facilitated by having pensioners as members, a group usually better able to 
dedicate time to party work. The party has had a treasurer since the party was 
founded (Party representative, 19.12.2017), who could deal with the permissive 
reporting requirements in this regulatory phase.  
The party also prioritised spending its state funds on television broadcasts 
following state funding access in 1995, 1997, and 2004. The annual account from 
1997 states that the party had ‘numerous transmissions on local television 
                                                          
79 In comparison, the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party had an income from the 
state of more than 560,000 euros and 850,000 euros respectively in the years when they hired 
staff. 
80 One could respond to this that the amount of state funding that the Pensioners won in 1990 
hindered them from hiring. However, the fact that the party did not hire staff following the 2004 
elections, when the amount received was over 600,000 euros, shows that it was not the amount 
of money from the state that stopped the party from hiring staff.  
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channels giving information on pension acts’, while the annual account from 2004 
states that ‘the information activities to citizens regarding the life and program of 
the party have happened […] especially through television transmissions on 
private television’. The party’s goal to both provide a service to pensioners and 
make itself known shed light on why the party does not support H1 over time, and 
the party will thus not be discussed further in the two other regulatory phases.  
Summary 
The table below summarises the evidence for H1 from regulatory phase 1. Data 
from the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party supports H1, as the 
parties hired staff when increasing their income from the state. Contrary to H1, 
the Pensioner Party decided not to take on staff because it prioritised television 
broadcasts. As expected, the analysis shows that (permissive) reporting was 
dealt with by existing treasurers.  
Table 6.2 Overview of support for H1 from regulatory phase 1: Italy  
 Support for 
H1 
Description of evidence 
The Green Party Yes Increased income from state, and responded 
by hiring staff. 
The Communist 
Refoundation Party 
Yes  Same as the Greens.  
 
The Pensioner Party No  Accessed state funding, but prioritised to 
spend them on television broadcasts. 
 
6.1.2 Staffing in regulatory phase 2: 1993-2011 
Broadly, I expect staffing patterns in regulatory phase 2 in Italy to reflect the 
shifting access criteria for state funds, and the shifting generosity. The transition 
from the first to the second republic in Italy led to the abolition of annual state 
funding in 1993 (only electoral reimbursements left), representing the start of 
regulatory phase 2, lasting until 2011. This decreased generosity also coincided 
with more constraining access criteria (compared with regulatory phase 1) for 
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electoral reimbursements related to national and regional elections. That said, 
there was an increase in generosity in state funding allocations, first in 1997 when 
a new tax benefit was introduced, then from 1999 onwards when electoral 
reimbursements were paid out annually instead of in one lump sum (Pacini, 2009, 
p. 187), and finally from 2002 onwards, when funds were multiplied for each year 
of the legislature (Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 77). Simultaneously, the access criteria for 
electoral reimbursements related to Chamber of Deputies elections were made 
more permissive, first in 1999, then in 2002. The generosity decreased after 
2008, which coincided with more constraining access criteria for state funds 
related to European and regional elections, introduced in 2009 and 2010 
respectively. I thus expect that new minor parties early and late in the phase will 
downsize staff due to less generous state funding allocations, and hire between 
1997 and 2008 due to more generous state funding allocations and more 
permissive access criteria to state funds. Even though the reporting requirements 
to maintain state funds became somewhat more comprehensive in 1997, they 
were still permissive, and did not require specialist skills, which means that I do 
not expect staffing due to reporting in this phase. 
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Table 6.3 Regulatory phase 2 (1993-2011). Overview of state benefits and 
constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Italy 
Type of regulation Regulation in place Expected consequence for 
staffing 
Access criteria Somewhat more constraining 
compared to phase 1, but still 
permissive. From 1999 and 
2002 increasingly permissive 
for funds related to Chamber of 
Deputies. More constraining 
after 2009 and 2010 for funds 
related to EP and regional 
elections respectively. 
Increasing generosity from 
1999 until 2008. 
New minor parties will decrease 
staff figures early (1993-1996) in 
this phase, but hire in the period 
1997-2008, due to increasingly 
permissive access criteria and 
increasing generosity.  
 
Staff figures will go down 
following more constraining 
access criteria for state funding 
and less generous allocation 
from 2008 onwards. 
Reporting 
requirements 
(related to 
maintenance of state 
funds) 
Somewhat more constraining in 
1997 when more 
comprehensive financial reports 
had to be compiled and 
disclosed. 
None, as parties can still 
manage the reporting with a 
treasurer, as no professional 
knowledge (such as auditing) is 
required. 
 
Tricolour Flame and the Segni Pact were formed early in this phase, and 
both managed to access state funds, while the Communist Party of Workers, 
established in 2006, did not. The Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, 
and the Pensioner Party continued to access funds. All the Greens’ staffing 
processes in this phase support H1, which is why the Greens is analysed first. 
Then, I analyse the staffing patterns in the Segni Pact, Tricolour Flame, the 
Communist Refoundation Party, which offer partial support for H1. Finally, I 
analyse why the staffing process in the Communist Party of Workers diverge from 
H1. 
When hiring and downsizing staff is linked to state funding (H1): The 
Greens 
Coming into regulatory phase 2, the Greens had eight staff members. Between 
1995 and 1996, according to the treasurer at the time, the party suffered 
financially because of the removal of annual state funds in 1993: ‘I found myself 
having serious troubles to balance the financial account’ (Lion, 17.11.2016). The 
consequence was to cut the number of staff in half (four remaining). Interestingly, 
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the Greens found themselves launching their first national membership campaign 
in the same period (1996), and also entered government for the first time (1996), 
which clearly did not affect the staff levels in 1996. That shows how being nearly 
completely state-dependent (the party received 92 and 80 percent in income from 
the state in 1995 and 1996 respectively), directly impacted staffing, supporting 
H1. 
Conversely, the Greens scaled up its number of staff when the income 
from the state increased in the 2000s. Concretely, the Greens doubled its income 
from the state every year from 2003-2005, and tripled it from 2005 to 2006 
(Financial accounts, 2003-2006), reflecting the generous turn in state funding 
regulations in 1999 and 2002. As a consequence, the party more than doubled 
its number of full-time (permanent and temporary) staff (from six to 13) between 
2003 and 2006 and increasingly relied on external staff (Vannucci, 2007). The 
party also increased its income from membership fees in this period, even though 
the state-dependency was still between 76 and 94 percent from 2003 to 2006 
(Financial accounts, 2003-2006). State funds were thus still the most crucial 
factor for understanding increased staffing in the Greens, even though an 
increased overall budget (due to membership fees) could have contributed.  
After 2008 the party lost nearly all state funding (Financial accounts, 2008-
2011), because it failed to win representation in parliament following the 2008 
elections, lost governmental status,81 and representation in the European 
parliament in 2009. The party continued to receive some state funds in 2009, but 
from 2010 onwards this income source shrunk drastically, as the figure below 
demonstrates.  
                                                          
81 The Greens was in government from 2006-2008.  
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Figure 6.2 Income from the state (euros) and staff figures (full time, permanent 
and temporary). The Greens, 2003-2011 
Sources: Financial accounts and Vannucci (2007).  
Note: Staff figures from 2007 and 2008 have been impossible to track down 
The decreased (but not complete loss of) income from the state forced the party 
leadership to place all seven employees in redundancy schemes in 2010 
(Financial account, 2010; Bonelli, 16.11.2016; Ripamonti, 18.03.2016; Party 
representative, 26.06.2018), and consequently (with time) all the staff were lost 
(Party representative, 26.06.2018).82 Interestingly, the party did not hang on to 
any of its employees when the crisis struck in 2008/2009, illustrating the 
emergency the party entered into in financial terms, adding evidence to the 
proposition that a loss of state funding indeed constitutes an environmental shock 
for parties (see Panebianco, 1988). The financial emergency grew as the income 
from membership fees also dropped. In 2010 the party only had 1/10 of the 
income from membership fees as it had in 2007.83 However, membership fees 
were never sufficient to cover the staffing expenses in the Green Party, so it is 
unlikely (also in light of what the interviewees say) that this drop sparked the shift 
                                                          
82 Being in redundancy schemes meant that the party still had some staff after 2010, but they 
were less available for the party as they were required to participate in various courses. 
Eventually, the staff found themselves new jobs and were lost by the party (Party representative, 
26.06.2018).  
83 In 2007 the party had nearly a million euros in income from membership fees. This sum was 
reduced to 150,000 euros in 2010 (Financial accounts, 2007-2010).  
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in staffing patterns. The fact that the party had administrative staff and a treasurer 
throughout the whole period demonstrates how the party had resources to 
manage the reporting.  
Analysing cases where staffing patterns partially support H1: Tricolour 
Flame, the Segni Pact, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the 
Communist Party of Workers 
The Segni Pact hired 10 staff members in 1994 (Annual account, 1994; Segni, 
05.01.2018). The party received 90 percent of its income from the state in 1994, 
indicating the importance of state funding for staffing. Interviewees suggest that 
the party’s staff had worked for party leader Mario Segni in the movement 
‘Popolari per la riforma’, prior to establishing the Segni Pact (Soldani, 
03.03.2018), which does not alter the fact that the state funds were crucial to pay 
for the staff’s existence in the party after foundation, supporting H1. Interestingly, 
the Segni Pact took on temporary staff related to the 1994 election campaign, 
financed by contributions from electoral candidates and bank loans (Financial 
account, 1994), showing the relevance of electoral cycle for (temporary) staffing. 
The staff’s tasks in the Segni Pact were mainly to keep in contact with the party’s 
territorial branches, tend to members/supporters, and also deal with 
administrative matters (Soldani, 03.03.2018; Segni, 29.01.2018). The presence 
of administrative employees, in addition to a treasurer who was (by profession) a 
notary (Segni, 29.01.2018), meant that the party had sufficient resources to deal 
with the reporting requirements related to state funds in this phase. 
The Segni Pact’s income from the state shifted from 3 million euros in 1994 
to 180,000 euros in 1998, and up to 1 million euros in 1999 (Financial accounts, 
1994-1999), but regardless, the party kept the same number of employees 
(Segni, 05.01.2018; Soldani, 03.03.2018), contrary to H1. As the party’s main 
source of income was state funding (Soldani, 03.03.2018), this is puzzling. 
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Interestingly, the party relied on support from the movements from which the 
Segni Pact originated (Segni, 29.01.2018), and the funds to pay the staff were 
most likely taken from these sources.84 We already know that these movements 
paid for staff prior to the establishment of the Segni Pact, as these staff followed 
Segni into the party. It is also worth noting that an increase in income from 
membership fees between 1994 and 1998, and the income from some donations 
(Financial account, 1994-1998; Soldani, 03.03.2018), could have contributed to 
the party’s ability to avoid downsizing when income from the state decreased. 
From 1999 onwards the party reduced its number of staff (Segni, 
05.01.2018), even though the party increased its income from the state in 1999. 
That said, the party had a considerable deficit in the financial account in 1999, 
despite state funding access that year, and also lost access to state funds the 
year after, in 2000. There is, however, little evidence for the relevance of the 
party’s financial situation for this downsizing process, as party elites made the 
decision to close the party down. Concretely, following two failed referenda 
attempting to abolish the proportional component in the mixed electoral system 
in 1999 and 2000, party representatives decided that the party’s mission to 
secure a majoritarian electoral system was best pursued outside the electoral, 
political arena (Segni, 05.01.2018, 29.01.2018; Masi, 13.03.2018). By 2001 the 
party had no staff left, and in 2002 it closed down. This sheds light on why this 
downsizing process did not operate according to H1. 
As with the Segni Pact, Tricolour Flame offer partial support for H1. In 
1997, i.e. one year after winning state funds for the first time, the party hired a 
secretary to perform administrative tasks (Annual account, 1997). Income from 
the state constituted 84 percent of the party’s overall budget in 1997, outlining 
                                                          
84 Unfortunately, I have not had access to the financial accounts of the supporting movements.  
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how the party’s increase of state funds in 1996 and onwards led to staffing, in line 
with H1. Interviewees also highlight the importance of state funds for staffing 
(Fracescon, 25.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016). Interestingly, when the 
party lost state funds between 2000 and 2003,85 it did not downsize, contrary to 
H1. By exploiting the state funds won in 1999 (1.4 million euros), and membership 
fees, which amounted to 20,000 euros in 2004 (Financial account), the party 
avoided downsizing.86 According to former party leader Luca Romagnoli 
(Interview, 16.11.2016), the party has always kept the maximum number of staff 
that it could with its level of income, indicating that the party avoided downsizing 
if it could. The party’s overall budget thus enabled the party to keep its staff 
between 2000 and 2003. When Tricolour Flame increased its income from the 
state in 2004, it took on another person full-time (Annual accounts, 2004-2007), 
supporting H1. It thus had two staff members from 2004 onwards. 73 percent of 
the party’s income came from the state in 2004, which facilitated staffing, 
supporting H1, despite a gradual decrease in membership fees and a split87 in 
2004 (Financial accounts, 1998-2000, and 2004). The annual account from 2004 
states that ‘Receiving state funding allows the party to plan with higher certainty 
for the future’ (Annual account, 2004), suggesting that state funds were important 
for the long-term commitments such as staffing.88 
                                                          
85 There are no financial accounts from these years, but the state’s reports on the distribution of 
state funding do not have any information on Tricolour Flame, implying that the party had no 
income from the state in this period. 
86 Unfortunately, I do not have the financial accounts from 2001-2003, but the income from 
membership fees was relatively stable between 2000 (ca. 19,000 euros) and 2004 (ca. 18,000 
euros), which means it is very likely that the party also had at least some income from members 
in 2001-2003. 
87 Former party founder Pino Rauti left the party in 2004 (La Repubblica, 09.05.2004). 
88 One could speculate whether the money the party managed to raise through its newspaper and 
through demonstrations (20 percent of the budget in 2004) could have contributed to the hiring 
process. However, given that this was an income the party had never managed to raise before, 
and the fact that taking on a full-time employee is an over-time commitment, this is unlikely. 
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Lending some support to H1, Tricolour Flame let one staff member go in 
2007 (Annual account, 2007), due to an anticipated financial deficit. So, the party 
did not experience decreased income from the state in 2007. In fact, the party’s 
income from state funds had been stable since 2004, due to electoral 
reimbursements being paid out annually. However, the treasurer and party leader 
stated that the 2008 elections would incur electoral expenses, and argued that it 
would be hard to balance the accounts in 2008 (Annual account, 2007), shedding 
light on why the party meant that it was necessary to let one employee go in 2007. 
One party representative also states that: ‘It [the contract] was not renewed 
because of financial constraints […]’ (Party representative, 31.01.2018). We thus 
see how an anticipation of a deficit led the party to take precautions and let one 
staff member go in 2007. Interestingly, that happened prior to an electoral 
campaign, showing how restricted funds trumped considerations concerning the 
electoral campaign.  
The permanent staff in Tricolour Flame dealt with administrative and 
technical matters, such as answering the telephone, sending letters, dealing with 
the membership and membership register, and material related to campaigns 
(Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016; Party representative, 
31.01.2018). Interestingly, the party drew on external consultants to comply with 
the regulatory requirements related to the receipt of state funding when Luca 
Romagnoli was leader as ‘We were never able to find someone to do things like 
this for us on a voluntary basis, we always had to pay someone’ (Romagnoli, 
16.11.2016). 
The final party whose staffing pattern (at times) support H1 in regulatory 
phase 2, is the Communist Refoundation Party. The party’s income from the state 
throughout the phase is outlined below:  
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Figure 6.3 Income from the state (euros) and number of staff. The Communist 
Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 2 
Source finances: Financial accounts.  
Source staff figures: 1993-2002: Bertolino (2004). 2003-2007: Financial accounts. 2008-2011: 
Rifondazione Comunista (undated).   
In the early 1990s the party increased its number of staff from 25 in 1992 to 35 in 
1994 (Bertolino, 2004; Calossi, 2007), which corresponded with a doubling of the 
party’s income from the state between 1992 and 1994, from 3.5 million euros to 
nearly 7 million euros (Financial accounts, 1992, 1994), supporting H1. 
Interestingly, in the period after, between 1994 and 1996, the party operated 
contrary to H1. Then the level of staff increased (Bertolino, 2004; see also 
financial accounts), even though there was a decrease in income from the state 
due to the removal of annual grants in the state funding scheme. The income 
from the state was also affected by a loss of party tax in 1995 due to a split, where 
14 MPs out of 36 and 3 senators out of 18 left (Bertolino, 2004, p. 102; Ignazi, 
2008, p. 130). The increased staffing was facilitated by a generally large budget 
(amounting to over 5 million euros), and a decision to reduce the transfers to 
subnational branches, which gave the national branch more financial leeway 
(Bertolino, 2004, pp. 278-279). 
Similarly, in 1997 the party experienced an increase in income from the 
state due to the introduction of the tax benefit Four for the Thousand, but did not 
scale up its number of staff. Rather, the party prioritised spending income from 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
5 000 000
10 000 000
15 000 000
20 000 000
25 000 000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Income from state funding Staff figures
174 
 
Four for the Thousand on supporting the party newspaper, Liberazione (Annual 
account, 1997). In addition to supporting the party newspaper, the treasurer wrote 
in the annual account that the money went to investments and purchase of party 
offices (Annual account, 1997). The necessity to keep the most important 
information organ in the party running, and to invest in property, thus trumped 
increases in staff, not supporting H1. Between 1998 and 1999, the party 
decreased its income from the state, but still increased its number of full-time staff 
with nearly 10 people from 1998 to 1999, also operating contrary to H1. Bertolino 
(2004, p. 279) argues that the increase in staff was due to a strategic choice by 
the party ‘following the loss of human resources related to the parliamentary party 
group, and more in general as a reaction to a situation outside the party that 
suddenly had become more hostile’ (Bertolino, 2004, p. 279). The quote first 
refers to a dramatic split in 1998, when founder and party president Armando 
Cossutta split, and took with him 21 out of 34 parliamentarians and 8 out of 11 
senators (Bertolino, 2004, p. 125; Financial account, 1998). The incident that 
caused the split also made the Prodi-government, which the Communist 
Refoundation Party had supported, fall.89 Secondly, the quote refers to the party’s 
disappointing performance in the European elections in 1999 and the national 
elections in 2001 (Bertolino, 2004; Ignazi, 2008).  
The party’s flexible (and large) budget, amounting to 6.6 million euros in 
1998, enabled the party, despite the decreased income from state and 
membership fees (Financial account, 1998), to scale up the number of staff 
further in 1999. This indicates that if a budget is of a certain size, minor shifts in 
                                                          
89 The split was the result of a long-lasting tension between Cossutta (the president of the party) 
and Fausto Bertinotti (the party secretary). The split was initiated by a disagreement over 
Government Prodi’s budget of 1998, where Bertinotti wanted to vote against, and consequently 
make the government fall, while Cossutta wanted to support it (Corriere della sera, undated; La 
Repubblica, 07.10.1998; Bertolino, 2004, pp. 122-123).   
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levels of income from the state will not affect processes of downsizing in the same 
way as hypothesised. The flexible budget also sheds light on why the party scaled 
up its number of staff from 2001 to 2002 (47 to 62) (Bertolino, 2004) when there 
was no substantial change in the income from the state (nor the overall income 
for that matter). According to a party representative (Celli, 30.11.2017) the party 
supported the big anti-liberal and anti-global demonstrations in Italy at the time, 
particularly related to the G8 summit in Genova, which increased the need for 
staff. 
Between 2002 and 2007, however, the party’s staffing supports H1. The 
party massively increased its overall budget (just like the Greens), and (given its 
state-dependency) also its income from the state in this period (Financial 
accounts, 2003-2007). A simultaneous increase in staff from 2002 and onwards 
followed, and by 2007, the party had 98 staff members (up from 49 in 2004) 
(Financial accounts, 2004, 2007). Despite the support for H1, this increased 
staffing was curious, as in the 2002 congress the party had decided to prioritise 
expenses on the external work of the party (Statutes, 2002; see also Calossi, 
2007). External pressures related to the party’s record high representation in 
parliament and government participation (2006-2008) (Albertazzi et al., 2011) 
sheds light on why the party still prioritised increased staffing (in line with H1), 
despite the congress decision.90  The party’s representation in parliament and in 
government - and preparation for the elections in 2008 - also helps to understand 
why the party took on more staff in 2008, despite the fact that the income from 
the state had started to decline. 
                                                          
90 A split in 2006 also seems unrelated to staffing, as it did not affect the membership figures (in 
fact, the income from members increased from 2006 to 2007 (Financial accounts, 2006, 2007)). 
The split was led by Marco Ferrando, long standing leader of the far-left (Trotskyist) current of the 
party, who took with him some party members. This split became the Communist Party of Workers 
(also under scrutiny in this study).  
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As with the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party experienced a 
drastic decrease in income from state funding following its loss of representation 
in the Italian parliament in 2008 and the European parliament in 2009 (Financial 
accounts, 2008-2010). This loss of representation in the European parliament 
(and in turn of state funds related to this level) reflected the newly established 4 
percent threshold for representation there. According to the treasurer in 2008, 
this loss of representation and state funds would have ‘dramatic consequences 
for the staff’ (Annual accounts, 2008, 2009). In 2009 and 2010 the party started 
to downsize and in 2010 all but two of the staff were (or were on their way) into 
redundancy schemes (Rifondazione Comunista, undated), supporting H1 (see 
also Annual account, 2010). A split in 2009 also contributed to the financial 
emergency, by draining the party of between 8000 and 10,000 members 
(Rifondazione Comunista, undated).91 The income from membership fees 
dropped by 100,000 euros from 2008 to 2009 (Financial accounts, 2008, 2009). 
Still, it was the decrease in state funds that most strongly contributed to the 
downsizing, given the party’s high state-dependency (91 percent in 2008). 
The final party, the Communist Party of Workers, has a staffing pattern 
which counters the rationale in H1. The party hired its party leader in a part-time 
position in 2006 (Party representative, 21.11.2016; Terra, 31.01.2016), despite 
not accessing state funds. As chapter 5 outlined, the party relies solely on income 
from members (Terra, 31.01.2016; Party representative, 11.11.2016). There are 
two reasons that shed light on this staffing process. First of all, party leader 
(Marco Ferrando) left his job upon establishing the new party (Party 
representative, 11.11.2016), which created a need to finance his commitment. 
                                                          
91 Nichi Vendola, who ran in (but lost) the leadership contest in the party in 2008, led the split. 
The split also meant that the Communist Refoundation Party had a direct competitor in the EP 
elections in 2009 (Albertazzi et al., 2011, p. 483).   
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Secondly, the party is a communist one, which split from a party with a large 
number of staff (Communist Refoundation Party), and which aims to resemble 
the mass party model, in which having a centralised party bureaucracy is a central 
feature (Duverger, 1959). A perceived need to pay the party leader, a readily 
available membership base, and a communist heritage can therefore help in 
understanding why the party prioritised the hiring of its leader on a part-time 
basis, despite no state funding access.  
Summary 
The evidence from regulatory phase 2 shows that state funding contributes to 
understanding all staffing processes in the Greens throughout this phase, both 
processes of hiring and downsizing. Some, but not all, staffing processes in 
Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Communist Refoundation Party also 
support the rationale in H1. Interestingly, shifts in the regulatory framework, for 
instance the constraining turn at the start of this phase (abolition of annual state 
funds), and the increasing generosity in the early 2000s, directly affected staffing 
patterns, e.g. in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party. As 
expected, staff were not taken on to deal with reporting requirements, apart from 
in the Tricolour Flame, which relied on external help to cope with reporting, as it 
did not succeed in finding anyone internal to the party to manage the reporting 
requirements.   
The analysis identified that a large budget in the Communist Refoundation 
Party, the Segni Pact’s support from the movement from which it originated and 
the party’s eventual demise, and Tricolour Flame’s exploitation of membership 
fees and previous income from the state, were factors in understanding patterns 
of staffing that diverge from H1. The staffing in the Communist Party of Workers, 
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the only party that did not access state funds, was found to be related to the 
party’s communist heritage, and its dedication towards a party leader that left his 
job to work for the party. 
Table 6.4 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 2: Italy  
 Support 
for H1 
Description of evidence for and contrary to H1 
The Green Party Yes Increased its income from the state, and responded by 
hiring staff (2006-2008). Decreased income from the 
state led to downsizing (1995-1996, and from 2008 
onwards). 
The Communist 
Refoundation 
Party 
Yes * Increased its income from the state, and responded by 
hiring staff (1992-1994, and 2002-2007). Decreased 
income from the state led to downsizing (from 2008 
onwards). 
 
Staffing patterns in 1994-1996, 1997, 1997-1999, and 
2001-2002 do not support H1 (see details in analysis). 
Tricolour Flame Yes*  Increased income from the state, and responded by 
hiring staff (1997 and 2004).  
 
Staffing pattern in 2000-2003 (did not downsize despite 
a loss of state funding) does not support H1. 
The Segni Pact Yes* Increased income from the state, and responded by 
hiring staff (1994). 
  
Staffing pattern in 1995-1998 (decreased income from 
the state, but no change in staff) and 1999 (increased 
income from the state, but scaled down number of staff) 
do not support H1. 
The Communist 
Party of Workers 
No Hired staff despite no state funding access. 
Notes: A star indicates that a party had staffing patterns (once or more throughout regulatory 
phase 2) where there is evidence contrary to the rationale in H1.  
6.1.3 Staffing in regulatory phase 3: 2012-2016 
The last regulatory phase in Italy starts in 2012 with the introduction of a party 
law, introducing common access criteria for electoral reimbursements for all 
levels (have one candidate elected) and more constraining reporting 
requirements. The generosity decreased in this phase, continuing the 
development started in 2008. From 2013 all direct state funding was abolished, 
and only the tax benefit Two for the Thousand was left. The access criteria for 
the latter were the most constraining to ever have been in place in Italy. I thus 
expect that the parties in this phase cut down staff due to more constraining 
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access criteria and decreasing generosity. Interestingly, registration in a new 
party register (2013) required external auditing, and registration was in turn a 
precondition to access Two for the Thousand. Thus, I expect parties to prioritise 
spending state funds (if access) or other funds (if no access) on external 
consultants to deal with this requirement in order to be eligible for state funds.  
Table 6.5 Regulatory phase 3 (2012-2016). Overview of state benefits and 
constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Italy 
Type of regulation Regulation in place  Expected consequence for 
staffing 
Access criteria One candidate elected (all 
levels). Decreasing generosity 
from 2012.  
In 2013, criteria to access state 
funds (Two for the Thousand) 
was registration and having 
institutional representation. 
New minor parties will downsize. 
Reporting 
requirements 
(related to 
maintenance of state 
funds) 
Increasingly constraining: 
Auditing (from 2012) required. 
From 2013, auditing is tied to 
registration (i.e. to the access 
criteria for state funds). 
Expect that new minor parties 
will draw on external 
professionals for auditing (in 
order to be eligible for funds). 
 
The staffing patterns in the Tricolour Flame in this phase support H1, and 
are thus analysed first. Then I analyse why the Greens and the Communist 
Refoundation Party, contrary to H1, abstained from staffing, despite an increase 
in income from state funds in this phase, and why Act to Stop the Decline took on 
temporary staff in 2013, despite lacking state funds. 
In line with H1, Tricolour Flame let go of its final employee in 2013, when 
the party no longer had any income directly from the state – even though the 
income from the state had been very modest since 2010 (Bevilacqua, 
14.11.2016).92 The figure below shows the party’s decreasing income from the 
state prior to 2013.  
                                                          
92 I have not been able to establish exactly which year Tricolour Flame let go of its final employee, 
but as interviewees specifically say that it happened when the party lost access to state funds, it 
is likely to have taken place around 2012/2013. 
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Figure 6.4 Income from the state (euros). Tricolour Flame, 2007-2012  
Sources: Financial accounts.  
Notes: The figure from 2010 was the total sum received by the electoral coalition with which 
Tricolour Flame fielded candidates in 2008, hence just a small part of this sum actually went to 
Tricolour Flame.  
The party also lost other sources of income, besides state funds, which 
contributed to a financial emergency. While the party had previously had some 
income from donations (see Financial accounts, 2005, 2007, and 2008; 
Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016), these decreased in this phase because ‘donors usually 
want something in return for their donations, and we are not currently in a position 
to offer that’ (Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016). There is also indication that the income 
from membership fees decreased in 2013 as former party leader Luca Romagnoli 
split from the party, taking with him a large part of the members in some regions, 
such as Lazio where ‘more than 95 percent of the members followed Luca 
Romagnoli’ (Party representative, 31.01.2018). So, even though the main reason 
(according to interviewees) for downsizing was loss of state funds, the decrease 
in other income sources also contributed. 
Unlike with Tricolour Flame, the staffing patterns in the Greens and the 
Communist Refoundation Party do not coincide with H1. When entering into this 
phase, both parties barely had any income from the state. Still, they took on 
external auditors when one criterion for access to state funding from 2013 was 
registration, which in turn required external auditing. Despite financial hardship, 
both parties thus prioritised complying with the eligibility criteria for state funds: 
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Imagine that we, without any form of state funding, have the obligation to 
certify our financial accounts with auditors that cost 8000 euros a year (…), 
this is a lot and a problem for us (…) (Bonelli, 16.11.2016, The Greens).  
 
The external auditing of our accounts is a costly business, but we do it of 
course, no problem (Gelmini, 23.11.2016, Communist Refoundation 
Party). 
There is thus indication that reporting specifically sparked staffing in both parties 
in 2013. Subsequently, both parties also accessed Two for the Thousand – the 
Communist Refoundation Party in 2015, and the Greens in 2016 – which made it 
easier for the parties to pay for auditing.93 The Communist Refoundation Party 
increased its income from the state from ca. 115,000 euros in 2014 to ca. 450,000 
euros in 2015, while the figures in the Greens went from 30,000 euros to 140,000 
euros in 2015 and 2016 respectively. Still, neither party took on staff as a result, 
contrary to H1, due to both parties’ financial emergency. The Communist 
Refoundation Party still presented a deficit in the financial account in 2015, while 
the Greens just managed to present a small surplus in 2016. The fact that both 
parties still had all their employees in redundancy schemes94 shows that the 
parties were in no position to hire. Moreover, both parties experienced decreasing 
income from membership fees, a development that had already started in 
regulatory phase 2, and which also contributed to the financial problems. 
Act to Stop the Decline was formed in 2012, and did not access state 
funding in its (short) life cycle, but still took on external consultants (marketing 
and advertising experts) to help with the party’s PR in the 2013 electoral 
campaign (Boldrin, 27.11.2016; Brusco, 28.11. 2016). The hiring was facilitated 
by the party’s income from small donations, amounting to nearly 1.5 million euros 
                                                          
93 The parties’ use of external auditors after accessing Two for the Thousand is not support for 
H1, as prior to this access both parties drew on external auditors to be eligible for state funds. 
94 The only exception was the Communist Refoundation Party leader, who worked on a part-time 
contract (see Gelmini, 23.11.2016). 
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(Boldrin, 27.11.2016; Brusco, 28.11.2016). The party also organised mass rallies, 
where entry was subject to a fee (Buzzi, 2013; Boldrin, 27.11.2016). Moreover, 
the party representatives themselves spent considerable amounts of money on 
the party.95 The type of tasks performed by the staff, and the timing of staffing 
suggests that electoral cycle is the most important factor for understanding the 
party’s temporary staffing. Also the membership size contributed to shedding light 
on staffing, given membership fees’ importance for the budget.96  
Summary 
The analysis of staffing in this phase showed that the loss of state funding, in line 
with H1, contributed to the loss of staff in Tricolour Flame. Neither the Greens nor 
the Communist Refoundation took on staff following their increased income from 
the state in this phase, due to the parties’ financial emergency, but did use 
external consultants (auditors) in order to be eligible for state funding. This shows 
how reporting requirements, independently of income from the state, impacted 
staffing patterns, which is understandable as the reporting was tied to being 
eligible for funds (and not only for maintaining them), and required professional 
knowledge. The analysis finally demonstrated how Act to Stop the Decline relied 
on self-generated income to hire external consultants in the 2013 electoral 
campaign. 
                                                          
95 Michele Boldrin states that he spent around 100-120,000 euros on Act to Stop the Decline 
(Boldrin, 27.11.2016).  
96 In the run-up to the party’s first congress in May 2013, the number of members was reported 
to be 10,000 (Canetta, 2013). 
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Table 6.6 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 3: Italy  
 Support 
for H1 
Description of evidence for H1 
The Green Party No Increased its income from the state, but the 
financial emergency restricted staffing. 
The Communist 
Refoundation Party 
No  Same as the Greens.  
 
Tricolour Flame Yes  Lost state funding, and downsized as a result. 
Act to Stop the 
Decline 
No Did not have state funding, but relied on self-
generated income to facilitate temporary staffing in 
electoral campaign. 
 
6.1.4 Staffing in Italy across three regulatory phases: A summary 
The analysis of staffing in Italian new minor parties has provided support for H1 
across all three regulatory phases. The Greens and Tricolour Flame consistently 
increased their number of staff when income from the state increased, and partial 
support for this argument was also found in the Segni Pact, and the Communist 
Refoundation Party. Similarly, the Greens let staff go in periods of decreased 
income from the state, supporting H1. Decreased income from the state also 
(sometimes) led to downsizing in the Communist Refoundation Party and 
Tricolour Flame. Only the Pensioner Party refrained from hiring staff following an 
increase of state funds, and its focus on providing council to pensioners on private 
television sheds light on this decision.  
Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Communist Refoundation Party 
operate contrary to the theorised rationale in H1 at different points throughout 
their life cycles. The Segni Pact kept a stable staff size despite decreasing income 
from the state in the mid 1990s, as it could draw on financial support from external 
movements. The party’s downsizing in 1999 (and afterwards) coincided with a 
loss of state funds and a restricted financial situation, but was mainly due to the 
party’s decision to close down. The Communist Refoundation Party’s (overall) 
large budget meant that the party had the flexibility to increase its number of staff 
in times of decreasing income from the state, and vice versa. Finally, Tricolour 
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Flame hung on to staff despite decreasing income from the state by drawing on 
membership fees and previous state funding allocations. Finally, the two parties 
that did not access state funds, i.e. the Communist Party of Workers and Act to 
Stop the Decline still managed to take on (temporary) staff, contrary to H1, with 
the help of self-generated income. 
The analysis in three regulatory phases has shown how the staffing 
patterns in state-dependent parties, like (most) of the new minor parties studied 
here, are vulnerable to changes in state benefits and constraints. When the 
system became less generous in the first years of regulatory phase 2 staffing in 
the Greens was directly affected. Similarly, the increasing generosity in the 
system, starting with annual electoral reimbursements in 1999 and continuing 
with a multiplication of the amounts available in 2002, facilitated increased 
staffing in the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and eventually 
Tricolour Flame. Increasingly constraining access criteria for funds and 
decreasing generosity from 2008 and onwards similarly led to downsizing in the 
Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and Tricolour Flame. Finally, 
constraining reporting requirements introduced in regulatory phase 3 prompted 
the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party to take on temporary external 
consultants, despite low income from the state. 
6.2 State funding and staffing: An analysis of Norwegian 
new minor parties 
6.2.1 Regulatory phase 1: 1970-2005 
The access criteria for national state funding were constraining for new minor 
parties in regulatory phase 1 in Norway, while the criteria were permissive on the 
subnational level. Subnational state funds were paid out to the subnational level, 
and if a national branch was to benefit from them directly, they would have to be 
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transferred (which happened in some parties). I thus expect only limited (no full-
time) staffing in the Norwegian new minor parties in this phase. That is also 
because even though increasing sums of money were made available in state 
funds throughout this phase, the largest bulk went to the national state funds (with 
constraining access criteria). State funds only existed in the form of annual grants 
in Norway in this phase (i.e. no electoral reimbursements). Only in 1998 were 
reporting requirements introduced in Norway, and I expect new minor parties to 
take on external consultants, as auditing (i.e. specialist skills) was required. 
Table 6.7 Regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005). Overview of state benefits and 
constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Norway  
Type of regulation Regulation in place Expected consequence for 
staffing 
Access criteria National level: Win more than 
2.5 percent of the votes and 
present lists in at least half the 
electoral districts. 
Subnational level: Vote support 
(no threshold). 
Increasingly generous 
allocations throughout phase. 
Hiring of staff in new minor 
parties will be minimal due to 
high access criteria for national 
state funds, and income from 
subnational branches requires 
internal transfers. 
Reporting 
requirements 
(related to 
maintenance of state 
funds) 
1970-1998: No requirements.  
1998-2005: For registered 
parties that had run lists at the 
previous parliamentary 
elections: Obligation to report 
income accounts every year 
(only national level). Audit 
required. 
No expectation that this will lead 
to permanent staffing, but expect 
that parties will rely on external 
professionals for auditing 
purposes.  
 
The Greens and the Pensioner Party accessed subnational state funding 
in this phase, transferred a share of it to the national branch, and subsequently 
took on staff, supporting H1. The Coastal Party, Future for Finnmark, and Cross 
Partisan MPs also support H1, in that they had no state funds and also no staff. 
These parties are thus analysed first. The Fatherland’s Party did not take on staff 
despite state funding access, for which a separate analysis is conducted last.  
The Greens took on one person in a temporary position in 1994 
(Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1994a, 1994b), i.e. the year after the national branch first 
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received transfers of subnational state funding.97 The Greens got nearly 50 
percent of its income from the state in 1994, the rest stemmed mainly from 
membership fees (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1994a). As staffing expenses 
amounted to half of the party’s budget in 1994 (14,300 NOK), state funds were 
important for staffing, supporting H1, but so were membership fees. 
Figure 6.5 Income from state funding (NOK), overall income and staff expenses. 
The Green Party, 1994-1997 
Sources: Financial accounts. The 1994 figures are based on the party’s budget, and not financial 
account.  
Notes: To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 
NOK is ca. 5000 EUR. 
The Greens increased its income from both state (1995 and 1996) and members 
(1994-1997), as the figure outlines. In parallel, the party had increased staff 
expenses in 1995 and 1996 (Financial accounts, 1995, 1996), further supporting 
H1. The party simply let the hired party secretary work in a 40 percent paid 
position (not 20 percent as usual) in the months preceding the regional and local 
elections in 1995 (Annual account, 1995). Election campaigning thus contributes 
to understanding the timing for scaling up the party’s staff resources. The 
employee in the Greens was hired mainly to deal with administrative and 
organisational tasks, such as branches; ‘The new secretariat [with one hired 
                                                          
97 The previous chapter showed that the Greens accessed subnational state funding following its 
first participation in (subnational) elections in 1991. The party introduced a rule in 1993 obliging 
the subnational branches to transfer 10 percent of their income from the state to the national 
branch (Statutes, 1993).  
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employee] will keep better in touch with the subnational branches, and keep on 
top of what goes on in the local councils’ (Miljøpartiet de grønne 1994c). The 
employee also saw to recruitment and maintenance of members, and answered 
the phone, in addition to dealing with finances (Annual account, 1995, 1996; 
Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1998a). The reporting requirements introduced in 1998 
were also dealt with by the hired employee (Simonsen, 23.10.2017).98  
 As outlined in the previous chapter on party income structures, I lack 
financial information on the Greens between 1998 and 2005. However, electoral 
statistics show that the party continued to draw on subnational state funds. As 
the subnational branches throughout this regulatory phase were obliged to 
transfer a share of their state funds to the national level, the national level also 
continued to draw on state funds. Also, the (few) organisational documents from 
the period indicate that the party continued to draw on (part-time) administrative 
staff, as it did between 1994 and 1996 (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1998a, 2001, 
2003, 2004), suggesting support for H1.  
Also supporting H1, the Pensioner Party hired then party leader Jørgen 
Øydvin in a 40 percent position in late 1995 (Annual account, 1995-1996; Hansen 
and Støtvig, 1998), four years after the national party first accessed subnational 
state funds (1991).99 Financial difficulty, stemming from a decision in 1991 to 
solve a severe internal conflict100 (Pensjonistpartiet, undated) by covering two 
competing factions’ expenses, combined with an already restricted financial 
                                                          
98 Unfortunately, I do not have financial accounts between 1998 and 2005, and I can thus not 
verify if the party spent funds on having the financial account audited, as the law required.  
99 The Pensioner Party introduced a rule obliging the subnational branches to transfer 10 percent 
of their state funds to the national branch in 1991 (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991a), and 20 percent from 
1992 onwards (Pensjonistpartiet 1992b, 1993a). 
100 A faction from Oslo split from the party in 1986 because its right to vote was put into doubt by 
the majority (due to a lack of foundation documents from branches that the Oslo faction claimed 
to represent). After this, the Oslo faction and the rest of the party disagreed on who had the right 
to represent the party (Pensjonistpatiet, undated). Later, some subnational branches aligned with 
the Oslo faction and others with the ‘original’ faction (see e.g. Pensjonistpartiet, 1991c) creating 
a completely split party. 
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situation (Annual account, 1991), had hindered the party from taking on staff 
before then. In 1995, the party increased its income from the state (Annual 
account, 1995-1996; Financial account, 1995, 1996), which facilitated staffing, 
supporting H1. The party was 74 and 92 percent state-dependent in 1995 and 
1996 respectively (Financial accounts, 1995, 1996), showing that state funds 
were crucial for hiring. 
Figure 6.6 Income from state funding, income from members, and overall 
income (NOK). The Pensioner Party, 1995-1998  
Sources: Financial accounts.  
Notes: To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 
NOK is ca. 5000 EUR. 
The (paid) party leader in the Pensioner Party was responsible for some 
administrative tasks, given that he was responsible for the secretariat in Bergen. 
It is likely that the hired party leader dealt with the reporting requirements 
introduced in 1998.101 However, as party leader, he also (naturally) performed 
political tasks. The party had expenses related to auditing, e.g. from 1999 to 2001 
(Financial accounts, 1999, 2000, 2001), which shows that reporting requirements 
from 1998 onwards required the party to draw on external professionals. 
The Pensioner Party decreased its income from the state in 1998 (see 
figure above), and in 1999 the party leader was let go (Financial account, 1999), 
which indicates support for H1. Still, a more precise reason for the downsizing is 
                                                          
101 No interviewees in the Pensioner Party were able to confirm this.  
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that the financial accounts of the party were blocked in 1999, as the (outgoing, 
paid) leader and the treasurer equally accused each other of financial 
mismanagement (Hansen and Støtvig, 1998). The criticism towards the leader 
was, interestingly, related to his allegedly generous salary from the party (ibid); 
Jørgen Øydvin [the party leader] has earned good money from being the 
leader of the Pensioner Party. (…) During his term as party leader, he has 
earned around 100,000 NOK more than he would have in a full position as 
teacher in an agricultural high school102 (Hansen and Støtvig, 1998). 
The blocked financial accounts represented the culmination of yet another 
conflictual period in the party’s history (see e.g. NTB, 16.09.1998). In addition to 
blocked financial accounts and a decrease in state funding, a new leader was 
elected in 1999 (Bekken, 1999), indicating that the paid leader also disappeared 
from the party. In other words, there is some support for H1 in this downsizing 
process, but the main reason for the party’s loss of staff in 1999 was leadership 
change and financial mismanagement.  
In line with H1, the Coastal Party did not take on any staff as it had no 
financial means to do so in regulatory phase 1 (see e.g. Kystpartiet, 2004). Unlike 
the Greens and the Pensioner Party, subnational state funds were not transferred 
to the national level (Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; Stabrun Johansen, 
26.01.2018). The party, as a registered party running in elections, had to comply 
with the income reporting introduced in 1998. Interviewees state that prior to 2005 
the responsibility for financial management lay with the party leader in parliament 
(see e.g. Party representative, 21.02.2018), and the leader and his staff in 
parliament thus also saw to the reporting (see also Kystpartiet, 2001). Similarly, 
Cross Partisan MPs operated with minimal financial resources, and relied upon 
personal funds for its operation (Party representative, 21.02.2018; Party 
                                                          
102 This was the party leader’s profession. 
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representative, 15.02.2018; Øverland, 16.05.2018; Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 
1997a, 1997e). The lack of state funds meant that it had no financial means to 
employ staff, in line with H1.103 Its staffing pattern is not discussed in relation to 
regulatory phase 2, as the party’s financial situation remained unchanged (ibid). 
Future for Finnmark elected one MP in 1989, but did not exceed the (constraining) 
reporting requirements for national state funds.104 There was a membership from 
1989, but it was not maintained from 1990 onwards (Leirvik, 26.01.2018), 
showing how there was no financial possibility to employ staff in the party, 
supporting H1.  
Contrary to H1, the Fatherland’s Party did not hire staff following state 
funding access in 1991, even though nearly all of the state funds were transferred 
to the national level (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a; Statutes, 1990; Fedrelandspartiet, 
1992). Party documents show that the income from state funding in 1991 was 
spent almost entirely on party work on the national level, mainly relating to the 
parliamentary elections in 1993 (Fedrelandspartiet, 1992, 1993). In addition, 
some party documents demonstrate that the state funding won in 1991 was spent 
to cover debts incurred during party work, for example by party leader Harald 
Trefall (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a). The party’s priorities and a restricted overall 
budget significantly impeded the party from hiring staff, despite state funding 
access. The party became subject to income reporting in 1998. As the party had 
a treasurer in regulatory phase 1 (see e.g. Fedrelandspartiet, 1993, 2002), there 
is indication that this was the person who dealt with the income reporting in the 
Fatherland’s Party.105 
                                                          
103 I have not been able to confirm if the party complied with the reporting requirements introduced 
in 1998.  
104 The party never fielded candidates in regional/local elections.  
105 Unfortunately, the data does not provide conclusive answers to this. 
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Summary 
Data from the Greens and the Pensioner Party supports H1, as both parties took 
on staff following an increase of state funding (transferred from subnational 
branches). Moreover, when the Green Party experienced a further increase of 
state funding, it scaled up staffing, also supporting H1. Similarly, the Pensioner 
Party let staff go when the income from the state decreased, supporting H1, even 
though the most important reasons for this decision were internal conflict and 
leadership change. Future for Finnmark, Cross Partisan MPs, and the Coastal 
Party did not have state funds in their national accounts and, in line with H1, did 
not take on staff either. The reporting requirements introduced in 1998 were dealt 
with by existing staff in the Greens and the Pensioner Party. The latter party also 
incurred expenses related to the external auditing required in order to comply with 
the new law. Contrary to H1, the Fatherland’s Party did not take on staff following 
state funding access due to a restricted budget and its decision to spend the 
funds on covering debts and financing an electoral campaign. 
Table 6.8 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 1: Norway  
 Support for 
H1 
Description of evidence for H1 
The Green Party Yes Increased income from state funds and hired staff 
as a result. When it further increased its income 
from the state, it increased the employee’s work-
load (i.e. increasing staff expenses). 
The Pensioner 
Party 
Yes  Increased income from state funds and hired staff 
as a result. When it experienced decreasing income 
from the state, it downsized (but other factors also 
relevant for that). 
Cross Partisan MPs Yes  Did not access state funding, and did not have the 
finances to hire staff. 
The Coastal Party Yes Did not access state funding, and did not have the 
finances to hire staff. 
Future for Finnmark Yes Did not access state funding, and did not have the 
finances to hire staff.  
The Fatherland’s 
Party 
No Accessed state funding, but did not take on staff. 
Restricted budget and party priorities made staffing 
difficult. 
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6.2.2 Regulatory phase 2: 2006-2016 
Regulatory phase 2 is characterised by a shift towards highly permissive access 
criteria for state funding on the national level. After 2006 annual state funds (on 
all levels) were divided into two parts: a vote support granted proportionally to all 
parties winning one or more votes; and a basic support granted to all parties 
winning more than 2.5 percent of the vote on the national level (4 percent/one 
candidate elected on the subnational level). As in regulatory phase 1, the 
allocation of state funds grew throughout this period. Both the permissive access 
criteria and the increased generosity lead me to expect staffing in the Norwegian 
new minor parties in this phase. Regulatory phase 2 also saw the introduction of 
more constraining reporting – first in 2006, then later in 2013/2014. This change 
to reporting was most prominent in 2013/2014, when parties were obliged to 
report both income and expenses (previously it had only been income), and 
became subject to more comprehensive enforcement mechanisms.  
Table 6.9 Regulatory phase 2 (2006-2016). Overview of state benefits and 
constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Norway  
Type of regulation Regulation in place (1970-
2005) 
Expected consequence for 
staffing 
Access criteria National level: Vote support: no 
threshold. Basic support: 2.5 
percent of the vote. Vote 
support constitutes 9/10 of the 
total support. 
Subnational level: Vote support: 
no threshold. Basic support: 4 
percent of the vote or one 
candidate elected. 
New minor parties will take on 
staff.  
Reporting 
requirements 
(related to 
maintenance of state 
funds) 
2006: More comprehensive 
income reporting introduced. 
Sanctions for non-compliance 
introduced. 
2013: More constraining 
reporting: Reporting of 
expenses was introduced, and 
independence of auditors was 
specified. 
New minor parties will either hire 
people to deal with reporting or 
have expenses related to 
reporting services. This is 
especially so after 2013/2014, 
less so before. 
 
Audit introduced in 1998 still 
required, and expenses related 
to this expected. 
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Staffing patterns in the Greens, the Coastal Party, and the Christian Conservative 
Party coincide with shifts in income from state funds, supporting H1, and are thus 
analysed first. The Pensioner Party only partially operates according to H1 in this 
phase, and is thus discussed second. Future for Finnmark and the Fatherland’s 
Party106 did not exist in this phase, and so are not mentioned here. 
The Greens increased its income from the state from 2006 onwards, which 
in turn affected staffing, supporting H1. The party’s income development in 
regulatory phase 2 is portrayed below:  
Figure 6.7 Income from state funding, members, and overall income (NOK). The 
Greens, 1994-2016 
 
Sources: Financial accounts.  
Notes: To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 
NOK is ca. 5000 EUR. 
In parallel with the increased income from the state, the party consistently 
increased either the number of staff or the quantity of work allocated to staff from 
2008 to 2015. More specifically, the party went from having two part-time 
members of staff in 2008 (Annual account, 2008), to three (at the most) working 
longer hours in 2009. In 2010, 2011, and 2012 the party decided to have two full-
time positions (Annual account, 2010, 2011, 2012), and in 2013 the party had a 
                                                          
106 The Fatherland’s Party formally existed until 2008, but in practice its operation stopped late in 
regulatory phase 1. 
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party secretary in a full-time position, and a person responsible for finances (20 
percent position). Moreover, two employees (paid by NAV)107 worked for the 
party, one of them with members. During 2013, a head of communications, a 
financial officer (100 percent positions) and three project workers were employed 
(Annual account, 2013).108 Another person was employed to deal with digital 
communication in 2014 (Annual account, 2014). According to party interviewees, 
increased state funding contributed to the staffing development, supporting H1. 
Party secretary Lars Gaupset (Interview, 15.05.2017), for example, reports that 
state funding ‘has given us the possibility to have a larger secretariat (…)’. Annual 
accounts (2014) also show that state funding contributed to running the party, 
and paying for staff. The state-dependency of the party in these years ranges 
mostly between 60 and 80 percent, which furthermore demonstrates the 
importance of state funding for staffing. That said, the party’s membership growth 
(see figure above) also increased the overall budget of the party, aiding staffing. 
One could speculate about whether the party’s ability to attract a considerable 
share of income from donations, particularly in parliamentary election years 
(2009, 2013), contributed to staffing. However, given that donations were 
dependent on election year, it is more likely that the state funds and the 
membership fees combined are the most important factors for understanding the 
increase in staff figures. 
The staff in the Greens mainly occupied itself with administrative tasks. In 
2008 the staff dealt with finances, mailing, and subnational branches (Annual 
account, 2008). In 2009 one of the (now three) employees worked on the election 
campaign, showing how a more flexible financial situation allowed the party to 
                                                          
107 NAV is the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration.  
108 In 2014 the expansion of the secretariat continued (Annual account, 2014), and for the first 
time regional staff were employed (five in total). This is just mentioned in a footnote as regional 
staff are not part of the definition of staff in this thesis. 
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take on staff to deal with this task specifically (Annual account, 2009). The 
employees’ tasks in 2011 and 2012 were membership management, finances, 
subnational branches, web editing, and functioning as the party secretary (Annual 
account, 2010). The party hired staff specifically to deal with social media, press, 
and finances in 2013. The party thus took on staff that could deal with the 
increasingly constraining reporting requirements introduced in regulatory phase 
2. There is also indication that the increasingly constraining reporting related to 
donations in election campaigns (non-compliance with which can lead to a loss 
of state funding) has influenced the party staff’s tasks – but not hiring processes 
per se. Current party secretary Lars Gaupset (Interview, 15.05.2017) states that 
‘there is a lot of bureaucracy related to that [reporting], which means that we have 
to spend a lot of resources on reporting’. Moreover, the party (as the other 
Norwegian parties) has consistently paid for auditing services (see e.g. Financial 
account, 2008, 2014). 
The national branch of the Coastal Party accessed state funds in 2006, 
and responded by taking on temporary staff (Party representative, 21.02.2018; 
Falch Pedersen, 04.07.2018; Kystpartiet, 2006a). One party representative says 
that it was the state funding that paid the salaries (Party representative, 
21.02.2018),109 which is supported by the party’s high state-dependency. In 2006, 
the party received 80 percent of its income from the state, lending support to H1. 
The party only had 682 members in 2006 (Financial account, 2006), and the low 
membership makes it an unlikely source for staffing. There is indication that the 
loss of parliamentary representation in 2005 contributed to the perceived need in 
the party to hire staff, as both administrative management and policy 
development had been the responsibility of MP Steinar Bastesen and his staff in 
                                                          
109 The staff were hired on an hourly basis. 
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parliament between the party’s foundation in 1999 and 2005 (Party 
representative, 2018; Olsen, 25.01.2018; Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; see also 
Bjørnbakk, 2003). When the party lost parliamentary representation in 2005, and 
Bastesen exited the party altogether in 2006, the party lost its focal point of 
reference for both political and organisational matters, creating a need for 
staffing.  
The Coastal Party’s staff at the party office in Bergen dealt with 
administrative tasks such as finances, financial reporting, the membership 
register, and phone/mail (Kystpartiet, 2006a). We thus see that the administrative 
staff dealt with the financial reporting, which became more constraining in 2006. 
The party also had expenses related to the legally required auditing (see e.g. 
Financial account, 2007). Political tasks, such as drafting press releases and 
motions to the annual state budget, were executed by the party’s office in Oslo 
(Olsen, 25.01.2018; Party representative, 21.02.2018; Kystpartiet, 2006a). 
Additionally, the party hired its then party secretary in a 20 percent position for 
about a year (2006-2007) because ‘There was a need […] to create active contact 
towards members and the organisation, as a whole’ (Falch Pedersen, 
18.12.2018; Kystpartiet, 2006a).  
The Coastal Party’s staff expenses decreased nearly linearly with the 
party’s decreasing (electoral support, and in turn) income from the state, which is 
unsurprising given the party’s high state-dependency after 2006 (between 70 and 
80 percent), supporting H1. The first decrease in state funds happened after 2009 
and led to decreased use of (hourly paid) staff (Financial account, 2009). 
Concretely, one interviewee states that the party has always adjusted its staffing 
level to match its financial abilities (Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018).  
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Figure 6.8 Development in income from the state and members (NOK). The 
Coastal Party, 2006-2016  
Sources: Financial accounts. 
Notes: To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 
NOK is ca. 5000 EUR. 
The figure above also shows that the amount of income from membership fees 
dropped significantly from 2009 to 2010, because the membership reduced from 
800 in 2009 to 392 in 2010 (Financial account, 2009, 2010). This naturally also 
affected the overall budget of the party, thus contributing to the reasons for its 
failing ability to maintain staff. After 2013 the party’s income from state funding 
further decreased, which resulted in a complete loss of staff, supporting H1. 
According to one party representative, there was ‘not the financial means’ to hire 
office help after 2013 (Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018). In 2013 and 2015 the 
party still received 80 percent of its income from the state, even though the actual 
amount received dropped significantly (to around 300,000 NOK in 2015), which 
demonstrates the importance of decreased income from state funds to 
understanding the downsizing, supporting H1. The decision in 2013 to downsize 
also coincides with a decrease in membership figures.110 According to 
interviewees, the party prioritised holding on to their administrative staff (rather 
than the political staff) longest (Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018).  
                                                          
110 In fact, in 2014 the party only had 62 paying members, which increased to 239 the year after. 
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The Christian Conservative Party accessed state funding after its first 
parliamentary election in 2013, receiving its first state funding instalment in 2014 
(see figure below). Supporting H1, the party decided to take on two staff 
members, the party leader and the party secretary, both of whom had already 
worked full-time for the party ahead of the elections. Their wages had, prior to 
accessing state funds, been covered by loans (Husveg, 18.12.2017; Party 
representative, 08.02.2018). State funding access thus enabled the party to pay 
them directly: 
[…] the vote support was so good that we could pay for those that were 
hired in the party, and in addition pay our debts (Husveg, 18.12.2017).  
The support for H1 is strengthened as the party was 60 percent state-dependent 
in 2014 (Financial account, 2014). With a large debt, it is unlikely that the party 
would have been able to take on staff (and especially two) had it not been for the 
state funding.  
Figure 6.9 Income from state funding, overall income, and staff expenses 
(NOK). The Christian Conservative Party. Regulatory phase 2 
 
Sources: Financial accounts. Accessed at www.partifinansiering.no  
Notes: To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 
NOK is ca. 5000 EUR. 
 
The party leader’s role was to encourage the party members, conduct 
travels in the electoral campaign, organise conferences and seminars, deal with 
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political issues, hold speeches, and write letters to editors (Party representative, 
08.02.2018; Husveg, 18.12.2017). He was also tasked with motivating members 
and party office holders (Husveg, 18.12.2017). The paid party secretary (who 
later was substituted with a paid secretary), was responsible for administrative 
issues such as answering email and telephone, preparing meetings and the 
congress, and dealing with the membership register (Party representative, 
08.02.2018; Husveg, 18.12.2017). The secretary dealt with the management of 
the reporting requirements related to state funding (Husveg, 18.12.2017; Party 
representative, 08.02.2018). The party also had administrative costs related to, 
for example, the auditing required to comply with reporting requirements, as 
expected (Party representative, 08.02.2018).111  
Also supporting H1, the Christian Conservative Party’s decreased income 
from the state in 2017112 led the party to operate without a paid party leader from 
2018 onwards, and to decrease the secretary’s percentage of employment 
(Husveg, 18.12.2017; Party representative, 08.02.2018). This is also evidenced 
by the annual account: 
The electoral result meant a reduction in state funding for the period 2018-
2021. The executive thus made several financial changes. The party 
leader’s paid position was terminated on 31.12.2017. He continued as an 
unpaid party leader. The payment to the administrative secretary was 
reduced on the same date (Annual account, 2017).  
Interestingly, this shows that the Christian Conservative Party, just like the 
Coastal Party, prioritised letting its politically-oriented staff go, and keeping the 
administrative staff longer. 
                                                          
111 Interestingly, the interviews indicate that it is the subnational branches that struggle the most 
with the reporting: ‘it is tougher for them [the subnational branches] to manage all the deadlines ’ 
(Party representative, 08.02.2018). 
112 The Christian Conservative Party’s process of letting staff go in 2017 happened outside the 
time-frame of the thesis (i.e. after 2016), but I include it anyway due to the short life cycle of the 
party. 
200 
 
The Pensioner Party both has staffing patterns that support H1, and some 
that do not in this phase. First, the party’s access to (national) state funds in 2006, 
due to the permissive turn in the access criteria, led the party to hire a party 
secretary (Annual account, 2007; Pensjonistpartiet, 2007), supporting H1. As the 
party was 92 percent state-dependent in 2008, the staffing expenses could not 
have been covered by other sources. Income from membership fees only 
amounted to about 21,000 NOK (ca. 2100 euros) (Financial account, 2008). The 
figure below shows the development in the party’s income from state funds 
across phases, to show the drastic increase that marks entry into regulatory 
phase 2 (2006). 
Figure 6.10 Income from state funding (NOK). The Pensioner Party. Regulatory 
phase 1 and 2 
Sources: Financial accounts. 
Notes: To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 
NOK is ca. 5000 EUR. 
It is also possible that a leadership change in 2005 contributed to the hiring 
process, as indicated by an interview with the leader who took over in 2005: 
You can put it this way: The precondition for me to take over as leader, 
was that I would get a party secretary (…), I still worked full-time (Dahl, 
16.05.201). 
Consequently, the party leader, since he was still working (and not in effect a 
pensioner), demanded that he get help with the administrative burdens of leading 
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
State funding income - The Pensioner Party
201 
 
a party, leading to staffing. The hired party secretary’s tasks were to answer the 
telephone and email, and to deal with membership recruitment and membership 
registration (Annual account, 2007, 2008). The party’s financial accounts show 
that the party had expenses related to auditing (see e.g. Financial accounts, 
2011-2016), indicating that the party drew on external professionals to comply 
with reporting requirements.  
Interestingly, the party decided to operate on a voluntary basis from 2012, 
which is contrary to H1, as the party’s income from the state was stable (see 
figure above). In late 2012 the party’s employee decided to resign (Financial 
account, 2013; Annual accounts, 2012-2013; Remman, 20.06.2016; 
Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017). She had since 2011 seen to (among other things) the 
maintenance of the party office, and the membership register (Financial account, 
2011, 2012; Remman, 20.06.2017; Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017).113 According to 
party representatives, the expenses related to having a paid employee had grown 
too large for the returned benefit (Remman, 20.06.2017), which sheds light on 
why the party decided not to replace the employee when she stepped down in 
2012. Concretely, the staff expenses had grown from 45,000 NOK in 2011, to 
nearly 200,000 NOK in 2012 (Financial accounts, 2011-2014). Instead of paying 
for an employee, the party decided to prioritise transferring funds to local 
branches to help with their electoral campaigns (Remman, 20.06.2017). So 
where other parties (such as the Greens) hired staff ahead of the elections, the 
Pensioner Party rather prioritised spending funds on internal transfers to 
subnational branches ahead of elections (and not staff).  
                                                          
113 The party secretary hired in 2006 was taken ill in 2009/2010 (Annual account, 2010), and quit, 
after which two people in the executive dealt with his tasks (Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017; Dahl, 
16.05.2018; see also financial account, 2010). In 2011 the party decided to take on a new person 
to maintain the party office (who is the one who resigned in 2012). 
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Summary 
The analysis of Norwegian new minor parties in regulatory phase two has 
provided ample support for H1. The Greens, the Coastal Party, and the Christian 
Conservative Party all hired staff following increased income from state funding, 
supporting H1. The latter two parties also decreased their number of staff when 
experiencing decreased income from the state. The analysis showed how the 
Greens, the Pensioner Party, the Christian Conservative Party, and the Coastal 
Party had staff to deal with the increasingly constraining reporting requirements 
in this phase, and that all had expenses related to auditing. Contrary to H1, the 
Pensioner Party decided to operate without staff after 2012, and to instead spend 
state funds on supporting subnational branches. 
Table 6.10 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 2: Norway  
 Support 
for H1 
Description of evidence for H1 
The Green Party Yes Increased its income from the state throughout the 
phase, and increasingly hired more staff.  
The Pensioner 
Party 
Yes*  Increased income from state funds, and hired staff as a 
result.  
 
Staffing pattern in 2012 (when the party downsized 
despite stable income from state funds) does not 
support H1. 
The Coastal Party Yes Increased income from the state in 2006, and hired 
staff as a result. Experienced decreasing income from 
the state and responded by downsizing.  
The Christian 
Conservative Party 
Yes Increased income from state funds in 2014 and hired 
staff as a result. Experienced decreasing income from 
the state and responded by downsizing. 
Note: A star indicates that a party had staffing patterns (once or more throughout regulatory 
phase 2) where there is evidence contrary to the rationale in H1.  
 
6.2.3 Staffing in Norway across two regulatory phases: A summary 
The analysis of Norwegian parties has provided support for H1, across both 
regulatory phases. The Greens, the Pensioner Party, the Christian Conservative 
Party, and the Coastal Party all took on staff when they increased their income 
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from state funding. Conversely, the Coastal Party and the Christian Conservative 
Party downsized when the income from the state decreased, also supporting H1. 
As expected from H1, no staff were taken on by Cross Partisan MPs, Future for 
Finnmark, or the Coastal Party, none of which accessed state funds in regulatory 
phase 1. The Fatherland’s Party operated contrary to the rationale in H1, as it did 
not take on staff after accessing state funding in phase 1, which was due to the 
party’s difficult (overall) financial situation. Moreover, the Pensioner Party in 
regulatory phase 2 prioritised spending state funds on internal transfers rather 
than on staff, shedding light on why the party’s process of downsizing in this 
phase did not coincide with the rationale in H1. There is furthermore indication 
that membership fees contributed to staffing in the Greens, and that a loss of 
membership fees contributed to a decrease in staff in the Coastal Party.  
The analysis outlined how shifts in access criteria with the advent of 
regulatory phase 2 particularly changed the staffing patterns in the Greens, the 
Pensioner Party, and the Coastal Party, by enabling them to take on more staff 
than in regulatory phase 1 (the Greens and the Costal Party), or to employ staff 
for longer time periods than they had in regulatory phase 1 (the Pensioner Party). 
The analysis showed that the parties have mainly relied on existing staff or 
existing treasurers in order to comply with reporting requirements that were 
introduced in 1998, and made more constraining throughout phase 2. Findings 
do indicate, however, that the parties have used external professionals to audit 
their accounts, as the law prescribed from 1998 onwards.  
6.3 Comparative overview and discussion 
This chapter has shown how an increase of state funds contributed to hiring 
processes, and a decrease to processes of downsizing, in new minor parties in 
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Norway and Italy. All staffing processes in the Coastal Party, the Christian 
Conservative Party, and the Greens in Norway were shaped by the parties’ 
income from the state, as suggested by H1. New minor parties where several (but 
not all) staffing processes lent support to H1 were the Greens, the Segni Pact, 
Tricolour Flame, and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy, and the 
Pensioner Party in Norway. As such, the analysis corroborates the empirical 
results found in other case studies of Western European countries investigating 
the link between state funding provision and staffing (Gidlund, 1991, p. 48; 
Sundberg, 1994, p. 173; Svåsand, 1994a, p. 325). However, the results here add 
more detail to this link than existing studies, by systematically analysing each and 
every staffing process in the parties studied. By doing so, the results from this 
chapter not only counter the claim that the timing of staffing in parties is unrelated 
to the availability of state funding (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 50), but also specify 
why this is so. Concretely, the results from this analysis indicate that new minor 
parties – unless restricted by, for instance, internal conflict or deep financial 
troubles – take on staff quickly following state funding access (or lose staff when 
staff funds decrease/are lost), confirming that timing of staffing is related to state 
funding. The new minor parties’ state-dependency, which was argued in chapter 
1 to be of crucial importance to understanding the actual impact of state funds, 
shed light on why state funds are found to matter for the timing of 
hiring/downsizing processes in this study, but to a lesser extent in others. Casas-
Zamora (2006, p. 50), for instance, builds his argument on Katz and Mair’s data 
(1992), which with some exceptions include only a few new minor parties.  
On a more general level, the staffing analysis in this chapter showed that 
specific changes to state benefits and constraints in permissive or constraining 
directions nearly ‘mechanically’ affected staffing patterns in new minor parties, 
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adding evidence to the contention made elsewhere that electorally minor parties 
are particularly susceptible to regulatory change (Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; 
Rashkova & Spirova, 2014). Concretely, the abolition of annual state funds at the 
start of regulatory phase 2 in Italy led to a process of letting staff go in the Greens, 
and the increasingly generous system from 2002 onwards led to hiring processes 
in both the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy. Similarly, 
constraining access criteria towards the end of regulatory phase two in Italy 
effectively shut new minor parties out from state funding access, contributing to 
downsizing in Tricolour Flame, the Greens, and the Communist Refoundation 
Party. Similarly, the drastic increase in the permissiveness of access criteria for 
state funds in Norway facilitated hiring processes in the Coastal Party, the 
Greens, the Pensioner Party, and the Christian Conservative Party.  
These examples also highlight another novel finding of the study. This 
chapter has been able to pin-point specifically what type of state benefits and 
constraints shape staffing, thus deepening our understanding compared to the 
existing literature, which has mainly focused on how the availability of state funds 
is linked to staffing (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Farrell, 1994; Gidlund, 1991; 
Svåsand, 1994a). Concretely, the analysis outlined how shifts to a) access criteria 
(state constraints) contributed strongly to shaping staffing patterns in both 
Norway and Italy, while b) the type (annual grants versus electoral 
reimbursements), and c) generosity of funds (i.e. amount of money in the 
system), also significantly contributed to shifts in staffing in Italy. In turn, this 
means that reporting requirements related to the maintenance of state funds are 
less important for understanding staffing. In fact, reporting requirements had to 
involve external auditing, i.e. professional, independent expertise, to prompt 
staffing. The analysis showed that, in order to comply with other reporting 
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requirements besides external auditing, the new minor parties in both contexts 
either drew on their existing staff or their existing (unpaid) treasurers, instead of 
scaling up staff to deal with them specifically.  
Reflecting the argument in H1 that new minor parties need staff to cope 
with organisational tasks, the analysis found that both Italian and Norwegian new 
minor parties mainly prioritised taking on administrative and/or organisational 
staff when hiring, dealing with tasks such as members, branches, and finances. 
This was evidenced in Tricolour Flame, the Greens, and the Segni Pact in Italy, 
and the Greens, the Christian Conservative Party, the Coastal Party, and the 
Pensioner Party (2006) in Norway. That is not to say that the parties did not have 
political staff (i.e. hire their party leader etc.), but overall the new minor parties 
always hired at least one administrative employee when hiring for the first time, 
as illustrated by the Greens, Tricolour Flame, the Communist Refoundation Party, 
and the Segni Pact in Italy, and the Greens, the Pensioner Party, the Coastal 
Party, and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway. Moreover, the new minor 
parties also prioritised keeping this type of staff longer than political staff in times 
of downsizing, as illustrated by the Christian Conservative Party and the Costal 
Party in Norway. This finding thus indicates that new minor parties first and 
foremost prioritise having staff resembling the traditional party bureaucrat (see 
e.g. Panebianco, 1988, pp. 220-235), i.e. an employee in charge of administrative 
tasks, with little (or no, at least formal) involvement in strategic political decisions 
(see also Karlsen, 2010; Karlsen & Saglie, 2017, p. 1334). These findings counter 
the claim that state funds contribute to alienating parties from their members (for 
an overview of this argument, see Biezen & Kopecký, 2017; Casas-Zamora, 
2006; Pierre et al., 2000), by showing how state funds in fact contribute to the 
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exact opposite by funding staff who specifically work to recruit and maintain 
members, and the branches to which they adhere. 
Moreover, these findings suggest that new minor parties indeed prioritise 
work to increase their membership sizes, reflecting the usefulness for new minor 
parties of members as voters, volunteers, and financial supporters (see e.g. 
Scarrow, 2015). So, even though the existing literature has shown that new 
parties tend to have poorly developed membership structures (Casas-Zamora, 
2006; Mair & Biezen, 2001), the analysis of new minor parties’ here shows that 
they themselves work to address this limitation. The fact that new minor parties 
in Italy and Norway, both early and late in their life cycles, prioritise hiring (or 
keeping) staff who specifically deal with members and branches, suggests that 
their need for members is just as much related to their minority status as their 
newness. This adds another layer to the existing literature which thus far has 
stated that members are particularly crucial to parties early on in their life cycles 
(Kölln, 2014, p. 472). Concretely, both the Italian Greens, which has existed since 
the 1980s, and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway, which was formed in 
2011, prioritised organisational staff. Future studies could benefit from further 
disentangling the specificities of these relationships between newness, (electoral) 
size, and party membership.  
The staffing analysis in this chapter has also outlined how other factors, 
besides state benefits and constraints, have contributed to staffing. One of the 
most interesting findings is that new minor parties with significantly larger budgets 
(compared to other new minor parties) hired and downsized staff independently 
of shifts to their income from state funds. Illustrative of this is the Communist 
Refoundation Party in regulatory phase 2 (until 2008-2010), a period in which the 
party’s budget ranged between 5 and 15 million euros (Financial accounts, 1993-
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2008). As such, the study brings us closer to understanding when, in financial 
terms, a new party stops being particularly shaped by external pressures 
(Stinchcombe, 1965), and when a minor party stops being particularly susceptible 
to regulatory change (Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Rashkova & Spirova, 2014). 
Interestingly, the results from the analysis of staffing patterns in the Communist 
Refoundation Party thus qualify the argument made above that state-dependency 
is what makes state funds matter for the timing of staffing (see also Casas-
Zamora, 2006, p. 50). Rather, state-dependency and budget size seem to be the 
two factors that matter for whether shifts in income from the state is related to the 
timing of hiring/downsizing processes. Concretely, state funds are crucial for 
understanding the timing of staffing in state-dependent new minor parties with 
relatively small budgets (i.e. less than 5 million euros), but less so in state-
dependent parties with budgets exceeding 5 million euros. The importance of 
both state-dependency and budget size for the timing of staffing is also well 
illustrated by the Communist Refoundation Party, which drastically downsized its 
staff at the end of regulatory phase 2, when its budget was considerably smaller 
(had dropped to ca. 1.1 million euros by 2011). Thus, the timing of its downsizing 
coincided with a decrease in state funds. Future studies could benefit from 
exploring these initial findings further to establish when, and why, a new minor 
party’s vulnerability due to newness and electoral size is overcome. 
A party’s overall budget was also found to matter – but in a different way 
– for staffing processes in other parties. A highly restricted overall budget in the 
Norwegian Fatherland’s Party prevented it from hiring staff, despite state funds, 
while the size of the Tricolour Flame’s overall budget enabled it to hold on to staff 
despite decreased income from the state. Both cases operated contrary to H1 in 
these instances. Similarly, increased income from members contributed to the 
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Norwegian Greens’ capacity to hire staff (in addition to the importance of state 
funds), which was also found in the two parties which did not access state funds, 
but still took on (temporary) staff, i.e. the Communist Party of Workers and Act to 
Stop the Decline in Italy. Finally a drastic decrease in income from membership 
fees helps us to understand the downsizing in the Coastal Party from 2009 
onwards.  
Leadership changes in new minor parties contribute to understanding 
staffing patterns in two of the Norwegian cases. Firstly, the replacement of the 
paid party leader in the Pensioner Party in 1999 with an unpaid one effectively 
contributed to downsizing in the party. Secondly, the exit of party leader Steinar 
Bastesen in the Coastal Party in 2006 (and the loss of parliamentary 
representation in 2005) created the need for staff in this party. Other findings also 
suggest that parliamentary representation (and governmental representation) 
contributed to shaping staffing patterns, as illustrated by the Communist 
Refoundation Party’s decision to take on more staff from 2002 onwards, due to 
external pressures related to parliamentary/governmental representation. Finally, 
the analysis, as expected from the existing literature emphasising the link 
between electoral campaigning and staffing (Farrell, 1996, 2006; Farrell & Webb, 
2000), showed that some of the parties, when they have the financial leeway to 
do so, do take on more staff ahead of election campaigns. This happened across 
the two contexts, as illustrated by the Greens in both contexts and by Act to Stop 
the Decline (which did not access state funds) and the Segni Pact in Italy. 
6.4 Summary  
This chapter has analysed how state funds shape processes of hiring and 
downsizing staff in new minor parties in Norway and Italy. Staffing has been 
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analysed in a life cycle perspective, investigating the role of state funds in each 
and every staffing process in all the selected parties over three (Italy) and two 
(Norway) regulatory phases. The analysis found broad support for H1, since both 
increasing and decreasing income from the state was shown to shape processes 
of hiring and downsizing staff respectively in new minor parties. The distinctions 
between regulatory phases outlined how shifts in access criteria, type of state 
funds available, and generosity had a nearly mechanical impact on staffing 
patterns in the parties. Despite the broad support for H1, some other factors were 
also found to shape staffing patterns, such as parliamentary representation, 
leadership change, size of overall budget, and changes in the membership. In 
the next two empirical chapters, the impact of not just state funds, but also staff, 
is analysed. Even though state funds and staff were found to be inter-linked in 
this chapter, their individual impacts on centralisation (and consolidation) is the 
topic of the next chapter.  
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7 State funding and centralisation  
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter explores the impact of state funding and staff presence (in the 
previous chapter found to be inter-linked) on centralisation of the executive 
council in new minor parties in Italy and Norway, and thereby sheds light on the 
thesis’ second hypothesis. As outlined in the analytical framework, centralisation 
is defined as the process in which elites increasingly, at the expense of party 
members, control the executive council, commonly described as the core organ 
that runs political parties on a daily basis (Katz & Mair, 2002, pp. 98-99; Michels, 
1962 [1911], p. 58; Poguntke, 1998, p. 161; Von dem Berge et al., 2013, p. 25). 
The argument of H2 is that state funds and staff strengthen party elites’ position, 
enabling them to initiate reform, and that state funds and staff contribute to 
executing centralising reforms. In parties that already have a completely 
centralised executive (i.e. composed entirely of elites), the argument is that state 
funds and staff consolidate party elites’ strong position by enabling them to 
decrease the importance of other core organs besides the executive. 
This chapter has three main parts, the first and second analysing Italian 
and Norwegian new minor parties respectively, and the third providing an 
overarching, comparative discussion. The analyses of Italian and Norwegian 
parties are structured in a similar way. First the statutory and de-facto 
composition and role of the executive council in the different parties is analysed 
over time, reflecting the argument that statutes have limitations with regards to 
describing actual party behaviour (see e.g. Smith & Gauja, 2010). This constitutes 
the life cycle analysis of centralisation for each party, and outlines whether 
centralising reforms of the executive took place (if there was room to centralise), 
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or if consolidating reforms were undertaken (if there was no room to centralise). 
Secondly, based on the life cycle analysis, I select the first centralising or 
consolidating reform process that took place in each of the parties following state 
funding access and/or staffing. The subsequent in-depth study of reform 
processes systematically analyses the impact of state funds and/or staff on 
centralisation/consolidation, relying on four indicators. The first two indicators 
capture whether state funds and/or staff strengthen party elites, in turn enabling 
them to initiate reform, as measured by party elites’ management of state funds, 
and their control over staff and hiring processes, or whether elites themselves are 
hired. The two last indicators capture whether state funds and/or staff are used 
to execute centralising/consolidating reforms. 
7.1 The implications of state funding access and staff for 
centralisation in Italy 
7.1.1 Italian new minor parties’ statutory and de-facto governing 
structures114 
The Greens in Italy introduced an executive council charged with the crucial task 
of initiating and carrying out the policy goals approved by the party’s national 
executive (Federal Council) and congress in 2001 (Statutes, 2001). Since 2001, 
the party has been run by this executive and the so-called Federal Council115 
between congresses, as meeting documents show (see e.g. Federazione dei 
Verdi, 2006). The Federal Council was set up in 1990 (Statutes, 1990),116 but no 
statutory executive was established until 1993. Rather, the so-called 
Coordinating organ was the de-facto executive council of the party until 1993, as 
                                                          
114 The full overview of composition and shifts to the composition of executive councils in each of 
the parties’ life cycles is outlined in Appendix F. 
115 The Federal Council comprises mostly regionally elected representatives. 
116 Before that there was only an informal leadership on the national level in the Greens (Biorcio, 
2016, p. 185). 
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it had organisational and representative tasks, and was vested with the power to 
make urgent decisions in the interest of the local federations (Vannucci, 2007, p. 
177; Statutes, 1990). Size-wise, it also resembled an executive with its 11 
members elected by the Federal assembly (congress). Two representatives from 
the party’s parliamentary group were invited to take part, without voting rights. 
The composition of the party’s executive was thus highly de-centralised as no 
party elites took part, which in turn meant that there was ‘room’ to centralise it. 
Nevertheless, given that the organ was the (collegial) leader of the party, it was 
arguably a form of elite group internal to the Greens. In 1993, the party introduced 
an organ which is described by party representatives as an executive (Party 
representative, 23.11.2017). It was appointed within the Federal Council, and 
comprised the president and vice-president of the Federal Council, the treasurer, 
the person responsible for information, and the spokesperson (Statutes, 1993). 
The shift from having a de-centralised ‘executive’ (the Coordinating organ) to an 
executive comprising elites such as the president, the vice-president, and the 
treasurer, is to be considered a centralising turn.117 This was the party’s first 
reform of the executive in its lifetime, and was also the first reform following 
access to state funding and staff. In line with the selection criteria, this reform 
process will be analysed in-depth to shed light on H2. 
Unlike the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party has had an 
executive charged with responsibility over the organisational and political activity 
of the party throughout its lifecycle. For example, its executive has decided on 
urgent policy-related matters, such as the party’s electoral cooperation in the 
European elections in 2009 (Rifondazione Comunista, 2009a), and it has passed 
                                                          
117 This argument is strengthened by the fact that the Coordinating organ per se was replaced 
with an individual spokesperson (Statutes, 1993).  
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the party’s internal financial regulations (Rifondazione Comunista, 2005). The 
executive is, and has always been, elected by the National Political Committee 
(among its members) which in turn is elected in the congress. The number of 
members of the executive has varied, and in recent years the National Political 
Committee (i.e. the national executive) has decided how many representatives it 
should have (Statutes, 2005). Throughout the party’s lifetime the party secretary 
has had an ex-officio seat in the executive. Between 2002 and 2005 the treasurer, 
the president of the parliamentary party group, and the leader of the internal audit 
group also enjoyed this privilege. The other members have thus by definition 
been non-elites, which means that there has been room to centralise the 
executive. In 2002 the number of representatives in the executive was reduced 
from 60 to 39 members. This increased the share of elites as the party secretary, 
the treasurer, and the presidents of the parliamentary party groups still had ex-
officio seats. The party had enjoyed access to state funding and staff since its 
foundation in 1991, and the reform in 2002 is the first reform of the executive in 
this party that this study has been able to trace, and is thus selected for in-depth 
analysis.  
Tricolour Flame was, from its foundation in 1995 until 2002, governed by 
an executive council composed of between 30 and 40 members, and a Central 
Committee (i.e. the national executive). The executive council, for example, 
developed guidelines and directives for the party’s parliamentary party group and 
approved appointment of positions in the party (Statutes, 1999). All the regional 
coordinators participated in the executive, while additional members were 
proposed by the party leader, whose potential entry into the executive was 
determined by the Central Committee (Statutes, 1999; see also Romagnoli, 
16.11.2016). The leader’s role in proposing candidates, and the presence of 
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regional leaders (i.e. elites), indicates that the executive was centralised, but not 
completely so, as there was no mention of the party secretary, treasurer (or other 
elites). That said, the party leader until 2002 (Pino Rauti) had a particularly strong 
position in the party.118 After the 1996 congress, newspapers reported that he 
only accepted the position as leader of the party under a guarantee of ‘having the 
most wide liberty of action, because a party in growth needs an iron hand’ (La 
Stampa, 18.11.1996). So, even though the statutes did not explicitly state that 
the executive was only to be composed of party elites (as it did not mention that 
the secretary/treasurer/deputy leader was to be represented), the de-facto 
leadership structure was completely centralised due to Rauti’s strong role, and I 
thus argue that there was no room to centralise further. In 2002 the executive 
was abolished, indicating a consolidating reform, as it left the party with its 
national executive119 (as before), and a secretariat at national level. The latter 
composed 15 members, all appointed by the party secretary himself. This was 
the party’s first revision of the executive since foundation, and the party had state 
funding access120 and staff prior to its introduction, which is why it is selected for 
in-depth scrutiny. 
The Pensioner Party’s main organ on the national level is the so-called 
National Council (i.e. the national executive) comprising regional secretaries, as 
well as up to 20 councillors elected by the National Congress (Statutes, 2002). 
There has, however, been no executive council, only a small secretariat with 
                                                          
118 Rauti had for a brief period also been the leader of The Italian Social Movement (Movimento 
Sociale Italiano), and had been a parliamentarian on both the national and European level for 
many years. This also contributed to give him a strong position in the party. 
119 This organ was also, after 2002, to be composed of 100 members elected by the congress, 
plus 20 proposed by the leader, and all regional leaders. A change after 2002 was that 
representatives from the party’s youth and feminist organisations were to be included (Statutes, 
2006). 
120 Tricolour Flame had enjoyed access to state funds until 2000, so even though the party did 
not have access to state funds in the year of the reform (2002), their impact can still be analysed. 
216 
 
members appointed by the leader himself (Statutes, 2002; Party representative, 
19.12.2017). Throughout time, the party has been effectively governed by party 
leader Carlo Fatuzzo, and crucial decisions on candidate selection, resource 
allocation, and policy development have always been made by him (Party 
representative, 10.11.2016, 19.12.2017), rather than by the National Council. An 
interviewee states: ‘The party secretary has always been Carlo Fatuzzo. That is 
untouchable’, and goes on to say that the party is governed top-down (Party 
representative, 19.12.2017). This is corroborated by the statutes, which state that 
the party secretary has the widest discretion concerning when and how to 
address congress decisions (Statutes, 2002).121 The party can thus be described 
as highly centralised, both because the party leader is so prominent, but also 
because there is effectively no executive to keep him in check (only a small 
secretariat and the larger executive). After 2005, the party decreasingly convened 
the National Council, which indicates that the position of the party leader was 
increasingly strengthened – amounting to consolidation. Prior to this shift to the 
National Council, the party had state funding access, which means that this 
consolidating reform in 2005 is analysed in-depth below. 
Similarly to the Pensioner Party, the Segni Pact had a de-facto completely 
centralised executive in its life cycle from 1993 to 2002.122 The executive council 
was the main leadership organ in the party (Segni, 29.01.2018), and comprised 
the party’s elected representatives and some regional councillors. Of them were 
Mario Segni, the party’s president, and some close collaborators, for example the 
                                                          
121 Also, the press refers to the party leader’s power, for instance in candidate selection. In 1992 
a porn star was put on the ballot for the Pensioner Party (for background, see Corrias, 1991; 
Dipollina, 1991), which led to the resignation of the party’s president. According to the press, it 
was the decision of the ‘secretary of the party to put the porn star on the ballot for the next 
elections’ (La Repubblica, 21.01.1992). 
122 According to interviewees (Segni, 29.01.2018; Masi 13.03.2018) the party did operate 
according to statutes, but they have been impossible to track down. 
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party’s spokesperson, Diego Masi, and its treasurer, Mario Soldani (Segni 
05.01.2018, 29.01.2018; Masi 13.03.2018; Soldani, 03.03.2018). The organ was 
thus completely centralised, as only regional and national elites participated. 
Further centralisation of the executive could thus not take place. However, neither 
could consolidation take place as there were no national organs (besides the 
executive) (Segni, 29.01.2018) that could either be removed or have their 
meeting frequency reduced. This lack of reform (and potential for reform) explains 
why the Segni Pact is not further analysed in the second, in-depth part of this 
chapter. 
The Communist Party of Workers’ executive council has managed 
organisational matters and political initiatives (Statutes, 2008, 2014) throughout 
its life cycle, operating alongside the national executive (called the Central 
Committee),123 which has been the highest decision-making body between 
congresses (Party representative, 21.11.2016; Terra, 29.11.2016; Party 
representative, 11.11.2016). The party’s executive had 15 members from 
foundation until 2014, and was initially (2008-2011) elected by the Political 
Committee, and later (2011-2014) by the congress. There was no mention in the 
statutes that particular elites were to be represented prior to 2014, and the 
executive was thus by definition completely de-centralised, and had room to 
centralise. In 2014 the executive changed composition, and rather than having 
15 elected members, the organ was now to have between 7 and 9 members, 
elected among the members of the main decision-making organ, the Central 
Committee.124 There is still no mention in the statutes of elites being part of the 
organ, but it was stated that the executive’s members were to have responsibility 
                                                          
123 The Central Committee was called the Political Committee between 2008 and 2011.  
124 The organ then also changed its name from Direzione nazionale (translated as ‘executive’ 
here) to Il Comitato Esecutivo (also translated as ‘executive council’ here, which is the same as 
the literal translation from Italian). 
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for specific tasks in the party, such as the treasury (Partito Comunista dei 
Lavoratori, 2017; Statutes, 2014). There is thus indication that the new executive 
was more centralised than before. The party never accessed state funding, but 
had staff prior to the introduction of this reform, which was the first reform of the 
executive’s composition after foundation. It will thus be analysed in light of H2 
below.  
Act to Stop the Decline, despite having a statute that gave provisions for 
an executive council comprising 21 members, elected among the members of the 
party’s National Council (i.e. national executive), was governed by fewer than ten 
representatives (Di Turi, 2013) between foundation in late 2012 and the party’s 
first congress in May 2013 (Brusco, 28.11.2016). These ten representatives were 
the party’s founders and some local elites (Brusco, 28.11.2016), indicating a 
centralised structure. In the party’s first congress it was decided to revise the 
composition of the executive in the statutes to 24 members (Di Turi, 2013; Fare 
per Fermare il Declino, 2013b). As all members of the party could stand as 
candidates (Fare per Fermare il Declino, 2013a), the new executive was more 
de-centralised than the centralised executive that had run the party since 
foundation, and also more de-centralised (given its large number of members) 
than the statutory executive (which had never been elected). After 2013 there 
was no further change to the executive. However, given that the party had neither 
state funding nor staff prior to the reform in May 2013, the impact of these factors 
on this de-centralising reform cannot be assessed, which means that Act to Stop 
the Decline is excluded from the below analysis.  
The table below summarises the findings from the above analysis of 
centralisation by outlining whether the different parties had room to centralise, 
whether they underwent reform, and which type of reform 
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(centralising/consolidating) has been selected for in-depth analysis. Moreover, 
their access to state funds and/or staff, as the two core indicators whose impact 
is studied, is also reported in the table. Since the Segni Pact never underwent 
either centralising or consolidating reforms, and Act to Stop the Decline had 
neither state funding access nor staff, these two parties are not part of the table 
below, nor the following in-depth analysis. 
220 
 
Table 7.1 Overview of Italian parties, their room to centralise, and reform process to be analysed 
Party  State 
funding 
access1 
Staff 
presence1 
Room to 
centralise  
Year of 
change 
Instance of change Centralisation/ 
Consolidation 
The Greens Yes Yes Yes 1993 The party removed the Coordinating organ 
(until then the de-facto executive), replacing 
it with an executive elected internally from 
the Federal Council. 
Centralisation 
Tricolour Flame No2 Yes No 2002 The executive council was abolished.  Consolidation 
The Communist 
Refoundation Paty 
Yes Yes Yes 2002 Reduction of members in the executive, 
enhancing the position of the elites (with ex-
officio seats). 
Centralisation 
The Pensioner 
Party 
Yes No No 2005 Decreased meeting frequency of National 
Council, i.e. the national executive.  
Consolidation 
The Communist 
Party of Workers 
No Yes Yes 2014 The number of members in the executive 
was reduced, and elites were invited in.  
Centralisation 
Sources: The Green Party: Statutes from 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2010, 2012, 2015. The Communist Refoundation Party: Statutes from 
1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013. Tricolour Flame: Statutes from 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017. The Pensioner Party: Statutes from 2002 and 
interviews. Act to Stop the Decline: 2012, 2013, 2014. The Communist Party of Workers: Statutes from 2008, 2011, 2014. The Segni Pact: Interviews. 
Notes: 1 Refers to whether the party in question had state funding access/staff in the year of the reform process.  
2 The party had enjoyed stable state funding access up until 2000, and the impact of state funds is thus still assessed.
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The analysis below firstly explores the implications of state funding and/or 
staff for the centralising reform processes in the Greens (1993), the Communist 
Refoundation Party (2002), and the Communist Party of Workers (2014). It then 
analyses how these factors contributed to the consolidating reform processes in 
the Pensioner Party (2005) and Tricolour Flame (2002).   
7.1.2 The implications of state funding and staff for centralisation: The 
Green Party, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Communist 
Party of Workers 
Staff in the Greens, in line with H2, contributed to strengthening party elites prior 
to the 1993 centralising reform, which replaced a de-centralised executive (the 
Coordinating organ) with a spokesperson, and introduced an executive 
comprising several elites (e.g. the treasurer). More specifically, in 1992/1993, the 
Coordinating organ (i.e. executive) in the Greens had the administrative support 
of eight staff members (1992). According to interviews, staff was indispensable 
for the leadership group. One party representative, for example, states that 
technical staff was crucial for the treasurer’s ability to make a financial account 
(Party representative, 23.11.2017). This suggests that the leaders in the 
Coordinating organ could control party staff’s tasks, in turn strengthening them 
ahead of the 1993 reform, supporting H2. Interestingly, state funding had a 
minimal role in reinforcing the position of party elites prior to the reform, contrary 
to H2, even though the management of state funds was concentrated in the 
Coordinating organ. The reason was that the Greens had strict rules regarding 
how much state funding should be transferred to the subnational branches (see 
for example Party representative, 23.11.2017). In the early 1990s this amounted 
to 60 percent (Financial account and Annual reports, 1989, 1990). There was 
also a strong understanding that the money was to be spent on campaigns and 
not on organisation (Lion, 17.11.2016; Annual account, 1988). The Coordinating 
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organ’s restricted leeway to manage state funds freely meant that state funds did 
not strengthen elites’ position. As the party’s resources were ‘very few’ (Stefano 
Boato to Radio Radicale, 29.05.1992), this leeway was further constrained. This 
restriction on the use of state funds also suggests that state funds had little impact 
on the execution of the centralising reform. 
The Coordinating organ, strengthened by staff, initiated the centralising 
reform (Party representative, 23.11.2017; Ripamonti, 18.03.2018). Interestingly, 
however, there is no indication that the Coordinating organ needed to use its 
strengthened position in order to initiate the reform, as there were three other 
factors that sparked the reform. First, there was a general understanding in the 
early 1990s that the Coordinating organ was unable to cope with the challenges 
of an increasingly popular party (Vannucci, 2007, p. 177). According to Biorcio 
(2016, p. 185) the Green Party was characterised by fragile and uncertain 
organisational structures, and a lack of strong leadership, while Rhodes (1992, 
1995) argued that the Greens suffered from internal weaknesses in the early 
1990s.125 Party representatives state the same:  
[…] the Coordinating organ was dispersed and often did not speak with 
one voice. Thus, it was necessary to identify one single person that was 
recognisable both for citizens and for the press (Party representative, 
23.11.2017). 
Secondly, a leadership change contributed to the initiation of the reform. 
Specifically, the few members of the Coordinating organ who originated from the 
radical green movement, with which the Greens had merged in 1990 (see e.g. 
Vannucci, 2007), had brought with them new ideas about how to organise a party 
leadership (Party representative, 23.11.2017), ideas different to the Greens 
                                                          
125 This was also an established understanding in the news media, which frequently referred to 
the vivid internal discussions in the Greens over whether it should stay a movement or become a 
traditional party with a secretary and a national leadership (see e.g. De Gregorio, 07.10.1992). 
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collegial leadership model adopted thus far. Thirdly, there were concerns in 1992 
that only the parliamentary party group, and not the party in central office, was 
capable of political initiative (Franco Corleone to Radio Radicale, 30.05.1992). 
This concern was related to the fact that the Greens had constraining internal 
incompatibility regulations that restricted the participation of elected 
representatives in the executive (Coordination organ) between 1990 and 1993 
(Statutes, 1990). This led, according to party representatives (Party 
representative, 23.11.2017) to a relatively strict division between the party in 
public office and party in central office before 1993 (see also Rhodes, 1995, p. 
186).  
After the reform was initiated, staff were used in the work of executing the 
reform process, supporting H2. Concretely, three  out  of  five  members  in  the  
group  that  developed  the  reform proposal  were  also  members  of  the  
Coordinating  organ  (the executive) (Radio Radicale, 31.10.1992). The staff’s 
importance (Party representative, 23.11.2017) for elites’ execution of core tasks 
(see also above), suggests that staff were also important for the works concerning 
the reform process, and not least for relieving the elites of other tasks so that they 
could focus on the reform. That was especially important as the reform process 
was long – it was debated in meetings throughout the whole of 1992 (Radio 
Radicale, 26.04.1992, 29.05.1992, 08.12.1992). Finally, staff intervened in 
decision-making on an informal basis (Bonelli, 16.11.2016; Fracescato, 
14.11.2016; Party representative, 23.11.2017), providing another avenue for 
aiding the execution of reform.  
The congress had to approve the statutory changes, and was composed 
of 400 delegates elected from the subnational level in the party (Statutes, 1990). 
The theoretical framework argued that members will accept centralising changes 
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if they are financially dependent on the national level. This was partially the case 
in the Greens in 1992, as the branches received large sums of state funds from 
the national level (Financial account and Annual accounts, 1989, 1990). Still, the 
branches controlled the membership fees coming in. Rather than resource-
dependencies, however, the congress’ approval of the centralising reform seems 
to be related to the fact that the organ from which the new executive was to spring 
after 1993, namely the Federal Council, had 44 out of 78 members elected 
directly by the regions. Consequently, even though it was a centralising reform, it 
was not necessarily seen as such, as an organ comprising mainly representatives 
elected by regional congresses (comprising either all members or delegates of 
members) was to be the source of the new executive (see Statutes, 1993).  
Unlike in the Greens, state funds in the Communist Refoundation Party 
impacted the centralising reform in 2002 by strengthening one faction’s party 
elites, levelling the playing field between the two core (competing) factions of the 
party,126 supporting H2. The reform cut the number of members of the executive 
from 60 to 39. Specifically, as Bertolino (2004, p. 118) and interviews (Gelmini, 
23.11.2016) suggest, party leader Fausto Bertinotti had slowly strengthened his 
position in the party from the mid-1990s onwards. This was partially because of 
an alleged increasing personalisation of Italian politics, and Bertinotti’s ability to 
communicate with the press (Bertolino, 2004, p. 118), and partially because the 
dual leadership structure (party leader and president) was abolished after a split 
                                                          
126 Two factions had run the party since foundation, one represented by the party secretary 
(Fausto Bertinotti) and one by the party president (Armando Cossutta). Even though Cossutta 
split from the party in 1998, the division was still very much present in 2002. For instance, the 
“Cossutta”-faction still had its stronghold in the party organisation, i.e. on local and regional levels, 
and also led the treasury. Bertinotti controlled the party’s external relationships, and the 
relationship with voters (Bertolino, 2004, p. 118).  
225 
 
in 1998127, leaving Bertinotti as the sole leader (Bertolino, 2004, p. 131). 
Moreover, Bertinotti was a member of both the European and Italian parliaments 
prior to the reform in 2002, which strengthened his position (see also Gelmini, 
23.11.2016). However, what was crucial in this reform process was that the 
faction competing with Bertinotti’s, i.e. the one led by treasurer Claudio Grassi, 
controlled the treasury. So, this faction managed the party’s state funds, and the 
related reporting (see e.g. Bertolino, 2004, p. 284). Consequently, while 
Bertinotti’s position in the party was crucial, the other faction controlled the most 
important resource in the party (the party’s state-dependency was over 90 
percent prior to 2002), strengthening its position, and securing it leverage in the 
negotiations over new statutes, supporting H2. 
The party had 62 staff members in 2002 (Bertolino, 2004; Calossi, 2007, 
p. 233), and the executive controlled the hiring processes (Bertolino, 2004, p. 
277). However, as the executive was not solely composed of party elites, the elite 
control over staffing was not unequivocal. Elites (of both factions) did, however, 
strengthen their position due to staffing, in line with H2, as elites themselves were 
to a large extent hired. For example, the treasurer was hired, and party leaders 
were generally paid by the party (Celli, 25.06.2018; see also Gelmini, 
23.11.2016), giving them freedom to work on party-related tasks on a daily basis.  
The centralising reform was initiated following poor electoral results in the 
European Parliament elections of 1999, which led the party to conclude that it 
needed to be more open towards civil society, and undergo a process of 
democratisation. The goal was that this would address the party’s weak social 
roots, and the lack of coordination between the centre and periphery of the party 
                                                          
127 When Armando Cossutta (the party’s president from foundation until 1998) split from the party 
in 1998, the dual leadership which had characterised the party since formation was abolished. 
This left the party with one leader, namely Bertinotti. 
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(Bertolino, 2004, pp. 132-133). Moreover, the G8 summit demonstrations in July 
2001 led the party to start discussions over whether identification with this 
movement, and its integration into the party, was a desirable solution or not 
(Bertolino, 2004, p. 138), in turn also contributing to the initiation of the reform.128 
The strengthening of elites by state funds and staff is thus of little relevance to 
the initiation of the centralising reform.  
However, when it comes to the execution of the reform, hired (and as such 
strengthened) party elites were important. The leader of the statutory 
commission, which counted no less than 55 members, was treasurer Claudio 
Grassi (Rifondazione Comunista, 2001a). Hired party elites with leeway to 
dedicate themselves fully to party work thus contributed directly to executing the 
centralising process. There is also indication that administrative and other 
political staff contributed to the reform process, as a long standing staff member 
states that the national leadership structure benefitted the most from staff in the 
party (as opposed to members and parliamentarians) (Celli, 30.11.2017), 
supporting H2. There is no indication that state funds directly contributed to the 
execution of the reform. 
The proposal of centralising reform from the statutory commission had to 
be approved in the congress.129 Even though the centralising changes to the 
executive council were said to benefit party leader Bertinotti, other changes 
satisfied the competing faction (that of treasurer Grassi), whose stronghold was 
the organisation (Bertolino, 2004, p. 118). Concretely, the proposal suggested 
strengthening the regional branches, which from then on were to hold regional 
                                                          
128 Party leader Fausto Bertinotti (leading the “innovative wing”), suggested including the no-
global movement within the party, while the “conservative wing”, led by treasurer Claudio Grassi, 
rejected this idea (Bertolino, 2004, p. 139).  
129 The congress comprised delegates elected at subnational (so-called federal) party congresses 
(Statutes, 1999).  
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congresses, something they had not had the mandate to do previously 
(Rifondazione Comunista, 2001b). This secured the maintenance of the Grassi 
faction’s ‘peripheral strongholds (…)’  (Bertolino, 2004, p. 145). So, even though 
the change to the composition of the executive in a centralising direction 
benefitted certain party elites (Bertinotti), the introduction of regional congresses 
benefitted the party on the ground (and Grassi’s faction), shedding light on why 
the members accepted the change, irrespective of their resource-dependency in 
relation to the national branch (for examples, see Bertolino, 2004; Financial and 
annual account, 2001).130 
The final Italian new minor party that introduced a centralising reform is the 
Communist Party of Workers. In 2014 it changed its executive council from a 15-
member organ elected by the congress (no elites), to a smaller organ elected 
among the members of the Central Committee (the national executive), 
comprising elites such as the leader of the treasury. The party did not have state 
funding, but had its party leader hired in a part-time position. Thus, the party’s top 
elite was hired as staff, indicating a strengthened position for the leader, lending 
evidence to H2. However, there is no indication that this contributed to the 
centralising reform, as one party representative states that the party leader 
(Marco Ferrando) was only minimally involved in organisational matters: 
‘Ferrando handles next to no matters regarding the organisation’ (Terra, 
31.01.2018).  
Rather, the core factor contributing to initiating and seeing the reform 
through, was the ambition to secure a properly functioning central executive. Prior 
to 2014, the executive had failed to work as a central, coordinating organ (Partito 
                                                          
130 It is worth noting that the subnational branches (mainly) controlled the membership fee (see 
chapter 5). 
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Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2017). The party had a membership ranging around 
1000 members (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2008, 2011, 2017) widely 
dispersed in the country (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2011, 2017). This, in 
addition to a poor financial situation, had contributed to preventing the party from 
creating a central reference point, as was outlined in the congress in 2014: 
The so-called “centre of the party” is thus divided into different structures: 
apart from the political leadership organs (…), we can identify the Financial 
Commission, the membership and the GCL, the internet page and the 
section in Rome. This decomposition naturally makes it hard to work (…) 
(Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2017, p. 3).131 
This lack of a strong centre going into 2014 is particularly interesting in the case 
of the Communist Party of Workers, as ever since its foundation it had expressed 
a wish to organise itself based on the principle of centralism (see e.g. Partito 
Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2008, 2011). In practice, such a principle, according to 
the party, meant constructing a central leading group, i.e. a single structure that 
would define the party’s choices and priorities (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 
2008). The party’s lack of central organisation was already emphasised in 2011, 
and it is thus no surprise that the party was eager to address this come congress 
in 2014. Concretely, the organisational document from 2011 states: 
(…) in the next phase of the party it is pivotal to construct a minimum of 
apparatus, and build a capacity at the centre. Without a functioning centre, 
the local units of the party cannot work (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 
2011, p. 21). 
Thus, the centralising change in 2014 can be seen as one step towards 
fulfilling the party’s quest to create a party based on centralism, and to be rid of 
organisational vulnerability. Given that the party leader has been the same 
throughout, and fluctuations in the membership have been small, there is little 
                                                          
131 This document is from 2017, but includes this quote from the 2014 organisational document. 
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indication that these factors influenced the party’s reform of the executive in 2014. 
In sum, therefore, ideological concerns, combined with a poorly developed 
leadership structure, most strongly contributed to the centralising reform in 2014. 
The only support for H2 is thus that the party leader indeed had a strengthened 
position as he was himself hired in the party. 
 In brief therefore, the above analysis shows that state funding and/or staff 
played a role in the centralising reforms in the Green Party and the Communist 
Refoundation Party, evidencing H2. Concretely, staff strengthened party elites in 
the Greens, and also contributed to executing the centralising reform process in 
1993. State funding played no role, because of the party’s restricted financial 
leeway. In the Communist Refoundation Party, state funds contributed to 
strengthening the treasurer’s faction in the party, and staff contributed to 
strengthening party elites and executing the reform. In the Communist Party of 
Workers, the role of staff was non-existent, contrary to H2. 
7.1.3 The implications of state funding and staff for consolidation: The 
Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame  
The Pensioner Party’s National Council (i.e. national executive) stopped 
convening after 2005 (Party representative, 10.11.2016, 19.12.2017).132 This 
shift in meeting frequency of the party’s top national organ (the party has no 
executive), constitutes a consolidating reform. Prior to the reform in 2005, state 
funding access had strengthened party leader Carlo Fatuzzo’s position. 
Specifically, Fatuzzo had alone controlled the state funds flowing into the party, 
both prior to the reform, but also over time (Party representative, 10.11.2016, 
19.12.2017), despite the existence of a treasurer.133 The leader’s leeway to 
                                                          
132 Another interviewee (18.01.2018) states that it has been some time since the council was last 
convened. 
133 In fact, the party’s treasurer died a few years ago, without being replaced (as of 2018) (Party 
representative, 10.11.2016, 19.12.2017; Party representative, 18.01.2018), which means that 
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manage state funds was further strengthened by the fact that the party rarely held 
congresses where budgets or financial accounts could be discussed. In fact, only 
3 congresses have been held since the party was founded in 1987, the last in 
2005 (Party representative, 10.11.2016, 19.12.2017; Party representative, 
18.01.2018). 
There is strong indication that Fatuzzo’s leeway to spend the funds in the 
manner he saw fit, contributed to the consolidating reform, evidencing H2. 
Concretely, in 2005 the party received generous amounts of state funding (over 
800,000 euros). Despite this, a party representative suggests that the decreasing 
meeting frequency of the National Council (i.e. the consolidating reform) was due 
to scarce financial resources: 
It has been a while since the council has met, and it is for financial reasons, 
we cannot have people coming in from Calabria, from Sicily, and from 
other parts of Italy without compensating their expenses for the trip (Party 
representative, 19.12.2017, also supported by Party representative, 
18.01.2018). 
The reason for this difficult financial situation (despite state funding access), was 
the party’s decision to spend money on television broadcasts (Party 
representative, 15.01.2018). Given that the party leader himself was in charge of 
spending the state funds on television broadcasts in 2005, rather than on 
summoning the national executive, the consolidation reform was facilitated by his 
strong role and broad leeway to spend party funds freely. State funding, in line 
with H2, has thus both strengthened Fatuzzo’s position and contributed to 
executing the consolidating reform.134  
                                                          
Fatuzzo has had sole responsibility for the funds in recent years (Party representative, 
18.01.2018). 
134 As a substitute for the lack of meetings in the National Council, the party leader has discussed 
urgent matters with his closest collaborators via email or telephone (Party representative, 
18.01.2018; Party representative, 19.12.2017), and met with the representatives of the different 
regions when visiting these regions (Party representative, 19.12.2018). 
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Additionally, one other reason helps us understand exactly why the party 
stopped convening the national executive besides the considerations of Fatuzzo 
himself: to avoid factionalisation in the party:  
By experience we know that when we are all united, someone always tries 
to make currents, and we seek to avoid that (Party representative, 
15.01.2018).  
There is limited evidence for this, but it suggests that the party leader has 
attempted to avoid conflict within the party by not summoning the national 
executive. There is no indication that a shift in members contributed to the 
consolidating reform in 2005, as the income from membership fees was stable 
between 2003 and 2006 (Financial accounts, 2003-2005). 
Similar to the situation in the Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame had a strong 
leader whose position was reinforced by state funds, supporting H2. Concretely, 
prior to the consolidating reform in 2002, which abolished the executive, party 
leader Pino Rauti had reinforced his position, by means of state funding access. 
Interviewees state that the resource allocation in the party was left to him 
(Romagnoli, 16.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016; Party representative, 
31.01.2018), meaning that Rauti had far-reaching powers over the management 
of state funding. This also coincides with information from the statutes (Statutes, 
1999), where it is stated that the party’s secretariat (headed by Rauti) was to 
manage the resources of the party. Another interviewee states:  
Of course the access to state funding reinforced Rauti’s position internally 
in the party. He managed it with full discretion (Party representative, 
31.01.2018). 
In line with H2, therefore, state funding allocations strengthened Rauti’s position 
in the party in the years prior to the statutory change. There is also some 
indication that staff presence did the same, as the party had one (administrative) 
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staff member from 1996 onwards. The data shows that the employee aided Rauti 
with administrative tasks such as transcribing his works (Party representative, 
31.01.2018), indicating that Rauti could allocate specific tasks to the staff. Thus, 
there is some evidence that he exercised staff control, which strengthened his 
position, supporting H2. 
Rauti’s strong position contributed to giving him leeway to propose 
changes to the statutes prior to the 2002 congress. Concretely, he announced 
that he would step down as leader, but simultaneously suggested strengthening 
the position of president (Radio Radicale, 10.02.2002), a position he was due to 
take up (Corriere della sera, 08.02.2002). Moreover, the proposal to eliminate the 
executive council – which is the specific consolidating reform of interest here – 
came from Luca Romagnoli, Rauti’s selected successor to the leadership (La 
Repubblica, 09.02.2002; Party representative, 31.01.2018), indicating how the 
two top elites of the party proposed the changes (that later were adopted). Apart 
from Rauti and Romagnoli’s considerations, a wish to make the party structure 
lighter was another reason to initiate the reform, according to the then leader of 
the statutory commission, Rocco Tauro (Radio Radicale, 10.02.2002; and 
interviews):  
[The reason for suggesting the reform was to] simplify the party 
organisation and allow the party leadership figures to save time and 
money, as they were often kept busy with repetitive meetings (Party 
representative, 31.01.2018). 
The reason was that the executive was composed of the same representatives 
as the other two organs on the national level.135 Luca Romagnoli, who proposed 
the change, also says that the number of members in the organs was 
disproportionate compared to the number of rank-and-file members in the party 
                                                          
135 The National Secretariat and the Central Committee. 
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(Romagnoli, 16.11.2016). This statement indeed coincides with the party’s 
income from membership fees, which declined by 13,000 euros between 1998 
and 2000, from 32,000 to 19,000 euros (Financial accounts, 1998-2000). In 
addition to the wish to simplify the organisation, one of the reasons for initiating 
the change was also financial, as meeting often – in many different forums – 
required resources. This reflects a wish to allocate the state funding to issues 
other than meetings. 
A separate commission elected in the congress developed the 
(consolidating) statutory changes in the two days of the congress. Neither Rauti 
nor Romagnoli was leader of this commission (Radio Radicale, 10.02.2002). This 
suggests that the state funds and staff that had strengthened Rauti’s position, 
were of little concrete importance for the execution of the reform process per se, 
contrary to H2. Subnational branches in Tricolour Flame were financially 
dependent on the national branch prior to the reform as they had neither (direct) 
access to state funds nor to the membership fee (which was collected at and 
remained on the national level), and hence relied on transfers from the national 
branch (see e.g. Financial account, 2000; see also chapter 5). In the congress 
itself, therefore, as theorised in H2, the congress delegates approved all the 
statutory changes proposed by the statutory committee, with no objections – 
despite the centralising turn this represented.136 
 In brief, therefore, this analysis of consolidating reforms in Tricolour Flame 
and the Pensioner Party shows how party leaders’ management of state funds 
strengthened their position in both parties, supporting H2. Staff also contributed 
to this in Tricolour Flame, as the party leader could allocated tasks and hence 
                                                          
136 Interestingly, the particular article concerning the president (i.e. the position Rauti was to take 
on), was approved individually (prior to the adopting of the other changes to the statutes), because 
it was described as particularly important (Radio Radicale, 10.02.2002), further delineating the 
particular role of Rauti in the party.  
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decide on the activities of the staff member. The Pensioner Party had no staff. In 
Tricolour Flame, this increased elite power gave the party leader (and his 
successor) leeway to propose a consolidating reform, but did not aid in the 
execution of the reform per se. In the Pensioner Party, however, state funding 
both strengthened the party leader, and contributed to seeing the consolidating 
reform through, supporting H2. 
Summary 
This analysis has found that state funding broadly contributed to strengthening 
party elites prior to centralising or consolidating reforms, evidencing H2. 
Concretely, ahead of the consolidating reform processes in The Pensioner Party 
in 2005 and Tricolour Flame in 2002, state funds strengthened the position of the 
party leaders in both these parties, due to their leeway to manage these funds 
freely. Similarly, state funds contributed to strengthening one faction (headed by 
the party treasurer) in the Communist Refoundation Party ahead of its centralising 
reform process in 2002, levelling the power structure between the two factions 
competing for influence in the party. Moreover, staff contributed to strengthening 
party elites in the Greens prior to its centralising reform in 1993, and in Tricolour 
Flame, as elites in both parties had the power to control the allocation of tasks to 
staff, evidencing H2. In the Communist Refoundation Party and the Communist 
Party of Workers, the fact that party elites were themselves hired contributed to 
strengthening the elites’ position. The analysis found that this strengthened 
position of party leaders in the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame enabled both 
leaders to initiate consolidating reform processes, supporting H2. The levelled 
power structure between factions (due to state funding) in the Communist 
Refoundation Party helps us to understand why the centralised reform of the 
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executive (party leader’s priority) was countered with efforts to strengthen the 
local branches (treasurer’s priority). 
Staff contributed to executing centralising reform processes in both the 
Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens, supporting H2. More 
specifically, elites were either helped directly by staff in these processes (the 
Greens) or were themselves staff who worked on the reform (the Communist 
Refoundation Party). Similar evidence is not found in Tricolour Flame’s 
consolidating or the Communist Party of Workers’ centralising reforms, as the 
staff here had no role in the reform processes. Only in the Pensioner Party did 
state funds contribute to executing a reform (consolidating reform). Finally, one 
interesting finding contrary to H2 is found in the Greens: State funding did not 
contribute to strengthening elites prior to the party’s centralising reform in 1993, 
due to the restricted leeway of elites to manage state funds freely. The table 
below outlines the empirical evidence in relation to the study’s indicators of 
centralisation and consolidation. 
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Table 7.2 Empirical overview, the impact of state funding and/or staff on 
centralisation and consolidation: Italy  
 Type of 
reform 
Does state funding and/or staff contribute to 
centralisation/consolidation? Support for H2 on 
four indicators  
  Elites 
manage 
state 
funds 
Elites hire 
staff, control 
staff, or are 
themselves 
staff 
State 
funding 
used to 
execute 
reform 
Staff 
used to 
execute 
reform 
The Green 
Party 
Centralising Yes, but no 
impact as 
restricted 
leeway 
Yes No Yes 
The 
Communist 
Refoundation 
Party 
Centralising Yes Yes No Yes 
The 
Communist 
Party of 
Workers 
Centralising NA Yes NA No 
The Pensioner 
Party 
Consolidating Yes NA Yes NA 
Tricolour 
Flame 
Consolidating Yes Yes No No 
Notes: NA (non-applicable) refers to a party’s lack of a resource prior to a reform (either state 
funds or staff). 
7.2 The implications of state funding access and staff for 
centralisation in Norway  
7.2.1 Norwegian new minor parties’ statutory and de-facto governing 
structures137 
The Green Party had a stable, national leadership structure between foundation 
in 1988 and 2012, as the party was run and governed (see e.g. Miljøpartiet de 
grønne, 1993, 1998b, 2004) by an executive council called the National Council 
(landsstyret). The executive discussed and decided matters related to party tax, 
study circles, policy motions and the organisation of party seminars (see e.g. 
Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1994d). The organ consisted of between 5 and 7 
representatives (Statutes, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009) 
                                                          
137 The full overview of composition and shifts to the composition of the Norwegian new minor 
parties’ executive councils is outlined in Appendix F. 
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elected by the congress,138 comprising the spokespersons139 and members. The 
organ’s composition was thus de-centralised. The de-facto governance in the 
party was also democratic as this de-centralised organ was the one to run the 
party. Moreover, members had a crucial position in the party in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. Concretely, due to the party’s (very) low membership (between 200 
and 500) ‘[…] you could risk being elected to anything at any time’ (Simonsen, 
16.06.2017). The party thus had ample room to centralise. In 2012 the congress 
changed the leadership structure in the Greens for the first time. The executive 
council (the National Council) was extended to become a broader, territorial 
organ, while an Executive Council, now comprising the two spokespersons, the 
party secretary, the international contact, and six members elected by the 
congress, was created. One of the spokespersons of the Youth Group could 
participate (Statutes, 2012), and so could parliamentarians (but without voting 
rights). This reform was centralising in that afterwards the executive comprised 
more party elites, i.e. the party secretary in addition to the spokespersons, than 
before. Prior to the reform the party had both access to state funds and staff. As 
this reform was the first to change the executive council’s composition in the 
party’s life cycle, it will be analysed in-depth below.  
The Pensioner Party introduced an executive council in its first statutes 
from 1985, and, apart from a change to its composition in 1992,140 it stayed the 
same until 2008. The executive has had a crucial role over time, making decisions 
                                                          
138 The organ was called the Political Committee (Politisk utvalg) between 1990 and 1993 
(Statutes, 1990). This was the highest decision-making authority in the party between 
congresses, as long as a so-called National Committee (Landsutvalget) had not been constituted. 
I have not been able to identify any evidence that the latter was ever constituted.  
139 After 1997 this person was to be elected by the congress. Prior to this the spokesperson was 
appointed internally within the executive (1993-1997), while one member of the executive (1990-
1993) was to be part of the party’s collegial leadership, called the Coordinating Group (comprising 
three people).  
140 In 1992 the executive was expanded to seven congress-elected members (from five), and the 
right of the leader of the parliamentary party group and governmental leaders to be part of the 
executive was abolished.  
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on exclusions (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992d), appointing evaluation committees, and 
dealing with policy and administrative matters (Pensjonistpartiet, 2005). The 
executive was, according to the 1992 statutes, to be composed of the leader, two 
deputy leaders, treasurer, secretary, and two board members, indicating that 
there was room to centralise it further. In 2008 the congress decided that the 
leader of the parliamentary party group was to be part of the executive. This 
change had no practical consequences, as the Pensioner Party has never had 
representation in parliament. Still, it represented a centralising turn given that 
(possible future) elected representatives were invited into the organ. The 
Pensioner Party had enjoyed access to (national) state funding since 2006, and 
also had staff in 2008, meaning that the centralising turn in 2008, the first after 
access to state funds and staff,141 will be analysed below.  
The Christian Conservative Party has in its short life been governed by the 
executive council, which, according to the statutes, is composed of the leader, 
two deputy leaders, the leader of the youth organisation, 4-6 congress-elected 
members, and the leader of the parliamentary party group. According to annual 
accounts, this is the organ that has run the party on a daily basis, making 
decisions on, for example, staffing (Annual account, 2013, 2014). Despite access 
to state funds and staff since 2014, and despite there being room to centralise, 
the party has not done so. Interestingly, however, there is evidence of 
consolidation, as the national council (i.e. the other national organ besides the 
executive) was barely convened in 2015, indicating increased power for the 
executive. This consolidating reform will thus be analysed in-depth below.  
                                                          
141 The party did introduce internal transfers of subnational state funds in 1991, but the national 
party struggled greatly to collect such funds initially (Annual account, 1991), which is why state 
funding’s role in the 1992 reform process has not been selected as the first reform process 
following access to state funds. 
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Since its foundation in 1999, the Coastal Party has been, on paper, 
governed by an executive council, comprising the party leader, two deputy party 
leaders, and four board members (Statutes, 2001).142 In 2003 the party decided 
to make the secretary and the full parliamentary party group (not just its leader) 
members of the organ. In 2007 another party elite, the treasurer, was added to 
the organ, indicating centralisation, while in 2012 the treasurer was once again 
removed from the organ, indicating de-centralisation. The centralising process in 
2007 is selected for in-depth analysis here, as it is the first reform process taking 
place following state funding access and hiring of staff (2006). Interestingly, this 
centralising reform in 2007 coincided with dramatic changes to the de-facto 
leadership of the party. Because, even though there had been room to centralise 
the executive on paper (which also happened in 2003), there had been no 
possibility (nor need) to do so in practice before 2006, as the party leader (and 
not the executive) had been in charge of the party’s political and administrative 
maintenance and development (Party representative, 21.02.2018; Olsen, 
25.01.2018; Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; see NTB, 23.10.2003). Between 
foundation in 1999 and 2006, therefore, the executive was effectively side-lined, 
as the focal reference point in the party was the party leader, who was also a 
member of parliament. This shows that the party, despite its seemingly 
democratic structure on paper, was de-facto highly centralised between 
foundation and 2006. As the leader disappeared from the executive in 2006, there 
was not just room to centralise the statutes, which happened in 2007, but also to 
allow for this change to have effect in practice. 
Three parties, the Fatherland’s Party (Statutes, 1990; Fedrelandspartiet, 
2002b, 2005), Cross Partisan MPs (Øverland, 16.05.2018; Party representative, 
                                                          
142 The party was formed in 1999, and these are the first statutes that I have accessed. 
240 
 
15.02.2018), and the Popular Movement for the Future for Finnmark (Future for 
Finnmark) (Moe, 05.02.2018; Leirvik, 26.01.2018), made no changes to the 
composition of their executive council, nor to any other organs on national level 
throughout their life cycles.143 This means that there are no reforms to select for 
in-depth scrutiny.144 That said, their statutory and de-facto governance structures 
are still analysed here: The Fatherland’s Party had an executive responsible for 
running the party throughout its life cycle, comprising the leader, deputy leader, 
treasurer, and as many board members as deemed necessary (Statutes, 1990; 
Fedrelandspartiet, 2002b, 2005), which leaves it open for a high level of de-
centralisation. However, in the first part of its life cycle, until 1997, the 
Fatherland’s Party had a strong leader, Harald Trefall, who ran the party, making 
it de-facto centralised (see e.g. Moseng, 26.02.2018). One party interviewee 
(Jonstad, 18.12.2017) states that Trefall’s style of leading the party was 
‘despotic’, while another states that he had a firm hand on the organisation (Party 
representative, 16.04.2018a). A third party representative argues that he was not 
authoritarian (Party representative, 19.04.2018). Still, Trefall himself 
acknowledged his strong position in a party newsletter, where he outlined that he 
had been criticised from within for being too dominating in decision-making 
(Fedrelandet nr. 1/1997). Trefall was the party leader in two periods, from when 
the party was founded in 1990 until 1993 and then again from 1993 to 1997. He 
remained in the executive council between 1993 and 1997 as treasurer. It is worth 
noting that Trefall himself selected his successor as leader (Moseng, 26.02.2018; 
see also Fedrelandet nr. 1/1994). Consequently, while the statutes had room to 
                                                          
143 I have not been able to access the statutes of Future for Finnmark and Cross Partisan MPs, 
even though they allegedly exist for the latter party (Party representative, 15.02.2018).  
144 In fact, neither Cross Partisan MPs nor Future for Finnmark accessed state funding and staff 
in their life cycle either, also disqualifying them from being analysed in the second part of this 
analysis. The Fatherland’s Party had state funding (but no staff) early on in its life cycle. 
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centralise, there was less possibility to do so in practice (before 1997) given the 
party leader’s strong position.  
Cross Partisan MPs has been a loosely organised party since it was 
founded in 1992. According to current party representatives (Interview, 
15.02.2018) the party has never convened a congress, even though the executive 
invited regional representatives to a joint meeting in June 1997 (Tverrpolitisk 
folkevalgte, 1997e). The party has generally been run by an executive council, 
now comprising seven people (Party representative, 15.02.2018). The members 
of this organ have been recruited by the existing executive or leaders (Party 
representative, 15.02.2018; Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997f), indicating a 
centralised structure, given that the possibility for outsiders (potential supporters) 
to access the organ is limited. Interestingly, however, this executive has on 
various occasions been effectively side-lined, due to the interdependence 
between regional branches and the national branch. In 1999, for instance, the 
party branch in Nordland – which later split and formed the Coastal Party – 
enrolled members in its own branch and developed a separate program, which 
neither the executive nor the party leader of the party had any power over (see 
e.g. Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997c; Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997d). In 2009, a 
party representative simply fielded a list under the party’s name, but ‘he did not 
get the program, so he ran an individual election campaign’ (Party representative, 
15.02.2018). This shows that the party’s leadership structure, despite the 
centralised executive, more than anything has been highly vulnerable. Moreover, 
it has been prone to takeovers by influential individuals (on the regional level) 
seeking a registered party name under which to field an electoral list.  
The final party in the sample, Future for Finnmark, did not have any formal 
governing structures in the four years that it existed (Moe, 05.02.2018; Leirvik, 
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26.01.2018), indicating an even more informal structure than that of the Cross 
Partisan MPs. The members in the party were members of the movement 
(Popular Movement for the Future for Finnmark), from which the electoral list 
sprung in 1989, but was not maintained after 1990 (Leirvik, 26.01.2018). The 
governance of the party was in the hands of the movement’s figurehead, MP 
Anders Aune (Moe, 05.02.2018; Leirvik, 26.01.2018), indicating a de-facto 
completely centralised structure with no room to centralise.  
The findings from this analysis are summarised in the table below, which 
outlines the different parties’ room to centralise, their access to state funding and 
staff, and specifies the reform process that has been selected for in-depth 
analysis. As mentioned previously, the first reform process taking place in each 
of the parties following state funding and/or staff access is selected. The table 
also indicates whether this reform process is a centralising or consolidating 
reform. Given that Future for Finnmark, Cross Partisan MPs, and the Fatherland’s 
Party never changed their executive council’s composition (nor that of other 
national party organs), there are no in-depth reform processes to study, which 
explains why these parties are omitted from the table below.  
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Table 7.3 Overview of Norwegian parties, their room to centralise, and reform process to be analysed 
Party  State funding 
access1 
Staff 
presence1 
Room to 
centralise  
Year of 
change 
Instance of change Centralisation/ 
Consolidation 
The Green 
Party  
Yes Yes Yes 2012 Introduced a new leadership structure, 
with a more centralised executive. 
Centralisation 
The Pensioner 
Party 
Yes Yes Yes  2008 The leader of the parliamentary party 
group got a seat in the executive. 
Centralisation 
The Coastal 
Party 
Yes  Yes  Yes  2007 The treasurer was to have a fixed seat 
in the executive. 
Centralisation 
The Christian 
Party 
Yes Yes Yes  2015 The national executive barely convened. Consolidation 
Notes: 1 Refers to whether the party had state funding access/staff in the year of the reform process or not. 
Sources: The Greens: statutes 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2016. The Pensioner Party: statutes 1985, 1986, 1992, 
1994, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2016. The Coastal Party: statutes 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014. The Fatherland Party: statute 1992. The 
Christian Party: statutes 2013, 2017. 
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The following analysis will firstly explore how state funding and staff 
contributed to the centralising reforms that took place in the Greens (2012), the 
Coastal Party (2007), and the Pensioner Party (2008), and secondly how state 
funds and staff contributed to the consolidating reform in the Christian 
Conservative Party in 2015.   
7.2.2 The implications of state funding and staff for centralisation: The 
Greens, the Costal Party, and the Pensioner Party 
State funding access on the national level (from 2006) significantly improved the 
financial situation in the Green party’s national branch145 (see e.g. Annual 
account, 2007) prior to the 2012 reform, which saw the introduction of a more 
centralised executive. There is indication that one of the party’s elites, namely the 
spokesperson, Hanna Marcussen, strengthened her position by means of the 
management of state funds prior to the reform, supporting H2. Even though the 
party’s budget was decided upon in the congress (Statutes, 2007): ‘Marcussen 
(…) worked very closely with the party office, and had a lot of the responsibility 
for the party altogether’ (former party secretary Mikkel Storm Glomstein in Siem 
Knudsen, 2016, pp. 47), indicating financial responsibilities. Another party 
representative also states that Marcussen ‘saved’ the party due to her efforts in 
the years prior to the reform (Simonsen, 16.06.2017), underlining this argument. 
Consequently, there is indication that Marcussen had leeway to manage the state 
funds ahead of the reform in 2012, thus strengthening her position in line with H2.  
Additionally, there is indication that Marcussen was strengthened by her 
role in staffing processes, also supporting H2. The previous chapter on staffing 
demonstrated that the party consistently increased its number of staff in the years 
                                                          
145 This also meant that the party was less dependent on the transfer of subnational state funds, 
upon which it had heavily relied before. 
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prior to the 2012 centralising reform. Since Marcussen was the only one of the 
party elites living in Oslo, the ‘building and professionalisation’ of the secretariat 
was left to her (Annual report, 2010). This also implies that she had a hand in 
staffing processes, supporting H2. That said, the executive (of which Marcussen, 
was a crucial member) could hire staff temporarily, and also hired the party 
secretary (Statutes, 2007, 2009), which strengthened the full executive council. 
Finally, the annual account states that Marcussen herself was hired in smaller 
positions during the spring of 2010 (Annual account, 2010). There is thus 
indication that Marcussen, as spokesperson, could contribute to controlling 
staffing, and also herself was hired, which strengthened her elite position prior to 
the 2012 reform, supporting H2. 
There is indication that this reinforced position of Marcussen, and her 
strategic goals and aspirations for the party’s future (see Lars Gaupset in 
interview with Siem Knudsen, 2016, p. 49) enabled her to contribute to initiating 
the centralising reform in 2012, and fending off internal opposition to the changes, 
supporting H2.146 This is because the centralising reform was initiated despite the 
fact that some Green hardliners left the party (Sand Holth and Mide Solberg, 
2015; see also Siem Knudsen, 2016), following what Marcussen herself called 
her ‘streamlining’ of the Greens (Hanna Marcussen, in Sand Holth and Mide 
Solberg, 2015) after 2008. Besides the role of Marcussen as party spokesperson, 
the massive growth in members and branches (see figure below) also contributed 
to the initiation of the reform.  
                                                          
146 Specifically, prior to 2012 there was internal conflict regarding how the party should be 
organised pertaining to staffing and having an Oslo-based party office. Establishing a permanent, 
central party office in the capital was not uncontroversial, as the party had had rotating party 
offices (in for example Trondheim, Oslo, and Grimo) for nearly three decades. 
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Figure 7.1 Development of membership and number of local branches in the 
Green Party, 2007-2016 
Sources: Annual and financial accounts, obtained from party office.  
More specifically, the rapid growth meant that ‘we have large challenges when it 
comes to organising ourselves in the most appropriate way’ (Annual report, 
2011). The party’s control committee147 stated that so-called growing pains led to 
discussions about power and authority in the party (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 2010). 
Current party secretary Lars Gaupset states that the executive organ prior to 
2012 (i.e. the so-called National Council) was unable to make decisions 
(Gaupset, 15.05.2017; see also interview with Gaupset in Siem Knudsen, 2016).  
With the increased resources, from both state funding and membership 
fees, the party’s executive prepared seminars which resulted in proposals for 
changes to the governing structure (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 2011). This shows 
some support for H2, as state funding partially contributed to executing the 
centralising reform. The executive had the main responsibility for preparing the 
reform (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 2011). As no staff members were part of the 
executive in 2011, there is little direct impact of staff on the execution of the 
reform. That said, one interviewee states that staff have been involved in strategic 
decision-making (Gaupset, 15.05.2018), which could suggest that the staff, for 
                                                          
147 The control committee was the highest organ between congress in matters pertaining to 
interpretation of statutes, audit of the compliance with statutes, and budget control (Statutes, 
2007).  
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instance the hired party secretary, could have intervened in the process.148 In 
2012 the centralising reform was passed in the congress, and the internal 
opposition to it was minimal (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 2012). The branches enjoyed 
financial autonomy, due to the de-centralised state funding allocation system in 
Norway. Thus, one would expect opposition to this centralising reform. The 
reason why members/delegates did not oppose the reform was that elites on 
different party levels (not just the national) were reinforced by the new 
(centralising) reforms. Concretely, whereas the party previously had just one 
National Council (i.e. executive) to govern the party, the leadership structure now 
had two central organs, one executive council and one National Council where 
all the regions were represented, which allowed more people to have a say, even 
though the change itself represented a centralising turn.  
State funding access contributed to the centralising reform of the Coastal 
Party in 2007, but not in the way theorised. Concretely, state funding access in 
2006 did not strengthen elites as expected by H2, but rather contributed to 
highlighting an organisational vulnerability that had emerged following party 
leader Steinar Bastesen’s exit from the executive in 2006. More specifically, 
between foundation and 2006, Bastesen had handled the party’s administrative 
(financial) matters on a day-to-day basis from his position as MP (Party 
representative, 21.02.2018; Olsen, 25.01.2018; Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; see 
also NTB, 23.10.2003). The executive’s role in financial matters was thus very 
limited. When both Bastesen and his support staff in parliament disappeared in 
2005, and when Bastesen disappeared from the party’s executive altogether in 
2006, financial management had to be dealt with by the party’s executive (as 
statutes prescribed, see Statutes, 2001) for the first time. This happened at the 
                                                          
148 This has not been possible to confirm. 
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same time as the party’s first access to national state funding,149 which carried 
management responsibilities and reporting requirements. According to party 
representatives, it thus became necessary to include the treasurer in the 
executive (Party representative, 16.04.2018b; Falch Pedersen, 16.04.2018). The 
reason was that the executive council had little or no overview of the party’s 
financial situation, which was hardly surprising given that former party leader 
Bastesen had previously dealt with this. After 2006 this created difficulty for the 
party, as its top leadership could not necessarily answer questions about the 
financial situation in the party, nor be completely on top of dispositions and 
financial availability (Party representative, 16.04.2018b). An interviewee also 
states that there was a tendency that ‘some people felt that they owned the 
money that came in’ (Party representative, 16.04.2018b). So, instead of 
strengthening the party elites or enabling centralising reform, the state funds 
rather contributed to highlight the executive’s lack of control over finances, which 
became particularly pressing due to state funding access. The discussion above 
also shows that leadership change (i.e. Bastesen’s exit from the executive) 
contributed to sparking the reform.  
There is indication that the hired staff in the Costal party in 2006 did 
contribute to enhancing the executive’s positon, as it was the executive’s 
responsibility to hire staff, and decide what tasks they were to execute (Statutes, 
2001; Kystpartiet, 2006a). However, as the executive also consisted of 
representatives that were not elites, the staff’s impact in strengthening elites is 
neutralised, not lending evidence to H2. Also, there is no indication that this 
proposal needed the support of staff and/or state funding in order to happen. 
                                                          
149 Even though the party had been represented in parliament between 1999 and 2005, it had not 
accessed state funding for the party organisation, as the threshold to do so was set at 2.5 percent 
of the vote prior to 2006 (see regulatory chapter). However, from 2006 onwards the access criteria 
were drastically lowered, which facilitated access in 2006, even though the party lost its only MP. 
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Concretely, the proposal for the reform was made in a national council meeting 
in April 2006 and unanimously accepted there (Kystpartiet, 2006b), before it was 
later passed on to the congress for final approval. In the Coastal Party in 2007, 
all of the regional, local, and national branches had state funding access. That 
said, the financial account from 2007 does indicate that the national branch 
transferred ca. 20,000 NOK (ca. 2000 euros) to the regional branches. Given that 
this sum was small, there is no indication that resource-dependencies existed 
between the different branches. Unfortunately, I lack the minutes from the 2007 
congress where the statutory change was passed. The reason why it passed, 
despite the centralising turn that it represented, was probably the perceived 
benefit of including the treasurer in the executive organ, to ensure proper financial 
management in the national branch.   
Similarly to the Coastal Party, state funds – contrary to H2 – did not help 
to strengthen elites in the Pensioner Party prior to the centralising reform in 2008, 
which gave the leader of the parliamentary party group an ex-officio seat in the 
executive. The reason was the party leader and treasurer’s restricted leeway to 
spend state funds freely. Concretely, the national party transferred state funds to 
local branches (Dahl, 16.05.2018; see also Remman, 20.06.2017), restricting the 
elites’ freedom to spend funds as they wished. In addition, there was a deficit of 
nearly 240,000 NOK in the 2007 accounts (Pensjonistpartiet, 2008). So, despite 
the fact that the party leader and treasurer have been in charge of the party’s 
state funds (and financial situation more generally) throughout (Dahl, 16.05.2018; 
see also Remman, 20.06.2017), they had limited scope for strengthening their 
position by means of these funds in the period before the centralising reform of 
2008, lending evidence contrary to H2. The restricted financial situation also 
indicates that state funds most likely had no role in executing the centralising 
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reform, also contrary to H2. Having said that, the staff – being paid for by state 
funds – did strengthen the position of the party leader, supporting H2. The paid 
party secretary worked on a range of tasks related to communication, such as the 
new webpage and the party newspaper (Annual account, 2007, 2008; Dahl, 
16.05.2018), projects which the party leader had initiated, indicating that the party 
leader had some control over the staff. Moreover, the party leader had himself 
set the hiring of an employee as a precondition of his taking on the role of leader 
(Dahl, 16.05.2018), indicating that the employee was taken on to relieve the 
works of the party leader specifically.  
There is no indication that the leader needed this staff to initiate or execute 
the statutory process, as a separate statutory committee was responsible for 
developing the centralising reform (Pensjonistpartiet, 2008).150 The initiation of 
the reform resulted from a heightened confidence about gaining parliamentary 
representation for the party in the 2009 parliamentary elections, which in turn 
would necessitate a link between the party in central office and in public office 
(Dahl, 16.05.2018; see also I Vindusposten nr. 2, 2006). This belief in the party’s 
ability to have an MP elected, erupted following the party’s growth in the years 
prior to 2008, and the increased activity in the party. First, the party increased its 
membership between 2005 and 2008. In 2005 the income from membership fees 
amounted to ca. 19,000 NOK, while the sum was nearly 22,000 NOK in 2008. 
The membership growth was also mentioned in the party’s newsletter in 2006 (I 
Vindusposten nr. 2, 2006), and Annual account from 2007. Moreover, the party 
managed to establish more local branches (in 2006) (I Vindusposten nr. 2, 2006).  
                                                          
150 There is no indication that Dahl himself proposed the change, as his insecurity as to who 
specifically proposed it, indicates that it was not himself (see Dahl, 16.05.2018).  
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Secondly, the election of a new party leader (Ragnar Dahl), described by 
others as a highly competent leader (Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017), ended (yet 
another) conflictual period in the party, sparking optimism.151 Moreover, he had 
precise goals for the party, such as representation in parliament and increased 
regional representation (Dahl, 16.05.2018), and he initiated a set of 
organisational activities, such as improving the flow of communication in the party 
by establishing a party newspaper and working on updating the webpage (Annual 
account, 2007, 2008; Dahl, 16.05.2018). A leadership change and the increased 
activity thus contributed to the aforementioned surge of optimism in the party prior 
to 2008 – in turn sparking the reform.  
Unfortunately, the minutes from the congress have been impossible to 
access, which makes it hard to establish whether or not the party members 
opposed the change, and whether the subnational branches’ receipt of funds from 
the national branch (see above) in any way contributed to swinging the vote, as 
the theoretical argument would predict. It is worth noting that the subnational 
branches themselves accessed state funds. Based on the fact that the Pensioner 
Party never had a parliamentarian elected, I would suggest that the delegates in 
the congress would perceive the inclusion of a potential parliamentary party 
leader into the executive as uncontroversial, given that electing an MP would 
represent a milestone and a big achievement for the party. 
In brief, therefore, state funding and staff contributed to strengthening 
elites in The Greens, as expected by H2, which contributed to the spokesperson’s 
ability to initiate the centralising process. Only staff strengthened the position of 
elites in the Pensioner Party, due to elites’ restricted leeway to spend state funds 
                                                          
151 During 2004 the party’s executive council members and the leader were in a bitter dispute, 
which ended with the suspension of the leader (Pensjonistpartiet, 2004).   
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and the party’s financial deficit prior to reform. That said, neither staff nor state 
funding were relevant for the actual execution of reforms in the Pensioner Party, 
while state funds played a minor role in executing the centralising reform in the 
Greens. In the Coastal Party state funding did not strengthen the elites as 
expected, but rather created a need for financial management in the executive, 
pushing forward the centralising reform. State funding thus neither strengthened 
party elites, nor contributed to seeing the reform through. Staff in the Coastal 
Party helped to strengthen the executive more broadly, but not elites particularly, 
as the executive comprised both elites and members, not evidencing H2. 
7.2.3 The implications of state funding and staff for consolidation: The 
Christian Conservative Party 
In the Christian Conservative Party state funding access and subsequent staffing 
contributed to strengthening party elites, and the elites’ leeway to spend funds 
freely contributed to the consolidating reform that took place in 2015, when the 
national executive was only convened once. The Christian Conservative Party is 
thus a case where I expected centralisation, as there is room in the statutes to 
centralise the executive, but where consolidation happened instead. As the 
analysis will show, the consolidation process secured the party elites the leeway 
they needed to steer the party (and to secure their own power), eliminating the 
need for a (more laborious, statutory) centralising reform.   
 State funding access on the national level in 2014 strengthened the 
position of the party secretary ahead of the consolidating reform, in line with H2, 
as he specifically (and the executive more broadly) was responsible for both 
reporting and the distribution of state funding on the national level (Party 
representative, 18.12.2018; see also Statutes, 2013). In addition, there is 
evidence that staffing contributed to strengthening the elites prior to the 
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consolidating change in 2015 because elites themselves were staff. Concretely, 
Erik Selle, who had been crucial in the work of building up the party, and was 
elected leader in 2013 (Partiet de Kristne, 2013) was hired in the party after it 
accessed state funding in 2014 (Party representative, 08.02.2018). Thus, prior to 
the 2015 consolidating reform, the party had a leader who had reinforced his 
position in the party due to his position as hired staff, supporting H2.  
 The control over state funds by the elites (mainly the party secretary) 
enabled them to prioritise not spending state funds on convening the national 
executive more than once in 2015. This effectively outlines how the management 
and use of state funds played a role in executing the elites’ consolidating reform, 
supporting H2. According to party representatives, the consolidating reform 
happened because of the party’s restricted financial situation (Partiet de Kristne, 
2016; Akerhaug, 2017), making it difficult to arrange a meeting with all regional 
leaders due to the travel reimbursements this would incur. Still, the party had 
nearly doubled its budget from 2013 to 2014, due to access to state funds 
(Financial accounts, 2013, 2014). This shows how party elites consolidated their 
position by deciding to spend the party’s funds on other activities besides 
convening the national executive, supporting H2. Interestingly, this consolidating 
reform also strengthened the position of the executive council more broadly (not 
just the elites within it), as it was left as the sole nationally-operating organ. In the 
Christian Conservative Party, therefore, the consolidating reform had a dual 
nature, strengthening mainly elites, but also the few members (not elites) in the 
executive. Contrary to H2, there is no specific data suggesting that the party 
leader’s hired position contributed to executing the consolidating reform.  
 There were good reasons to execute a consolidating rather than 
centralising reform in the party. The most important was that the reform did not 
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change the statutes, which eased its introduction. One additional factor (besides 
strengthened elites) sheds light on why the party was easily able to introduce the 
reform: an inexperienced membership. The National Council pointed out that 
there was a need to do internal training in the party in 2015 (Annual report, 2015), 
and the annual account from 2016 documents that the party did invest in training 
courses conducted by its own representatives (Partiet de Kristne, 2013, 2014, 
2015a; Husveg, 18.12.2017). In the congress in May 2017, the then party deputy 
leader Arne Husveg said to a newspaper:  
Organisationally, there are many that do not have any deep experience of 
political work and activity. These are people [i.e. members] that have a 
standpoint, but that lack political experience. There is of course a share 
with experience from other parties, but the majority must be trained 
(Akerhaug, 2017). 
Even though this quote is from 2017 and the information regarding the training 
course from 2016, i.e. from before the consolidating reform happened, it is highly 
likely that this evidence was also valid in 2015. Maybe even more so, as the party 
overall was newer in 2015. An inexperienced membership thus gave the 
strengthened leadership more leeway to execute the consolidating reform in 2015 
without interference.  
Summary 
This analysis has outlined that state funding contributed to strengthening party 
elites in the Greens and the Christian Conservative Party, evidencing H2. Elites, 
mainly the party spokesperson in the former and the party leader and party 
secretary in latter, controlled and managed the state funds, enhancing their 
positions. In a similar vein, the elites’ control over staff in these two parties, and 
the fact that they themselves (at least sometimes) were staff, contributed to 
strengthening them prior to the two parties’ reforms. The Pensioner Party leader’s 
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control over staff strengthened his position there, also evidencing H2. In the 
Greens and the Christian Conservative Party these strengthened elites used their 
position to initiate reform processes, supporting the rationale in H2. There is some 
indication that state funding contributed to executing the centralising reform in the 
Greens, and the elites’ use of state funding in the Christian Conservative Party in 
2015 also contributed to the consolidating reform there, lending evidence to H2. 
That said, neither staff nor state funds contributed to the execution of centralising 
reforms in the Pensioner Party and the Coastal Party, contrary to H2.  
There is also some other evidence contrary to H2 in the Norwegian new 
minor parties. State funds were unable to strengthen party elites’ position when 
financial accounts were in deficit, as they were in the Pensioner Party prior to its 
centralising reform in 2008. Interestingly, state funding access played a different 
role than theorised in the centralising reform process in the Coastal Party, as 
state funding did not contribute to strengthen elites, but impacted on the reform 
anyway, by creating an urgent need for financial management in the executive. 
Finally, staff did strengthen the overall work of the executive in the Coastal Party 
prior to the centralising reform in 2007, but, given the executive’s composition of 
both elites and members, there was no unequivocal strengthening of elites. The 
table below outlines these empirical results.  
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Table 7.4 Empirical overview, the impact of state funding and/or staff on 
centralisation and consolidation: Norway 
 
 
 Type of 
reform 
Does state funding and/or staff contribute to 
centralisation/consolidation? Support for H2 on 
four indicators  
   Elites 
manage 
state funds 
Elites hire 
staff, control 
staff, or are 
themselves 
staff 
State 
funding 
used to 
execute 
reform 
Staff 
used to 
execute 
reform 
The Green 
Party 
 Centralisation  Yes Yes Yes No 
The 
Pensioner 
Party 
 Centralisation Yes, but no 
impact as 
accounts 
were in 
deficit 
Yes No No 
The Coastal 
Party 
 Centralisation No, state 
funds rather 
created a 
need for 
financial 
management  
No No No 
The Christian 
Conservative 
Party 
 Consolidation Yes Yes Yes No 
 
7.3 Comparative overview and discussion 
The analysis showed that state funding and staff help us to understand 
centralising and consolidating reforms in new minor parties in Norway and Italy, 
supporting H2. Four indicators were analysed to shed light on this. The first two 
indicators captured whether state funding and staff strengthened elites, in turn 
enabling them to initiate centralising or consolidating reforms, as measured by a) 
party elites’ management of state funds, and b) elites’ control over staff, ability to 
hire staff, or their position as staff themselves. The last two indicators captured 
whether c) state funds, and d) staff, contributed to executing centralising and 
consolidating reforms.  
First of all, the analysis found that when party elites, such as the party 
leader, the treasurer, or the party secretary themselves manage the receipt and 
allocation of state funding in a party, their position is strengthened. Thus, elites in 
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Tricolour Flame, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Pensioner Party in 
Italy, and the Greens and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway, were all 
empowered due to state funding access prior to the studied reform processes. 
These results contribute to the literature in two ways. First, the results corroborate 
existing claims that those party actors who have access to their own resources 
become stronger and more independent from others in a party (Nassmacher, 
2009, p. 379; see also Mendilow, 1992). Secondly, the analysis pin-points exactly 
which actors in a party are reinforced due to state funding access, namely 
treasurers, party leaders, and party secretaries, i.e. those in control of state funds. 
As such, the results add detail to existing literature which has found that state 
funding empowers certain faces of a party over others, for example the party in 
central office versus the party on the ground (Hagevi, 2018; Katz & Mair, 2002).  
Echoing the existing literature (see e.g. Bardi et al., 2017; Katz & Mair, 
2002), the analysis also showed that staff contributed to strengthening party 
elites, thus adding to Panebianco’s (1988, p. 227) contention that the control of 
staff (even though he refers to a strong, bureaucratic apparatus) advantages 
those who control it over those who do not (see also Nassmacher, 2009, p. 379). 
In some parties, such as the Green Party and Tricolour Flame in Italy, and the 
Green Party, and the Pensioner Party in Norway, the empowerment of elites 
happened because the elites controlled staff – either the staffing process per se 
or the tasks that staff were employed to do. Elites were also strengthened by staff 
because they themselves were staff, granting them leeway to dedicate more time 
to party work, as illustrated by the Communist Refoundation Party and the 
Communist Party of Workers in Italy, and the Christian Conservative Party, and 
to a certain extent the Greens, in Norway. Broadly, these findings add to the 
existing literature which uses staff as an indicator for changing power structures 
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in parties (see e.g. Bardi et al., 2017), by specifying how exactly staff strengthen 
party elites. 
The analysis shed further light on H2, by showing how the empowered 
party elites (by means of staff or state funding) contributed to initiating the 
consolidating reforms that took place in the Christian Conservative Party in 
Norway and the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame in Italy, and the centralising 
reform in the Greens in Norway. These findings reflect Barnea and Rahat’s (2007) 
contention that politicians will try to either keep or change the status quo to protect 
or increase their status, and show how (reform) initiatives, in line with Ware (1999, 
p. 110) are more likely to develop among elites due to their access to resources. 
This analysis thus adds more detail to existing studies that link the provision of 
state funds to (the national branch) to centralisation, but that do not explore this 
relationship in-depth (see e.g. Ebbighausen, 1996, cited in Koss, 2011, p. 22; 
Mendilow, 1992, pp. 100-102; Nassmacher, 1989, p. 250). It does so by 
specifying that state funding and staff strengthen party elites, who in turn use their 
enhanced position to initiate centralising or consolidating reforms. Finally, the 
results in this study outlining how staff can strengthen elites (that in turn initiate 
centralising and consolidating reforms) reflect the literature linking staff presence 
to increased concentration of power in the national branch of parties (see e.g. 
Casas-Zamora, 2006; Michels, 1962 [1911]) and centralisation (Poguntke & 
Webb, 2005; Tan, 1997).  
Adding more evidence to the literature linking state funding and staff to 
centralisation (see above) is the analysis’ finding that state funding contributes to 
executing (i.e. not just initiating) consolidating reforms in the Pensioner Party in 
Italy and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway, and to a limited extent to a 
centralising reform in the Greens in Norway. This lends further support to H2. 
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Thus, when it comes to the direct contribution of state funds to executing a reform, 
the finding is that state funding most often mattered to executing processes of 
change in parties where party elites already had a strong position, once again 
highlighting the importance of studying the impact of state funding in-depth. Staff 
contributed to executing centralising reforms in the Greens and the Communist 
Refoundation Party in Italy, adding empirical evidence to Moe’s (1980) claim that 
staff can be crucial for elites in developing centralising reforms, as they, for 
example, can gather necessary data and develop proposals. Staff’s contribution 
to executing centralising reforms was found to be dependent on whether party 
elites themselves were directly involved in the centralising reform processes, as 
they were in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy, but not 
(for example) in the Pensioner Party and the Greens in Norway.  
More broadly, the results show that state funding (and related staff) can 
contribute to centralising and consolidating reforms both in contexts with a 
centralised state funding allocation system (e.g. a most likely context for 
centralisation such as Italy152) and contexts with a de-centralised system (e.g. 
Norway). In the existing literature, it has often been argued that a context’s 
allocation system for state funds modifies the impact of state funding on 
centralisation (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Nassmacher, 2009). However, this study 
shows that the core indicator for understanding how state funds shape 
centralisation is not whether state funds are allocated in a centralised or de-
centralised manner, but whether party elites manage state funds or not, and 
whether they are used to execute centralising or consolidating reforms. This 
emphasises the difference between focusing exclusively on the role of state 
funding in centralising reforms and analysing centralisation in light of state 
                                                          
152 See discussion of Italy as a most likely case for centralisation in chapter 4. 
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funding access (for the discussion of state funding as dependent and 
independent variable, see Koss, 2011). 
The empirical support for the theoretical argument (H2) notwithstanding, 
there are also some cases where state funding and/or staff plays a different role 
than theorised, or no role at all, in centralising or consolidating reforms. 
Specifically, state funding has been found to not strengthen party elites – and 
subsequently to have no impact on centralising reforms – in parties where the 
elites either have a restricted leeway to spend these funds freely (the Greens in 
Italy) or because the financial accounts overall were in deficit (Pensioner Party in 
Norway). This also effectively outlines the importance of the factor overall budget 
for centralising reforms. Similarly, staff’s and/or state funds’ role in strengthening 
elites was found in the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the 
Communist Party of Workers in Italy, and the Pensioner Party in Norway, without 
this having an impact on elites’ propensity to initiate or propose centralising and 
consolidating reforms in these parties as hypothesised. The reason was either 
that other party representatives (not elites) were responsible for the initiation of 
the reform (the Pensioner Party in Norway), or that other factors, besides the wish 
of strengthened elites to enhance their own position, were clearly more important 
for understanding the initiation of the reform (the Communist Party of Workers, 
the Communist Refoundation, and the Greens in Italy).  
Interestingly, in all the three latter parties, i.e. the Communist Party of 
Workers, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Greens in Italy, centralising 
reforms were initiated in order to address organisational vulnerabilities, such as 
poorly functioning national leadership organs. Such vulnerabilities concerning the 
operation of the national organs were also found to be a factor in understanding 
the reforms that were initiated by empowered party elites (i.e. those operating 
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according to H2), in Tricolour Flame in Italy, and the Greens in Norway. These 
findings reflect the argument that new parties have less institutionalised party 
structures (Gauja, 2016, p. 115). Correspondingly, state funding access in the 
Coastal Party emphasised the organisational vulnerability of the executive 
council with respect to the management of finances, which contributed to initiating 
a centralising reform.  
Leadership change was important to either triggering or shaping the 
centralising reform processes in Tricolour Flame and the Greens in Italy, and the 
Coastal Party in Norway, in this way adding to the evidence of other studies that 
emphasise individual leaders’ impact on party reform (Albinsson, 1986; Gauja, 
2016; Müller, 1997; Wilson, 1980). Fluctuations in the membership, either 
decreasing or increasing, were also found to impact reforms, supporting existing 
studies that emphasise how considerations regarding (mostly decreasing) 
membership contributes to party reforms (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Kenig, Rahat, & 
Hazan, 2015). Concretely, Tricolour Flame experienced membership loss prior to 
the consolidating reforms it underwent, while the Greens and Pensioner Party in 
Norway experienced the opposite before centralising their executives. This 
indicates that diverging development in membership size can trigger similar 
reform processes, highlighting the feasibility and necessity of studying such 
processes in-depth. Electoral decline and loss of parliamentary representation, 
supporting findings outlining the relevance of these factors for party reform 
(Albinsson, 1986; Harmel & Janda, 1994), played a role in the centralising 
reforms in the Communist Refoundation Party and the Coastal Party. 
Interestingly, the importance of ideology (the principle of centralism) was an 
important trigger for centralising reform in the Communist Party or Workers.  
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7.4 Summary  
This chapter has analysed the thesis’ second hypothesis, by exploring whether 
and how state funds and staff shape centralising or consolidating reform 
processes in new minor parties in Norway and Italy. To do so, the analysis in 
each context (Norway and Italy) was divided into two parts. The first analysed the 
statutory and de-facto role and composition of the executive council in each of 
the new minor parties over time, which constituted a life cycle analysis of 
centralisation. In a second step, which was based on the first, the first reform 
process following access to state funds and/or staff – either in a centralising or 
consolidating direction, depending on whether the life cycle analysis showed that 
the party had room to centralise or not – was selected for an in-depth analysis in 
relation to H2. A total of three centralising and two consolidating reforms were 
selected for Italy, and one consolidating and three centralising reforms for 
Norway.  
The broad findings from the in-depth analysis, of how state funds and staff 
shape centralisation and consolidation, support H2. Firstly, both state funds and 
staff were found to strengthen party elites in new minor parties across contexts. 
Secondly, the analysis documented that elites in some (but not all) parties used 
this empowered position – either it originated from state funds, staff or both – to 
initiate centralising reforms. Thirdly, state funds were found to contribute to the 
execution of two consolidating and one centralising reform in both contexts, while 
staff was found to contribute to executing two centralising reforms in Italian new 
minor parties. The next and last empirical chapter further explores the impact of 
both state funds and staff, by turning to their influence on facilitating new minor 
parties’ pursuit of constitutive function, i.e. their ability to overcome signature 
requirements for ballot access and present an electoral list.  
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8 State funding and pursuit of constitutive 
function 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the thesis’ third hypothesis (H3), and thus explores 
whether and how state funding and staff directly and/or indirectly impact new 
minor parties’ ability to surpass the threshold of authorisation (Pedersen, 1982), 
i.e. overcome signature requirements for ballot access and present lists in 
elections, also referred to as ‘electoral participation’ here. The argument for H3 
is that state funds and staff aid parties to directly overcome signature 
requirements and present electoral lists, by contributing to planning and 
executing signature campaigns and facilitating candidate recruitment. Indirectly, 
state funds and staff can contribute to electoral participation by recruiting 
members and establishing and/or strengthening subnational branches. Following 
the structure of the previous chapters, I analyse Italian and Norwegian parties 
separately, and conclude with an overarching discussing bringing together the 
findings from both contexts.  
The analysis in each context starts with an overview of signature 
requirements for ballot access across time, as they lay the groundwork for a) 
selecting an electoral contest for in-depth scrutiny, and b) analysing how state 
funds and staff each enable parties to comply with such requirements. Secondly, 
I outline each new minor party’s electoral trajectory, i.e. the share of 
constituencies in which it fielded candidates in different elections over time. This 
constitutes the life cycle analysis of the parties’ pursuit of constitutive function. 
Thirdly, I select one electoral contest in each of the parties’ life cycles in order to 
explore in-depth the dynamics of the ways in which state funding and staff 
influence electoral participation. To select an electoral contest, I first identify when 
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each of the new minor parties under scrutiny experienced an increase or 
decrease of state funding and/or staff, in order to ensure variation with respect to 
the study’s two factors of interest. The first electoral contest after such a shift is 
selected in a majority of the cases. However, in order to ensure the broadest 
possible variation concerning signature requirements for ballot access, and the 
institutional tier of the election, the second electoral contest following a new minor 
party’s increase or decrease of state funding or staff is selected in a minority of 
the cases. To explore H3, i.e. the impact of state funds and staff on electoral 
participation, I rely on four indicators: whether state funds and staff are used to 
overcome the signature requirements related to ballot access and present an 
electoral list (direct impact), and whether state funds and staff are used to recruit 
members and/or establish and strengthen subnational branches (indirect impact).  
8.1 Pursuit of constitutive function in Italian new minor 
parties 
8.1.1 Italian signature requirements for ballot access – an overview 
Overall, the signature requirements for presenting electoral lists for Chamber of 
Deputies elections have become more permissive over time. Specifically, prior to 
1993, party lists had to be supported by signatures from between 500 and 1000 
eligible voters (L361/1957), with no exemptions. In 1993, when the electoral 
system shifted from a largely proportional to a mixed system (see e.g. Donovan, 
1995; Katz, 2003), two distinct signature requirements were introduced: one for 
the presentation of lists in uninominal colleges (between 500 and 1000 signatures 
required), and one for the presentation of lists in proportional constituencies 
(between 1500 and 4500 signatures required, depending on the number of 
inhabitants in the constituency). There was no exemptions, but in the event of 
snap elections the number of required signatures was halved (L277/1993; 
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L73/1994; L162/1994). Exemptions from the signature requirement were 
introduced for the first time in 2005, when parties represented in a parliamentary 
party group in both chambers of parliament, or parties with one representative in 
the European parliament that aligned (in a coalition) with two or more 
parliamentary parties, were exempted (L270/2005). Other parties still had to 
collect between 1500 and 4500 signatures to field lists (only proportional 
constituencies).153 In 2008 the signature requirements were made even more 
permissive, as an additional exemption (to the ones introduced in 2005) was 
passed: From 2008 onwards, parties with at least two deputies in the outgoing 
parliament or two deputies in the European parliament were exempted 
(L24/2008; L30/2008).  
On the regional level, the same signature requirements applied to parties 
in all regions until 2005, when regions – following a constitutional amendment – 
started to introduce their own electoral laws. The signature requirements have 
thus shifted – not just between different regional elections – but also (after 2005) 
between different regions. Before 1995, parties that wished to present a (so-
called provincial) electoral list had to collect signatures from between 750 and 
3000 eligible voters, depending on the size of the constituency (L108/1968). From 
1995, when both provincial lists and regional lists were to be presented (due to a 
change in the electoral laws),154 the signature requirement for provincial lists 
stayed the same while regional lists required the support of between 1000 and 
5000 eligible voters depending on the size of the constituency. The signature 
requirement was halved in the case of snap elections (L43/1995), but there were 
                                                          
153 Specifically, the mixed electoral system was replaced with a proportional system (with a 
majority bonus), meaning that electoral lists were only presented in one type of (proportional) 
constituency. For details, see Giannetti & De Giorgi (2006).  
154 From 1995, 4/5 of the regional councillors were elected based on competing provincial lists, 
and 1/5 based on a majoritarian model on the basis of competing regional lists (see L43/1995). 
Prior to that, only provincial lists were presented. 
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no exemptions. Ahead of the regional elections in 2005, five regions had 
introduced a regional electoral law, and three regions had introduced exemptions 
from the (nationally imposed) signature requirement for a) parties represented in 
the Italian parliament (Calabria), and b) parties with a parliamentary party group 
in parliament or a council group in the region (Puglia and Lazio). These regions 
thus represented a more permissive environment for new minor parties in 2005. 
In 2010 the permissiveness increased across Italian regions, as Campania, 
Piemonte, and Umbria also introduced exemptions from the signature 
requirement for parties with institutional representation (but see details in 
Appendix G). This development culminated in the 2015 regional elections, when 
Veneto, Liguria, and Toscana also introduced exemptions.155 
The signature requirements for ballot access to European elections have, 
overall, been more permissive for new minor parties than those in place for 
regional and national elections, because an exemption from signature collection 
has always existed. Specifically, parties represented in either the national or 
European parliament have always been exempted from collecting the required 
30,000 to 35,000 signatures from eligible voters in each constituency (L18/1979). 
From 1990 this exemption also applied to parties aligned with such parties 
(L53/1990). The details of the signature requirements for ballot access across 
elections and time – comprising ballot access requirements besides signature 
requirements – are outlined in Appendix G. 
8.1.2 Italian new minor parties’ electoral trajectory 
National, regional, and EU elections in Italy are held every five years, except in 
cases where an assembly (national/regional) is terminated early. The figure 
                                                          
155 The different regional legal texts are cited in Appendix G. 
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below outlines the development in the share of constituencies in which the 
different parties fielded candidates over time.  
Figure 8.1 Share of constituencies in which parties fielded candidates 
(percentage). Elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the European parliament 
and Regional councils: Italy, 1987-2016 
Notes: Only data on regional elections in which seven or more regions held elections 
simultaneously are included in the figure. Only Chamber of Deputies (not Senate) elections are 
included. CD stands for Chamber of Deputies, R for regional elections, and EP for European 
elections. Only the parties’ participation in the proportional component of Chamber of Deputies 
elections (only between 1994 and 2001) is registered. In cases where a new minor party fields an 
individual candidate on the electoral list of another party, this is not counted as electoral 
participation, but a party’s participation in electoral coalitions is included as this means that the 
party did have to surpass the threshold of authorisation and present an electoral list (even though 
this was in conjunction with other parties/party).  
Sources: The Ministry of Interior’s electoral statistics, elaborated by author.156 
The main implication of the above figure is that the selected new minor parties 
have been on a downward electoral trend. Since 2008/2009, all the parties have 
seen a decrease in the share of constituencies in which they exceed the threshold 
of authorisation, irrespective of institutional tier. Most prominent is the 
development in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party, which are 
the only two parties to consistently field candidates in all constituencies in 
                                                          
156 Can be accessed here (last accessed 28.08.2018): https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/. 
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national, regional, and EU elections since they were founded in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s respectively. However, since 2009 (Greens) and 2014 
(Communist Refoundation Party), both parties have struggled to maintain this 
record on the regional level. The drop is most prominent for the Green Party. The 
Segni Pact has had a similar trajectory. Its ability to exceed the threshold of 
authorisation declined steeply after the European elections in 1999, and it 
eventually dissolved in 2002. Prior to that, the party had fielded lists in more than 
60 percent of the constituencies in all elections.  
The Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame have differed greatly throughout 
their life cycles from election to election concerning the number of constituencies 
in which they have exceeded the threshold of authorisation. That said, both 
parties have generally been more successful in fielding candidates in all the 
electoral constituencies in European elections than they have in elections on 
regional and national levels. Similar to the Greens, the Communist Refoundation 
Party, and the Segni Pact, both parties have since 2009 struggled to surpass the 
threshold of authorisation, and have presented lists in at most 40 percent of the 
constituencies (on all institutional tiers). The downward trend is also visible for 
the Communist Party of Workers and Act to Stop the Decline. While the latter 
stopped pursuing its constitutive function in 2014 and died, the former has 
exceeded the threshold of authorisation in a decreasing share of constituencies. 
The ultimate low was in 2014, when for the first time in its life cycle the party did 
not field lists in an electoral contest (the European elections).  
The first and core criterion for selecting electoral contests for in-depth 
scrutiny of H3, is that a party experienced a shift in either income from the state 
or staff prior to the electoral contest. Chapter 5 (on parties’ income structure) 
outlined how the Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens had stable 
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access to state funding throughout their life cycles until 2008. From 2009 onwards 
both parties experienced a drastic decrease in income from the state. Reflecting 
that, the staffing chapter showed that the two parties started to downsize staff, 
the Greens in 2010 and the Communist Refoundation Party in 2009. The first 
electoral contest for these two parties following this decrease in resources is thus 
the 2010 regional elections. In 2010, the Communist Refoundation Party had 
experienced a recent decrease in both state funding and staff, and the Greens a 
decrease in state funds (only). Since these parties had to collect signatures in a 
different number of regions (due to their diverse representation in the outgoing 
regional councils), the selection of the 2010 regional electoral contest for in-depth 
scrutiny for these two parties also secures variation concerning the signature 
requirement, which is another selection criterion for the electoral contests to be 
analysed in-depth. The Segni Pact experienced shifting levels of income from the 
state throughout its (short) life cycle. After 1999, however, the party lost access 
to state funds completely (for the first time), and it never re-accessed state funds. 
After 1999 the party also downsized its staff, and by 2001 it had no staff left. The 
first electoral contest following this was the 2001 parliamentary elections, which 
is the electoral contest that will be analysed below.  
The Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame share the trait of having irregular 
state funding access throughout their life cycles. The latter accessed state 
funding in 1998 and 1999, but then lost it, before it once again accessed state 
funding in 2004. In 2004 the party decided to take on a second employee, 
meaning that it then had two staff members. This increase in state funds and staff 
in 2004 represented a significant shift, and the first election that took place 
afterwards was the regional elections in 2005, which is thus selected for in–depth 
analysis. The party was subject to different signature requirements in the regional 
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election in 2005 than the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party were in 
the regional elections in 2010, ensuring variation. The Pensioner Party accessed 
state funding in 1990, 1997, and 2003. Between 2003 and 2005 the party 
increased its income from the state. The party never had staff. In order to secure 
the inclusion of another election for the Chamber of Deputies, the electoral 
contest in 2006, and not the regional election in 2005, is selected for in-depth 
analysis. This secures variation in signature requirements, as there was a shift 
(in a permissive direction) to the relevant signature requirements between the 
general elections in 2001 (analysed for the Segni Pact) and 2006 (analysed for 
the Pensioner Party). Finally, the Communist Party of Workers never had access 
to state funding, but has had one part-time staff member since its foundation in 
2006. The party’s first electoral contest was in 2008, but in order to include one 
election to the European parliament, I analyse how staff contributed to its 
electoral participation in the 2009 European elections. Act to Stop the Decline did 
not access state funds (nor did it have staff), and is thus not discussed further in 
this chapter. 
In total therefore, three regional electoral contests, two electoral contests 
for the Chamber of Deputies, and one for the European Parliament are selected, 
ensuring the inclusion of all institutional tiers and a variety of signature 
requirements. The table below summarises the case selection, and gives core 
information for the following in-depth analysis of H3 in the Italian context.
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Table 8.1 Selection of electoral contests for in-depth scrutiny of H3: Italy 
Party State 
funding  
Staff1 Electoral 
contest to 
analyse 
Type of 
election 
 Details on parties’ ability to surpass 
threshold of authorisation in selected 
electoral contest  
The Greens 
 
 
Steep 
decrease in 
2009 
Yes 2010  Regional  The party decreased the share of constituencies 
in which it fielded lists compared to previous 
regional elections. 
The Pensioner Party 
 
Increase from 
2003 onwards 
No 2006 Chamber of 
Deputies 
 The party presented lists in all constituencies in 
an election for the Chamber of Deputies (for the 
first time). 
The Communist 
Refoundation Party 
Steep 
decrease in 
2009 
Yes (but 
decrease after 
2008) 
2010  Regional  The party presented lists in all constituencies (no 
change compared to before). 
The Segni Pact 
 
Loss after 1999 No 2001 Chamber of 
Deputies  
 The party (for the first time) did not present lists.   
Tricolour Flame Increase in 
2004 
Yes (increase 
in 2004) 
2005 Regional  The party increased the share of constituencies 
in which it fielded candidates compared to 
previous regional elections. 
Communist Party of 
Workers  
No  Yes 2009  European  The party decreased the share of constituencies 
in which it fielded candidates. 
Notes: 1 The values in this column refer to the existence of staff at the time of the electoral contest to be analysed. 
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The selected electoral contests from the Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame, 
the Greens, and the Communist Refoundation Party are analysed first as they all 
lend evidence to H3. Concretely, state funds and staff are found to impact 
electoral participation in all these four parties. In a second section, I explore why 
a decrease of state funds and staff in the Segni Pact did not affect the party’s 
pursuit of constitutive function in the 2001 elections, contrary to H3, and why staff 
presence did not aid electoral participation for the Communist Party of Workers, 
also contrary to H3.  
8.1.3 When state funding and staff impact electoral participation (H3): The 
Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame, the Greens, and the Communist 
Refoundation Party 
The following discussion will show how an increase of state funds in the 
Pensioner Party ahead of the 2006 Chamber of Deputies election, and an 
increase of state funds and staff in Tricolour Flame ahead of the 2005 regional 
elections, facilitated these parties’ electoral participation, supporting H3. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows how a decrease in income from the state in the 
Greens before the 2010 regional elections complicated the party’s pursuit of 
constitutive function, also supporting H3. Finally, I discuss how state funds and 
staff in the Communist Refoundation Party enabled its electoral participation in 
the 2010 regional election, supporting H3, even though both resources had 
drastically decreased.  
Interestingly, the data suggests that the Pensioner Party’s157 increased 
income from state funds, from 2003 to 2005, directly contributed to setting up the 
electoral list ahead of the 2006 Chamber of Deputies elections, but in a different 
way than theorised in H3. Concretely, Emanuela Rocchi, Pensioner Party 
                                                          
157 As previous chapters have outlined, the Pensioner Party did not have staff, which is why this 
factor is not discussed for the Pensioner Party.  
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candidate for Lombardy in the 2006 Chamber of Deputies elections, stated in an 
interview that she first became aware of the Pensioner Party through one of party 
leader Carlo Fatuzzo’s television broadcasts, which, as mentioned previously, 
were financed with the help of state funds.158 After getting in touch with him and 
discussing her joining the party, she was recruited as a candidate (Telelombardia, 
2006). The Pensioner Party was present in television broadcasts in 16 out of 20 
Italian regions at least once a week in the period running up to the 2006 Chamber 
of Deputies elections. Only in Lombardy was the party present on 10 different 
channels (Partito Pensionati, undated; see also Annual account, 2006). Thus, 
there is some evidence that state funds, by financing television broadcasts, 
served as an additional way of recruiting electoral candidates, which aided the 
party, for whom candidate recruitment had been difficult (Party representative, 
10.11.2016). 
Apart from this, state funding was of little relevance to the candidate 
selection process, as candidacies are identified and decided upon by the top 
elites, mainly the party leader Carlo Fatuzzo (Party representative, 10.11.2016; 
Party representative, 18.01.2018). This completely centralised candidate 
selection mechanism lessened the theorised importance of having viable local 
branches to coordinate and facilitate recruitment of candidates, which was 
convenient for the Pensioner Party as it had active local branches in only eight 
out of 20 Italian regions in 2006 (Partito Pensionati, 2006). This also resonates 
with the fact that no funding transfers to subnational branches took place in 2006 
(Financial account, 2006). This suggests that there was no indirect impact of state 
                                                          
158 See chapter 6 on staffing, which outlined how the Pensioner Party has refrained from having 
staff, instead prioritising spending state funds on television broadcasts. 
274 
 
funds – by means of strengthening the membership or branches – on electoral 
participation in 2006. 
Additionally, there is little evidence that state funds assisted with the 
overcoming of signature requirements, as the party’s decision to field candidates 
within a coalition (Romano Prodi’s centre-left coalition), combined with its 
presence in the European parliament, exempted it from signature collection. The 
party was thus able to exploit the newly introduced exemption to the signature 
requirement in 2005.159 The party’s ability to do so was also facilitated by the 
strong incentives for the two dominant centre-right and centre-left coalitions to 
take electorally minor parties (such as the Pensioner Party) on-board in 2006, 
due to the majority bonus awarded to the winning coalition (Bardi, 2007; Diamanti, 
2007; Giannetti & De Giorgi, 2006). Interestingly, there is indication that the 
Pensioner Party’s small budget (despite state funding access) contributed to the 
party’s decision to enter into an electoral coalition specifically to avoid the 
signature requirement. Interviewees from the party state that the signature 
requirement for electoral participation has been a real challenge for the party 
throughout its life cycle, as their collection (due to travels) and authentication 
have been costly (Party representative, 10.11.2017).  
In sum, therefore, state funding directly aided the Pensioner Party in the 
process of recruiting candidates (by paying for television broadcasts), supporting 
H3, while there was little impact of state funds on compliance with signature 
requirements. Neither was there any indirect impact of state funds in building a 
membership or establishing and/or strengthening subnational branches. In fact, 
the party’s participation in the centre-left coalition in 2006 seems to be the primary 
                                                          
159 See section 8.1.1. Specifically, the new exemption was for parties that adhered to a coalition 
(where two or more parties were represented in parliament), and that simultaneously had 
representation in the European parliament.  
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factor in its managing to field candidates in all constituencies in a national election 
for the first time.  
Unlike the Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame was not exempted from 
signature collection in any of the regions in the 2005 regional elections, which, 
according to interviewees, presented a challenge: ‘The collection of signatures is 
really a problem’ (Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016; see also Romagnoli, 16.11.2016). 
The collection of signatures was arguably particularly demanding in 2005 due to 
the party’s restricted financial situation, despite the increase in state funds that 
the party had experienced in 2004: 
 In the end, the money that we had was limited. Once we had spent one 
part on rent, one part on salary […], and one part to the subnational levels, 
there was something left to print some material, and that was it. Done 
(Romagnoli, 16.11.2016).  
The party’s income from other sources – besides state funds – had decreased 
the year before the 2005 regional elections due to membership decline, as former 
party leader Pino Rauti split from the party and created a new party (Movimento 
Idea Sociale) (see e.g. La Repubblica, 09.05.2004; Financial account, 2004, 
2005).  
The combination of the signature requirement, a perceived vulnerable 
financial situation (despite state funding access), and membership loss 
contributed to the party’s decision to enter into an electoral coalition in 2005.160 
This did not exempt Tricolour Flame from the signature requirement (see e.g. 
Amabile, 2005; La Matttina, 2005), but spread it out between several parties, 
making it more manageable. The participation in a coalition was also an attempt 
to increase the party’s chances of representation (La Mattina, 2005). One 
                                                          
160 The coalition comprised Tricolour Flame, the New Force (Forza Nuova), and the National 
Social Front (Fronte Sociale Nazionale), and was called The Social Alternative (Alternativa 
Sociale). 
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interviewee states that having state funds was crucial for both the collection and 
authentication of signatures (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016), which coincides with the 
party’s high state-dependency in 2005 (86 percent) (Financial account, 2005). 
This shows that expenses related to the signature campaign were bound to (at 
least) partially be taken from the state funds received, supporting H3.  
There is also evidence that state funds were transferred to the local 
branches in the course of the regional campaign in an attempt to increase the 
membership base of the party (Annual account, 2005; see also Romagnoli, 
16.11.2016), which in turn – indirectly – could help enable the party’s electoral 
participation, in line with H3. However, since the funds were transferred during 
the electoral campaign, there is little indication that they arrived in time to 
strengthen the party’s presence on the territory before needing to exceed the 
threshold of authorisation in 2005, thus lending no support to H3. 
In 2005, the party had two staff members, and according to interviewees, 
the staff in the party dealt (strictly) with administrative matters (e.g. the 
membership register, campaign material) (Party representative, 31.01.2018; 
Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016). This indicates that the staff likely also contributed to 
managing the formalities concerning signature requirements and the presentation 
of lists, indicating some support for H3. Interestingly, there is evidence that the 
staff, as trusted collaborators in the party, facilitated the process of setting up the 
electoral list by providing (informal) advice on candidacies (Romagnoli, 
16.11.2016), supporting H3. Arguably, this was particularly crucial in a party like 
Tricolour Flame, which rarely had the luxury of selecting between candidates, 
and often had to rely on self-recruited candidates (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016; 
Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016) when the final decision regarding candidacies was 
made in the party’s Central Committee (Francescon, 25.11.2016; Romagnoli, 
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16.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016). Given the party’s membership loss due 
to the split in 2004, the recruitment pool was even more restricted, arguably 
making the staff’s informal advice even more crucial. 
Thus, the data shows that state funds and staff contributed to facilitating 
electoral participation for Tricolour Flame in 2005, supporting H3. What seems to 
have enabled the party’s fielding of candidates in all constituencies on the 
regional level for the first time, however, seems to be the party’s participation in 
an electoral coalition, which lessened the demands related to both signature 
collection and candidate recruitment.  
Whilst the analyses of the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame have 
shown how an increase of state funds (and staff in Tricolour Flame) facilitated 
electoral participation in line with H3, the following analysis of the Greens outlines 
how a decrease in state funds contributed to the party’s failure to field an electoral 
list in all constituencies in the 2010 regional elections, also supporting H3. 
Specifically, the Greens had to collect signatures in nine out of 13 regions that 
held elections in 2010, but had experienced a significant decrease in state funds 
in 2009. This made the financial situation of the party restricted and difficult 
(Bonelli, 16.11.2016; Ripamonti, 23.11.2016; Financial reports, 2009-2012; 
Radio Radicale, 09.10.2009), which the figure below outlines.  
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Figure 8.2 Income from state funding and membership fees (euros): The 
Greens, 2007-2011  
Sources: Financial accounts. 
According to the Green Party’s treasurer, the party’s decreased income 
from the state made the signature requirement in the nine regions difficult to 
achieve in 2010, supporting H3:  
The collection of signatures is a costly and laborious task. The signatures 
must be approved by a public employee, or by a notary. (…) The financial 
situation made the collection of signatures difficult (Ripamonti, 
18.03.2018).  
This quote is supported by current party leader, Angelo Bonelli, who emphasises 
the importance of state funding (in the past) for signature collection campaigns 
(Bonelli, 16.11.2016). Another factor that complicated the party’s signature 
campaign in 2010 was a significant loss of members between 2009 and 2010 
(see figure above). The treasurer states, ‘In the Greens the number of members 
available to organise events and collect signatures decreased’ (Ripamonti, 
18.03.2018), which is also supported by another interviewee: 
(…) If you do not have elected representatives in a region, you have to 
collect many signatures to present a list. It was one thing to do that before 
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2008/2009 with 40,000 members on the territory, but another thing to do it 
now with 2000/3000 members (Party representative, 14.03.2018).161   
Despite the party’s financial difficulty due to decreased state funds, it still 
managed to transfer funds to the subnational branches in 2010 (Annual and 
financial account, 2010). The transfer shows how the presence of some state 
funds, despite being much lower than before, were still important for keeping 
branches running, reflecting the theoretical argument in H3. It is also likely that 
some of these funds were used to execute the signature campaign, supporting 
H3. The transfers to the subnational level to secure branches’ operation were 
particularly important as the Regional Federal Councils were in charge of 
deciding on the electoral lists, and dealing with candidate proposals emerging 
from the local branches (Bonelli, 16.11.2016; Ripamonti, 18.03.2018). 
The party’s staff was not placed in redundancy schemes until after the 
2010 regional elections (Annual account, 2010), and staff had a special eye on 
‘that which had to do with the presentation of lists’ (Party representative, 
23.11.2017), such as keeping up to speed on ballot access requirements (see 
also Francescato, 25.11.2016). Consequently, staff directly contributed to aiding 
the party’s electoral participation in the regional elections in 2010 by supporting 
(among other things) the signature campaign, in line with H3. Additionally, there 
is indication that staff contributed indirectly to electoral participation by supporting 
and strengthening the branches, as some of the staff primarily worked specifically 
to maintain the territorial branches of the party (Party representative, 23.11.2017; 
see also chapter 6).  
                                                          
161 The party representatives’ reference to membership figures refer to current (2018), figures. 
However, the income from membership fees had already dropped significantly in 2010, 
highlighting the importance of his argument for the 2010 election as well. 
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The decreased income from the state hindered the collection of signatures 
in the 2010 regional elections, supporting H3. Also a membership loss contributed 
to this. These findings shed light on why, for the first time in 2010, the party did 
not present lists in all electoral constituencies in a regional election. That said, 
the existence of staff and some state funds still assisted with the party’s electoral 
participation and helps us understand how the party managed to field lists in 10 
out of 13 constituencies. 
The final electoral contest that lends support to H3, is the Communist 
Refoundation Party’s participation in the 2010 regional election. On the basis of 
the theoretical framework, the expectation is that the Communist Refoundation 
Party would have a harder time presenting electoral lists in the 2010 regional 
election, as the party experienced a drastic decrease in income from the state 
and in staff from 2007/2008 onwards. Contrary to the rationale in H3, however, 
this decrease in income from state funds and staff did not hamper the party’s 
electoral participation in 2010. In fact, it fielded candidates in all the electoral 
constituencies that it had in prior elections. Despite this, the party’s 2010 regional 
electoral contest is still presented as a case of support for H3, given the fact that 
state funds and staff (despite being decreased), were crucial for facilitating 
electoral participation in this contest, in line with H3.  
None of the Communist Refoundation Party’s interviewees, contrary to 
interviewees in other Italian new minor parties, mentioned the signature 
requirement for ballot access when they were asked about constraining 
regulations more generally (Gelmini, 23.11.2016; Meloni, 24.11.2016). This 
indicates that signature requirements have not been a prominent matter of 
concern for the party throughout its life cycle, including in 2010, when the party 
was obliged to collect signatures in eight of the 13 regions where elections were 
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held. It is likely that having an income of 6.6 million euros from the state was 
sufficient to cover expenses related to signature collection in 2010, supporting 
H3. This was the case even though the party’s income from the state had 
decreased drastically prior to 2010 (see figure below), and the treasurer 
described the financial situation as immensely dire that year (Annual account, 
2010). Moreover, the party had over 40,000 members in 2010 (Rifondazione 
Comunista, undated) who could aid in a signature campaign, even if it had lost 
some income from membership fees due to a split in 2009 (see figure below).162 
The large pool of members would also decrease the need to spend state funds 
on specific campaigns or efforts to identify and recruit candidates.  
Figure 8.3 Income from state funding (euros) and number of staff: The 
Communist Refoundation Party, 2007-2010 
Sources: Staffing 2008-2010: Rifondazione Comunista (undated). Income figures: Financial 
accounts. 
Notes: In 2009, 41 of the staff in the figure above were in redundancy schemes, in 2010 the 
number was 72. 
Now, there is evidence that the party reduced the transfers from the 
national branch to the regional branches (Annual and financial account, 2010), 
thereby reducing the branches’ financial leeway. In fact, the transfers to 
subnational branches was more than halved from 2009 to 2010.163 This surely 
could have (indirectly) affected the party’s ability to file electoral lists, as decisions 
                                                          
162 The split in 2009 drained the party of several top representatives (see e.g. La Repubblica, 
24.01.2009; La Stampa, 24.01.2009). 
163 From ca. 2 million euros in 2009 to ca. 800,000 euros in 2010 (Financial account, 2009, 2010). 
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concerning candidacies for regional elections would normally be taken on the 
regional level (Regional Political Committee) (Gelmini, 23.11.2016; Meloni, 
24.11.2016). That said, as some transfers still took place, this gave the branches 
some, albeit decreased, leeway to ensure operation and enable electoral 
participation, supporting H3. 
As outlined in chapter 6, staff in the Communist Refoundation Party 
worked on administrative, organisational, and political matters (see e.g. Bertolino, 
2004, p. 284), thereby also contributing to maintaining the membership and the 
territorial branches, and contributing to electoral campaigns, supporting H3. Even 
though 72 out of the 83 staff members were placed in redundancy schemes in 
2010, and hence had less time to work for the party as they also had to attend 
mandatory courses etc. (see e.g. Celli, 25.06.2018; Party representative, 
26.06.2018), the party still had 83 staff members – working to various degrees – 
in 2010. In brief, therefore, there is no indication that the party’s decreased 
income from the state and reduced staff negatively impacted the party’s electoral 
participation in 2010, rather the large presence of staff and state funds still 
contributed to the party’s pursuit of constitutive function (both directly and 
indirectly), supporting H3.  
Besides the party’s access to (relatively) large resources such as staff, 
income, and members, the Communist Refoundation Party’s ability to field lists 
in all constituencies in 2010, despite decreasing income from the state and lower 
staff levels, can also be partially be related to its participation in an electoral 
coalition. For the first time, the party fielded lists in an electoral coalition on the 
regional level. This move (as for Tricolour Flame) helped by distributing demands 
regarding signature collection and recruitment of candidacies between the 
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coalitions’ constitutive parties.164 Interestingly, the coalition had already been 
established for the European elections in 2009, and was a result of the party 
leader’s (Paolo Ferrero) wish to cooperate with other forces, which he had 
pursued since he was elected leader in 2008 (see e.g. La Reppublica, 
13.08.2008; Fusani, 2008; Rifondazione Comunista, 2009a; see also 
Rifondazione Comunista, 2009b). This indicates that the decreased income from 
the state and falling staff levels preceding the regional elections in 2010 was less 
important for understanding this electoral cooperation, a hypothesis also 
supported by interviewees (Celli, 09.04.2018), contrary to the case of Tricolour 
Flame and the Pensioner Party.  
8.1.4 When an increase or decrease of state funding and staff do not 
impact electoral participation: The Segni Pact and the Communist Party 
of Workers  
The following section explores why state funds and staff were not relevant to the 
Segni Pact’s electoral participation in the 2001 parliamentary elections, and why 
the staff in the Communist Party of Workers, contrary to H3, did not aid the party’s 
pursuit of constitutive function in the European elections in 2009.  
After 1999, the Segni Pact lost access to state funds (Financial account, 
1999-2001). The financial account from 2001 presented a small deficit, due to the 
lack of contributions from both ‘private and public’ sources (Annual account, 
2001). In fact, the party’s only income in 2001 stemmed from editorial activities 
and demonstrations/rallies, and amounted to circa 31,000 euros. The party had 
also started to decrease its staffing figures from 1999 (Segni, 05.01.2018; see 
also chapter 6), and by 2001, there was no staff left (Annual account, 2001). This 
loss of staff meant that the party prior to 2001 had not nurtured its territorial 
                                                          
164 The coalition was called The Left Federation (Federazione della Sinistra), of which the 
Communist Refoundation Party and the Italian Communist Party were the largest components.   
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branches and supporters, as this was the core task of the party’s staff (Soldani, 
03.03.2018; Segni, 29.01.2018). Thus, even though the party had one 
representative in the European parliament ahead of the 2001 general elections 
(elected in 1999), the party’s financial and human resources were very limited, 
which in turn could have hindered the party’s pursuit of constitutive function 2001, 
supporting H3. This was especially so since the party would have had to collect 
signatures to participate in the 2001 Chamber of Deputies elections. That said, 
this lack of resources would not have posed a problem for the candidate selection 
process per se, as the candidacies were decided by the top (national) party elites 
(Masi, 13.03.2018; Segni, 29.01.2018).  
However, contrary to H3, this resource shortage did not contribute to the 
party’s failure to field candidates in the 2001 elections. The reason why the party 
did not exceed the threshold of authorisation (nor attempt to do so) in 2001, was 
that the party leaders had decided to pursue the goal of the party – i.e. the 
introduction of a majoritarian electoral system in Italy (Segni, 29.01.2018; 
Warner, 2008) – outside the electoral arena. Following two failed referenda in 
1999 (La Repubblica, 12.01.1999; La Repubblica, 21.11.1998) and 2000 (La 
Repubblica, 08.02.2000; La Repubblica, 17.05.2000; La Repubblica, 
15.05.2000), both seeking to abolish the proportional component in the mixed 
electoral system, Segni and his allies decided that, as a party, there was limited 
possibility to change the system further. This ended the Segni Pact’s existence 
on the national level (Segni, 05.01.2018). One party representative states that 
when the final referenda was over in 2000 ‘also the function of the party was over’ 
(Masi, 13.03.2018).165 The party was officially closed down in 2002. In brief, 
                                                          
165 It is worth noting that the party had also struggled in elections since its foundation in 1994. 
Warner (2008, p. 71) argues that the 1994 electoral result of 4.6 percent for the Segni Pact was 
a ‘resounding rejection’ of Segni’s party. In the 1996 general elections, the party presented itself 
within an electoral coalition (Lista Dini – Rinnovamento Italiano), as the party knew it did not have 
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therefore, the reason why the Segni Pact does not lend evidence to H3, i.e. why 
a lack of state funds and staff did not affect the party’s pursuit of constitutive 
function in 2001, was that the party had decided to close down. 
Similar to the Segni Pact, the Communist Party of Workers also operated 
contrary to the rationale of H3. Specifically, the data suggests that the party’s one 
employee did not aid the party’s electoral participation in the 2009 European 
elections, as expected. The main reason was that the party leader (Marco 
Ferrando), employed on a part-time basis, was not employed to deal with 
organisational matters: ‘Ferrando handles next to no matters regarding the 
organisation’ (Terra, 29.11.2016). Rather, he is a political figurehead, and work 
related to signature campaigns and development of the electoral list were thus 
dealt with by volunteers (ibid). Also, this means that he, as staff, was not 
responsible for establishing and strengthening branches, something which would 
have (indirectly) facilitated electoral participation. There is thus little indication 
that the presence of staff either directly or indirectly contributed to enabling the 
party to surpass the threshold of authorisation in the European elections in 2009, 
contrary to H3. 
Interestingly, the data from the Communist Party of Workers indicate that 
the lack of organisational staff and state funds seems to have complicated 
electoral participation in 2009, evidenced by interviews with party representatives 
(Party representative, 11.11.2016; Party representative, 21.11.2016; Terra, 
29.11.2016), in line with H3. Concretely, the party had to collect between 30,000 
and 35,000 signatures in order to present an electoral list in the 2009 European 
elections, as it did not qualify for the exemption. The party’s lack of state funds 
                                                          
a chance of reaching the threshold for entry to parliament (4 percent) (Soldani, 03.03.2018). The 
participation in the 1999 European elections (in which the party ran with The National Alliance) 
was also a disappointment (see e.g. Buzzanca, 1999). 
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specifically, and the party’s ‘limited financial resources’ more generally (Partito 
Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2008), and lack of organisational staff, hindered this 
process: 
The larger parties that have money, that have state funding, and many 
paid people in their secretariats, have many benefits. We are all 
volunteers, we work. So that makes it all more complicated (Terra, 
29.11.2016).  
The party has never accessed state funds, and has relied on membership fees 
as its main source of income (Party representative, 11.11.2016; Party 
representative, 21.11.2016; Terra, 29.11.2016).  
The lack of organisational staff has led party representatives to take one 
week off from work when a new signature campaign starts, in order to deal with 
it properly (Terra, 29.11.2016). Another party representative argues that the low 
membership figures, amounting to around 1000 members in 2008 (Partito 
Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2008), also complicated the signature campaign in 
2009: 
This [signature collection] is the most difficult regulatory requirement 
because the small parties do not have many members, and have to collect 
signatures for many months, and often do not succeed in the end. So, this 
is the largest obstacle (Party representative, 11.11.2016).  
In brief, therefore, the party’s staff did not – contrary to H3 – assist with 
electoral participation. That said, the party’s lack of (state) funds, 
(organisationally oriented) staff, and members, hindered electoral participation (in 
all constituencies) in the European elections of 2009, thereby also indicating 
some support for the rationale of H3. 
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8.1.5 Summary 
The in-depth analysis of Italian new minor parties’ electoral contests lent broad 
support to H3. The analysis showed that an increase in state funds contributed 
to facilitating electoral participation in Tricolour Flame in the regional elections in 
2005, and the Pensioner Party in the 2006 Chamber of Deputies elections. In the 
former, state funds contributed to financing the signature campaign, while in the 
latter they financed television broadcasts which in turn aided recruitment. 
Similarly, a decrease in income from the state contributed to the Green Party’s 
failure to present lists in all constituencies in the 2010 regional elections. That 
said, the presence of some state funds, still aided the party in executing the 
signature campaign, and in ensuring the operation of branches, as state funds 
were transferred to subnational levels. Similarly, the decrease in state funds did 
not impact electoral participation in the Communist Refoundation Party, contrary 
to H3. However, in line with H3, the party’s (still comparatively high) income from 
the state ensured the execution of the signature campaign, and some (albeit 
decreased) transfers to subnational levels secured the operation of branches. 
Thus, the results showed that state funds both directly and indirectly aided 
electoral participation in these parties, by supporting signature campaigns, the 
development of the electoral list, and the operation of branches. 
Moreover, staff was found to impact electoral participation – both directly 
and indirectly – in Tricolour Flame, the Greens, and the Communist Refoundation 
Party, supporting H3. In Tricolour Flame, staff aided with recruitment of 
candidates and with formalities regarding the presentation of the electoral list, 
while party staff in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party helped 
with both the signature campaign and with ensuring the operation of subnational 
branches. Once again, the decrease in staff in the Communist Refoundation 
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Party was not detrimental for electoral participation (contrary to H3), rather, the 
party’s (still large staff) contributed to enabling electoral participation, supporting 
H3. 
In two parties shifts in staff and state funds did not have the expected 
impact on electoral participation. In the Communist Party of Workers, staff was 
not found to aid electoral participation, as the hired person did not occupy himself 
with organisational matters. Interestingly, however, the exploratory analysis 
found that the party’s lack of organisational staff and state funds made electoral 
participation more difficult there, which in turn also supports the rationale of H3. 
In the Segni Pact, the decreased state funds and staff were not relevant for the 
party’s failure to pursue constitutive function in the 2001 Chamber of Deputies 
elections, as the party had decided to dissolve. 
The analysis found that shifts in income from state funds and staff 
sometimes contribute to changing a party’s ability to pursue constitutive function 
(the Greens, Tricolour Flame, the Pensioner Party), and sometimes not (the 
Communist Refoundation Party, the Communist Party of Workers). Regardless 
of shifts in state funds and staff, however, the analysis found that the presence 
of such resources is always useful for electoral participation as long as the 
resources exist (to whatever degree) and are used to deal with the demands of 
signature requirements for ballot access and the development of the electoral list. 
Correspondingly, the absence of state funds and (organisational) staff was found 
to complicate electoral participation, as illustrated by the Communist Party of 
Workers. The table below summarises the findings from the analysis.  
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Table 8.2 Summary of analysis: The impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation: Italy  
 State 
funding  
Staff1 Electoral 
contest 
to 
analyse 
Type of 
election 
Support 
for H3 
Specification of evidence  
The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Increase 
from 
2003 and 
onwards 
No 2006  Chamber 
of 
Deputies 
Yes Increase of state funds directly paid for television broadcasts which in turn 
aided recruitment, facilitating electoral participation. 
Tricolour 
Flame 
Increase 
in 2004 
Yes 
(increase 
in 2004) 
2005 Regional Yes Increase of state funds paid for expenses to signature campaign. Increased 
staff contributed in candidate selection and with formalities regarding the 
electoral list. 
The Greens Steep 
decrease 
in 2009 
Yes 2010 Regional Yes Decreased state funds made signature requirement difficult to cope with. Staff 
(no change in staff) contributed to signature campaign, and to ensuring 
operation of branches. 
 
The (decreased) state funds the party had were used on internal transfers, 
ensuring the operation of subnational branches, which facilitated electoral 
participation, supporting H3. 
The Segni 
Pact 
Loss after 
1999 
No (had 
lost after 
1999) 
2001  Chamber 
of 
Deputies 
No The party’s elites had decided to dissolve the party. Loss of state funds and 
staff is thus not relevant for understanding the party’s failure to pursue 
constitutive function in 2001. 
The 
Communist 
Refoundation 
Party 
Steep 
decrease 
in 2009 
Yes (but 
decrease 
after 
2008) 
2010  Regional Yes* In line with H3, both state funds and staff were used to facilitate electoral 
participation (aiding signature campaign, supporting branches).  
 
Decreased state funds and staff did not complicate electoral participation, 
contrary to H3.  
The 
Communist 
Party of 
Workers 
No  Yes 2009 European No* Increased staff presence (i.e. party leader in part-time position), did not 
facilitate electoral participation, contrary to H3, since the employee did not 
occupy himself with organisational matters.  
 
In line with H3, however, the lack of (organisational) staff and state funds 
overall complicated electoral participation. 
Notes: (*) indicates mixed evidence (both supporting and not supporting H3). 
1 The values in this column refer to the existence of staff at the time of the electoral contest to be analysed. 
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8.2 Pursuit of constitutive function in Norwegian new minor 
parties 
8.2.1 Norwegian signature requirements for ballot access – an overview  
The Norwegian signature requirements for ballot access have barely changed in 
the course of the studied new minor parties’ life cycles. The Electoral Act from 
1985 stated that registered parties166 simply had to have the electoral list signed 
by the leader and secretary of the regional branch (in national and regional 
elections) in order to present it. For unregistered parties, the electoral list had to 
be supported by the signatures of at least 500 voters. The changes to the 
Electoral Act in 2002 made one important change to this, as it extended the 
signature requirement to those registered parties that in the previous 
parliamentary election had failed to either achieve 5000 votes on the national 
level, or 500 votes in at least one constituency. This was thus a constraining turn 
for the minor contestants in Norway. The details of other ballot access 
requirements – besides the signature requirement – are found in Appendix G.  
8.2.2 Norwegian new minor parties’ electoral trajectory 
The figure below outlines the electoral trajectory of each of the Norwegian new 
minor parties, i.e. the share of (the 19) constituencies in which each party fielded 
candidates in parliamentary and regional elections over time. Both national and 
regional elections are held in odd-numbered years in Norway, and the term for 
each is four years.  
                                                          
166 Registration required a foundation document, signatures of the members of the party’s 
executive council, and signatures of 5000 eligible voters (Art. 17, Electoral Act, 1985). The new 
Electoral Act passed in 2002 kept these requirements, but also stated that a party wishing to be 
registered also had to submit a statute (outlining which organ was charged with the responsibility 
to select the executive), and be registered on the Legal Entity Register (Art. 5.1 and 5.2, Electoral 
Act, 2002; see also Political Party Act, 2005).  
291 
 
Figure 8.4 Share of constituencies in which the parties fielded candidates 
(percentage). Regional and parliamentary elections: Norway, 1987-2016  
Notes: N stands for national election, S for subnational (regional) elections. There are 19 electoral 
constituencies in both national and regional elections. Cross Partisan MPs ran as “The Freedom 
Party against the EU” in 1993, and as the Freedom Party in 1995. 
Sources: For figures from 2001 onwards: NSD (undated), and for figures prior to 2001: Statistics 
Norway (Undated (a)).    
The figure shows how the Greens and the Pensioner Party increased the 
share of constituencies in which they fielded candidates throughout their life 
cycles. The Pensioner Party started this trend in 1993, since when it has 
presented lists in between 60 and 80 percent of the electoral constituencies on 
both national and regional levels. The turning point for the Green Party came 
later, and only from 2003 did the party increase the share of constituencies in 
which it fielded candidates. From 2009 onwards, the party systematically 
exceeded the threshold of authorisation in all constituencies. The Coastal Party 
only presented lists in the two northernmost constituencies (Finnmark and 
Nordland) in its first elections in 1999, while in the subsequent elections the party 
fielded candidates in all (or nearly all) constituencies. However, in the regional 
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elections in 2015 the party – for the first time since 2003 – presented lists in only 
53 percent of the constituencies.  
The Christian Conservative Party has been very successful in exceeding 
the threshold of authorisation, and has, since its foundation (2011), consistently 
run in all constituencies in both regional and national elections. The Fatherland’s 
Party, Cross Partisan MPs, and Future for Finnmark stand out from the four 
aforementioned parties as they have generally exceeded the threshold of 
authorisation in a lower share of constituencies. Future for Finnmark only ran in 
the parliamentary elections in 1989, and only fielded electoral lists in one 
constituency (Finnmark). After 1989 the party never participated in elections 
again and died in 1993. Cross Partisan MPs exceeded the threshold of 
authorisation in between 11 and 37 percent of the constituencies from 1993 to 
2001. After 2001, it did not present itself again until 2009, when it fielded a list in 
one constituency (Nordland). The Fatherland’s Party managed to present lists in 
all constituencies in the national elections in 1993, 1997, and 2001, but to a very 
varying degree on the regional level. After 2001, the party did not field lists in any 
constituency, and officially died in 2008.  
The most important criterion for selecting an electoral contest for in-depth 
scrutiny is variation with regards to state funding and staff. Chapter 5 (on income 
structure) outlined how the Pensioner Party accessed state funding for the first 
time, by means of internal transfers from the subnational levels, in 1991. Whilst 
10 percent of the income from the state was to be transferred to the national level 
in 1991 (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991a), it increased to 20 percent in 1992 
(Pensjonistpartiet, 1992b; Pensjonistpartiet, 1993a), and there was thus a stark 
increase in the (national) party’s income from the state in 1992, even though, as 
chapter 6 outlined, the party did not have staff at the time. The party’s first election 
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following this shift was the 1993 parliamentary elections, which will be explored 
in-depth below. Similarly, the Greens also accessed state funds in the mid-1990s, 
but, as outlined in chapter 5, the party experienced its greatest increase in income 
from the state in the years following 2006, when the party accessed state funds 
on the national level for the first time. In parallel, the party also increased its 
staffing figures from 2008 onwards. In order to explore the impact of both 
increased state funds and staff, the 2009 parliamentary election is thus selected, 
and not the 2007 regional elections. In a similar vein, previous chapters have 
outlined how the Christian Conservative Party accessed state funds for the first 
time following (its first ever) parliamentary election in 2013, and took on two staff 
members as a result. The first electoral contest following this increase in state 
funds and staff is the 2015 regional elections, which is selected for in-depth 
analysis. 
Both the Coastal Party and the Fatherland’s Party experienced decreasing 
income from the state, and reduction in staff (only the Coastal Party), in their life 
cycles. Specifically, the Fatherland’s Party had irregular access to state funds in 
the early years of its life cycle (1992-1999), but received its very last instalment 
in 1999. The first election following this was the 2001 parliamentary election, 
which would be the first choice for the in-depth analysis below. However, in order 
to investigate how a new minor party responded to the constraining turn in the 
signature requirement for ballot access in 2002, the second election following the 
party’s loss of state funding is selected for in-depth scrutiny, i.e. the regional 
elections in 2003. Similarly to the Fatherland’s Party, the Coastal Party – which 
had enjoyed stable access to state funds and staff from 2006 onwards – first 
experienced a stark decrease in income from the state in 2009, and then again 
in 2013. From 2013 onwards, the party also operated on a completely voluntary 
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basis (i.e. without staff), which is why the regional elections in 2015 (and not the 
2013 parliamentary elections) are analysed below.  
Given that Cross Partisan MPs and Future for Finnmark had neither state 
funding nor staff throughout their life cycles, the dynamics between state funds 
and/or staff and electoral participation cannot be explored. These parties are thus 
omitted from analysis below. In brief, five electoral contests will be analysed in-
depth in the next section, two parliamentary (1993 and 2009) and three regional 
(2003, and two in 2015) elections. This ensures an analysis of elections on 
different institutional tiers, and of electoral contests where the new minor parties 
are exposed to different signature requirements for ballot access.  
Table 8.3 Selection of electoral contests for in-depth scrutiny of H3: Norway 
Party State 
funding  
Staff1 Electoral 
contest 
to 
analyse 
Type of 
election 
 Details on 
parties’ ability to 
surpass 
threshold of 
authorisation in 
selected electoral 
contest  
The 
Pensioner 
Party 
 
Increase 
in 1992 
No 1993  National  The party increased 
the share of 
constituencies in 
which it fielded 
candidates.   
The Green 
Party 
 
 
Increase 
after 2006 
Yes 
(increase 
after 
2008) 
2009 National  The party increased 
the share of 
constituencies in 
which it fielded 
candidates.   
The 
Fatherland’s 
Party 
 
Loss in 
1999 
No 2003 Regional   The party did not 
field candidates in 
any constituency.  
The Coastal 
Party 
 
Decrease 
in 2013 
No (lost in 
2013) 
2015  Regional  The party decreased 
the share of 
constituencies in 
which it fielded 
candidates. 
The Christian 
Conservative 
Party 
Increase 
in 2014 
Yes 2015 Regional  No change. As in 
2013, the party 
fielded lists in all 
constituencies. 
Notes: 1 The values in this column refer to the existence of staff at the time of the electoral contest 
to be analysed. 
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8.2.3 When state funding and staff impact electoral participation (H3): The 
Pensioner Party, the Greens, the Christian Conservative Party, the Coastal 
Party, and the Fatherland’s Party 
The following analysis outlines how either state funds or staff – or both – 
contributed to facilitating electoral participation in all the Norwegian new minor 
parties under scrutiny, supporting H3.  
State funding facilitated the Pensioner Party’s increased ability to field 
electoral candidates in the parliamentary elections in 1993 by contributing to 
solving a conflict and to establishing branches. First and foremost, state funding 
– accessed on the subnational level and transferred to the national level – helped 
make possible the unification between two factions in 1991. Concretely, since the 
party’s foundation in 1985, two factions had quarrelled over the right to represent 
the party, meaning that two competing executive councils on the national level 
(and in several regions) were present (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992a; 
Pensjonistpartiet, 1992c). Attempts to unite the two factions before the 
subnational elections in 1991 failed (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991b), but following what 
was characterised as an ‘exceptionally good’ electoral result in that election 
(Loraas, 1991), the leaders of the two competing factions agreed to hold an 
extraordinary congress in 1991 to unite the party ‘with the main goal to continue 
the good electoral result also in the parliamentary elections in 1993’ 
(Pensjonistpartiet, 1991c). State funds contributed to this unification as the 
extraordinary congress decided to spend them on covering expenses that each 
of the factions’ executive councils had incurred in 1991. Additionally, the income 
from state funding was to cover the two executive councils’ legal expenses (up to 
a limit of 30,000 NOK, ca. 3000 euros) (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991a). Consequently, 
the availability of state funding enabled the two factions to enter into a united 
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party without considerable (personal) debts, easing the transition into a joint 
party.  
The unification of the party was particularly important for electoral 
participation, as candidate selection happened on the regional level, and the 
regional branch, in collaboration with the local branches, identified and decided 
on the candidacies (Lonstad, 08.06.2017; Remman, 20.06.2017; Gjermundnes, 
20.06.2017; see also Pensjonistpartiet, 1993b). Consequently, the elimination of 
the party’s two executive councils (on both national and regional levels) ahead of 
the 1993 elections, meant that the number of regions with coherent executive 
councils was larger. This also made the work of compiling electoral lists in a wider 
range of regions more simple and feasible than it had been before. State funds 
also contributed to establishing new branches, supporting H3. The Pensioner 
Party’s budget from 1992 outlines that the party planned to spend 30,000 NOK 
on preparation of the election campaign and on travels related to the 
establishment of three new regional branches (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992b). In fact, 
the party increased its number of regional branches from 11 in 1990 (Nygaard, 
1991) to 14 in 1991 (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991b), and then to 16 in 1994 
(Pensjonistpartiet, 1994).167 The Pensioner Party, being a registered party in 
1993, had no obligation to collect signatures. This is why there is no indication 
that the party needed either state funding or staff (which the party did not have) 
in order to exceed ballot access requirements.  
Similarly to the Pensioner Party, the Greens was not subject to a signature 
requirement in the 2009 parliamentary elections, as it achieved more than 500 
votes in at least one constituency in the previous (2005) parliamentary elections, 
                                                          
167 Unfortunately, I have not been able to access membership figures for the Pensioner Party in 
this phase, and I thus cannot assess the potential impact of state funds on shifts in the 
membership.  
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exempting it from the signature requirement. State funds and staff thus enabled 
electoral participation in 2009 by contributing to creating and strengthening 
subnational branches and increasing the membership. This arguably contributed 
to the party’s ability to present lists in all electoral districts in 2009, supporting H3. 
More concretely, prior to 2008/2009, the Greens had mostly relied on one part-
time employee, dealing with everything from administrative and financial matters, 
to members and branches. This restricted the party’s ability to maintain and 
secure the operation of (vulnerable) regional branches, and in 2008, the party’s 
executive did not achieve its goal of having an annual meeting in all regions 
(Annual account, 2008), showing how poorly functioning many of the Green’s 
regional branches were in 2008. Early in 2009, however, the party took on one 
employee specifically to work on the establishment of new branches and on 
strengthening the existing ones (Annual account, 2008), which ‘significantly 
improved’ the work within this field (ibid). Three new regional branches were 
established,168 while the work on three other regions was well underway (Annual 
account, 2008). An interviewee also emphasises that the presence of state funds 
(not just staff) granted the national branch leeway to support the branches: 
It [state funding] makes it possible to more effectively follow up on the 
regional branches, and offer services to the rest of the organisation (…) 
(Gaupset, 15.05.2017). 
As candidacies for national elections are recruited and decided upon by the 
regional branch, with the help of local branches and members (Golis, 02.06.2017; 
Gaupset, 15.05.2017), the role of state funds and staff in establishing and 
strengthening branches was particularly important for electoral participation, 
                                                          
168 Telemark, Østfold and Hedmark. 
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supporting H3. The figure below shows the increase in subnational (regional and 
local) branches in the period of interest: 
Figure 8.5 Development of membership and number of local branches in the 
Green Party, 2007-2010 
Sources: Annual and financial accounts, obtained from party office.  
This figure also shows that the party experienced a surge in membership 
from 2007 onwards, which was also emphasised as necessary for the increased 
presentation of lists in the 2009 election (MDG-nytt 8/2008; MDG-nytt 9/2008). 
This demonstrates how having a solid recruitment ground is important for the 
process of setting up electoral lists, as theorised. Given that the party’s staff was 
concerned with the maintenance of the membership register (among other things) 
(see chapter 6), the staff may have also contributed to this membership increase, 
in turn facilitating electoral participation, lending support to H3. 
In addition to the importance of having staff to deal with branches, and 
members to recruit from, the party’s increased electoral participation in 2009 was 
thanks to one of the two new spokespersons elected in 2008, Hanna Marcussen. 
She brought in a very clear vision and strategy for the Green Party, which rubbed 
off on the party, according to Green politician Hans Borgen: ‘We became much 
more strategic. You saw the first seeds of this in 2009 (…)’ (Sand Holth and Mide 
Solberg, 2015). For example, the National Council initiated a relaunch of the party 
after the 2008 congress, initiated work on a new party program (as the previous 
program had its basis in the program from 1997), and by June 2008 it had already 
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developed a detailed strategy for the 2009 elections. Moreover, one of the regions 
(Nordland) was declared to be a focus region. A new graphic profile for the party 
was also to be developed (Annual account, 2008; Sand Holth and Mide Solberg, 
2015). Marcussen’s role in leading and coordinating these various processes has 
been highlighted both by my and others’ interviewees (Simonsen, 16.06.2017; 
former and current party secretaries Mikkel Storm Glomstein and Lars Gaupset 
in Siem Knudsen, 2016). Moreover, Marcussen also worked tirelessly, starting in 
the 2009 elections, to increase the Greens’ media visibility, for example by 
working to become included in voting advice applications, and to be included in 
television debates (Siem Knudsen, 2016; see also Sand Holth and Mide Solberg, 
2015).  
In brief, therefore, staff and state funds contributed to strengthening 
branches and increasing the membership which in turn helped the party to 
increase the share of constituencies in which it fielded candidates in 2009, 
supporting H3. The presence of a resourceful leader also helped.  
State funds and staff also indirectly contributed to electoral participation in 
the Christian Conservative Party in the regional elections in 2015, when the party 
fielded candidates in all electoral constituencies. As with the Greens, the 
Christian Conservative Party’s performance in the 2013 parliamentary elections 
exempted the party from having to collect signatures in the 2015 regional 
elections, as the party received more than 5000 votes overall in the country. 
Coming into election year 2015, the party had two employees, and, according to 
party interviewees, these contributed in different (indirect) ways to electoral 
participation in 2015. More specifically, staff aided in ensuring the operation of 
the subnational branches. The party had established branches in all 
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constituencies prior to the parliamentary elections in 2013,169 and the staff worked 
specifically on supporting these, for example by ‘(…) checking and following up 
that everything was right, and that procedures were followed […]’ (Party 
representative, 08.02.2018). The party’s annual account from 2015 states that 
the staff, of them party leader Erik Selle, along with two other party 
representatives, visited a range of regional (and local) branches throughout 2015. 
Also, a party representative states that one of the hired party leader’s tasks was 
to motivate the party’s regionally (and locally) appointed representatives 
(Husveg, 18.12.2018). This shows how the presence of staff contributed to 
ensuring the operation of subnational branches ahead of the 2015 regional 
elections. 
Staff support of regional branches was particularly important as the 
regional branch was responsible for setting up the electoral list, while members 
and local branches supported the process by suggesting candidates (Party 
representative, 08.02.2018; Husveg, 18.12.2017). The staff’s effort to ensure the 
operation of the branches was arguably also important as the financial resources 
in the Christian Conservative Party’s branches were very poor coming into the 
election year 2015. The reason was that none of them had had the opportunity to 
access state funds themselves,170 and were thus dependent on transfers from 
the national level. In 2014 no such transfers took place (Financial account, 2014), 
but there were some transfers in 2015 (Financial account, 2015; Husveg, 
18.12.2017).171 However, the transfers in 2015 were mainly meant to support the 
electoral campaign (Husveg, 18.12.2017), i.e. they were not intended for the 
                                                          
169 The travels and efforts related to the establishment of all the branches were financed with 
loans. These loans, after 2014, were then paid down with the help of state funds (Party 
representative, 08.02.2018; Husveg, 18.12.2017). 
170 In the 2011 subnational elections, the party did not present electoral lists in any regions (only 
in one municipality, Bømlo).  
171 The party’s membership fees were paid to the national branch (see Partiet de Kristne, 2015b). 
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process of exceeding the threshold of authorisation, which takes place months 
ahead of the campaign. Thus, staff support of the (financially weak) branches 
was important to keep them operative, supporting H3. 
Additionally, there is some indication that staff presence contributed to the 
membership growth that the party experienced prior to the 2015 regional 
elections (see figure below), which was important for securing a recruitment pool, 
lending some support to H3. The hired party leader worked on motivating 
members and, in addition to the administrative employee, seeing to tasks related 
to maintenance of members, for example responding to their queries on 
email/telephone, and maintaining the membership register (Husveg, 18.12.2018).  
Figure 8.6 Membership development, the Christian Conservative Party, 2013-
2015 
Source: Partiet de Kristne (undated). 
Finally, the party prioritised spending some of its state funds specifically 
on strengthening the branches prior to the 2015 election, supporting H3. 
Concretely, the annual account from 2014 states that the party had started to 
arrange training courses on the regional level within the financial range that it 
could allow itself, concerning ‘work methodology, ideology, and program’ (Annual 
account, 2014). As the party received more than 50 percent of its income from 
the state in 2015, it is likely that state funds, in addition to the party’s two other 
core income sources (donations and membership fees), contributed to financing 
this training (Financial account, 2015).  
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In brief, the evidence from the Christian Conservative Party reveals that 
state funds and staff both contributed to strengthening the operation of party 
branches ahead of the 2015 regional campaign, supporting H3. That said, the 
party’s recent effort (prior to the 2013 parliamentary election) to establish 
branches in all regions – an effort that was financed with the help of loans (see 
e.g. Party representative, 08.02.2018; Husveg, 18.12.2017) – laid important 
groundwork for the party’s ability to field candidates in all constituencies in 2015. 
So far, the analysis has shown the importance of an increase of state funds 
and staff for electoral participation. The evidence from the Coastal Party echoes 
these findings, but shows how the loss of staff prior to the 2015 regional election 
was detrimental to the party’s membership, supporting H3, in turn shedding light 
on why the party only presented lists in 10 of the 19 regions in 2015. Concretely, 
the loss of staff in 2013, sparked by decreased income from the state (see 
chapter 6), put extra pressure on the members, as they increasingly had to deal 
with administrative, rather than purely political, tasks prior to the 2015 election 
(Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018). A long-standing regional and local 
representative, who left the party in 2016, states:  
I used to say that the Coastal Party is a party that eats its own people. 
Because it only demanded more and more of us who were left and who 
stayed on until the end, and to put it this way: The less we managed. 
Because the fewer people we were, the less we managed to accomplish 
(Olsen, 25.01.2018).  
Thus, there is strong indication that the party’s loss of staff made it much harder 
to be a party member in the Coastal Party, as more work, not just related to 
elections, but also generally, fell on these members, showing how the loss of one 
resource (staff) also contributed to the loss of another (members). The figure 
below shows that the party’s income from membership fees was nearly halved 
ahead of the 2015 elections.  
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Figure 8.7 Income from membership fees (NOK): The Coastal Party, 2009-2016  
Sources: Financial accounts 2009-2013, and from 2015-2016.  
This decrease in membership drained the regional branches of representatives. 
This was problematic as it was the regional branches that were responsible for 
seeing the candidate selection process through (Olsen, 25.01.2018; Stabrun 
Johansen, 26.01.2018; see also Kystpartiet, 2014). According to interviewees, 
the party’s loss of regular – but also more prominent – members, such as elected 
representatives on the subnational level, particularly hindered electoral 
participation in 2015. Former party leader Bengt Stabrun Johansen states: 
(…) The number of members has decreased, but even worse is the fact 
that central, active members, so to speak, those who have been active in 
regional branches and in local branches, have also left the party, and we 
have not been able to recruit new members (Stabrun Johansen, 
26.01.2018). 
A concrete example from the 2015 electoral campaign illustrates how the loss of 
members, and prominent ones at that, affected the party. In one municipality 
(Loppa), the Coastal Party had held the mayoral position for two election periods 
(eight years) prior to 2015. However, when the mayor decided not to stand for 
another electoral term, nobody else in that party branch wished to take his place 
on the electoral list (the first position). Moreover, throughout the eight years the 
pool from which the branch could draw candidates had shrunk to five (all local 
councillors), which meant that the number of candidates necessary to create a 
list was too small. Thus, loss of both regular and prominent members meant that 
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a party that had held the mayoral position for two periods did not manage to 
present a list in 2015 (Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018; Mjøen, 2015), highlighting 
an acute emergency in the party’s recruitment pool.  
Thus, a loss of staff (sparked by a stark decrease in income from the state), 
contributed to complicating electoral participation in the regional elections in 
2015, due to its impact on membership loss, supporting H3. The party did not 
have to collect signatures in order to field lists in this election, as it was exempted, 
showing how the signature requirement is not relevant for understanding the 
party’s decreased ability to field electoral lists in this election.  
Adding to the findings from the Coastal Party, the loss of state funds in the 
Fatherland’s Party (the party never had staff), hindered the party’s ability to 
comply with the signature requirement in the 2003 regional elections, supporting 
H3. As the Fatherland’s Party had failed to win at least 5000 votes nationally or 
500 votes in a region (constituency) in the previous parliamentary election in 
2001, the new law (introduced in 2002) stated that the party had to collect 
signatures to field lists in the 2003 regional election. However, the Fatherland’s 
Party was (as it was throughout its life cycle) in deep financial trouble before the 
2003 election. Already in 1997, party leader Harald Trefall stated that the party 
‘is financially weaker than ever’ (Fedrelandspartiet, 1997). In 2002, the year 
before the election, the executive council stated that ‘When the debts concerning 
the newsletter and the Oslo regional branch, and expenses concerning the 
congress, are paid, it is not financially possible for the executive to do more in 
2002’ (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a). The congress in 2002 was held as a telephone 
meeting to reduce costs (ibid). This shows that the Fatherland’s Party had few 
funds to spend on a signature campaign related to the 2003 elections, in turn 
hindering electoral participation in line with H3. Moreover, there were no funds 
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available to support the operation of subnational branches and to boost 
membership campaigns. There was even a lack of funds available to execute 
basic meetings, meaning that potential meetings to recruit candidates – as 
outlined in the theoretical argument – were impossible to arrange.  
In addition to a lack of (state) funds, the party’s membership decreased, 
which meant a smaller recruitment pool, and fewer people it could rely on for 
signature collection. The figure below shows the party’s declining trend in income 
from members: 
Figure 8.8 Income from membership fees (NOK): The Fatherland’s Party, 1993-
1999  
Source: Fedrelandspartiet (2002a). 
By the parliamentary elections in 2001 the decreasing membership had already 
presented challenges for candidate recruitment, as the same group of party 
representatives (of them party leader Harald Trefall) were candidates in nearly all 
of the 19 electoral constituencies (NSD, undated). The membership decline was 
partially caused by internal splits. For example, the party lost some people to a 
group in 1998 called the National Alliance (Bergens Tidende, 2000), and to a 
marginal party called the National People’s Party (Nasjonalt Folkeparti) in 
2000/2001 (Ellingsen, 2001). Moreover, the party had to eject certain members 
due to their support for Nazi beliefs (Moseng, 26.02.2018). There is no indication 
that the loss of state funds per se contributed to the decrease in members, but 
the party did struggle in the late 1990s to send out membership fee payment slips 
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to all members on a regular basis (Fedrelandspartiet, 1997), showing how 
organisational incapacity affected the party’s income from members.172  
Party representatives themselves argue that the main reason that the party 
did not present lists in the 2003 elections was the signature requirement for ballot 
access (see Jensen, 2003; Løschbrant, 2003). This analysis has outlined why 
this was so, namely due to the loss of state funds, supporting H3, the lack of other 
sources of income, and a decreasing membership. The analysis has also shown 
how the party’s loss of members would have hindered the development of 
electoral lists, and how the lack of funds would have made basic meetings to 
secure recruitment difficult to execute, in line with H3.  
8.2.4 Summary 
The in-depth analysis of the ways in which state funds and staff affect electoral 
participation in Norwegian new minor parties has provided ample support for H3. 
The analysis has mainly shown how state funds and staff indirectly facilitate 
electoral participation in Norwegian new minor parties. State funds were found to 
impact electoral participation in the Pensioner Party, the Greens, the Christian 
Conservative Party, and the Fatherland’s Party, supporting H3. In the Pensioner 
Party state funds helped to solve a conflict which had split the party, hindering its 
presentation of electoral lists across regions, and helped to establish branches. 
State funds in the Greens and the Christian Conservative Party helped to 
strengthen party branches, in the latter by paying for training courses for regional 
party representatives. Finally, the loss of state funds in the Fatherland’s Party 
contributed to make the party’s financial leeway (even more) restricted, thereby 
                                                          
172 It is likely that this also explains the large shifts in income from the membership, for example 
between 1997 and 1998 in the figure above. 
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– directly – contributing to make the execution of a signature campaign in 2003 
highly difficult. It also prevented the party from arranging basic meetings.  
In a similar vein, staff contributed to establishing and strengthening 
subnational branches in the Greens, facilitating the party’s ability to surpass the 
threshold of authorisation in a higher number of constituencies (compared to 
before) in 2009. There was also some indication that staff presence contributed 
to the party’s increase in membership ahead of the 2009 elections. Staff similarly 
secured the operation of (financially constrained) branches in the Christian 
Conservative Party ahead of the 2015 regional elections, contributing to the 
party’s presentation of lists in all electoral constituencies. Similarly, the loss of 
staff (linked to a decrease in state funds) in the Coastal Party put strain on the 
members, which in turn led to membership loss and to a decreased ability to 
present lists in the 2015 regional election. The results from the analysis are 
summarised in the table below. 
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Table 8.4 Summary of analysis: The impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation: Norway 
 State 
funding  
Staff1 Electoral 
contest 
to 
analyse 
Type of 
election 
Support 
for H3 
Specification of evidence  
The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Increase 
in 1992 
No 1993  National Yes Increase of state funds contributed to solving conflict (leading to united 
branches, and a united party), and to establishing branches.  
The Greens Increase 
after 
2006 
Yes 
(increase 
after 
2008) 
2009 National Yes Increase of state funds contributed to strengthening branches. Staff 
contributed to establishing new and strengthening existing branches. 
There is also indication that staff contributed to membership increase. 
The 
Christian 
Conservative 
Party 
Increase 
in 2014 
Yes 2015 Regional Yes Staff contributed to strengthening party branches, and also to 
membership increase. State funds contributed to strengthening branches 
by paying for training courses on the regional level.  
The Coastal 
Party 
Decrease 
in 2013 
No (lost 
in 2013) 
2015  Regional Yes Loss of staff (linked to decrease of state funds) put strain on members, 
thus contributing to membership loss, which hindered electoral 
participation due to restricted recruitment pool.  
The 
Fatherland’s 
Party 
Loss in 
1999 
No 2003 Regional  Yes Loss of state funds made the financial situation very restricted, 
contributing to limiting the party’s ability to execute a signature campaign. 
Also, the lack of (state) funds meant that branches were not supported, 
nor could meetings (to recruit candidates) be held.  
Notes:  1 The values in this column refer to the existence of staff at the time of the electoral contest to be analysed.
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8.3 Comparative overview and discussion 
The analyses in this chapter found that state funds and staff both affect electoral 
participation for new minor parties in Norway and Italy, supporting H3. Four 
indicators were used to analyse this. The first two captured whether state funds 
and staff were used to overcome signature requirements for ballot access and to 
develop and present the electoral list, thereby capturing the direct impact of state 
funds and staff on electoral participation. The second two indicators captured the 
extent to which state funds and staff indirectly contributed to electoral 
participation, i.e. whether state funds and staff were used to recruit members, 
and/or establish and strengthen subnational branches.  
State funds directly influenced electoral participation across Norwegian 
and Italian new minor parties, supporting H3. Broadly, the results from this 
chapter thus support Nassmacher’s (2009, p. 292) contention that state funds 
keep parties alive from one election to the next, by showing how such funds help 
new minor parties to exceed the threshold of authorisation, allowing them to 
continue to field lists in elections. More specifically, the results from this chapter 
add detail to results from previous studies that have found a link between state 
funding and new minor parties’ (and other parties) ability to remain in the electoral 
race (i.e. survive) (see Bolleyer, 2013; Casal Bértoa & Taleski, 2016; Casal 
Bértoa & Walecki, 2014; Spirova, 2007), empirically outlining exactly how exactly 
state funds (can) matter. More specifically, the analysis found that state funds 
helped to pay for expenses related to signature campaigns, as illustrated by 
Tricolour Flame in Italy, to pay for television broadcasts that facilitated recruitment 
in the Italian Pensioner Party, and to solve conflict in the Norwegian Pensioner 
Party. Conversely, a decrease of state funds made the signature campaign more 
complicated to execute in the Greens in Italy and the Norwegian Fatherland’s 
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Party, while the complete lack of state funds had the same impact in the 
Communist Party of Workers. Indirectly, state funds contributed to establishing 
and/or strengthening branches, or contributed to membership growth, in the 
Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy, and the Pensioner Party, 
the Greens, and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway. A loss of state funds 
meant that the Fatherland’s Party in Norway was unable to support its branches.  
In a similar vein – and also supporting H3 – the presence or loss of staff 
was found to affect electoral participation across new minor parties in Norway 
and Italy. More specifically, staff was found to directly aid electoral participation 
in Tricolour Flame and the Greens in Italy, by contributing to executing the 
signature campaigns. In Tricolour Flame, staff also helped to decide on 
candidacies. In terms of indirect impact on electoral participation, staff aided in 
the establishment and strengthening of branches in the Greens and the Christian 
Conservative Party in Norway, and the Greens and the Communist Refoundation 
Party in Italy. The loss of staff in the Coastal Party led to membership loss, which 
in turn hindered electoral participation. These results thus add another layer to 
the aforementioned literature linking state funding to new minor parties’ continued 
ability to field electoral lists. They show how staff – largely found to be linked to 
state funding access in this study – specifically contribute to electoral participation 
for new minor parties, and do so in ways different to the contribution made by 
state funds directly. Whereas existing studies have shown how both state funds 
and staff are useful for election campaigns (Casas-Zamora, 2006; see e.g. 
Farrell, 1996; Farrell, 2000; Karlsen, 2010), the findings from this chapter 
demonstrate how both resources are crucial for new minor parties’ ability to make 
it to the election campaign at all – by aiding them in the stage prior to that, that of 
exceeding the threshold of authorisation. As such, the findings from this study 
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highlight one particular reason why income173 and staff are crucial indicators of 
party organisational strength (see e.g. Webb, 2002; Webb & Keith, 2017). 
Specifically, both types of resource individually contribute to new minor parties’ 
ability to pursue their constitutive function, while a decrease or lack of such 
resources hinders it. 
The findings from the in-depth analysis of electoral contests in relation to 
Norwegian and Italian new minor parties coincide with previous research which 
has documented that costs related to electoral participation (such as signature 
requirements) particularly impact electorally minor parties (Rashkova & Spirova, 
2014). More specifically, this analysis found that the way in which new minor 
parties prioritise the use of state funds and staff in the pursuit of constitutive 
function is largely a response to the requirements concerning signature collection 
in place in each context. To elaborate, in the Italian context, where all the new 
minor parties (except the Pensioner Party) were subject to signature 
requirements to exceed the threshold of authorisation, state funds and staff were 
found to most often have a direct impact on electoral participation by contributing 
to processes of planning and executing signature campaigns. Conversely, state 
funds and staff in the Norwegian context, where just one party was subject to a 
signature requirement, for the most part had ‘only’ an indirect impact on electoral 
participation, and were (mainly) spent on establishing and/or strengthening 
branches, or securing membership growth. Existing studies on new party 
entrance into the electoral system (see e.g. Bischoff, 2006; Rashkova, 2010; 
Tavits, 2006, 2008) evidence the importance of ballot access criteria. This study 
extends those findings by showing how one type of ballot access requirement, 
namely signature requirements, shapes new minor parties’ operation in the 
                                                          
173 As new minor parties are highly state-dependent, income here refers to state funds.  
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electoral system, by prompting them to prioritise using two of their core resources 
to secure their continued electoral participation. 
The theoretical argument for H3 contended that state funds and staff can 
shape membership size, which, it was in turn argued, has the potential to impact 
new minor parties’ ability to pursue constitutive function. In line with the literature 
which argues that the extra-parliamentary units of parties ‘prepare the party for 
the next electoral event’ (Kölln, 2015, p. 707), the analysis showed how the 
wealth of members in the Communist Refoundation Party enhanced the party’s 
ability to execute a signature campaign, and how an increase of members in the 
Greens and Christian Conservative Party in Norway helped the parties to 
construct an electoral list. Conversely, a decrease of members or low 
membership figures in the Tricolour Flame, the Communist Party of Workers, and 
the Greens in Italy, complicated signature campaigns and the recruitment of 
candidates, while decreased membership figures in the Coastal Party and 
Fatherland’s Party in Norway made the recruitment of candidates difficult, 
hindering electoral participation. These results contribute to the literature in two 
ways. First of all, they empirically demonstrate how important members can be 
as a recruitment pool for candidacies in elections (Scarrow, 2000, p. 84; 2015, p. 
102), thereby addressing Art’s (2011, p. 35) contention that ‘one thing that parties 
absolutely cannot do without (…), is candidates’. Secondly, the findings show 
how important members can be as providers of volunteer labour, for instance 
related to the execution of signature campaigns (Katz, 2002; Scarrow, 2000, 
2015). Whilst existing studies have argued that members are particularly 
important for new parties because of the electoral support they can provide (Kölln, 
2014, p. 465), this study adds another dimension, and shows that members are 
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equally important for new (minor) parties in ensuring that they are able to run at 
all. 
Two parties operated contrary to the hypothesised rationale of H3. In the 
Segni Pact, state funds and staff were not relevant for the party’s failed pursuit of 
constitutive function in 2001, as the party had decided to close down. The other 
party operating contrary to H3 was the Communist Party of Workers. The analysis 
found that staff with purely political (not organisational) tasks, did not contribute 
as theorised to electoral participation, outlining how staff must be directly utilised 
in efforts to collect or execute signature campaigns, or must work on establishing 
or strengthening subnational branches, in order to aid electoral participation for 
new minor parties.  
Echoing the results in chapter 6 (on staffing), the Communist Refoundation 
Party’s (comparatively large) resources once again made the party an anomalous 
case in the analysis. Even though state funds and staff were found to be important 
for its exceeding the threshold of authorisation in the 2010 regional elections – 
supporting H3 – the party also lent evidence contrary to H3, as its stark decrease 
in income from state funds and staff prior to the election did not affect the party’s 
ability to exceed the threshold of authorisation in 2010 per se. This finding 
coincides with the finding from chapter 6, where I found that when a new minor 
party’s budget is of a certain size, shifts in income from the state cease to matter 
in intra-organisational dynamics such as staffing. Similarly, the analysis of the 
Communist Refoundation Party in this chapter showed that shifts in income from 
the state and shifts in staff do not matter as long as the party still has 
(comparatively large) staff resources and state funds available. This argument 
was effectively demonstrated by the fact that shifts in income from the state and 
shifts in staff impacted the electoral participation of new minor parties with smaller 
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budgets and less staff (than the Communist Refoundation Party), such as the 
Greens in Italy and the Coastal Party in Norway. The analysis of the Communist 
Refoundation Party once again indicates how organisationally strong (in terms of 
state funds and staff) a new minor party has to be in order to avoid being 
vulnerable to shifting external pressures such as regulation. 
Similarly, new minor parties’ overall budget was also shown to have an 
impact on electoral participation in Tricolour Flame and the Pensioner Party in 
Italy. Concretely, both parties – despite an increase in income from the state – 
decided to participate in an electoral coalition in 2005 and 2006 respectively, due 
to the parties’ limited budgets (and hence limitations with regards to signature 
collection). These findings in turn add more empirical evidence to studies that 
have found that parties’ financial considerations can shape their particular 
electoral choices (Kostadinova, 2005; Rashkova & Spirova, 2014; Spirova, 2007, 
p. 146). In a related vein, the analysis showed how participation in electoral 
coalitions facilitated parties’ pursuit of constitutive function, for example by easing 
the demands of signature collection, as illustrated by the Pensioner Party, 
Tricolour Flame, and the Communist Refoundation Party. In turn, this helps to 
understand how the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame for the first time could 
manage to field lists in all constituencies on national and regional levels 
respectively.  
8.4 Summary 
This chapter has analysed in-depth how state funds and staff influence new minor 
parties’ pursuit of constitutive function, i.e. electoral participation. The analyses 
of Italian and Norwegian parties each started with a brief outline of the 
characteristics and developments of signature requirements for ballot access in 
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the relevant context, before the electoral trajectory of each of the individual new 
minor parties was outlined. Concretely, the number of constituencies in which 
each of the parties fielded candidates in supra-national (only Italy), national, and 
regional elections, over time was presented. This constituted the life cycle 
analysis of pursuit of constitutive function for each of the new minor parties. One 
electoral contest following either an increase or decrease of state funds and/or 
staff was selected for each party (that had either state funds and/or staff), in order 
to explore in-depth the dynamics of whether and how state funds and staff shape 
parties’ electoral participation (H3). The selection of electoral contests also took 
into account the institutional tier of the election and signature requirements for 
ballot access. The overall finding of the in-depth analysis was that state funds 
and staff shape electoral participation, thus supporting H3. First, these resources 
directly influence electoral participation, by either facilitating (if increase of 
resources) or hindering (if loss/decreased resources) the execution of signature 
campaigns and/or the development and presentation of electoral lists. Secondly, 
and indirectly, state funds and staff contribute to membership growth and the 
establishment and strengthening of subnational branches, thereby contributing to 
electoral participation. Conversely, a decrease/loss of such resources was found 
to contribute to membership loss and failure to maintain branches, in turn 
hindering electoral participation. This chapter concludes the empirical part of the 
thesis. The next chapter, the conclusion, delves further into the implications of 
the findings of this chapter, and of the staffing and centralisation analysis, and 
addresses both their normative implications and their implications for future 
research. 
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9 Conclusion 
9.0 Introduction 
This thesis started out by describing the increased tendency around the world to 
distribute state funding to parties (Casas-Zamora, 2006), the growing tendency 
to regulate these funds through transparency and disclosure requirements 
(Biezen, 2008), and the importance of state funds for party budgets (Poguntke et 
al., 2016). These developments highlighted the importance of understanding in-
depth whether and how state funds shape intra-organisational dynamics in 
contemporary parties.  
In order to aid such understanding, this thesis zoomed in on the specific 
role state funding plays (or does not play) in staffing, the centralisation of the 
executive council, and pursuit of constitutive function in new minor parties, 
thereby complementing previous studies which (mainly) analyse correlations 
between state funds and different intra-organisational processes. In order to 
analyse the impact of state benefits and constraints in parties where it was most 
likely to manifest itself, newly established (post-1980) and electorally minor 
parties (winning less than 10 percent of the vote) were analysed. These parties 
are largely state-dependent (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43), arguably 
shaped more by external pressures than other parties due to their newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965), and more susceptible to changes in regulation due to their 
minority status (for examples, see Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Lanzalaco, 
1985,  cited in Pridham, 1991; Rashkova & Spirova, 2014). The research question 
was thus: How does state funding influence processes of staffing, 
centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function in newly established, 
electorally minor parties? 
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This concluding chapter first summarises the empirical findings in relation 
to this research question, discusses how the results contribute to the existing 
literature outlined in detail in chapter 1, and assesses the generalisability of the 
results. Then, the empirical results are used to shed light on whether state 
benefits and constraints in any way can shape the linkage function of parties 
today to elucidate the normative implications of the results. The final part of the 
chapter outlines – based on this study’s findings – future avenues for research. 
A final conclusion brings the thesis to a close.  
9.1 Empirical results and contribution to literature 
9.1.1 State funding and staffing (H1) 
Staffing was defined as the process of hiring or downsizing temporary or 
permanent staff, and H1 argued that an increase of state funding would contribute 
to hiring, and a decrease or loss of state funding would lead to downsizing in new 
minor parties. The exploratory analysis found broad support for this, both within 
individual parties’ life cycles, and across new minor parties in Norway and Italy. 
Concretely, when the Coastal Party, the Green Party, the Pensioner Party, and 
the Christian Conservative Party in Norway, and Tricolour Flame in Italy, 
increased their income from the state, they always – throughout their life cycles 
– hired staff, or increased existing employee’s workloads, thereby increasing staff 
expenses. Similarly, the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the 
Segni Pact in Italy sometimes, but not always, hired staff when increasing their 
income from the state. Conversely, the Christian Conservative Party and the 
Coastal Party in Norway, and the Greens in Italy, downsized when they 
decreased their income from the state, while the same happened (sometimes, 
but not in all staffing processes) in Tricolour Flame and the Communist 
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Refoundation Party in Italy, and the Pensioner Party in Norway. By exploring 
these patterns within regulatory phases, the analysis went beyond previous 
findings that have mainly found a correlation between the availability of state 
funds and staffing (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Farrell, 1994; Gidlund, 1991; 
Svåsand, 1994a), and showed how changing access criteria were crucial for 
understanding staffing patterns in both Norwegian and Italian parties, while the 
generosity of funds and the type of funds (annual funds vs. electoral 
reimbursements) were important for understanding staffing patterns in Italy.  
The results from the staffing analysis contribute to closing two gaps in the 
literature on state funds and staffing, as outlined in chapter 1. First of all, the 
results showed that state funds are crucial for the timing of staffing in new minor 
parties, countering Casas-Zamora’s (2006, p. 50) claim that this is not the case. 
More importantly, the analysis illuminated the reasons for this; state funds 
impacted new minor parties’ timing of hiring or downsizing staff because of these 
parties’ state-dependency, demonstrating that general conclusions about the 
concrete impact of state funds on staffing must be based on a broader selection 
of parties, including state-dependent new minor parties. Casas-Zamora (2006) 
based his argument on the staffing patterns in (larger, established) parties whose 
state-dependency is not as high as for the new minor parties studied here. 
Interestingly, the analysis of the Communist Refoundation Party, which over time 
had considerably more income from state funds than the other studied parties, 
showed that state-dependency matters less for the timing of staffing when a 
party’s budget is larger. Specifically, the Communist Refoundation Party hired 
and downsized staff irrespective of shifts in income from the state in periods when 
its budget exceeded five million euros (even though it was highly state-
dependent). This suggests that both state-dependency and budget size are 
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important factors for understanding how state funds impact on the timing of party 
staffing processes. 
The second contribution of the staffing analysis was to explore how other 
income sources besides state funds – when present – contributed to staffing 
patterns, thereby filling another gap in the literature. Despite the main finding that 
an increase or loss of state funds is a core driver for hiring and downsizing staff 
in new minor parties, the analysis also showed that membership fees, personal 
funds, and the funds of external organisations contributed to keeping staff and 
thereby bridging (shorter) periods during which parties did not have state funding, 
as illustrated by Tricolour Flame and the Segni Pact. Moreover, membership fees 
financed a part-time position in the Italian Communist Party of Workers, external 
consultants in Act to Stop the Decline, and contributed to facilitating increased 
staffing in the Greens in Norway. Overall, this finding exemplifies the fact that 
other sources of income contribute to (smaller) shifts in staffing patterns in new 
minor parties. This illustrates why analyses of the ways in which state funds 
impact staffing in larger, established parties provide more mixed results (Casas-
Zamora, 2006, pp. 50-51), as these parties rely on broader and larger sources of 
income that can also (in addition to state funds) facilitate staffing.  
By analysing the type of staff new minor parties take on, I showed that new 
minor parties are, on the whole, highly interested in recruiting and maintaining 
members, as all the new minor parties in both Italy and Norway that accessed 
state funds prioritised taking on staff to deal with administrative and 
organisational matters, such as maintenance of membership and branches. 
Interestingly, in times of downsizing, the administrative and organisational staff 
was the staff that was kept the longest in the Norwegian parties, as illustrated by 
the Coastal Party and the Christian Conservative Party. A notable contribution of 
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this analysis is thus to show that new minor parties in both Italy and Norway 
prioritise membership recruitment and maintenance, underpinning Kölln’s (2014, 
p. 467) argument that party members are particularly useful for new parties in 
virtue of the electoral support they can provide early in a party’s life cycle. 
Interestingly, it also shows that new (minor) parties indeed try to build 
memberships, even though existing studies have found that new parties tend to 
have under-developed memberships (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43; Mair & 
Biezen, 2001, p. 14). Furthermore, the analysis shows that new minor parties – 
irrespective of whether they are early or late(r) in their life cycles – prioritise 
putting staff to work on membership recruitment and maintenance. My results 
thus suggest that it is not just parties’ newness that creates the particular need 
for members, as Kölln (2014) argues, but also their minority status.  
9.1.2 State funding and centralisation (H2) 
H2 argues that state funding and staff will strengthen party elites, who, 
subsequently, depending on whether the executive council in the party is 
centralised or not, will be enabled to either centralise the composition of the 
executive council or consolidate their already strong position. The centralisation 
analysis found support for H2, and first showed how elites’ management of state 
funds contributed to strengthening new minor party elites in both the Norwegian 
and Italian contexts, as illustrated by evidence from the Communist Refoundation 
Party, the Pensioner Party, and Tricolour Flame in Italy, and the Greens and the 
Christian Conservative Party in Norway. The exploratory analysis showed that 
elites were only empowered by state funds if they had leeway to use this income 
freely, and if the financial situation in the party more broadly was flexible. 
Concretely, state funds did not strengthen party elites in parties riddled by 
financial deficit (e.g. the Pensioner Party in Norway). In line with the existing 
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literature, the analysis found that the actors who manage state funds (treasurers, 
party leaders, etc.) are able to reinforce their position (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 379; 
see also Mendilow, 1992), due to their control over the receipt and allocation of 
the most crucial financial resource in new minor parties. By outlining the 
mechanisms through which party elites strengthen their position following state 
funding access, the results add more detail to those studies that more broadly 
refer to how different party faces, mainly the party in public office, are 
strengthened by state funding access (Bardi et al., 2017; Hagevi, 2018; Katz & 
Mair, 2002).  
Moreover, staff also empowered party elites, across parties and contexts, 
as illustrated by all the Italian parties studied (which had staff), namely the 
Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, the Communist Party of Workers, 
and Tricolour Flame. In all but one of the Norwegian parties studied in the 
centralisation analysis, staff strengthened elites’ position, as illustrated by data 
from the Greens, the Pensioner Party, and the Christian Conservative Party. Staff 
reinforced elites when elites controlled hiring processes or determined the tasks 
conducted by employees, reflecting Panebianco’s (1988, p. 227) contention that 
the control of staff (even though he refers to a strong, bureaucratic apparatus) 
advantages those who control it over those who do not. Elites who were 
themselves staff were also reinforced by their position, which gave them 
increased leeway to dedicate themselves to party work. These findings thus go 
beyond previous studies that have mainly equated staff presence with increased 
intra-party control (e.g. for the party in public office) (for examples, see Bardi et 
al., 2017; Biezen, 2003b; Katz & Mair, 2002), by outlining the mechanisms 
through which staff reinforce elites.  
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In turn, there is evidence from some of the parties that elites empowered 
by state funds and/or staff use their position to initiate consolidating or centralising 
reforms, further supporting H2, and echoing the literature outlining the importance 
of party leaders as core promoters of organisational change (Gauja, 2016, p. 147; 
see also Harmel et al., 1995). This was illustrated by the Christian Conservative 
Party (consolidating reform) and the Greens (centralising reform) in Norway, and 
consolidating reform processes in the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame in 
Italy. Secondly, the empirical analysis showed that state funds were used to 
execute consolidating reforms in the Pensioner Party in Italy and the Christian 
Conservative Party in Norway, and (to a limited extent) the Greens’ centralising 
reform in Norway. Similarly, staff were used to execute centralising reforms in the 
Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy. These results contribute 
to filling a gap in the literature by unveiling how exactly, i.e. the mechanisms 
through which, state funds and staff can contribute to introducing changes that 
ultimately benefit party elites at the expense of members in new minor parties. 
As such, the analysis enriches research that has suggested that state funding 
entails centralisation (see e.g. Ebbighausen, 1996, cited in Koss, 2011).  
The broader finding is that state funds and staff play a role in intra-
organisational reform processes which leave party elites, at the expense of 
members, with an increased control over the party’s day-to-day management (i.e. 
control over the executive council). This is an important contribution to the state 
of the art and contributes to filling a gap in the literature, both by studying and 
evidencing who it is that controls that rarely-studied organ, the executive council, 
and secondly by evidencing how state funds and staff can contribute to shaping 
its composition. The study thus adds a new dimension to the party organisational 
literature, as existing studies have mainly aimed to shed light on which party 
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actors (members, delegates, elites, etc.) control crucial party decisions (see e.g. 
Gauja, 2013; Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Lisi et al., 2015).  
9.1.3 State funding and pursuit of constitutive function (H3) 
Pursuit of constitutive function was defined as the process of overcoming the 
threshold of authorisation (Pedersen, 1982), i.e. the ability of parties to comply 
with ballot access requirements and present an electoral list (electoral 
participation). H3 argued that state funding and staff would directly and indirectly 
contribute to facilitating electoral participation, while a decrease or loss of state 
funding and staff would hinder it. The analysis showed that state funds 
contributed both directly (i.e. by paying for expenses) and indirectly (e.g. by 
building branches) to enabling electoral participation by new minor parties, 
supporting H3. Concretely, state funds contributed directly to electoral 
participation by paying for expenses related to the signature campaign in 
Tricolour Flame and the Communist Refoundation Party, while a decrease in 
state funds complicated the execution of a signature campaign for the Greens in 
Italy, and the loss of state funds made a signature campaign impossible to 
execute for the Fatherland’s Party in Norway. Furthermore, state funds 
contributed to electoral participation in the Italian Pensioner Party by paying for 
television broadcasts that facilitated recruitment, and helped to solve conflict and 
establish branches in the Norwegian Pensioner Party, which enabled the party to 
participate in elections. State funds also helped to strengthen branches in the 
Norwegian Greens, and to increase membership in the Christian Conservative 
Party. These results thereby extend the existing literature, by empirically outlining 
some potential reasons why previous studies have found that parties with access 
to state funds – but which lack parliamentary representation – manage to 
continue to run in elections (i.e. survive) (Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Spirova, 
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2007), and why parties that suffer loss of electoral support, but still rely on state 
funds, manage to continue to field candidates in elections (Casal Bértoa & 
Walecki, 2014).  
Moreover, the study also explored in detail the role of staff in new minor 
parties’ pursuit of constitutive function, and found that staff – as well as state 
funds – matter, supporting H3. As such, the results contribute to filling a gap in 
the literature, which has mostly been concerned just with the role of state funds. 
More specifically, staff contributed to the development of the electoral list in 
Tricolour Flame in Italy by providing advice on candidacies, and to executing 
signature campaigns and dealing with the operation of subnational branches in 
the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy. In Norway, staff in 
the Greens contributed indirectly to electoral participation by working to establish 
more branches, strengthening those already in place, and increasing the 
membership. The strengthening of subnational branches was also one of the 
tasks set for staff in the Christian Conservative Party in Norway. In the Coastal 
Party a loss of staff (linked to a stark decrease in income from the state) 
contributed to membership loss, which in turn made electoral participation 
difficult. These results show how state funds and staff are not just helpful in 
electoral campaigns (Casas-Zamora, 2006; see e.g. Farrell, 1996; Farrell, 2000; 
Karlsen, 2010), but also in the processes prior to them.  
Interestingly, the analysis of the richest new minor party in the sample 
(Communist Refoundation Party in Italy) showed how a shift (in this case a 
decrease) in state funds and staff did not affect the party’s electoral participation 
in the 2010 regional elections, as theorised in H3. Still, state funds and staff, as 
theorised, contributed to enabling the party’s electoral participation in 2010. As in 
the staffing analysis, this finding suggests that in terms of the impact of state 
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funds, the extent to which parties’ intra-organisational dynamics are affected by 
shifts to state funds and staff is conditional upon the size of the parties’ overall 
budget and staff.  
9.1.4 Filling an empirical gap on new minor parties (in Norway and Italy) 
This study of Norwegian and Italian new minor parties fills two important empirical 
gaps. First of all, the in-depth intra-organisational analyses of the selected new 
minor parties’ income structures, and their patterns concerning staffing, 
centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function, make an important empirical 
contribution to the general literature on electorally minor parties. Electorally minor 
parties have barely been covered in the existing literature (Fisher, 1980; Muller-
Rommel, 1991; Pedersen, 1982; Pridham, 1991; but see e.g. Spoon, 2011), and 
especially in organisational terms. For instance, electorally minor parties have 
only to a small extent been covered in the broad efforts to collect comparative, 
party organisational data (see e.g. Katz & Mair, 1992; Poguntke et al., 2016). 
New parties (which are often also minor parties, see e.g. Pedersen, 1982) are 
covered to a greater extent than minor parties, especially  parties of specific (new) 
party families, such as green parties (Poguntke, 2002a; Spoon, 2011; van Haute, 
2016) or the far-right (Art, 2011; Enyedi & Linek, 2008; Ignazi, 2003). That said, 
organisational studies of new parties per se (irrespective of party family) are few 
(but see Bolleyer, 2013). Thus, the selection and analysis of new minor parties – 
irrespective of party family – sheds light on how a broader group of parties 
operate, contributing to closing one (large) gap in the general party literature.  
Secondly, the empirical analyses conducted here contribute extensively to 
the country-specific literatures on political parties in Italy and Norway. To date, 
no in-depth, comparative, organisational analysis has been conducted across 
different new minor parties in Norway and Italy, even though some excellent case 
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studies exist on the Greens (Biorcio, 2016; Vannucci, 2007), and the Communist 
Refoundation Party (Bertolino, 2004; Calossi, 2007) in Italy, and the Greens in 
Norway  (Heglum, 2015; Jupskås, 2013; Siem Knudsen, 2016). This study’s in-
depth analyses of organisational dynamics in a broad range of different new 
minor parties (e.g. of different ideologies), thus represents a rich empirical 
addition to the literature on party organisation in Norway and Italy. This addition 
is timely, as some of the cases studied have been part of the party systems in 
Norway and Italy for over three decades, but barely mentioned in the academic 
literature (such as the Pensioner Parties in both contexts). 
Given that political parties – both large/established and new/minor – are 
crucial for the working of contemporary democracies, only in-depth studies like 
the one presented in this thesis can bring us closer to a full understanding of the 
representative capacities of political parties today. In sum, therefore, the 
empirical results of new and electorally minor parties in Norway and Italy means 
that future studies analysing Norwegian and Italian parties and party systems 
specifically, but also Western European parties and party systems more broadly, 
will have a much richer empirical basis upon which to build their conclusions.  
9.1.5 Generalisability of findings 
An important question is whether – and, if yes, how broadly – the empirical 
findings discussed in the previous section can be applied to other parties and 
contexts. The aim of this thesis has been to say something concrete about the 
impact of state funding (and staff) on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of 
constitutive function in new minor parties. These are parties where the impact of 
state funds – both due to their minority status and to their newness – is likely to 
manifest itself (for similar arguments, see Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; 
Rashkova & Spirova, 2014; Stinchcombe, 1965). New minor parties also have 
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very limited income sources, and have been found to rely heavily on state funds 
(see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ikstens et al., 2002; Mair & Biezen, 2001). Based 
on this, it has been argued in this thesis that new minor parties constitute most-
likely cases, i.e. cases where I expect to see the theorised impact of state funds 
to take place. Such cases could limit the generalisability of the study’s scope, as 
outlined in chapter 1. However, the in-depth, exploratory analysis of the specific 
ways in which state funds shape staffing, and how state funds and staff shape 
centralisation and pursuit of constitutive function, allows me to discern how the 
studied parties’ newness and (electoral) size themselves impacted the findings. 
In turn, this opens up a broader discussion of the extent to which the empirical 
results in this thesis can be applied to electorally larger and established parties.  
Before engaging in that discussion, I shall briefly outline how broadly the 
results might extend to other new minor parties – outside Norway and Italy, 
thereby developing a contingent generalisation (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 31), 
that applies to ‘well-defined types or subtypes of cases’. This thesis explored the 
impact of state funds on intra-organisational dynamics in 14 new minor parties in 
two established democracies in Western Europe. The universe of new minor 
parties in this thesis is thus limited to those operating in established democracies 
in Western Europe. The selection of Italy and Norway, i.e. two regulatory contexts 
within Western Europe that have exposed their new minor parties to a range of 
different state benefits and constraints, is a good starting point for extending the 
relevance of the findings beyond Norway and Italy.  
Still, the fact that parties – both new and minor, and large and established 
– in both contexts have generally received a large share of their income from the 
state, is a limitation. For example, the analysis of staffing, which was found to 
(partially) hinge on the amounts of state funding available to parties, could look 
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different in other contexts where parties are generally less state-dependent, such 
as the UK or Germany (Poguntke et al., 2016). That said, the new minor parties 
analysed here differ on a range of factors, which arguably makes them 
representative of other (new minor) parties. They differ in size (within the category 
‘new and minor’), ideology, formation, and age (but all formed post-1980). 
Broadly, therefore, the findings from this study shed light on how state funding 
and staff contribute to processes of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of 
constitutive function in largely state-dependent new minor parties operating in 
Western European, established democracies, where state funding constitutes a 
majority of (all) parties’ income (more than half). Having established the group of 
new minor parties to which the empirical results here have relevance, the next 
section explores the extent to which parties’ newness and electoral size is 
relevant to the empirical results obtained, thereby indicating the potential 
relevance of the findings for electorally larger and older parties.  
Both a new minor party’s state-dependency and its overall budget size 
were crucial factors for understanding whether or not state funds shaped the 
staffing patterns of that party (i.e. the timing of staffing). Concretely, the 
Communist Refoundation Party’s large budget (even if it was nearly completely 
state-dependent) enabled it to hire or downsize staff relatively independently of 
minor shifts in income from the state. Conversely, the other studied new minor 
parties, with much more limited budgets (i.e. well below 5 million euros), hired 
and downsized staff following shifts in income from the state. Now, a party’s 
budget size, as argued in this thesis, is often related to both a party’s newness 
and electoral size (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair & Biezen, 2001). That 
said, it does not have to be, as there are (for instance) examples of new parties 
with large budgets, such as Forza Italia and the Five Star Movement in Italy. The 
329 
 
take-away point is thus that the results concerning the impact of state funds on 
staffing are often (because income structure is often related to size and age), but 
not necessarily always, limited to new minor parties.  
More specifically, the results of the staffing analysis suggest that 
electorally larger (i.e. not minor), and/or established (i.e. not new), state-
dependent parties with overall low budgets that operate in contexts where the 
state-dependency of parties overall is high (for an overview, see e.g. Poguntke 
et al., 2016), will respond to shifts in income from the state by hiring or downsizing 
staff – just like the new minor parties in this thesis. The reason is that their state-
dependency and budget size will coincide with those of the new minor parties 
studied in this thesis.  
 The centralisation analysis showed how both state funds and staff 
contributed to strengthening the position of party elites. Arguably, elites can only 
empower themselves due to the management of state funds if these funds 
constitute a crucial income source for the party, which they do in new minor 
parties. Specifically, if a party only receives a minimal share of its overall budget 
from the state, the receipt and allocation of these funds hardly equates to intra-
party power. The elites of new minor parties are thus empowered by managing 
state funds given the centrality of this money for their operation (i.e. the party’s 
state-dependency). Therefore, there is reason to expect that elites who operate 
in electorally larger and/or established parties, but equally manage state funds 
that constitute a large share of these parties’ income, will also be able to 
strengthen their position by means of this financial control. This shows, as in the 
discussion of the wider relevance of the staffing analysis above, that party size 
and age per se are not necessarily the most important factors for understanding 
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an empirical result – rather, it is often parties’ state-dependency that matters 
(even though these two are often inter-linked). 
 The centralisation analysis also found that the control of new minor party 
elites over staff (hiring processes or employees’ tasks) similarly empowered their 
positions. This is interesting, as new minor parties’ staff resources are often small 
(see staffing analysis). Theoretically, the argument that party actors who control 
staff have an advantage has been advanced for parties with a large and strong 
bureaucracy (Panebianco, 1988, p. 227). Thus, there is reason to believe that 
this study’s finding that party elites strengthen their position due to control over 
staff (hiring or their tasks) in new minor parties, is also highly relevant to large, 
established parties, echoing similar findings in the literature (see e.g. Bardi et al., 
2017; Katz & Mair, 2002). 
Thirdly, the centralisation analysis found that elites empowered by state 
funds and staff, in some parties across Norway and Italy, used their strong 
position to initiate centralising or consolidating reforms. There are two reasons 
why it is problematic to extend the relevance of this finding to electorally larger, 
established parties. First and foremost, new parties have more malleable and 
less institutionalised party structures (see e.g. Gauja, 2016, p. 115). Thus, party 
elites empowered by state funds and/or staff may have an easier time initiating 
(potentially controversial) reforms in new than in established parties. This 
resonates with the finding that some party reforms are more common in new and 
small parties (see e.g. Chiru et al., 2015, p. 46; Cross & Blais, 2012, p. 39). To 
this, one could answer that elite empowerment due to state funds and/or staff is 
the extra leeway that elites in large, established parties need in order to initiate 
(potentially controversial) reform there. However, the potential difference in 
organisational structure, and in likelihood that reforms take place, leads me to 
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refrain from extending the relevance of this finding (i.e. that elites empowered by 
state funds and/or staff initiate reform) to large and established parties.  
 Fourthly, the centralisation analysis found that state funds and staff 
contributed to the execution of (some) centralising and consolidating reforms. 
The contribution of both state funds and staff was found to be dependent on the 
direct involvement of these resources in the reform process itself. The importance 
of staff and state funds in these reforms was thus not attributed to either a party’s 
size or its age, but rather to the role these resources played in the reform 
processes. Therefore, this finding also has relevance for larger and established 
parties. That said, for state funds to play the same role in large and established 
parties as in new minor parties, the former must be state-dependent (as the latter 
are). If not, other income sources, besides state funds, will most likely take their 
place.  
In the analysis of pursuit of constitutive function, I found that both state 
funds and staff contribute to facilitating new minor parties’ electoral participation. 
Concretely, state funds and staff contributed both directly, by enabling 
compliance with signature requirements for ballot access and setting up the 
electoral list, and indirectly, by building branches and boosting the membership. 
Both a party’s size and age are relevant for these findings.  
Firstly, due to their size, electorally minor parties are often subject to 
signature requirements that larger parties (often enjoying institutional 
representation) are exempted from. The importance of institutional 
representation, for being eligible for exemptions from the signature requirement, 
was effectively outlined in the Italian context. In effect, major parties may simply 
not need to collect signatures, removing the potential impact of state funds and/or 
staff in the execution of signature campaigns. Secondly, because of their age, 
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new minor parties have poorly developed membership structures and branches 
(Casas-Zamora, 2006), which hinders both candidate recruitment and the ability 
to collect signatures. Established (i.e. older) parties, which were to a larger extent 
formed in the era of mass membership, will often have a more solid recruitment 
pool and better developed branches, both of which can aid in processes of 
signature collection, and development of the electoral list (but see also literature 
on membership decline, e.g. Biezen et al., 2012). The indirect impact of state 
funds and staff on established parties’ electoral participation is thus likely to be 
limited, given that they face fewer pressures concerning the operation of 
branches and the membership.  
Having said this, for large and/or established parties that either – contrary 
to the expectations outlined above – have low memberships or vulnerable 
branches, and/or are exposed to signature requirements, there is reason to 
believe that state funds (if the party’s state-dependency is similar to that of new 
minor parties), and staff, will contribute to enabling electoral participation, either 
indirectly or directly.  
The above discussion first showed how the results of this thesis have 
relevance for state-dependent new minor parties in other established Western 
European democracies where state funds constitutes a relatively large share of 
these parties’ income. Then, I discussed how newness and electoral size 
impacted on the study’s various findings, thereby outlining the applicability of the 
results to large and established parties. Broadly, I outlined how state-dependency 
– which may or may not be related to electoral size and age – mattered. 
Concretely, if also large, established parties have restricted budgets and are 
state-dependent, the patterns of staffing found in this thesis are also of relevance 
to them. Moreover, the finding that state funds strengthen party elites can 
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arguably also extend to larger, established parties if these parties are state-
dependent. Similarly, the impact of staff on strengthening party elites extends 
particularly well to large, established parties, as these parties often have more 
staff than new minor parties. Finally, the importance of state funds and staff for 
the execution of centralising reforms had little in particular to do with size and 
newness (and more to do with the actual use of these resources in reform 
processes), which means we can extend the findings’ relevance beyond new 
minor parties. Conversely, the organisational differences between new minor 
parties, and large, established parties, made it difficult to extend the findings 
concerning the initiation of centralising or consolidating party reforms (by 
empowered party elites) to the latter. Finally, I contended that both electoral size 
and newness matter for the results concerning the impact of state funds and staff 
on electoral participation, making it difficult to extent the relevance of these 
findings beyond new minor parties.  
9.2 Normative implications of empirical findings 
As outlined in chapter 1, the views of both proponents and opponents of state 
funding are rooted in normative conceptions of political parties’ role as core 
linkage structures between citizens and the state. Linkage is understood as ‘the 
provision of a connection between those in elite positions and the electorate at 
large’ (Poguntke, 2002b, p. 44; see also Gunther & Diamond, 2001; Webb, 2002). 
The following section discusses how the empirical findings of this thesis can shed 
light on whether state funding promotes or hinders new minor parties’ ability to 
perform this citizen-state linkage function. 
The analysis first demonstrated that state funding constitutes a large share 
of new minor parties’ income in Norway and Italy, which by definition indicates 
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that state funding enables parties that lack a strong membership structure and 
other sources of income (e.g. donations), to face (if not all, then some of) the 
costs related to the basic operation of a party. This in turn enables fulfilment of 
their role as linkage structures in contemporary democracies – because parties 
without activities like congresses, campaigns, and policy and program 
development would not constitute a party able to absorb opinions from members 
and citizens and transfer them upwards in the political system. The state-
dependency of new minor parties also undermines the claim, proposed by 
opponents of state funding, that state funds ‘ossify’ the existing party system by 
only benefitting the established parties that design state funding regulations. 
Naturally, there is indication that the established parties can – if they wish – 
introduce state funding regulations that disadvantage new minor parties, which 
was the case in Norway prior to 2006 when access criteria to state funds were 
constraining towards new minor parties. However, the broad evidence from 
Norway and Italy is that ossification or freezing (due to state funding regulations) 
of the party systems has not taken place to any great degree.174 Rather, the 
results from the period I have analysed show that state funding has not just 
enabled new minor parties to perform their linkage function, but also contributed 
to ensuring the overall ability of the Italian and Norwegian party systems, by 
securing the operation of a range of new minor parties, to link citizens to the state.  
Furthermore, state funds contribute to promoting the linkage function of 
parties by paying for staff, which is another way of granting new minor parties 
leeway to execute their tasks, and thereby operate more effectively. Concretely, 
in most of the analysed new minor parties, staff had organisational and 
                                                          
174 The question is whether the Italian state’s ban of all direct forms of state funds from 2013 
onwards (whose effects are yet to be seen) will ossify the party system. 
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administrative tasks, seeing to everything from telephone and email, to 
membership recruitment and maintenance, to the establishment and 
maintenance of branches. Some parties also had politically oriented staff 
employed to develop policy and communicate with the press. The presence of 
staff means that a range of party tasks are dealt with by the same people on a 
regular basis, ensuring consistency and regularity.  
Additionally, having staff that handle the membership and local branches 
specifically contributes to enabling performance of the linkage function of new 
minor parties. Concretely, members have the value of transforming politicians 
from self-interested and independent actors into agents of the people (Katz, 2002, 
p. 106; see also Scarrow, 2000). The efforts of new minor parties’ staff to recruit 
and maintain members is thus vital for enabling parties to act as structures of 
linkage. Interestingly, these results indicate that state funding access does not 
mean that party leaders have a reduced incentive to recruit members in new 
minor parties (even when demands to collect ‘matching funds’ are not present). 
Rather, state funding has the exact opposite impact in new minor parties: It pays 
for staff which in turn aids membership recruitment, assisting parties in the 
performance of their linkage function, effectively undermining one of the core 
claims of critics of state funds.  
Furthermore, state funds ensure the linkage function of new minor parties 
by contributing to electoral participation, as running in elections is the only way in 
which a party can secure representation, i.e. the possibility of channelling the 
wishes of citizens into the actual state apparatus (into institutions). The analysis 
demonstrated that state funding and staff facilitate the process of exceeding the 
signature requirement for ballot access. Moreover, state funds and staff 
contribute to processes of setting up the electoral list, and to the establishment 
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and strengthening of local branches, which are important steps in achieving 
electoral participation. So, state funds help get new minor parties into the 
electoral arena, which is also further evidence contrary to the claim that state 
funds lead to the ossification of party systems.  
Despite the role of state funding and staff in advancing the linkage function 
of new minor parties, there is indication from the analysis that state funds and 
related staff can also contribute to shifting intra-party dynamics in a way that 
disadvantages members, in turn potentially harming the parties’ ability to 
effectively capture and subsequently promote members’ wishes in the political 
arena. This finding coincides with a prominent claim concerning party staff in the 
literature, which outlines how staff marginalise party members and how party 
grassroots are increasingly replaced by professional staff (see e.g. Dalton & 
Wattenberg, 2002; Mair et al., 2004). The analysis of this thesis showed that state 
funds and staff (paid for with the help of state funds) strengthen party elites at the 
expense of members, and contribute to either shifting the power in the executive 
council towards elites, or consolidating an already completely centralised 
leadership structure. A decrease or removal of members from the crucial 
executive council, which deals with the management of the party on a day-to-day 
basis, ultimately also threatens a party’s ability to perform its linkage function, as 
members will be hindered from directly expressing their opinion on urgent and 
pressing matters. Moreover, consolidating reforms effectively deepen members’ 
exclusion from the (national) leadership. To this, one could respond that elites 
also represent the members. Still, a loss of members in the executive still 
effectively removes the direct link between members and the governing organ 
(and core decisions). Rather, members will be left to voice their opinion in the 
party congress, held much more rarely than executive council meetings.  
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There is thus a tension with regards to how exactly state funds (and related 
staff) impact on the linkage function of new minor parties. On the one hand state 
funds contribute to effective operation and electoral participation, but on the other 
state funds and staff contribute to internal power-shifts that disadvantage the 
members, in turn also undermining the party’s linkage function. Whether effective 
operation or internal power distribution is more important, with regards to new 
minor parties’ linkage function, is difficult to decide conclusively here. However, 
in terms of securing democracies’ overall capacity to represent the broadest 
possible group of citizens, the effective operation of new minor parties, rather 
than their internal power structure, is arguably more important. This is especially 
so since this study has restricted itself to investigating how state funds and staff 
shape the composition of the executive council (centralisation), and the operation 
of other national executive organs (consolidation), i.e. ‘just’ the (albeit crucial) 
national arena of decision-making. Thus, further studies, also investigating how 
state funds and staff (potentially) shape the power of members to participate in 
the congress, and in crucial party decisions such as candidate and leadership 
selection, are necessary in order to disentangle the specificities of this normative 
tension concerning the impact of state funds and staff on new minor parties’ 
linkage function. Only when we know more exactly how it is that state funds and 
staff can impact membership rights more broadly can a final judgement be 
passed on whether or not the benefits of these resources for promoting new minor 
parties’ linkage function outweigh the drawbacks.  
9.3 Avenues for future research 
Existing research has demonstrated that state funding regulations (and party 
laws more generally) differ between old and new democracies (see e.g. Biezen 
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& Borz, 2012; Biezen & Kopecký, 2014). An insightful avenue for further research 
is thus to explore whether the impact of state funds on intra-organisational 
processes is the same for new minor parties that operate in new democracies as 
it is in the two established democracies studied here. This would not just provide 
a broader overview of how state funds shape party organisations, but also of how 
different regulations for state funds do so. In a related vein, this analysis has 
studied new minor parties in two Western European countries where parties 
generally (not just new minor parties) receive a large share of their income from 
the state (see e.g. Biezen & Kopecký, 2014, 2017). The field could thus benefit 
from future studies that explore whether state funds shape intra-organisational 
patterns in the same way in contexts where state funds are less generous, such 
as in Germany and France (Biezen & Kopecký, 2017). This would enhance our 
insight regarding how new minor parties in such contexts finance their operation, 
but also regarding whether state funds impact staffing, centralisation, and pursuit 
of constitutive function in the same way when they are provided in (much) smaller 
sums. Even though my analysis was a life cycle analysis, and thus able to shed 
light on how both large and small incomes from the state shaped intra-
organisational dynamics, we cannot take for granted that the dynamics are the 
same when there is, per definition, less money available from the state.  
 Future studies aiming to explore how state funds and staff shape party 
reform, can draw on the framework developed in this thesis. Concretely, this 
analysis demonstrated the importance of exploring how state funds and staff 
strengthen elites, how this in turn enables them to initiate reform, and finally how 
state funds and staff directly contribute to the execution of reform. This framework 
can be applied to studies analysing how state funds and staff impact 
centralisation/consolidation in new minor parties (in other contexts), and, just as 
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importantly, to studies of electorally larger, and established parties. Now, 
analyses of large, established parties do not necessarily have to look at the 
impact of state funds – a factor that is less important given that such parties 
(often) rely on a wider range of income sources. However, to assess the impact 
of money in politics more generally, future studies could explore the extent to 
which the management of (different types of) income sources and staff strengthen 
party elites, and whether that in turn enables them to initiate and execute reform.  
 Interestingly, the analysis of the ways in which state funds and staff shape 
centralisation showed how several of the new minor parties’ centralising reforms 
were also attempts to adjust or improve poorly functioning leadership organs, 
corroborating the contention that new parties have less institutionalised 
structures than established parties (Gauja, 2016, p. 115). This study thus 
suggests that state funds and staff not only contribute to centralising and 
consolidating reforms, but also to processes perceived (at least by elites) as 
organisational building. Future studies could benefit from exploring further this 
role of state funds and staff in shaping crucial new minor party (leadership) 
structures, by comparing parties with and without such resources to shed light on 
whether the development happens at the same speed and in the same direction 
(centralising vs. de-centralising) across different new minor parties. This is 
particularly interesting in light of this study’s finding that all the new minor parties 
studied here introduced a centralising (not de-centralising) reform to their 
executive as their first reform following access to state funds and/or staff. 
This study has focused on the national party branch of new minor parties. 
Apart from exploring electoral participation on regional, national, and EU-levels, 
and capturing state funding paid out to different levels (but only appearing in the 
national financial account), it was beyond the scope of this study to systematically 
340 
 
analyse how state funding affects regional and local party branches. The 
importance of the national branch in organisationally vulnerable new minor 
parties, and a wish to ensure comparability across new minor parties due to 
limited availability of financial data, drove this decision. Complementing the 
findings of this thesis, future studies may benefit from exploring whether state 
funds in regional/local party branches shape staffing in the same way as on the 
national level. This would further enhance our knowledge of the capacities of new 
minor parties as a whole, and their constituent parts. Only such multi-level 
analyses, documenting both state funds and staff, can give us a complete 
overview of the full organisational strength of new minor parties.  
Similarly, the framework on centralisation argued that party elites (on 
either national or subnational levels) will be strengthened by state funds. 
However, the focus on state funds and staff in relation to the national branch 
restricted the thesis from analysing specifically how these resources affected the 
position of subnational party elites, apart from acknowledging that resource-
dependencies between party branches might affect elites’ possibility to have 
centralising reforms passed in the party congress. Future studies may thus 
benefit from analysing the impact of state funds (and staff) on elites on different 
levels, which would also lay the groundwork for studies analysing how 
strengthened elites on different levels cooperate (or clash with one another) to 
promote or restrict intra-organisational reform processes. This would in turn 
broaden our understanding of how state funding in relation to different party 
branches can shape intra-organisational dynamics in new minor parties. 
In terms of methodology, the analyses of H1-H3 in this thesis have 
explored the impact of state funding on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of 
constitutive function in new minor parties, but have not aimed to systematically 
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determine the importance of state funding in such processes compared to other 
factors. It has thus not established (i.e. weighed) how important state funding 
(and staff) has been for the outcome. Future in-depth qualitative studies with a 
similar number of cases can thus contribute to the literature by adopting 
methodological approaches such as qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), in 
order to bring us closer to understanding how important state funding is (is it 
necessary and/or sufficient?), in comparison to other factors to determine the 
outcome of intra-organisational processes.  
Finally, the analysis showed how one party, namely the Communist 
Refoundation Party in Italy, (often) operated contrary to the theorised rationales 
concerning staffing (H1) and pursuit of constitutive function (H3). This was mainly 
due to the party’s large budget, substantial group of staff, and large membership. 
In other words, the analysis has also shed light on the quantity of resources a 
party needs in order to stop being vulnerable to external pressures such as state 
funding regulations (see Stinchcombe, 1965). Now, the results of this study 
merely suggest that a party with a budget of between 5 and 10 million euros, and 
with a group of staff of more than 10, has an organisational strength that enables 
it to hire staff when necessary and exceed the threshold of authorisation without 
trouble. Albeit limited, this finding provides a fruitful starting point for future 
organisational studies attempting to explore more in-depth the conditions under 
which a party is (organisationally) resilient enough to withstand fluctuations in 
state funding regulations specifically, and other regulations (e.g. regarding 
electoral laws) more broadly. 
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9.4 Closing remarks 
This thesis started out by outlining how state funds and attached regulation have 
become an increasingly prominent part of contemporary democracies. The aim 
of the thesis has been to shed light on how state benefits and constraints 
contribute to processes of staffing, centralisation of the executive council, and 
pursuit of constitutive function in newly established minor parties. One main 
contribution of the thesis has thus been to zoom in and pin-point the exact role 
that state benefits and constraints play in intra-organisational dynamics, without 
attempting to analyse these processes per se. By approaching the research 
question by means of a comparative analysis of most-likely cases, namely new 
minor parties, the thesis has contributed to the state of the art in two important 
ways.  
First and foremost, the analysis has detailed the specific ways in which 
state funding matters for processes of staffing, centralisation of the executive, 
and pursuit of constitutive function. Broadly, the analysis found that an increase 
of state funding led parties to hire staff, while a decrease or loss of state funding 
fostered the opposite process. In a similar vein, access to state funding and staff 
contributed – both directly and indirectly – to facilitating the electoral participation 
of new minor parties, while a decrease or loss of such resources hampered it, 
leading new minor parties to present lists in a lower number of electoral 
constituencies. Finally, state funding and staff were found to strengthen party 
elites, who in turn – in some parties – used their strengthened positions to initiate 
centralising or consolidating reform processes. There was also data showing that 
state funds and staff were in some cases used explicitly in the work to execute 
centralising and consolidating reforms. Normatively, these results broadly imply 
that state funding contributes to performance of the linkage function of new minor 
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parties in contemporary democracies, countering the pessimistic view in the 
literature that state funding is one of the factors that turn parties away from 
citizens and into the state, making them resemble public utilities more than free, 
voluntary organisations (see e.g. Biezen, 2004).  
The second main contribution of the thesis has been to elucidate the 
internal workings of new, electorally minor parties generally, and new minor 
parties in Italy and Norway specifically, both of which have received scarce 
attention in the literature. Thus, by analysing the specific impact of state funding 
in intra-organisational processes in new minor parties (in Italy and Norway), the 
study has provided a new angle on, and evidence for, discussions concerning 
state-party entanglement. Equally importantly, it has enhanced our knowledge of 
the operation of a broader range of parties in contemporary democracies, in turn 
shedding new light on the representative capacities of democracy at large. 
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Overview of Italian and Norwegian new minor 
parties 
 
Table 1: Italian new minor parties: Formation and establishment date 
Party name (English) Party name (Italian) Split/newly 
born 
Foundation 
year 
The Lombardy League  Lega Lombarda Split 19821  
Communist Refoundation Party  Rifondazione Comunista Split 1991 
The Segni Pact  Patto Segni Split 1993  
Party for the Italian Communists 
(Italian Communists) 
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani 
(Comunisti Italiani) 
Split 1998 
Italy of Values – Pietro’s List  Lista di Pietro – Italia dei Valori Split 1998 
The Green Party (the Greens) Federazione dei Verdi Newly born 1986 
The Network – Movement for 
Democracy  
La rete – Movimento 
Democratico 
Split 1991 
The Pensioner Party  Partito Pensionati Split 1987 
The Autonomy Veneto League  Lega Autonomia Veneta Split 1992 
Tricolour Flame Fiamma Tricolore Split 1995 
Yes, referendum Si, referendum Split 1992 
Christian Democratic Centre Centro Cristiano Democratico Split 1994 
United Christian Democrats Cristiani Democratici Uniti Split 1995 
Dini List – Italian Renewal  La Lista Dini – Rinnovamento 
Italiano 
Newly born 1996 
Autonomy Movement  Movimento per le Autonomie Split 2005 
The Communist Party of Workers  Partito Comunista dei 
Lavoratori 
Split 2006 
Brothers of Italy  Fratelli d’Italia Split 2012 
The Right La Destra Split 2007 
Work to stop the decline  Fare per Fermare il Declino Split 2012 
European Democracy  Democrazia Europea Split 2001 
The Democratic Centre Centro Democratico Split 2012 
Civic Choice with Monti for Italy  Scelta Civica con Monti per 
l’Italia 
Newly born 2013 
AT6 Southern Action League AT6 Lega d’Azione Meridionale Split 1992 
Social Cristians Cristiani Sociali Split 1993 
Centrist Union Unione di Centro Split 1993 
Union for the Republic Unione per la Repubblica Split 1999 
Notes: 1 Officially 1984. 
 
Table 2: Norwegian new minor parties: Formation and establishment date 
Party name (English) Party name (Norwegian) Split/newly 
born 
Foundation 
year 
Future for Finnmark Folkeaksjonen Framtid for 
Finnmark 
Split 1989 
Cross-Partisan MPs Tverrpolitisk Folkevalde Newly born 1992 
The Coastal Party Kystpartiet Split 1999 
The Pensioner party Pensjonistpartiet Split 1985 
The Greens Miljøpartiet de grønne Split 1988 
The Fatherlands Party Fedrelandspartiet Split 1990 
The Political Party Det politiske parti Newly born 2000 
The Christian Conservative 
Party 
Partiet de Kristne Split 2011  
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Appendix B: Overview of primary sources used in thesis 
 
Primary sources, Italian new minor parties 
Federazione dei Verdi (The Greens, Italy) 
Annual accounts: 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016.   [Relazione sulla gestione 
del bilancio and Nota integrativa]. Accessed at Gazzetta Ufficale and 
www.verdi.it.  
De Gregorio, Concita. 1992. ‘Non c’è un buco nei conti dei Verdi’. La 
Repubblica. 07.10.1992. 
Federazione dei Verdi. Undated. ‘Undici anni di Verdi in Italia. Breve storia del 
movimento verde in Italia’. Accessed 02.07.2018: 
https://web.archive.org/web/19980610225525/http://www.verdi.it/document/fram
e1.htm 
Federazione dei Verdi. 1999a. ‘Verso la costituente’. Accessed via 
Waybackmachine, 17.03.2017: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20030101212350/http://www.verdi.it/risorse/costit.ht
m   
Federazione dei Verdi. 1999b. ‘Il percorso costituente’. Accessed via 
Waybackmachine, 17.03.2017: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20030101212350/http://www.verdi.it/risorse/costit.ht
m  
Federazione dei Verdi. 2006. ‘Documenti Consiglio Federale Nazionale’. 
[Overview of documents related to meetings in the Council]. Accessed 
05.07.2018: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060511140130/http://www.verdi.it/apps/presenta
zione.php?pagina=documenticonsigliofederale  
Financial accounts: 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 [Rendiconto]. Accessed at 
Gazzetta Ufficale and www.verdi.it.  
Radio Radicale. 26.04.1992. ‘Consiglio Federale dei Verdi’. Accessed 
05.09.2018: https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/46172/46232-consiglio-
federale-dei-verdi  
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Radio Radicale. 30.05.1992. ‘XV Assemblea Nazionale della Federazione dei 
Verdi’. Accessed 05.09.2018: https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/46920/46980-
xv-assemblea-nazionale-della-federazione-dei-verdi  
Radio Radicale. 29.05.1992. ‘XV Assemblea Nazionale della Federazione dei 
Verdi’. Accessed 05.09.2018: https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/46895/46955-
xv-assemblea-nazionale-della-federazione-dei-verdi  
Radio Radicale.  31.10.1992. ‘Consiglio Federale dei Verdi’. Accessed 
20.09.2018: https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/49759/49820-consiglio-
federale-dei-verdi  
Radio Radicale. 8.12.1992. ‘XVI Assemblea nazionale dei Verdi’. Accessed 
04.09.2018: https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/50624/50686-xvi-assemblea-
nazionale-dei-verdi  
Radio Radicale, 09.10.2009. ‘30ª Assemblea Nazionale della Federazione dei 
Verdi - prima giornata’ [Congress speech, Grazia Francescato]. Accessed 
14.03.2018: https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/288624/30a-assemblea-
nazionale-della-federazione-dei-verdi-prima-giornata 
Statutes. 1986 (founding statute), 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2010, 
2012, 2015. 
 
Fiamma Tricolore (Tricolour Flame, Italy) 
Amabile, Flavia. 2005. ‘La Mussolini: Non m’arrendo, sciopero della fame’. La 
Stampa. 14.03.2005. 
Annual accounts: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010 (with La Destra/the Right), 2011 (with La Destra/the Right), 2012 
(with La Destra/the Right). [Bilancio]. Accessed at Gazzetta Ufficale. 
Corriere della sera. 08.02.2002. ‘Rauti: lascio, il future è con il Polo’ 
Financial accounts: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010 (with La Destra/the Right), 2011 (with La Destra/the Right), 2012 
(with La Destra/the Right). [Relazione sulla gestione]. Accessed at Gazzetta 
Ufficale. 
La Matttina, Amedeo. 15.03.2005. ‘Veleni, doppi giochi, complotti: “Ma chi è il 
vero traditore?”’ La Stampa.  
La Repubblica. 09.02.2002. ‘Rauti porta la Fiamma nel Polo, l’Ulivo insorge’.  
La Repubblica. 09.05.2004. ‘La Guerra della Fiamma ‘ Pronto un nuovo 
simbolo’’. Accessed 23.08.2018: 
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http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2004/05/09/la-guerra-
della-fiamma-pronto-un-nuovo.ba_034la.html?ref=search   
La Stampa. 18.11.1996. ‘Al congresso MS-Fiamma ‘tutto il potere a Rauti’’.  
Radio Radicale, 10.02.2002. ‘”Il futuro...noi" - 3º Congresso nazionale del 
Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (presso il Centro Congressi Hotel Serena 
Majestic, 8 - 9 - 10 febbraio 2002)’. Accessed 05.09.2018: 
https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/136112/210843-il-futuronoi-3o-congresso-
nazionale-del-movimento-sociale-fiamma  
Statutes, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017 
 
Rifondazione Comunista (The Communist Refoundation Party, Italy)  
Annual accounts: 1991, 1992, 1994, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015. 
[Relazione del tesoriere and Nota integrativa]. Accessed at Gazzetta Ufficale 
and from the Communist Refoundation Party office. 
Correre della sera. Undated. ‘La scissione di Rifondazione Comunista’. 
Accessed 27.07.2018: http://www.corriere.it/speciali/Ds/rifondazione.shtml,  
Financial accounts: 1991, 1992, 1994, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015. 
[Rendiconto]. Accessed at Gazzetta Ufficale and from the Communist 
Refoundation Party office. 
Fusani, Claudia. 2008. ‘Ferrero nuovo segretario di Rc. Vendola sconfitto: “No 
scissione”’. La Repubblica. 27.08.2008. Accessed 24.06.2018: 
http://www.repubblica.it/2008/07/sezioni/politica/cosa-rossa-2/conta-
finale/conta-finale.html  
La Repubblica. 07.10.1998. ‘Cossutta dà il via alla scissione del Prc’. Accessed 
27.07.2018: http://www.repubblica.it/online/fatti/rifondazione/cinque/cinque.html.  
La Reppublica 13.08.2008. ‘Congresso di Rc in città vince Ferrero’. Accessed 
24.05.2018: 
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2008/07/13/congresso-
di-rc-in-citta-vince-ferrero.html?ref=search  
La Repubblica 24.01.2009. ‘Prc, Vendola conferma l’addio nasce Rifondazione 
della sinistra’. Accessed 24.06.2018: 
http://www.repubblica.it/2009/01/sezioni/politica/liberazione-ferrero/vendola-
chianciano/vendola-chianciano.html  
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La Stampa. 24.01.2009. ‘Vendola e I suoi lasciano il Prc, nasce Rifondazione 
della sinistra’. Accessed 24.06.2018: 
http://www.lastampa.it/2009/01/24/italia/vendola-e-i-suoi-lasciano-il-prc-nasce-
rifondazione-per-la-sinistra-LwRPRy1VfKa0r8pm9DF15O/pagina.html 
Rifondazione Comunista. Undated. ‘Organisational document outlining income 
figures, staffing figures etc.’ Developed by treasurer Marco Gelmini, given to the 
author, 23.11.2016. [Executive Council] 
Rifondazione Comunista. 2001a. ‘Riunione del 24/25 novembre 2001’. [Meeting 
in the National Political Committee]. Accessed 05.09.2018: 
http://web.rifondazione.it/archivio/cpn/2012index.html  
Rifondazione Comunista. 2001b. ‘Proposta di statuto. Approvato dal comitato 
politico nazionale del 15.-16.12.2001’. [Proposal for new statutes, approved by 
the National Political Committee]. Accessed 07.09.2018: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20020815123602fw_/http://www.rifondazione.it:80/v
/doc/statuto1.html  
Rifondazione Comunista. 2005. ‘Direzione 13.06.2005. Regolamento 
del Partito della Rifondazione Comunista - Direzione Nazionale’. [Meeting in the 
executive council concerning financial regulation]. Accessed 07.08.2018: 
http://web.rifondazione.it/archivio/direzionepolitica/050613/050613regolamento_
prc.html    
Rifondazione Comunista. 2009a. ‘Direzione dell'11 febbraio 2009 - Ordine del 
giorno sulle elezioni europee’. [Executive council motion]. Accessed 
24.06.2018: 
http://web.rifondazione.it/archivio/direzionepolitica/090211/090211odg_elezionie
uropee.html      
Rifondazione Comunista. 2009b. ‘Direzione dell’11 febbraio 2009 – Sintesi della 
relazione di Paolo Ferrero’. [Executive council, presentation by party leader 
Paolo Ferrero]. Accessed 25.06.2018: 
http://web.rifondazione.it/archivio/direzionepolitica/090211/090211relazione.htm
l  
Statutes, 1990 (founding statute), 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013.  
 
Fare per fermare il declino (Work to Stop the Decline, Italy) 
Buzzi, Emanuele. 2013. ‘Giannino fa il record di sottoscrizioni e doppia I 
democratici’ Corriere della Sera. 13.02.2013. Accessed here, 23.02.2017: 
https://stborean.wordpress.com/tag/autofinanziamento/  
Canetta, Tommaso. 2013. ‘Boldrin nuovo president di Fare per Fermare il 
Declino’. Linkiesta. 13.05.2013. Accessed 19.01.2018: 
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http://www.linkiesta.it/it/article/2013/05/13/boldrin-nuovo-presidente-di-fare-per-
fermare-il-declino/13652/  
Di Turi, Nicola. 2013. ‘Intervista a Michele Boldrin: ‘Sarò il traghettatore di Fare: 
ora cambiamo le regole del partito’. Huffington Post. 13.05.2013. Accessed 
19.01.2018: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130607161227/http://www.huffingtonpost.it:80/20
13/05/13/intervista-a-michele-boldrini_n_3267813.html  
Fare per fermare il declino. 2013a. ‘Manuale per i congressi di Fare, Maggio 
2013’. [Road map for 2013 congress]. Accessed 19.01.2018: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130423005359/http://www.fermareildeclino.it:80/
sites/default/files/manuale_congressi_2013.pdf  
Fare per Fermare il Declino. 2013b. ‘Direzione Nazionale: la prima riunione, 
18.05.2013’. [Protocol from meeting in the executive]. Accessed 05.09.2018: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130607045737/http://www.fermareildeclino.it:80/
articolo/direzione-nazionale-la-prima-riunione  
Statutes, 2012, 2013 
 
Patto Segni (The Segni Pact, Italy) 
Annual accounts: 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001. [Relazione 
sulla gestione and Nota integrativa]. Accessed at Gazzetta Ufficale. 
Buzzanca, Silvio. 1999. ‘I pattisti: Non siamo riusciti a fare capire la novità 
dell’alleanza’. La Repubblica. 14.06.1999. 
Financial accounts: 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001. [Bilancio]. 
Accessed at Gazzetta Ufficale. 
La Repubblica. 21.11.1998. ‘Per I referendum primi esami a dicembre’ 
La Repubblica. 12.01.1999. ‘Referendum il 18 aprile se la Consulta dà il via 
libera’ 
La Repubblica. 08.02.2000. ‘Pannella: riproporremo quei quesiti’ 
La Repubblica. 15.05.2000. ‘Mario Segni apre il duello tra il sì e il no’ 
La Repubblica. 17.05.2000. ‘Referendum, ecco i big’ 
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Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori (The Communist Party of Workers, Italy)  
Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori. 2017. ‘Documento organizzativo. Organizzare 
il PCL nella crisi: Strutturiamo sezioni e settori di intervento, sviluppiamo il 
centro del partito’. [Organisational document from the 2017 congress]. 
Accessed here (last accessed 05.09.2018): 
https://www.pclavoratori.it/files/index.php?obj=SEZ&oid=105  
Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori. 2008. ‘L’organizzazione e l’intervento del PCL: 
la costruzione di un partito comunista rivoluzionario’. [Organisational document 
from the 2008 congress]. Accessed 06.07.2018: 
http://www.pclavoratori.it/files/index.php?obj=ART&oid=4443  
Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori. 2011. ‘Intervento di massa e strutturazione: La 
nuova fase di sviluppo del Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori’. [Organisational 
document from the 2011 congress]. Accessed 05.09.2018: 
file:///M:/pc/downloads/ALL_8__Documento_organizzativo.pdf  
Statutes. 2008, 2011, 2014.  
 
Partito Pensionati (The Pensioner Party, Italy)  
Annual accounts: 1997, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010. [Relazione 
and Nota integrativa]. Accessed at Gazzetta Ufficale 
Financial accounts: 1997, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010. 
[Rendiconto]. Accessed at Gazzetta Ufficale 
Franzi, Alessandro. 2017. ‘Il partito più vecchio d’Italia? È quello dei Pensionati 
(che compie tren’anni)’. Linkiesta. 19.10.2017. Accessed 27.07.2018: 
https://www.linkiesta.it/it/article/2017/10/19/il-partito-piu-vecchio-ditalia-e-quello-
dei-pensionati-che-compie-tren/35892/  
Corrias, Pino. 1991. ‘Moana si allea con i Pensionati, sarà capolista’. La 
Stampa. 28.12.1991. Accessed 28.05.2017: 
http://www.archiviolastampa.it/component/option,com_lastampa/task,search/mo
d,libera/action,viewer/Itemid,3/page,1/articleid,0890_01_1991_0319_0001_124
56630/ 
Dipollina, Antonio. 1991. ‘Moana si butta in politica e s’allea al potere grigio’. La 
Repubblica. 28.12.1991. Accessed 28.05.2017: 
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1991/12/28/moana-si-
butta-in-politica-allea.html?ref=search  
La Repubblica. 21.01.1992. ‘Io sono nonna, con Moana non voglio starci’.  
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Partito Pensionati. Undated. ‘Trasmissioni TV’. Article from party webpage 
saved by Wayback-machine 06.05.2006. Accessed 21.06.2018: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060508143130/http://www.partitopensionati.it/ad
esioni/adesioni.htm  
Partito Pensionati. 2006. ‘Le Nostre Sedi’. [Overview of the party’s local 
branches as of 2006]. Accessed 20.06.2018: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060516081521/http://www.partitopensionati.it/  
Statutes 2002.  
Telelombardia. 2006. Interview with Emanuela Rocchi. Air date: 23.03.2006. 
Accessed 20.06.2018: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060508143609fw_/http://www.partitopensionati.it/
attivita/novita/marzo2006/marzo2006.htm   
 
Primary sources, Norwegian new minor parties 
Miljøpartiet de grønne (The Greens, Norway)175 
Annual account. 1995, 1996, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014. 
Accessed in the Green Party’s archive.  
Financial account. 1995, 1996, 1997, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016. All financial accounts have been accessed in the 
Green Party’s archive.  
Grønn Kontakt nr.4, 1995. [Party newsletter] 
MDG-nytt 8/2008. Elektronisk nyhetsbrev frå Miljøpartiet dei grøne. Desember 
2008. [Party newsletter, Dec 2008] 
MDG-nytt 9/2008. Elektronisk nyhetsbrev frå Miljøpartiet dei grøne. Desember 
2008/januar 2009. [Party newsletter, Dec 2008/Jan 2009] 
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 1993. ‘Referat fra LS møte 5/10 – 93’. [Minutes from 
National council meeting].  
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 1994a. ‘Budsjettforslag sekretariatet’. Del av 
landsmøtedokument 1994. [Budget proposal for the secretariat, part of 
congress documents in 1994].  
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 1994b. ‘Dagsorden for landsstyremøte nr. 6/1994’. [Plan 
for National Council Meeting].  
                                                          
175 All documents have been accessed in the Green Party’s archive. 
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Miljøpartiet de grønne. 1994c. ‘Referat fra landsmøtet 1994’. [Minutesfrom the 
congress in 1994].  
Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1994d. ‘Dagsorden for landsstyremøte nr. 8/1994’ 
[Agenda for National council meeting].  
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 1998a. ‘Stillingsinstruks og arbeidsvilkår 
sekretærfunksjonen i Miljøpartiet de grønne’.  
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 1998b. ‘Referat LS 2/98’. [Minutes from National council 
meeting].  
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 2001. ‘Referat fra LS-møte nr. 12-2001’. [Minutes from 
National Council Meeting].  
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 2003. ‘Referat fra landsstyremøte, onsdag 30.april 
klokken 20’. [Minutes from National Council Meeting].  
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 2004. ‘Innkalling til landsstyremøte mandag 9. Februar kl 
20’. [Invitation to National Council Meeting].  
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 2010. ‘Kontrollkomiteens i Miljøpartiet de Grønne. 
Rapport til landsmøtet 2011’. [The Control Committees report to the congress, 
2011].  
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 2011. ‘Kopi av vedlegg 8 vedtekter’, 
landsmøtedokument 2011. [Statutory changes, congress documents 2011].  
Miljøpartiet de grønne. 2012. ‘Referat frå Landsmøtet MDG 2012, Bergen, 14.-
15. april’. [Congress minutes].  
Sand Holth, Ole Øyvind and Reidar Mide Solberg. 18.09.2015. ‘Fra hippiereir til 
unge akademikeres favoritt’. Dagens Næringsliv.  
Statutes, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2016.  
 
Pensjonistpartiet (The Pensioner Party, Norway) 176  
Aftenposten. 17.09.1998. ‘Pensjonistpartiets opposisjon i opprør: Krever 
partilederens avgang’. 
Annual account. 1991, 1995-1996 (Annual account for the period 21.04.1995-
19.04.1996), 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012-2013. 
Bekken, Gunnar. 1999. ‘Pensjonister og skatt’. Aftenposten. 31.10.1999. 
                                                          
176 All party documents (unless otherwise stated) have been accessed in the Pensioner Party’s 
archive.  
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Financial account 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016. All financial accounts were 
accessed in the Pensioner Party’s archive, except the 2005 account, which was 
retrieved from www.partifinansiering.no (last accessed 04.09.2018).  
Hansen, Jon-Inge and Støtvig, Alf Øystein.. ‘Kranglepartiet’. VG. 07.06.1998 
I Vindusposten nr. 2, 2006. [Party newsletter]. 
Loraas, Øivind. 1991. “Pensjonistjubel i sør”. Aftenposten. 11.09.1991. 
NTB 16.09.1998. ‘Krever full oppvask og lederens avgang i Pensjonistpartiet’.  
Nygaard, Haakon. 1991. Brev til hovudstyret i Pensjonistpartiet, 16.05.1991 frå 
advokat Haakon Nygaard. [Letter to the executive council from lawyer Haakon 
Nygaard]. 
Pensjonistpartiet, undated. ‘Notat om striden i pensjonistpartiet og partenes 
juridiske stilling m.m’. [Document concerning the conflict in the Pensioner Party 
in the early 1990s].  
Pensjonistpartiet. 1991a. “Referat fra ekstraordinært landsmøte i Kristiansand 
30.11.1991». [Protocol from extraordinary congress]. 
Pensjonistpartiet. 1991b. Brev frå Ingar Roggen til partimedlemer. 04.05.1991 
[Letter from Ingar Roggen to party members].  
Pensjonistpartiet 1991c. ‘Til pensjonistpartiets fylkesmenn, 11.06.1991’. Brev 
frå Erik Christoffersen. [Letter to regional leaders in Pensioner Party].  
Pensjonistpartiet. 1992a. ‘Orientering fra hovedstyres formann om status for 
partiet, de mest nærliggende oppgaver og mål samt virkemidler for å nå 
målene’. Brev til fylkes- og kommunepartystyre, valde representantar og 
hovudstyrets medlemmer og varamenn, 01.02.1992. [Letter from party leader to 
elected party representative, the executive, and regional and local branches 
regarding the party’s status].   
Pensjonistpartiet. 1992b. “Budsjettforslag for 1992”. [Budget 1992]. Accessed in 
the Pensioner Party Office.  
Pensjonistpartiet. 1992c. ‘Pressemelding – ekstraordinært landsmøte 
19.02.1992’. [Press release].  
Pensjonistpartiet. 1992d. ‘Brev fra hovedstyre, 18.08.1992. Møte i 
Pensjonistpartiets sentralstyre mandag 17.august 1992. Vedtak’. [Letter from 
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Pensjonistpartiet. 1993a. ‘Hovedstyremøte I Oslo 12.02.1993’. [Protocol from 
executive council meeting]. 
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Pensjonistpartiet. 1993b. ‘Sentralstyremøte den 8.mars 1993 – innkalling’. Brev 
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[Information document concerning a revision of the statutes]. Sent to author 
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Fedrelandspartiet. 1993. ‘Rådsmøte 27-28.12.1993’. [Council meeting 
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Fedrelandspartiet. 1997. Brev frå partiformann Harald Trefall til ‘medlemmer, 
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representative.  
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Appendix C: Overview of interviewees 
 
Table 1: Interviewees in Italian new minor parties 
Name Party Position in 
party 
Interview 
date(s) 
Form of 
interview 
Party 
representative 
The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Anonymous 10.11.2016 
19.12.2017 
Telephone 
(both) 
Party 
representative 
The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Anonymous 18.01.2018 Telephone 
Michele Boldrin Act to Stop 
the Decline 
Founder and 
later leader 
27.11.2016 Skype 
Sandro Brusco Act to Stop 
the Decline 
Founder 28.11.2016 Skype 
Angelo Bonelli The Greens Current party 
leader. Held a 
range of offices 
in the party 
since foundation 
16.11.2016 In person 
Grazia 
Francescato 
The Greens Former 
spokesperson, 
president, MP 
14.11.2016 In person 
Marco Lion The Greens Former treasurer 
(throughout the 
1990s). Also 
member since 
foundation 
17.11.2016 In person 
Natale 
Ripamonti 
The Greens  Current 
treasurer, former 
senator for the 
party in three 
periods 
23.11.2016 Telephone 
Party 
representative 
The Greens Anonymous 23.11.2017 Telephone 
Mario Segni The Segni 
Pact 
Founder and 
party president 
05.01.2018  
29.01.2018 
Written 
interview (the 
first). 
Telephone 
(the latter) 
Mario Soldani The Segni 
Pact 
Treasurer 03.03.2018 Written 
interview 
Diego Masi The Segni 
Pact 
Founder, and 
various positions 
in party 
(secretary/leader 
of parliamentary 
party group) 
13.03.2018 Telephone 
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Francesco 
Condorelli Caff 
Tricolour 
Flame 
Member of the 
executive 
council. Long-
standing party 
member. 
28.11.2016 Telephone 
Luca 
Romagnoli 
Tricolour 
Flame 
Party leader 
2002-2013 
16.11.2016 In person 
Party 
representative 
Tricolour 
Flame 
Anonymous 31.01.2018 Written 
interview 
Ferdinando 
Francescon 
Tricolour 
Flame 
Member of the 
executive 
council 
25.11.2016 Telephone 
Roberto 
Bevilacqua 
Tricolour 
Flame 
Member of the 
executive 
council. Long-
standing party 
member. 
14.11.2016 In person 
Marco Gelmini Communist 
Refoundation 
Party 
Treasurer  23.11.2016 In person 
Vito Meloni Communist 
Refoundation 
Party 
Regional 
representative 
(Rome), former 
responsible for 
school related 
matters in the 
party 
24.11.2016 In person 
Alberto Celli Communist 
Refoundation 
Party 
Staff member 30.11.2017 Written 
interview 
Michele Terra The 
Communist 
Party of 
Workers 
Member of 
central 
committee 
29.11.2016 Telephone 
Party 
representative 
The 
Communist 
Party of 
Workers 
Member of 
central 
committee 
11.11.2016 In person 
Party 
representative  
The 
Communist 
Party of 
Workers 
Anonymous 21.11.2016 In person 
 
Table 2: Follow-up Interviews in Italian new minor parties 
Name Party Position in 
party 
Interview 
date(s) 
Form of 
interview 
Alberto Celli The 
Communist 
Party of 
Workers 
Staff member 09.04.2018 
25.06.2018 
Written (both) 
Party 
representative 
The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Anonymous 15.01.2018 Written 
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Party 
representative 
The Greens Anonymous 14.03.2018 
26.06.2018 
Written 
Natale 
Ripamonti 
The Greens Treasurer  18.03.2018 Written 
Michele Terra The 
Communist 
Party of 
Workers 
Member of the 
central 
committee 
31.01.2018 Written 
 
 
Table 3: Interviewees in Norwegian new minor parties 
Name Party Position in 
party 
Interview 
date(s) 
Form of 
interview 
Arne Husveg The Christian 
Conservative 
Party 
First deputy 
leader, deputy 
regional leader 
18.12.2017 Telephone 
Party 
representative 
The Christian 
Conservative 
Party 
Anonymous 08.02.2018 Telephone 
Bengt Stabrun 
Johansen 
The Coastal 
Party 
Former party 
leader, elected 
representative 
(subnational 
level) 
26.01.2018 Telephone  
Party 
representative 
The Coastal 
Party/Cross 
Partisan MPs 
Anonymous 21.02.2018 In person 
Rut Olsen The Coastal 
Party 
Former 
executive 
council 
members, 
elected 
representative 
(subnational 
level) 
25.01.2018 Telephone 
Stig-Harold 
Falch 
Pedersen 
The Coastal 
Party 
Former party 
secretary 
(1998-
2004/2005) 
18.12.2017 Telephone 
Reinert 
Andreas 
Leirvik 
Future for 
Finnmark 
Advisor to party 
leader in 
parliament 
26.01.2018 In person 
Erling Moe Future for 
Finnmark 
Advisor to party 
leader in 
parliament 
05.02.2018 In person 
Birte Simonsen The Greens Founder, 
spokesperson, 
elected 
representative 
(subnational 
level) 
16.06.2017 
 
In person 
Lars Gaupset The Greens Current party 
secretary 
15.05.2017 In person 
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Natalia Golis The Greens Regional leader 02.06.2017 In person 
Party 
representative 
The Greens Former 
spokesperson 
28.06.2017 Telephone 
Herlov Kåre 
Øverland 
Cross 
Partisan MPs 
Executive 
council member 
(long-standing) 
16.05.2018 Telephone 
Erik B. Næss Cross 
Partisan MPs 
Current party 
leader 
15.02.2018 In person 
Einar Lonstad The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Former party 
leader, local 
leader, former 
executive 
council member 
08.06.2017 Telephone 
Ragnar Dahl The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Former party 
leader, local 
elected 
representative 
16.05.2017 Telephone 
Per Walseth The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Former party 
leader 
01.06.2017 Telephone 
Ottar 
Gjermundnes 
The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Former party 
leader 
20.06.2017 In person 
Liv Remman The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Treasurer 20.06.2017 In person 
Anonymous The 
Fatherland’s 
Party 
Anonymous 16.04.2018a 
 
Telephone 
Oddbjørn 
Jonstad 
The 
Fatherland’s 
Party 
Former party 
member. 
Currently leads 
the party1 
18.12.2017 In person 
Arnljot Moseng The 
Fatherland’s 
Party 
Former party 
secretary and 
member 
26.02.2018 Telephone 
Note: 1 The party officially died in 2008 (see case selection in chapter 3), but he currently runs a 
party with this name, without it being registered.  
 
Table 4: Follow-up Interviews in Norwegian new minor parties 
Name Party Position in 
party 
Interview 
date(s) 
Form of 
interview 
Birte Simonsen The Greens Founder, 
spokesperson, 
elected 
representative 
(subnational 
level) 
23-24.10.2017 Written (email) 
Anonymous The 
Fatherland’s 
Party 
Anonymous 13. and 
16.04.2018 
 
Written (email) 
Einar Lonstad The 
Pensioner 
Party 
Former party 
leader, local 
leader, former 
14.05.2018 Written (email) 
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executive 
council member 
Party 
representative 
The Coastal 
Party 
Representative 
close to the 
process of 
introducing 
centralising 
reform in 2007 
16.04.2018b Telephone 
Stig-Harold 
Falch 
Pedersen 
The Coastal 
Party 
Former party 
secretary 
(1998-
2004/2005) 
16.04.2018 Written (email) 
Stig-Harold 
Falch 
Pedersen 
The Coastal 
Party 
Former party 
secretary 
(1998-
2004/2005) 
04.07.2018 Written (email) 
Party 
representative 
The 
Fatherland’s 
Party 
Anonymous 19.04.2018 Written (email) 
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Appendix D: Ethics approval 
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Appendix E: Italian and Norwegian interview guides and 
consent forms 
 
Italian interview guide: 
 
PRIMA PARTE:  
1. Secondo Lei, esistono elementi nel quadro legislativo che sono 
vantaggiosi (utili) per il Suo partito? (rimborsi elettorali, co-finanziamento, 
accesso ai media, finanziamento dei gruppi nel senato/parlamento, 
consegna gratuita/accesso ad edifici/strutture/locali,agevolazioni fiscali). 
- Se si, potrebbe specificare quali leggi sono? 
 
2. Direbbe che la sua percezione di questi leggi vantaggosi è cambiata 
tramite tempo? 
- Se si, riesce a ricordare perchè? 
- Se si, riesce a ricordare quando (potrebbe essere legata ai 
cambiamenti che sono stati introdotti nel quadro legislativo, e.g 1981, 
1993, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2013)? 
 
3. Direbbe che l’operazione quotidiania del partito è stata influenzata, in 
qualsiasi modo, da questi leggi vantaggiosi? 
- Se si, potrebbe spiegare più in che modo – e dove (nella quale parte) 
del partito? 
- Se si/no: Secondo Lei, questa influenza/il fatto che il partito non è 
stata influenzata, è stato diverso nel passato? (in altre parole: è così 
che leggi vantaggiosi hanno avuto un impatto più o meno significativo 
nel passato/prima) 
a) Se si, si ricorda quando? E perchè? 
 
4. Secondo Lei, esistono elementi nel quadro legislativo che sono vincolanti 
per il Suo partito? (criteri di accesso a risorse statali, regole di 
ripartizione, obbligazioni di trasparenza, uso di revisiori, limitazioni su 
erogazioni liberali ai partiti (sia sulla somma sia sugli enti che possono 
erogare), restrizioni di spesa, organi di controllo, sanzioni). 
- Se si, potrebbe spiegare quali leggi sono? 
 
5. Direbbe che la sua percezione di questi leggi vincolanti è cambiata 
tramite tempo? 
- Se si, riesce a ricordare perchè? 
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- Se si, riesce a ricordare quando (potrebbe essere legata ai 
cambiamenti che sono stati introdotti nel quadro legislativo, e.g 1981, 
1993, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2013)? 
 
6. Direbbe che l’operazione quotidiania del partito è stata influenzata, in 
qualsiasi modo, da questi leggi vincolanti? 
- Se si, potrebbe spiegare più in che modo – e dove (nella quale parte) 
del partito? 
- Se si/no: Secondo Lei, questa influenza/il fatto che il partito non è 
stata influenzata, è stato diverso nel passato? (in altre parole: è così 
che leggi vincolanti/limitanti hanno avuto un impatto più o meno 
significativo nel passato/prima) 
a) Se si, si ricorda quando? E perchè? 
 
7. Potrebbe indicare alle quali risorse statali il Suo partito al momento 
accede? 
- Rimborsi elettorali 
- Co-finanziamento 
- Accesso ai media 
- Sovvenzioni/contributi per i gruppi del parlamento/senato 
- Consegna gratuita (posta)/accesso a strutture/edicifi/locali  
- Agevolazioni fiscali (per il partito o per i vostri donatori) 
 
8. E nel passato: Il partito ha accesso le stesse risorse anche prima? 
- Se si/no: Potrebbe dire quando precisamente il partito ha accesso 
risorse? 
- E potrebbe indicare anche quali risorse? 
 
9. Secondo il Suo partito, è facile o difficile accedere alle risorse nominate 
sopra? 
- Era più facile/difficile nel passato accedere alle risorse statali? 
- Ci sono state risorse che secondo il Suo partito sono state più 
facili/più difficili ad accedere paragonato a altre? (Se si, quali risorse 
sono)? 
 
10. Potrebbe indicare se il Suo partito riceve erogazioni liberali (o da 
persone fisiche o da enti/aziende etc o tutti e due)? 
 
11. (Dipende delle risposte sopra) Mi potrebbe dire quali risorse statali/fonte 
di reddito sono considerati particolarmente importanti per il Suo partito 
adesso? 
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- Questa risorsa/queste risorse è/sono sempre stata/state importanti 
per il Suo partito? 
SECONDA PARTE: CARATTERISTICHE DEI PARTITI – ORA E PRIMA 
12. Vorrei sapere di più come il suo partito assume decisioni nei seguenti 
campi:  
- Selezione dei candidati elettorali 
- Selezione dei leader del partito 
- Stabilire e sviluppare il programma politico 
- Ripartire risorse  
 
13. Come descriverebbe il coinvolgimento dei membri/iscritti nei campi nominati 
sopra (al momento)? 
 
14: (Solo nel caso che manco informazione su staff): Il Suo partito ha al 
momento personale (cioè personale stipendiato). 
 
15.Come descriverebbe il coinvolgimento dello staff nei quattro campi nominati 
sopra? 
 
16. Secondo Lei, il partito ha cambiato il modo di assumere decisioni nei campi 
nominati sopra tramite tempo (tra la fondazione del partito e oggi)? 
 
 Se ci sono stati dei cambiamenti: In che modo è cambiato il meccanismo 
decisionale? 
- In che misura direbbe che il coinvolgimento dello staff è cambiato tra 
oggi e la Fondazione del Suo partito? 
- In che misura direbbe che il coinvolgimento dei membri/iscritti è 
cambiato tra oggi e la Fondazione del Suo partito? 
 
 Se ci sono stati dei cambiamenti: Mi potrebbe spiegare cosa è stata la causa 
di questi cambiamenti? 
A) Secondo Lei, il quadro legislativo potrebbe essere responsabile per 
cambiamenti di questo tipo (i.e. per cambiamenti nel meccanismo 
decisionale)? 
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TERZA PARTE: IL QUADRO LEGISLATIVO E L’IMPATTO AI PARTITI 
17. (Solo per partiti che hanno avuto accesso a risorse statali): Se riflette 
sull’occasione in cui il suo partito ha accesso risorse statali per la prima volta: In 
che misura, o nulla, ha questo accesso alle risorse contribuito a introdurre 
cambiamenti nel’organizzazione del Suo partito? 
 Staff 
 Meccanismo decisionale 
 Membri/iscritti 
 
18. Tramite tempo, pensa che il fatto che il partito ha avuto accesso/non 
accesso a risorse statali, ha contribuito a introdurre cambiamenti 
nell’organizzazione del suo partito? 
- Se si, quali cambiamenti? (staff, meccanismo decisionale, 
sopravvivenza) 
 
19. (Solo per partiti che hanno avuto accesso a risorse statali): Prima nella 
intervista (Q7 e Q8) ha raccontato che il suo partito, tramite tempo, ha avuto 
accesso continuato/non continuato a risorse statali. Secono Lei, questo 
continuato accesso/non continuato accesso a risorse statali ha avuto un impatto 
al suo partito? 
- Se si, in che modo? (staff, meccanismo decisionale, sopravvivenza) 
 
21. (Solo per partiti che hanno avuto accesso a risorse statali): Direbbe che il 
tipo di risorse statali che il partito accede, determina la natura di cambiamenti 
(se ci sono cambiamenti) che vengono introdotti nella organizzazione del 
partito?  
- In altre parole, è diverso avere accesso ai media, agevolazioni fiscali 
e/o rimborsi elettorali per gli eventuali cambiamenti che succedono? 
 
22. Generalmente, direbbe che avere accesso/non accesso alle risorse statali, 
è una cosa negativa o positive per il suo partito? 
- Positiva: In che modo? 
- Negativa: In che modo (vincolanti)? 
- La Sua percezione di questo è cambiata tramite tempo (era più 
negativo/positivo per il partito accedere/non accedere risorse statali 
prima?) 
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23. Secondo Lei, l’accesso alle risorse statali è importante per la sopravvivenza 
dei partiti politici in Italia oggi? 
- E prima/nel passato? 
- Se no, perchè no (puo essere perche i partiti sono ben legati alla 
societa civile per esempio)? 
 
QUARTA PARTE: DOMANDE FINALI 
24. Secondo Lei è più facile mantenere e tenere vivo un partito che accede 
risorse statali? 
- Perchè? 
 
25. Secondo Lei, I dirigenti hanno più potere nei partiti che hanno accesso 
risorse statali paragonato ai partiti che non hanno accesso risorse statali? 
- Perchè? 
 
26. Secondo Lei, un partito che accede risorse statali assume personale? 
- Perche? 
 
27. Secondo Lei, un partito che si trova in un ambiente nel quale il quadro 
legislativo spesso cambia, dà più potere ai suoi dirigenti paragonato a partiti 
che lavorano in un ambiente nel quale il quadro legislativo cambia raramente? 
- Perchè? 
 
28. Direbbe che è più facile per un partitio a sopravvivere se si trova in un 
ambiente nel quale la soglia per accedere risorse statali è bassa, e nel quale gli 
elementi vincolanti sono pochi? 
- Perchè?  
 
FINALE: 
Abbiamo raggiunto la fine. C’e qualcosa che desidera aggiungere? 
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Italian consent form: 
Titolo della ricerca: The influence of state funding on new minor party development and 
survival 
Informazione sul progetto  
Tale ricerca investiga se, e nel caso di sì, come le leggi statali sul finanziamento dei partiti 
politici influiscono caratteristiche interne di partiti nuovi e minori in Norvegia e Italia. In altre 
parole, il progetto cerca di analizzare se diversi leggi statali (per esempio sul finanziamento 
pubblico, su erogazioni liberali, sulla trasparenza) esercitano un’influenza al numero di 
personale dei partiti nuovi e minori, il finanziamento, il meccanismo decisionale e le 
prospettive di sopravvivenza. L’obiettivo é quello di capire meglio come lo stato, tramite 
vantaggi nella, e limiti della legge, influisce lo sviluppo interno dei partiti fondati dopo 1980 e 
che sono minori, cioé che non hanno mai vinto piú di 10 percento dei voti in elezioni per la 
Camera dei Deputati. Essendo la nostra conoscenza di questo tema molto limitata, interviste 
saranno indispensabili per l’analisi. Senza interviste, informazione dettagliata su cambiamenti 
interni nei organizazzioni sarebbe stato difficile a ottenere.  
Questo progetto é un dottorato finanziato dal European Research Council, e fa parte di un 
progetto quinquennale che si chiama Regulating Civil Society. Il progetto ha base all’Universitá 
di Exeter in Inghilterra, dura dal 2013 al 2018, e cerca di investigare la influenza della legge 
(coprendo sia vantaggi nella, sia limiti della legge) su organizzazioni volontari come ONLUS e 
partiti politici. La dottoranda non ha nessun interesse commerciale. 
Dettagli di contatto 
Per ulteriore informazione sul progetto, potrebbe contattare:  
Nome:  Torill Stavenes 
Indirizzo:  Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Office 502, Rennes 
Drive. Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK 
Telefono: 00 44 (0) 7492 242024  
Posta elettronica:  ts433@exeter.ac.uk  
Se Lei avrebbe domande o preoccupazioni sulla ricerca che desiderebbe discutere con un’altra 
rappresentante dell’universitá, potrebbe contattare profesoressa e relatrice Nicole Bolleyer, 
n.bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk. 
Confidenzialitá  
Interviste e transcrizioni di questi saranno tenuti in confidenzialita. Non verranno usati per 
altro che gli obiettivi descritti sopra, e terze parti non potranno accessarli (se non obbligatorio 
secondo la legge). Se Lei desidera, potrebbe avere una copia del testo transcritto della Sua 
intervista, cosí che puó dare ulteriori commenti (in questo caso, per favore fornisca la Sua 
posta elettronica sotto). Le sue dati verranno tenuti in conformitá alla cosiddetta “Data 
Protection Act”.  
Notizia sulla protezione delle dati 
La informazione che Lei fornisca sará usata soltanto per scopi di ricerca, e le sue dati personali 
saranno trattati in conformitá alla legge in vigore su protezione di dati e in conformitá alla 
notifica dall’Universitá di Exeter nel Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Le interviste e le 
transcrizioni saranno archivati in server nell’Universitá di Exeter per un periodo indefinito. I 
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suoi dati personali verranno trattati in confidenzialitá rigida, e non verranno rivelati a terzi non 
autorizzati. Il finanziamento di questo progetto viene dal European Research Council, ma il 
consiglio non ha nessun diritto di accedere né interviste né transcrizioni. La consegna della tesi 
é fissato per Ottobre 2018, ma risultati preliminari potranno essere pubblicati in varie 
conferenze/workshop e in riviste prima questa data. Esiste anche una possibilitá che la tesi 
verrá pubblicata come una monografia accademica.  
Anonimato 
Le dati dalle interviste saranno tenuti anonimati, senza riferimento al Suo nome, se altro non é 
stato concordato. In qualsiasi caso, la dottoranda fa riferimento al partito politico nel quale Lei 
lavora/ha lavorato. Le chiedo di indicare la scelta di anonimato che preferisce qui sotto: 
Nome completo e titolo   
Titolo solo (non nome) 
Anonimato completo 
Consenso 
Io sono informato sui scopi di questo progetto, e capisco che: 
 non é mandatorio participare in questa ricerca, e se decido di partecipare, posso nel 
qualsiasi momento ritirare il consenso 
 ho il diritto di rifutare che qualsiasi informazione su me venga pubblicato 
 qualsiasi informazione che do, sará usato soltanto per gli obiettivi di tale ricerca, che 
puó includere per esempio publiccazioni (ad.es. in riviste), conferenze o presentazioni 
seminari 
 se applicabile, la informazione che fornisco, potrebbe essere condiviso con altri 
ricercatori che partecipano in questo progetto (“Regulating Civil Society”) 
 tutta la informazione che fornisco sará trattato con confidenzialitá 
 se niente altro é concordato, la dottoranda si sforza di preservare il mio anonimato 
 
 
............................……………..……..   
 ............................……………..…….. 
(Firma di informatore)     (Data) 
 
…………………………………………………   …………………………………………..…… 
(Nome di informatore in lettere maiuscole) (Posta elettronica di informatore se 
desidera ricevere una copia della 
trascrizione della intervista) 
 
............................………………..    ............................……………….. 
(Firma di dottoranda)     (Nome di dottoranda in lettere 
maiuscole) 
Una copia di questa scheda sará tenuta del informatore, mentre una seconda copia sará tenuta 
dalla dottoranda. I  Suoi recapiti sono tenuti separatamenta dalle dati della intervista. 
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Norwegian interview guide: 
 
INTRODUKSJON TIL PARTIETS INDRE FORHOLD 
 
1. Når du tenkjer på heile livsløpet til partiet, frå det var stifta til i dag: Vil du 
sei at partiet har gjennomført interne, organisatoriske reformar? 
 Dersom ja: Kva slags reformar? 
 Dersom ja: Kva var årsaka til desse reformane? 
(tilgang til statsstøtte, skattefordelar eller registrering, td) 
 
2. I kva grad vil du sei at organisasjonen har endra seg over tid? 
a. Kor mange landsmøte har partiet hatt – og når? 
 
3. I kva grad fekk reformane konsekvensar for...? 
- Tilsette/årsverk 
- Medlemene si rolle i A) aktivitetar og B) I å fatta avgjerder 
 
4. Kan du sei litt om kva for aktivitetar medlemene i partiet er involvert i? 
 
5. Vil du sei at medlemene er involvert i aktivitetar på ein annan måte enn 
før? 
- Viss JA: Når skjedde det? 
- Kva var  årsaka til desse endringane? 
 
6. Dersom personalsituasjonen er uklar: Har partiet tilsette pr i dag? 
- I kva grad har personalsituatsjonen i partiet endra seg over tid (sidan 
partiet vart stifta til i dag?) 
- Kva oppgåver har tilsette jobba med? 
- Kven eller kva delar av organisasjonen vil du sei hadde mest nytte av 
dei tilsettte? (jobba dei tilsette mest med og for leiarar, medlemer 
etc?) 
- I dei periodane partiet var representert på Stortinget/på andre nivå: 
Medverka tilsette som jobba for partiet der til partiorganisasjonen? 
 
7. Kven vil du sei hadde ansvaret for den daglege drifta av partiet? 
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8. Så  er eg interessert i å vita meir om korleis partiet fattar avgjerder på 
ulike område. Kan du skildra korleis partiet... 
a) Nominerer og vel dei som skal stå på vallistene 
b) Nominerer og vel ny leiar 
c) Utviklar partiprogram (kven har ansvaret) 
d) Kven handterer pengestraumen/ressursane 
 
9. Korleis vil du skildra medlemene si mogelegheit til å delta I prosessane 
nemnd ovanfor? 
 
 
10. Kva med tilsette: Medverkar dei (formelt eller uformelt) i prosessane 
nemnde ovanfor? 
 
11. Vil du sei at måten partiet fattar avgjerder på har endra seg over tid? 
a) Nominerer og vel dei som skal stå på vallistene 
b) Nominerer og vel ny leiar 
c) Utviklar partiprogram (kven har ansvaret) 
d) Kven handterer pengestraumen/ressursane 
 
12. Har dei tilsette sin posisjon endra seg sidan partiet vart stifta? 
 
- Viss JA:  Når skjedde det? 
- Kva var  årsaka til desse endringane? 
 
13. Har medlemene si rolle i å fatta avgjerder endra seg over tid  
 
- Viss JA:  Når skjedde det? 
- Kva var  årsaka til desse endringane? 
 
INTRODUKSJON TIL DET JURIDISKE RAMMEVERKET  
14. Finst det statlege reguleringar/statlege ordningar nedfelt i lovverket som 
du opplever gagnar eller er fordelaktige for partiet (til dømes: statsstøtte-
reglar, gruppetilskot, skattefordelar)? 
a. Viss ja: Vil du sei at dei har hatt noko innverknad på den daglege 
drifta av partiet? Og i tilfelle ja – korleis? 
 
15. Vil du sei at oppfatninga di av desse fordelaktive reguleringane/statlege 
ordningane har endra seg over tid? 
a. Viss ja: Greier du å hugsa kvifor – og når? 
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16. Finst det statlege reguleringar/statlege ordningar nedfelt i lovverket som 
du opplever som begrensande for partiet? (til dømes: registrering, 
kriterium for å motta statsstøtte, fordelingsnøkkel av statsstøtte, krav om 
rapportera rekneskapsopplysningar, krav om bruk av revisor, 
restriksjonar på å motta gåver/donasjonar, kontrollorgan, sanksjonar) 
a. Viss ja: Vil du sei at dei har hatt noko innverknad på den daglege 
drifta av partiet? Og i tilfelle ja – korleis? 
 
17. Vil du sei at oppfatninga di av desse fordelaktive reguleringane/statlege 
ordningane har endra seg over tid? 
a. Viss ja: Greier du å hugsa kvifor – og når? 
 
 
INNTEKTER OG STATSSTØTTE 
18. Kva er dei viktigaste inntektskjeldene til partiet no? 
a. Kva med tidlegare? 
b. I kva grad får partiet pengegåver? 
 
19. (Til parti som har motteke direkte statsstøtte): Når du tenkjer tilbake 
på den FYRSTE gongen partiet fekk tilgang til direkte pengestøtte frå 
staten (statsstøtte). På kva måte påverka det partiet, vil du sei? 
 
20. I kva grad førte tilgang til statsstøtte til endringar i... 
a) Personale? 
b) Endringar i måten å fatta avgjerder på? 
c) Medlemene si involvering i a) aktivititar, b) avgjerdsprosedyrar 
 
21. (Til parti som har mista statsstøtte): Når du tenkjer tilbake på når 
partiet har mista statsstøtte. På kva måte påverka det partiet, vil du sei 
(td møtefrekvens, medlemsaktivitetar osv)? 
a) Personale? 
b) Endringar i måten å fatta avgjerder på? 
c) Medlemene si involvering i a) aktivititar, b) avgjerdsprosedyrar 
 
22. (Til parti som har hatt lengre periodar med stabil tilgang til 
statsstøtte) Korleis har det påverka partiet å ha lengre periodar med 
stabil tilgang til statsstøtte? 
a) Personale? 
b) Endringar i måten å fatta avgjerder på? 
c) Medlemene si involvering i a) aktivititar, b) avgjerdsprosedyrar 
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23. Meiner du at det å ha tilgang/ikkje tilgang til statlegge ressursar som 
statsstøtte og skattefordelar er positivt eller negativt for partiet? 
- Positivt: På kva måte (nøkkelord: overleving, personale, medlemer) 
- Negativt: På kva måte (meir begrensningar, restriksjonar) 
- Har ditt syn på korvidt tilgang til statsstøtte og skattefordelar er 
positivt/negativt endra seg over tid? 
 
24. På generelt grunnlag: Meiner du at tilgang til statlege ressursar er viktig 
for at parti skal overleva? 
- Viss ja: På kva måte? 
- Viss ikkje: Kvifor ikkje? 
 
SISTE SPØRSMÅL 
25. Vil du sei at det er lettare å oppretthalda og halda i live eit parti som har 
statsstøtte?  
a. Kvifor? 
 
26. Vil du sei at leiarar har meir makt i parti som har statsstøtte samanlikna 
med parti som ikkje har statsstøtte? 
a. Kvifor? 
 
27. Vil du sei at parti som får tilgang til statsstøtte tilset personale? 
a. Kvifor? 
 
28. Vil du sei at eit parti som opererer i ein kontekst der det juridiske 
rammeverket ofte endrar seg gjev meir makt til leiarane sine, samanlikna 
med parti som opererer i ein kontekst der det juridiske rammeverket 
endrar seg sjeldan? 
a. Kvifor? 
 
29. Vil du sei at det er lettare for eit parti å overleva i ein kontekt der grensa 
for å få tilgang til statsstøtte er låg, og der ufordelaktige reguleringar er 
få? 
a. Kvifor? 
 
AVSLUTNING 
Er det noko du ynskjer å leggja til som me ikkje har snakka om endå? 
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Norwegian consent form: 
Samtykkeskjema 
Prosjekttittel 
The influence of state funding on new minor party development and survival  
Informasjon om prosjektet  
Dette prosjektet undersøkjer den mogelege innverknaden av lover og reguleringar på interne 
forhold i og overlevingsraten av nye småparti I Noreg og Italia. Prosjektet er med andre ord 
interessert i å finna ut om fordelar (td. statsstøtte) og avgrensingar (td. krav om rapportering) i 
lovverket fører til endringar i talet på tilsette, medlemene si rolle og avgjerdsprosedyrar i nye 
småparti, og ser på om slike statlege reguleringar innverkar på slike parti sine 
overlevingsutsikter. Ingen tidlegare studiar har undersøkt innverknaden av lover og 
reguleringar på dei mest sårbare politiske partia i eit partisystem. Intervjua vil bli brukt for å 
belysa problemstillingane skildra ovanfor. Utan intervju er slike opplysningar om interne 
partiorganisatoriske forhold vanskeleg å få informasjon om. 
Denne studien er eit doktorgradsprosjekt finansiert av Det europeiske forskingsrådet 
(European Research Council). Prosjektet er også ein del av eit større, femårig forskingsprosjekt 
(2013-2018) med base ved Universitetet i Exeter i Storbritannia, Regulating Civil Society. Det 
overordna prosjektet ser på korleis lover og reguleringar påverkar frivillige organisasjonar som 
interessegrupper og politiske parti. Stipendiaten som er ansvarleg for dette prosjektet har 
ingen kommersielle interesser.  
Kontaktinformasjon 
For ytterlegare informasjon om prosjektet, kontakt gjerne: 
Namn: Torill Stavenes 
Adresse: Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Office 502, Rennes 
Drive. Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK 
Telefon: 0047 97001356 
Epost: ts433@exeter.ac.uk 
Dersom du har spørsmål om prosjektet som du ynskjer å diskutera med andre ved 
Universitetet i Exeter, kan du kontakta professor og rettleiar Nicole Bolleyer, 
n.bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk. 
Konfidensielle opplysningar 
Intervjuopptak og transkriberte versjonar av desse blir handsama konfidensielt. Dei vil ikkje bli 
brukt til anna føremål enn det som er skildra ovanfor, og tredjepersonar vil ikkje få tilgang til 
materialet (så lenge dette ikkje er lovpålagt). Viss du ynskjer, kan du få ein kopi av det 
transkriberte intervjuet slik at du kan gje kommentarar på det (ver snill å oppgje epost under 
dersom du ynskjer dette). Data om deg vil bli oppbevart i samsvar med den såkalla Data 
Protection Act.  
Informasjon om oppbevaring av data  
Den informasjonen du gjev i dette intervjuet vil kun bli brukt til forskingsføremål. Alle 
personlege data vil bli handsama i samsvar med gjeldande regelverk om datahandsaming og i 
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tråd med Universitetet i Exeter sine avtalar med det britiske datatilsynet (Information 
Commissioner’s Office).  Alle intervjuopptak og transkriberte versjonar av desse vil bli 
oppbevart på serverar ved Universitetet i Exeter på ubestemt tid. Dine personlege data vil bli 
handsama på strengt konfidensielt vis. Som nemnd ovanfor, finansierer Det europeiske 
forskingsrådet (European Research Council) dette prosjektet, men rådet har ingen rett til å få 
tilgang til intervjumaterialet. Planlagt disputas er i løpet av hausten 2018, sjølv om førebelse 
resultat frå studien er planlagt å bli presentert og publisert før det. Det er også ein liten sjanse 
for at doktorgraden kan bli publisert i bokform.  
Anonymitet 
Dersom ikkje anna er avtalt, vil intervjudata bli oppbevart i anonymisert form, utan at namnet 
ditt blir nemnd. Me vil likevel referera til det politiske partiet du arbeider/arbeidde for. Ver 
snill å kryss av for ynskt grad av anonymitet i prosjektet i ei av rutene under.  
 
Bruk av fullt namn og tittel (noverande eller tidlegare) 
Bruk av noverande/tidlegare tittel i partiet (td. «leiar») 
Full anonymitet 
 
Opptak 
Ver snill å kryss av for om du tillet opptak (kun lyd) av intervjuet eller ikkje. 
 
Eg tillet at stipendiaten gjer opptak av dette intervjuet:  
Eg tillet ikkje at stipendiaten gjer opptak av dette intervjuet:  
 
Samtykke  
Eg har fullt ut blitt informert om føremåla ved dette prosjektet. Eg forstår at: 
 det ikkje er obligatorisk å delta i dette forskingsprosjektet, og dersom eg ynskjer å 
delta, kan eg likevel trekkja meg til ei kvar tid 
 eg har rett til å nekta at informasjon om meg blir publisert 
 den informasjonen eg gjev kun vil bli brukt til dette forskingsprosjektet, som kan 
innebera publikasjonar eller akademiske konferansar/andre seminarpresentasjonar 
 informasjon som eg gjev kan delast med andre forskarar som deltek i prosjektet (i 
anonymisert form, og kun dersom det er relevant) 
 all informasjon eg gjev blir handsama konfidensielt 
 dersom ikkje anna er avtalt, vil forskaren søkja å ivareta min anonymitet 
 
 
............................……………..……..   ............................……………..……..  
(Signatur av deltakar)     (Dato) 
…………………………………………………   …………………………………………..…… 
(Namn på deltakar i blokkbokstavar) (Epost-adressa til deltakaren, dersom 
denne har bede om å sjå ein 
transkribert versjon av intervjuet)  
……………………………….    
(Signatur av stipendiat)     
Deltakaren og forskaren skal ha kvar sin kopi av dette dokumentet. Kontaktinformasjonen din 
er oppbevart separat frå intervjudataene dine. 
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Appendix F: Composition of executive councils in Norwegian and Italian new minor parties 
over time 
 
Table 1: Analysis of changes to composition of executive council (centralisation) in new minor parties in Norway  
Party/Year Formation 
year 
Composition of executive in first 
statutes (that I have accessed) 
Changes to the executive made in later versions of 
statutes 
The Pensioner 
Party  
1985 1985:  
 
Art. 2: The main party organisation is to 
consist of an executive council of 5 
people (…). 
 
Art. 4: The executive (hovedstyret): The 
executive consists of the party leader, 
first and second deputy leader, and two 
members. In addition, the parliamentary 
party group’s leader and the leader of the 
party’s group in government are 
members.   
 
Art. 6: The congress elects the executive. 
1986: The executive was extended with one board member. Two of 
the board members were to be the treasurer and the party secretary. 
 
1992: The executive was extended with two (regular) member. The 
right of the parliamentary party group’s leader and the leader of the 
party’s group in government to be part of the executive was 
abolished.  
 
1994:No change 
1996:No change 
2004:No change 
 
2008: (first reform after state funding access)1: The executive was 
extended with the leader of the parliamentary party group and the 
leader of the youth organisation.  
 
2010: The leader of the parliamentary party group and the leader of 
the youth organisation were no longer to be part of the executive 
(i.e. reversing the 2008 reform).  
 
2016: The ‘study’ leader was to be included in the executive, so was 
the secretary (take the places of the two neutral board members 
from before).   
The Greens 1988 1990:  
 
Art 7: The Congress elects a Political 
committee (a smaller executive council) 
of 5 people, which has the daily 
responsibility for the external activities of 
1993: The council was to allocate the following positions internally 
after being elected: leader, deputy leader, secretary, treasurer, 
international contact (Art. 11.2 and 11.3).  
 
1997: No change, except that two of the members of the executive 
were to be appointed spokespersons (Art. 11.3). 
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the party, including being the editor of the 
party newspaper (Grønn kontakt).  
 
 
2000: The executive could now have either five or seven members.2 
 
2004: No change 
2007: No change 
2009: No change 
 
2012 (first reform after state funding access): The executive 
committee was to comprise two spokespersons (one of each 
gender), the party secretary, the international contact, 6 other 
members elected by the congress and one of the spokespersons 
for the youth organisation (…) (Art 9.1). 
 
Parliamentarians were automatically part of the executive, without 
voting rights, unless they were also (already) members of the 
executive (Art. 9.5). 
 
2014: Only the leader of the parliamentary party group (and not all 
parliamentarians) had meeting (but not voting rights) in the 
executive. 
 
2016: No change.  
The 
Fatherland’s 
Party 
1990 1990: 
 
Art 2a: The congress elects the 
executive.  
 
Art. 2c: The executive council runs the 
party on a daily basis. It should comprise 
the leader, deputy leader, treasurer, and 
as many board members that are 
deemed appropriate.  
1993: No change 
 
2002: No statutes, but description of executive on webpage in 2002 
indicates no change 
 
2005: Same as above.  
The Coastal 
Party  
1999 2001:  
 
Art. 12: The members of the executive 
council are: The executive council 
members elected by the congress, and 
the party’s parliamentary party leader.  
 
Art. 7.10: The national congress is to 
elect the members of the executive 
council (Hovedstyret): a). The party 
2004: The executive council was extended with a party secretary. 
The full parliamentary party group (and not just its leader) became 
full members of the executive (Art. 7.9) 
 
2007: (first reform after state funding access): The executive was 
extended to include the treasurer (Art. 7.10) 
 
2008: No change.  
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leader, b) the first deputy leader, c) the 
second deputy leader, d) four board 
members and 4 deputy members. 
 
 
2012: The treasurer was removed from the executive (Art. 7.12). 
Side organisations (one representative from each organisation) 
were granted representation in the executive for the first time (Art. 
12). 
 
2014: No change.  
The Christian 
Conservative 
Party 
2011 2013:  
 
Art. 6: The executive council comprises 
the leader and two deputy leaders 
elected by congress. 4-6 members 
elected by congress. Leader of the youth 
org (from 2014 onwards), and leader of 
the parliamentary party group are also 
members.  
 
The party secretary meets in the 
executive with the right to speak and 
suggest proposals, but without voting 
rights. The representative for the 
employees have full rights in all matters, 
apart from political issues where he/she 
only has the right to propose and speak. 
2017: No change.  
Notes: There are no statutes for the Cross Partisan MPs or Future for Finnmark, which explains why these parties are omitted from the table.  
1 The party did introduce internal transfers of subnational state funds in 1991, but the party struggled greatly on collecting such funds on national level 
initially (Annual account, 1991), which is why state funding’s role in the 1992 process has not been selected as the first reform process following state 
funding here.  
2 This has not been perceived as a shift here, as it was not a definite change from 5 to 7 members (only a possibility).  
Sources: The Greens: statutes 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2016. The Pensioner Party statutes: 1985, 1986, 1992, 
1994, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2016. The Coastal Party: statutes 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014. The Fatherland Party: Statutes: 1990, 1993. The 
Christian Conservative Party: Statutes 2013, 2017. 
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Table 2: Analysis of changes to composition of executive council (centralisation) in new minor parties in Italy 
Party/Year Formation 
year 
Composition of executive in first 
statutes (that I have accesed) 
Changes to the executive made in later versions 
The Greens  1986 Foundation document (atto costitutivo) 
 
Art 4: To be part of the first Coordination 
group, the following people have been 
elected unanimously and by acclamation: 
(list of 11 people). 
1990: The Coordinating group was (still) composed of 11 
members, elected at the federal assembly. Two representatives 
from the parliamentary party group were invited to take part, 
without voting rights (Art. 15).1 
 
1993 (first reform following state funding access): The Federal 
Council (comprising 60 members elected by regional assemblies, 
the spokesperson, and MPs and senators that participated without 
voting rights) was to elect internally a president, a vice-president, a 
treasurer, a person responsible for information in the party. These, 
along with the spokesperson constituted the federal coordination 
group of the greens (i.e. executive) (Art. 12). 
 
1996: No change.  
 
1998: The Federal Council was now only to elect internally a 
president, a vice-president, and a treasurer. Simultaneously, a so-
called Political office was introduced (which was now to be the 
executive organ of the party), composed of the spokesperson, the 
treasurer, 10 members elected by the national assembly, the 
president and vice-president of the federal council, the leader of 
the Senate group, of the parliamentary party group, and the leader 
of the delegation in the European Parliament. The latter three did 
not have a right to vote (Art. 12 BIS). 
 
2001: The executive was now composed of the president, and 
seven elected representatives. The presidents of the parliamentary 
party groups in Parliament/Senate and a representative from the 
European Parliament, and a representative from government 
participated without voting rights (Art. 13). 
 
2006: No change 
2010: No change 
 
2012: The executive was now composed of two spokespersons (not 
just the president) (Art. 13) 
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2015: The executive was extended from 7 regular members to 12 
(excluding spokespersons and elected representatives) (Art. 13).  
The Pensioner 
Party 
1987 2002 (no executive, only larger, national 
executive):  
 
Art. 2.1. (Chapter 4): The national council 
is made up of the regional federation 
secretaries and by the chairmen of the 
associations federated to the party, who 
automatically are part of the council. In 
addition, and up to 20 other councillors 
(…). 
 
 
Not accessed other versions of the statutes.  
The Communist 
Refoundation 
Party 
1991 1999:  
 
Art 39: The executive (direzione 
nazionale) is composed of a number 
given by the National Political Committee, 
that is no larger than 60. The secretary, 
the treasurer, the presidents of the 
parliamentary party groups, the president 
of the internal audit group are part of the 
executive by right. 
 
2002 (first reform following state funding access)2: The maximum 
number of representatives in the executive was decreased to 39. 
The secretary, the treasurer, the president of the parliamentary 
party groups, the president of the internal audit group still had ex-
officio seats (Art. 39).  
 
2005: The number of representatives was now decided by the 
National Political Committee (the national executive council). Only 
the secretary was now part of the organ by right (Art. 39). 
 
2008: No change. 
2011: No change 
2013: No change 
Tricolour Flame  1995 1999:  
 
Art. 39: The executive (direzione 
nazionale) is composed of between 30 
and 40 members elected by the Central 
Committee on the basis of a proposal 
from the national secretary. The regional 
coordinators participate with full rights.  
 
 
2002: (first reform following state funding access): The executive 
council was removed from the statutes (i.e. abolished).  
 
2006: The executive was re-introduced, now with 18 members 
elected by the Central Committee (national executive). The 
national secretary participated with full rights, so did the members 
of the national secretariat, the president of the Central Committee 
and the president of the Central Commission of Discipline (Art. 33).  
 
2010: The executive was once again removed from statutes. 
 
2013: No change 
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The Communist 
Party of 
Workers 
2006 2008:  
 
Art. 10.3: The national leadership is 
composed of 15 members, elected by the 
Political Committee on the basis of the 
norms given in the statutes.  
 
2011: The 15 members were now elected by the congress, 
otherwise no change (Art. 9.3).  
 
2014 (first reform following staffing): The executive was now to 
compose between 7 and 9 members, elected by the Central 
Committee (i.e. the national executive). They were to hold specific 
responsibilities (e.g. of the treasury) (Art. 10).  
Act to Stop the 
Decline 
2012 2012: 
 
Art. 8.1: The executive is composed of up 
to 21 individuals, nominated by absolute 
majority by the national council among its 
members (…).  
 
Art. 8.2: Among the members of the 
executive, a treasurer is identified. One or 
more vice-presidents may also be 
appointed.  
2013: The executive was to comprise 25 people, comprising the 
national coordinator, and 24 members elected by the national 
assembly (Art. 24.1) 
 
2014: No change. 
Notes: There are no statutes from the Segni Pact, which is why this party is omitted from the table. 
1 Given that these were not granted voting rights, this has not been treated as a (centralising) reform process.  
2 There is indication that the 1999 statutes also reformed the composition of the executive council (Bertolino, 2004). In line with the approach adopted 
here, I have selected the first reform (that I have been able to identify with my primary sources) as the first reform following state funding access. The 
Communist Refoundation Party’s office did not manage to find statutes prior to 1999, which has made it impossible to trace development prior to 1999. 
Sources: The Green Party: statutes from 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2010, 2012, 2015. The Communist Refoundation Party: statutes from 
1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013. Tricolour Flame: statutes from 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017. The Pensioner Party: statutes from 2002. Act 
to Stop the Decline: statutes from 2012, 2013, 2014. The Communist Party of Workers: statutes from 2008, 2011, 2014. 
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Appendix G: Ballot access criteria, Norway and Italy  
 
Table 1: Ballot access criteria, Norway (national and regional level) 
Introduction 
year (of 
legislation) 
Description of ballot access criteria Source 
1985  Art. 25: The electoral list has to be submitted by the 31st of March in election year. The list has to clearly indicate 
for which election it is submitted, and have a title that indicates the party/group. For registered parties, the title 
has to be the (registered) party name. The number of candidates is equal to the number of candidates to be 
elected from the relevant constituency (and 6 more candidate can be added to this). In regional elections the 
additional number of candidates amounts to 10 in regions where the regional council has at least 41 
representations, and 20 additional candidates in regions that have at least 71 regional councillors.  
 
Art. 25 (continued): For non-registered parties (in regional and national elections), the electoral list must be 
signed by at least 500 people eligible to vote in that constituency (region).  If a party is registered according to 
§17 in the Electoral Act (for which 5,000 signatures from eligible voters are required), the electoral list (in 
national and regional elections) has to be signed by the leader and secretary of the regional branch, and in local 
elections the leader and secretary for that local branch (if they are eligible to vote there). A candidate can only 
run for one party.  
 
 
‘Valgloven’ (Law 
1985-03-01.3). 
[The Electoral 
Act] 
2002  Art. 6 (mostly similar to the regulation outlined above, changes are noted here): The number of candidates on 
regional electoral lists has to comprise at least seven candidates, and not more than the number of 
representatives that are to be elected to the regional council – plus six candidates.   
 
Art. 6 (continued): For non-registered parties (in regional and national elections), and for registered parties that 
in the previous parliamentary elections either received less than 5,000 votes overall (in the whole country), or 
less than 500 votes in each constituency in which it fielded candidate, the electoral list must be signed by at 
least 500 people eligible to vote in that constituency (region). For registered parties that either received 500 
votes in a region or 5,000 votes in the country in the previous national elections, the electoral list only has to be 
signed by two board members in the relevant branch. The signatories must be eligible to vote in the 
constituency. 
 
 
‘Valgloven’ (Law 
2002-06-28-57). 
[The Electoral 
Act]. 177 
                                                          
177 Can be accessed here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2002-06-28-57#KAPITTEL_6  
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Table 2: Ballot access requirements. Chamber of Deputies elections. Italy 
Introduction 
year (of 
legislation) 
Description of ballot access criteria Source 
1957 Art. 14: A logo has to be presented for parties that intend to present a list of candidates. Logos that are similar 
to other parties’ logos will not be accepted. 
 
Art. 15: The logo has to be presented not before 8 am of the 68th day, and no later than 4pm of the 62nd day 
before election day. It must have been verified by a notary, and presented by either the president or secretary 
of the party or political group.  
 
Art. 17: The parties also have to, when they register the logo, indicate a person in each constituency who will 
be charged with right to submit the electoral list in that constituency. A declaration, approved by a notary, 
must outline who this person is. 
 
Art. 18: The list of candidates for each constituency has to be presented by at least 500 and no more than 
1,000 voters that are eligible voters in the relevant constituency. Each candidacy has to be followed by a 
declaration, signed and authenticated by a mayor or a notary, stating that the candidate has accepted the 
candidacy. The electoral list cannot have less than three candidates, and not more than the total number of 
candidates that are to be elected from that constituency.  
 
L361/1957.   
 
1993 and 
1994   
L277/1993: 
Art. 14 (small change to Art. 14 from 1957 law): A logo has to be presented for parties that intend to present a 
list of candidates, or candidates for the uninominal constituencies. 
 
Art. 2 (eliminates Art. 18 from the 1957 law): The presentation of candidates in the uninominal constituencies 
is made as individual candidates align themselves to (proportional) lists (according to art 1, comma 4, which 
states that in each constituency, 25 percent of the total number of seats are allocated proportionally (…)). A 
candidate’s alignment to a list must be followed by a written letter by the representative (in line with art 17 in 
the 1957 law, see above) charged with the right to deposit the list to which the individual candidate is aligned. 
A candidate can just present him/herself in one electoral college.  
 
Art. 18: The declarations that present a candidate in the uninominal colleges have to be signed by no less 
than 500 and no more than 1,000 voters who are eligible to vote in the municipalities within the relevant 
uninominal college. The candidacy has to be accepted by (the candidate him/herself), documented through a 
signed declaration, authorised by a mayor or a notary.  
 
Art. 18-bis (new): The presentation of lists for the distribution of seats within the proportional component has 
to be signed by at least 1,500 and no more than 2,000 voters in the relevant constituency, in constituencies 
L277/1993  
L73/1994  
L162/1994 
392 
 
with up to 500,000 inhabitants. The numbers are 2,500-3,000 voters in constituencies with between 500,000 
and 1,000,000 inhabitants, and between 4,000 and 4,500 in constituencies with more than 1,000,000 
inhabitants. 
 
Art. 18-bis (continued): The lists have to contain a number of candidates that is not superior to a third of the 
seats assigned to that constituency (in the proportional quota of the election). 
 
L73/1994 and L162/1994: 
Art. 1: In cases where the parliament is dissolved more than 120 days before the anticipated time, the number 
of required signatures to collect is halved [of what is outlined in the 1993 law text].  
2005  Art. 14: Changed back to how it was in 1957 law (see above). 
 
Art. 14-bis (new): Parties or groups of parties that intend to align themselves in a coalition must present a 
declaration where they outline that they wish to do so when the logo is registered. Upon registration of the 
logo, parties or groups of parties also submit their electoral program. Coalitions present one single program, 
and they also have to give the name of the leader of the coalition.  
 
Art. 18-bis (changed): The presentation of lists for the distribution of seats with the proportional method has to 
be signed by at least 1,500 and no more than 2,000 voters in the relevant constituency, in constituencies with 
up to 500,000 inhabitants. The numbers are 2,500-3,000 voters in constituencies with between 500,000 and 
1,000,000 inhabitants, and between 4,000 and 4,500 in constituencies with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. 
If the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved more than 120 days ahead of schedule, the number of signatures to 
be collected is halved. The signatures must be verified. Parties that are part of a parliamentary group in both 
chambers of parliament (Senate and the Chamber of Deputies) may register candidate lists without collecting 
supporting signatures from voters. The same is true for parties running in coalitions with two or more 
parliamentary parties and that have at least one elected member of the European Parliament elected under 
the same logo (with which it is now competing in the Chamber of Deputies elections). 
 
Art. 18-bis (continued): Each list, when presented, is composed of a list of candidacies that contains no less 
than a third, and no more than the number of seats assigned to that constituency.  
OSCE. “Italy 
Parliamentary 
elections 9 and 10 
April 2006”.178 
 
L270/2005.  
2008 Rules from 2005 still applied. However, the 2008 elections were snap elections, and the number of signatures 
required for ballot access were thus halved. Furthermore, an extraordinary law passed in 2008 extended the 
category of the parties and political groups eligible for the exemption of collecting signatures, to all parties 
which had two deputies in the dissolved Parliament or two deputies in the European parliament.   
OSCE. “Italy 
Parliamentary 
elections 13 and 14 
April 2008”.179 
 
L24/2008 
L30/2008  
                                                          
178 https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/italy/19405?download=true Accessed 19.06.2018 
179 https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/italy/33280?download=true Accessed 19.06.2018 
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2013 
 
 
Rules from 2005 still applied. But, due to the early dissolution of parliament, and a new law introduced (see 
sources) the number of required signatures was reduced to a quarter of the regular numbers (not halved, like 
the 2005 law stated).   
L223/2012 
L232/2012 
 
Camera dei 
deputati:  “Manuale 
elettorale 2013”180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
180 http://leg16.camera.it/temiap/temi16/Manuale4febbraio2013_WEB.pdf Accessed 16.08.2018. 
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Table 3: Ballot access requirements. Regional elections. Italy.  
Introduction 
year (of 
legislation) 
Description of ballot access criteria Source 
1968  Art. 9: The list of candidates in each constituency (so-called provincial lists) have to be presented between 9 
am on the 30th day before the election day and noon on the 29th day prior to election day.  
 
Art. 9 (continued): The lists have to be presented by at least 750 and no more than 1,100 people eligible to 
vote (i.e. signatures)  in constituencies that have a up to 100,000 inhabitants. The numbers are 1,000 to 
1,500 signatures in constituencies that have between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants, 1,750 to 2,500 
signatures in constituencies that have between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants, and between 2,000 and 
no more than 3,000 signatures in constituencies with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. The signatures must 
be verified.  
 
Art. 9 (continued): Each electoral list has to comprise a number of candidates not exceeding the number of 
regional councillors that are to be elected from the constituency, and no less than a third of this number.  
 
Art. 9 (continued): Along with the electoral list, specific declarations to confirm that those who signed the 
electoral list really are eligible to vote must be presented. These declarations are issued by the mayor in the 
municipalities in which the signatories live. Furthermore, each candidacy must be followed by a document 
stating the candidate’s approval, which has to be signed by a mayor or a notary. Also, a declaration stating 
that the candidates are eligible voters in any municipality in Italy must follow. 
L 108/1968 
1995  The turn towards a majoritarian system meant that from 1995 and onwards 4/5 of the regional councillors 
were elected based on competing provincial lists, and 1/5 based on a majoritarian model on the basis of 
competing regional lists. The rules below refer to the regional list (while the rules regarding the provincial 
lists are the ones outlined in L108/1968, referred to above, and which were still in force). 
 
Art. 1: The declaration of the presentation of each regional list has to take place within the time frame 
outlined in L108/1968. The list has be accompanied by a declaration, which states that the list is linked to 
provincial lists presented in no less than half of the provinces in the relevant region. This declaration is only 
valid if also the provincial lists declare the same (i.e. provincial lists have to declare to which regional list they 
are linked). The regional list has to be signed by between 1,000 and no more than 1,500 people eligible to 
vote in municipalities in regions with up to 500,000 inhabitants. The numbers are between 1,750 and 2,500 
in regions with between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants, between 3,500 and 5,000 in regions with more 
than 1,000,000 inhabitants. The signature requirement is halved if the regional council is dissolved more 
than 120 days ahead of schedule.  
 
L43/1995 
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Art. 1 (continued): Each regional list comprises a number of candidates that counts no less than half of the 
candidates that are to be elected. The regional and provincial electoral lists cannot comprise more than 2/3 
of one gender. 
1999 In 1999 ordinary, statutory regions (Regioni a statuto ordinario) were given the constitutional right to adopt 
their own regional electoral laws. However, no region did so ahead of the 2000 regional elections, and the 
1968 and 1995 laws thus applied in the 2000 regional election.  
Regione Campania: 
“Le elezioni regionali 
sotto il nuovo titolo 
V”181 
 
Fiumicelli, 2009.182 
2005 The laws regulating the presentation of provincial lists (see L108/1968 above), and regional lists (see 
L43/1995) above) still applied, unless the regions had themselves introduced their own electoral laws. An 
overview of the ballot access criteria in the different regions (that had introduced their own regional laws) 
follows: 
 
5 regions introduced an electoral law in time for the 2005 regional elections: 
 
Toscana (LR 25/2004): Art. 8: Provincial lists: Each provincial lists is marked with a logo, and attached to a 
candidate for the president for the regional government (‘giunta’). The provincial lists are formed of one or 
two regional candidates (if two, one of each gender has to be present, Art. 10), and by constituency 
candidates (listed after the regional candidates). The number of candidates depends on the number of 
inhabitants in the province. The lists have to have gender parity (no more than 2/3 of one gender on the list).  
 
Art 10: A candidacy can only be presented in a maximum of three constituencies. Regional candidates can 
also present themselves as constituency candidates (in a total of two constituencies).  Candidates for the 
president of the regional government cannot be presented as regional and/or constituency candidates.  
 
Art. 11: The logo of each group of lists has to be presented. A declaration from each list which outlines its 
alignment to a candidate for the president of the regional government must also be submitted. A signature 
requirement applies for the presentation of provincial lists: Between 750 and 1,000 signatures (from eligible 
voters) are required in constituencies with up to 200,000 inhabitants. Between 1,000 and not more than 
1,500 signatures from voters in constituencies with between 200,000 and 500,000 inhabitants. Between 
1,750 and not more than 2,500 signatures from voters in constituencies with between 500,000 and 
1,000,000 inhabitants. Between 2,000 and not more than 3,000 signatures from voters in constituencies with 
more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. The signatures have to be authenticated, and no person can sign more 
than one list.  
 
Regione Campania: 
“Le elezioni regionali 
sotto il nuovo titolo 
V”183 
 
Fiumicelli, 2009.184 
 
LR 25/2004 
(Toscana) 
 
LR 27/2005 (Le 
Marche) 
 
LR 1/2005 (Calabria) 
 
LR 2/2005 (Puglia) 
 
LR 2/2005 (Lazio) 
                                                          
181 Accessed 25.08.2018: http://www.sito.regione.campania.it/Elezioni/Normativa/dossiersenatoelezregionali.pdf  
182 Accessed 25.08.2018: https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/mobile-saggi/fascicoli/fasc-3-2009/325-davide-fiumicelli/file  
183 Accessed 25.08.2018: http://www.sito.regione.campania.it/Elezioni/Normativa/dossiersenatoelezregionali.pdf  
184 Accessed 25.08.2018: https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/mobile-saggi/fascicoli/fasc-3-2009/325-davide-fiumicelli/file  
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Art 11 (continued): Each list has to be followed by a declaration from each candidate, declaring that they 
accept the candidacy.  
 
Le Marche: Had a new law (LR 27/2005), but it did not apply to the 2005 elections, so the national law 
applied.  
 
Calabria: (LR 1/2005): Art. 1: Electoral lists that are expressions of parties represented in the Italian 
parliament are exempted from the signature requirements (see the signature requirement in the national 
law).  
 
Art. 1 (continued): The electoral lists have to comprise both male and female candidates.  
 
Puglia: (LR 2/2005): Art. 8: Electoral lists that are expressions of parties constituted in a parliamentary party 
group (in either the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies) or a council group in the outgoing regional council 
are exempted from the signature requirement (see the signature requirement in the national law).  
 
Lazio: (LR 2/2005): Art. 8: Electoral lists that are expressions of parties or movements that are represented 
in a regional council group or in parliamentary party groups (in either one of the national chambers), are 
exempted from the national signature requirements. Also, parties whose electoral lists are marked with the 
same logo as a party exempted from the signature requirement, are exempted. No signature requirement 
exists for the presentation of candidacies for President of the Region.  
 
Art. 8 (continued): Each constituency list is composed of a number of candidates depending on the specific 
constituency (in the metropolitan constituency of Rome the lists were for example to be composed of 
between 22 and 32 candidates).  
 
Abruzzo (LR 9/2005): In each provincial and regional list, neither of the genders could be represented with 
more than 70 percent of the candidates.   
2010 The rules outlined before, still applied. But, as more regions had adopted their own regional laws, the ballot 
access criteria changed in some regions:  
 
Calabria: (In addition to LR 1/2005, which still applied, LR 4/2010 was introduced): Art. 1: In addition to the 
exemptions from the signature requirements in LR 1/2005, also provincial electoral lists that are expressions 
of at least one regional council group, or one of the components according to art. 27 of the region’s statutes, 
are exempted. In any case, regional lists that are linked to provincial lists are exempted from the signature 
requirement.  
 
Art. 3:  The provincial lists must comprise a minimum of 2/3 up to a maximum of the number of seats that the 
constituency is entitled to.  
Camera dei deputati: 
“Documentazione e 
ricerche. Le elezioni 
regionali del 28 e 29 
marzo 2010».185 
 
LR 4/2010 (Calabria) 
 
LR 4/2009 
(Campania) 
 
                                                          
185 http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/dossier/Testi/Re0127.htm#_ftn38 Accessed 16.08.2018.  
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Campania (LR 4/2009): Art. 3: The presentation of provincial lists must be accompanied by a declaration 
stating the lists’ alignment with a candidate for the candidacy of President of the regional government. The 
provincial lists, as long as they also comply with other regulations, and are presented under the same 
symbol in at least 3 constituencies, are accepted.  
 
Art. 3 (continued): Those lists that are expressions of parties represented in the Italian parliament or in 
groups in the regional council are not subject to signature requirements.  
 
Art. 10: Each provincial list cannot have more than 2/3 of candidates of one gender.  
 
Lazio: No change after 2005. 
 
Le Marche: (LR 27/2004, for the first time applied in this election): Art. 9: Each provincial list is formed by a 
number of candidates that does not exceed the number of regional councillors that are to be elected from 
that constituency, and no less than 1/3 of this number. Each provincial list is aligned with a candidate for the 
presidency of the regional government. No provincial list can have a representation of one gender amounting 
to more than 2/3 of all the candidacies on the list.  
 
Art. 10: The lists of candidates (provincial lists) must be presented between 8 am on the 30th day before the 
election and noon on the 29th day before the election. The signature requirements are: For provincial lists in 
constituencies with up to 250,000 inhabitants, a list must be signed by at least 350 and no more than 700 
voters, and in constituencies with more than 250,000 inhabitants, the number is between 500 and 1,000 
signatures. The signatures have to be authenticated. No voter can sign more than one electoral list. A 
candidacy can only be presented in one constituency (province).  
 
Art. 10 (continued): To the list of candidates, a certificate from mayors regarding the signatories must be 
attached (stating that those who signed the list are really eligible to vote), and a declaration from each 
candidate on the list accepting the candidacy. A declaration stating that the candidate is an eligible voter 
must also follow. The declaration of the presentation of the list has to include a statement outlining to which 
candidate for the president of the regional government the list is attached.  
 
Piemonte (LR 21/2009): Art. 1: Those lists that are expressions of parties that had at least one candidate 
elected in the last elections to either the national parliament, the European parliament, or the regional 
council, are exempted from the signature requirement. The same goes for lists that are expressions of 
parties/movements present in council groups in the outgoing regional council when the election campaign 
starts, and for lists that are linked to council groups when the electoral campaign starts.  
 
Puglia: No change after 2005. 
 
LR 27/2005 (Le 
Marche) 
 
LR 21/2009 
(Piemonte) 
 
LR 74/2004 and LR 
50/2009 (Toscana) 
 
LR 2/2010 (Umbria)  
 
LR 3/2010, and LR 
19/2010 (Basilicata)  
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Toscana (LR 74/2004 and LR 50/2009): The 2005 act was still valid, for instance concerning signature 
requirement (see above), but some additions:  
 
LR 74/2004: 
Art. 3: The electoral lists (provincial) are to be presented between 8 am on the 30th day prior to the election 
and noon on the 29th day before the election.  
 
Art. 3 (continued): The following documents are necessary to present a list: Certificate from mayors stating 
that the signatories are indeed eligible to vote in the relevant province, declaration from each candidate that 
she/he accepts the candidacy, and a certificate attesting that the candidate is eligible to vote in one (any) 
municipality in Italy. Each list has a logo and is linked to a candidate to the presidency of the regional 
government. Each list is composed of one or more regional candidates, having a maximum of 5 regional 
candidates (both genders must be represented), and constituency candidates. The total number of the latter 
type of candidates is determined proportionally based on the population (according to the last census). The 
number of candidates cannot be less than 1/3 of this. No provincial list can have more than 2/3 of its 
candidates of the same gender.  
 
LR 50/2009:  
Art. 2: The provincial lists are formed of one or two regional candidates (same as LR 25/2004 stated), but no 
more than five (new in 2009). 
 
Umbria (LR 2/2010): Art. 6: For provincial lists, the signature requirement is as follows: Between 750 and 
1,100 in provinces with up to 100,000 inhabitants, between 1,200 and 1,500 in provinces having between 
100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants, between 2,000 and 2,500 in provinces with between 500,000 and 
1,000,000 inhabitants, and between 2,400 and 3,000 in provinces with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants.  
 
Art. 6 (continued): Lists that are expressions of parties or movements constituted in a regional council group 
(except for the mixed group) or in the national parliament (either one of the chambers), are exempted from 
signature collection. The same is the case for parties, movements and political groups that are represented 
in the regional council and that are linked with at least one party or political group that is present in both the 
chambers of the national parliament 
 
Abruzzo: No change. 
 
Basilicata (LR 3/2010, and LR 19/2010): No change to ballot access requirements (national law applied).  
2015 Veneto (LR 5/2012): Art. 13: Each provincial list is linked to a logo and to a candidate for the president of the 
regional government. The provincial lists are composed of a number of candidates that is not superior to the 
number of regional councillors to elect from the constituency, and no less than a third of this. Provincial lists 
that have an even number of candidates, has to have complete gender parity among its candidacies. If the 
number of candidates is an odd number, one gender cannot have more than one representative more than 
the other gender. 
Ministero 
dell’Interno: “Elezioni 
regionali e 
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Art. 14: The lists of candidates have to be presented between 8am on the 30th day prior to the election and 
noon on the 29th day prior to the election. The lists are presented by at least 750 and not more than 1,100 
voters in constituencies with up to 100,000 inhabitants, by at least 1,000 and no more than 1,500 voters in 
constituencies with more than 100,000 inhabitants and up to 500,000 inhabitants, by at least 1,750 and no 
more than 2,500 voters in constituencies with more than 500,000 inhabitants and up to 1,000,000 
inhabitants, and finally by at least 2,000 and no more than 3,000 voters in constituencies with more than 
1,000,000 inhabitants.  
 
Art. 14 (continued): Electoral lists that are expressions of regional council groups or of components that are 
represented in the mixed group (in the regional council) are exempted from the signature requirement. The 
same is the case for lists of candidates that have a declaration of alignment to regional groups or political 
components in the mixed group, and that were present in the regional council at least one year prior to the 
electoral campaign. No voter can sign more than one electoral list. A candidate can present his/her 
candidacy in all constituencies, as long as it is under the same logo.   
 
Art. 14 (continued): The following documents must follow the electoral list: Declarations from mayors stating 
that those who have signed the electoral list are indeed voters in a municipality in the constituency. The 
declaration of acceptance of the candidacy from each candidate. The confirmation that each candidate is an 
eligible voter in any municipality in Italy. The list also has to have a declaration stating to which candidate for 
the president of the regional government the list is attached.  
 
Puglia (LR 7/2015): Art. 6 (replaces Art. 8 from the 2005-act): The presentation of lists has to be 
accompanied by a declaration of alignment to one of the candidates for the president to the regional 
government. If the electoral lists comply with the law and are presented in at least three constituencies, they 
are approved. Electoral lists must be presented between 8am on the 30th day before the election and noon 
on the 29th day before the election.  
 
Art. 6 (continued): Signature requirement:  Between 750 and 1,100 voters in constituencies with up to 
100,000 inhabitants. Between 1,000 and 1,500 voters in constituencies with between 100,000 and 500,000 
inhabitants. Between 1,750 and 2,500 voters in constituencies with between 500,000 and 1,000,000 
inhabitants. Between 2,000 and no more than 3,000 voters in constituencies with more than 1,000,000 
inhabitants. Those lists that are expressions of parties and movements that are represented in council 
groups in the outgoing regional council, or that are constituted in parliamentary party groups in the national 
legislature (in one or both of the chambers), or that are initiated by a regional councillor that is in office in the 
outgoing regional legislature, are exempted from the signature requirement.  
 
Art. 6 (continued): No voter can sign more than one electoral list. Each electoral list has to comprise a 
number of candidates that counts no less than the number of seats assigned to that constituency, and no 
amminstrative, 31. 
maggio 2015».186 
 
LR 5/2012 (Veneto)  
 
LR 7/2015 (Puglia)  
 
LR 41/2014 (Liguria) 
 
LR 51/2014 
(Toscana) 
 
LR 4/2015 (Umbria) 
 
LR 5/2015 (Le 
Marche) 
                                                          
186 http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/dossier_2015_portale.pdf Accessed 25.08.2018 
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more than the number that one gets by dividing the number of inhabitants by 50. Neither one of the genders 
can be represented with more than 60 percent of the candidates in an electoral list.  
 
Art. 6 (continued): With the electoral list, the following documents must be attached: Declarations from 
mayors stating that those voters who have signed the electoral lists are indeed registered voters in one of 
the municipalities in the relevant constituency. A declaration of acceptance of the candidacy from each 
candidate. Certificate that the candidates are registered voters in any municipality in Italy.  
 
Campania: No change (see above).  
 
Liguria (LR 41/2014): Art. 13:  Provincial lists are to be supported by signatures. The signature requirement 
is: Between 500 and no more than 1,000 signatures from voters in constituencies with up to 300,000 
inhabitants, and at least 1,000 and no more than 1,500 voters in constituencies with more than 300,000 
inhabitants. Between 1,500 and 2,500 signatures are required for regional lists. The signature requirement is 
halved in the case of early elections of the regional council. Those lists that are expressions of parties or 
movements that are already represented in the regional council or in the Italian parliament are exempted 
from the signature requirement. 
 
Toscana (LR 51/2014 – replaced LR 25/2004): Art. 8: Each list has a symbol and has to be aligned with a 
candidate for the president of the regional government. On the provincial lists, no more than three regional 
candidates can appear. The number of candidacies is determined based on the number of inhabitants. 
Electoral (constituency) lists under a specific logo are accepted only if they are presented (under the same 
symbol) in at least nine constituencies.  
 
Art. 10: A candidacy can maximum be presented in three constituencies. Regional candidates can only 
present themselves in a total of two constituencies.  
 
Art. 11: Each list has to present a symbol and a declaration stating to which candidate to the regional 
government the list is aligned. The signature requirements are as follows: Between 525 and 500 voters in 
constituencies with up to 200,000 inhabitants. Between 700 and no more than 1,050 voters in constituencies 
with more than 200,000 inhabitants and up to 500,000 inhabitants. Between 1,225 and no more than 1,750 
voters in constituencies with more than 500,000 inhabitants. For constituency lists that are expressions of 
regional council groups, provided that they were constituted at least six months prior to the election 
campaign, (even if the list is with another symbol or name than that of the group) only have to collect 10 
signatures from eligible voters. Those regional council groups constituted six months or less prior to the 
election, only have to collect half the required signatures. The signatures have to be authenticated. No voter 
can sign more than one electoral list. The presentation of each list is followed by a declaration of acceptance 
by the candidates, and (if present) the regional candidates (these declarations must be authenticated).    
 
Umbria (LR 4/2015): Art. 9 (replaces art. 6 in LR 2/2010): The lists of candidates are presented between 8 
am on the 30th day prior to the election and noon on the 29th day prior to the election. No gender can be 
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represented with more than 60 percent of the candidates on a list. The lists are signed by a minimum of 500 
and a maximum of 1,000 voters in the region. If the regional assembly is terminated early (with more than 
120 days), the number of minimum and maximum signatures that must be collected are halved. No voter can 
sign more than one electoral list. Each list has to comprise a number of candidates not superior to the seats 
assigned to the constituency, and no less than 1/5 of this number.  
 
Art. 9 (continued): The electoral list has to be followed by a declaration stating that the voters who have 
signed the electoral lists are indeed voters in the specific region (the declaration has to stem from mayors). 
Additionally, a declaration from each of the candidates stating that they have accepted the candidacies, and 
a declaration that each candidate is an eligible voter in any municipality in Italy, must follow the list. 
Furthermore, the declaration of alignment of each list to a candidate for the presidency of the regional 
government (the candidate for president has to release the same declaration) must also be attached.  
 
Le Marche (LR 5/2015) (changes to the law in 2010): 
Art. 6: No gender can be represented with less than 1/3 of the candidates on a provincial list. 
Art. 7: Changes to the signature requirement. The new signature requirements were: For provincial lists in 
constituencies with up to 250,000 inhabitants, a list must be signed by at least 245 and no more than 490 
voters, and in constituencies with more than 250,000 inhabitants, the number is between 350 and 700 
signatures. The signatures have to be authenticated. No voter can sign more than one electoral list. A 
candidacy can only be presented ion one constituency (province).  
 
Notes: LR stands for ‘legge regionale’ (regional law).  
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Table 4: Ballot access requirements. European elections. Italy.  
Introduction 
year (of 
legislation) 
Description of ballot access criteria Source 
1979 Art. 11: The logo has to be presented not before 8am on the 49th day prior to the election and no later than 
4pm on the 48th day prior to the election.  
 
Art. 12: The lists of candidates have to be presented, for each constituency, from 8am on the 40th day prior 
to the election to 8pm on the 39th day prior to the election. The lists have to be signed by no less than 
30,000 voters and no more than 35,000 voters. At least 10 percent of the signatures must come from voters 
in each and every region in the constituency. Those parties or groups of parties that are represented in 
parliament (in the sitting legislature), in either one of the two chambers when the electoral campaign starts, 
or that in the last election presented candidacies under an own logo and won at least one seat in one of the 
two chambers, are exempted from the signature requirement. The exemption finally applies to parties or 
group of parties that in the last election presented candidacies under its own logo and won at least one seat 
in the European parliament.  
 
Art. 12 (continued): A candidate cannot be part of two competing lists. Each candidate has to declare that 
he/she has accepted the candidacy, and has to declare if he/she is running in other constituencies. Each 
electoral list has to comprise a number of candidates no less than three, and not more than the number of 
members to elect from that constituency.  
L18/1979 
(with updates in 
L61/1984) 
1990 Addition to the existing law:  
 
Art. 12 (further exemption from the signature requirement): If a party presents a joint list with a party that is 
exempted from the signature requirement, the other party is also exempted. 
 
Art. 14: The signatures for the electoral lists have to be approved by a notary (or similar official). Signatures 
can only be collected in the 180 days prior to the final date set for the presentation of candidacies.  
L53/1990 
2004 Addition to the existing law: 
Art. 4 (further exemption from the signature requirement): No signature is required for parties or political 
groups that in the previous election to the Chamber of Deputies presented a list (in the proportional part of 
the election), and that were aligned to a candidate that was elected in a uninominal electoral college. 
L90/2004 
2014 
 
Addition to the existing law (Art. 12). 
 
Art. 1: On the electoral list, candidates of the same gender cannot exceed half of the candidacies. The two 
first candidates have to be of different genders.  
 
 
L65/2014  
 
See also: Camera 
dei deputati. 
“Manuale elettorale. 
Le norme per le 
elezioni dei membri 
403 
 
del Parlamento 
Europe spettanti 
all’Italia».187 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
187 http://www.camera.it/temiap/temi17/Manuale%20elezioni%20europee%202014_29%20aprile%202014.pdf Accessed 19.06.2018. 
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